PREDATORY POLITICS AND STRUGGLES OF PEACEMAKING IN SOMALIA

by

Roba D. Sharamo
A Dissertation
Submitted to the
Graduate Faculty
of
George Mason University
in Partial Fulfillment of
The Requirements for the Degree
of
Doctor of Philosophy
Conflict Analysis and Resolution

Committee:

Chair of Committee

Graduate Program Director

Date: July 16, 2012

Summer Semester 2012
George Mason University
Fairfax, VA
Predatory Politics and Struggles of Peacemaking in Somalia

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy at George Mason University

by

Roba D Sharamo
Masters of Arts
Brandeis University, 2002
Bachelor of Environmental Studies
Kenyatta University, 1998

Director: Andrea Bartoli, Professor
School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution

Summer Semester 2012
George Mason University
Fairfax, VA
This work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noderivs 3.0 unported license.
DEDICATION

This is dedicated to my beloved wife, Tunne. I extend a special tribute to sweet memories of my dad, Duba Sharamo and mum, Darare Duba for instilling in me a deep sense of commitment, discipline and desire for western education.

This is also dedicated to the late Professor Wallace Warfield, a member of my Committee who unfortunately is not with us today.

Finally, in a special way, I also dedicate this work to the thousands of victims and survivors of the excruciating civil war in Somalia.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

There are so many things that I am grateful for in the finalizing of this dissertation. First, I would like to thank the Almighty God for according me good health, strength, determination and the capability to accomplish this project. Second, I would like to thank my dear wife, brothers, sisters, in-laws and their families for their support, understanding and prayers. Third, a special gratitude to my Dissertation Committee: chair, Professor Terrence Lyons, and members Professor Thomas Flores and Professor Hazel McFerson for their intellectual and professional guidance and support to make this happen. Their intellectual push unleashed the best in me. Fourth, I would like to thank Mrs. Wendolyn Clarke for her support and editing assistance and colleagues at George Mason University’s Sally Evans and staff of the Department of Information Technology for their invaluable formatting help. Fifth, I would like to thank my Somali friends, notably: Mohamed Yarrow, Khadija Ali, Hussein Halane and many others for facilitating and sharing their experiences and critical contacts – which contributed significantly to the success of the field work. Equally, gratitude goes to the various respondents for agreeing to share their experiences in the arduous search for peace in Somalia. Finally, many thanks to the leadership of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kenya, the Institute for Security Studies and the United Nations Development Programme (Kenya) for their support and facilitation during the period of research and writing of this dissertation.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>List of Tables</td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Figures</td>
<td>viii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Abbreviations</td>
<td>ix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>xii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 1 Introduction to the Study</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1 Background to the Study</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 Dynamics between the Political Economy of Conflict and Peace Processes</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2.1 Problem Statement</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2.2 Operationalization of Key Concepts and Terms</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3 An Overview of the Research Methodology</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3.1 Description of the Selected Case Study</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3.2 Research Methods</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3.3 Conclusion</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 2 Political Economy of Civil Wars and Peace Processes</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1 Theoretical Framework: Understanding the Political Economy of Civil Wars</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1.1 Theories of Rebellion: Revisiting the Greed and Grievance Debates</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2 Transformative Capacities of News Wars</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3 Shadow states and Institutionalization of War Economies</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4 Understanding Wartime Rebel Institutions</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5 Civil War Peacemaking: Role of Negotiations in Civil War Termination</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5.1 Conditions Favoring Successful Peace Negotiations: Ripeness Theory Revisited</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5.2 Barriers to the Negotiation Process</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.6 Conclusion: Establishing the Gap in the Literature</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 3 Dynamics of State Collapse and Experiences of Early Peace Negotiations in Somalia</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1 The Path to Collapse and Overview of the Conflict</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2 Overview of the Early Interventions</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Contents

**Chapter 3: The Turbulent Search for Peace**

3.3 The Turbulent Search for Peace ................................................................. 114

3.4 The genesis, dynamics and promise of the Arta peace process .......................... 120

3.4.1 Troubles and Challenges of the Arta Peace Process .................................. 133

3.4.2 The imminent collapse of the TNG and the search of a successor regime ............ 150

3.5 Genesis and the Promise of the Mbagathi Peace Process ................................. 156

3.5.1 Structure, Phases and Outcomes ............................................................... 162

3.6 Conclusion ...................................................................................................... 179

**Chapter 4: Predatory Politics and Struggles of Peacemaking in Somalia**

4.1 Structure and Anatomy of Somalia’s Predatory War Economies .......................... 181

4.1.1 Characteristics and Typology of Somali Wartime Actors ............................... 182

4.1.2 Institutionalization of Predation and Wartime Actors’ Economic Agendas .......... 187

4.1.3 Regional Administrative Structures and Resource Endowments .................... 194

4.1.4 Rings of Predation in Somalia: Sources of Revenue ..................................... 203

4.1.5 Beyond the Veil of Clan Labels: Social Logic of Predation ........................... 266

4.2 Conclusion ...................................................................................................... 280

**Chapter 5: Impact on the Mbagathi Peace Process**

5.1 The Trappings of Rewarding Predations and Entrenched Economic Agendas .......... 284

5.2 Domination by the Lords of War over Civilian Institutions ............................... 294

5.3 Strong Parties not Necessarily a Panacea to Peace .......................................... 300

5.4 Violence as a Strategy for Predation and Spoiling Peace .................................. 302

5.5 Conclusion ...................................................................................................... 308

**Chapter 6: Summary and Discussions**

6.1 Re-statement of the Problem and Methodology ............................................... 310

6.2 Major Findings and Summary of the Results .................................................. 312

6.3 Discussions of the Results .............................................................................. 317

6.3.1 Relationship to Previous Research and Studies ........................................... 319

6.3.2 Theoretical Implications of the Study ......................................................... 325

6.4 Implications for Practice .................................................................................. 350

**Appendices** ..................................................................................................... 360

**References** ....................................................................................................... 381
# LIST OF TABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Table 1: Key characteristics of the Somali conflict</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 2: Spectrum of total state collapse</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 3: List of factional leaders who signed the Eldoret Declaration</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 4: Gross revenue from charcoal exports through ports</td>
<td>238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 5: Foreign companies in Somalia</td>
<td>252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 6: List of Somalia's main armed factions, territories, clan and militia numbers</td>
<td>265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 7: Models of predation</td>
<td>326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 8: Grand matrix of predation</td>
<td>361</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## LIST OF FIGURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Figure 1: Triangle of predation web</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 2: Distinctive features of war economies</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 3: Early Somalia's armed factions</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 4: Strategic pillar of peacebuilding and impact on ripeness</td>
<td>352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 5: Map of Somalia</td>
<td>360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academy for Peace and Development</td>
<td>APD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa Confidential</td>
<td>AC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Union Mission in Somalia</td>
<td>AMISOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Union</td>
<td>AU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Itihaad Al Islamiya</td>
<td>AIAI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance for Re-Liberation of Somalia</td>
<td>ARS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance for Restoration of Peace and Counter Terrorism</td>
<td>APRCT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arizona</td>
<td>AZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bay Center for Conflict Prevention</td>
<td>BCCP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>CA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambridge University Press</td>
<td>CUP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Center for Economic Policy Research</td>
<td>CEPR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Center for Research and Development</td>
<td>CRD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Center for Strategic International Studies</td>
<td>CSIS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
<td>CIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Society Organizations</td>
<td>CSOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colorado</td>
<td>CO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common Market for East and Southern Africa</td>
<td>COMESA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connecticut</td>
<td>CT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Correlates of War</td>
<td>COW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
<td>DRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit</td>
<td>GTZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development Alternatives Incorporated</td>
<td>DAI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization and Re-integration</td>
<td>DDR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Council</td>
<td>DC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District of Columbia</td>
<td>DC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti Peace Initiative</td>
<td>DPI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group of Eight</td>
<td>G8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group of Thirteen</td>
<td>G13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawiye Somali Consultative Council</td>
<td>HSCC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hiraan Political Alliance</td>
<td>HPA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Rights Watch</td>
<td>HRW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGAD Facilitation Committee on Somalia</td>
<td>IFCS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGAD Partners Forum</td>
<td>IPF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGAD Technical Committee on Somalia</td>
<td>ITCS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Indian Ocean Newsletter................................................................. ION
Integrated Regional Information Networks ...................................... IRIN
Inter-Governmental Authority on Development ................................ IGAD
Internally Displaced Persons.......................................................... IDPs
International Crisis Group............................................................ ICG
Islamic Courts Union ................................................................. ICU
Juba Valley Alliance ....................................................................... JVA
Kenya Broadcasting Corporation ................................................. KBC
League of Arab States .................................................................... LAS
Life and Peace Institute ................................................................. LPI
London School of Economics ........................................................ MLA
Marehan Ogaden Durbante ............................................................. MOD
Marine Research Assessment Group ............................................. MRAG
Maryland ....................................................................................... MD
Massachusetts ............................................................................... MA
Member(s) of Parliament ............................................................... MP(s)
Michigan ........................................................................................ MI
Middle East News Agency .............................................................. MENA
Minnesota ...................................................................................... MN
National Commission for Reconciliation and Property Settlement .... NCRPS
National Patriotic Liberation Front ................................................ NPLF
New Jersey ..................................................................................... NJ
New York ........................................................................................ NY
Organization for Social Science Research in Eastern and Southern Africa .... OSSREA
Organization of African Unity ........................................................ OAU
Organization of Islamic Conference ............................................. OIC
Oromo Liberation Front ............................................................... OLF
Pan-African News Agency .............................................................. PANA
Physicians for Human Rights ......................................................... PHR
Portuguese Frente de Libertação de Moçambique ............................ FRELIMO
Prime Minister ............................................................................. PM
Puntland Development Research Center ........................................ PDRC
Rahanweyn Resistance Army ....................................................... RRA
Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana ............................................. RENAMO
Revolutionary United Front ......................................................... RUF
Somali Democratic Alliance ......................................................... SDA
Somali Democratic Movement ..................................................... SDM
Somali National Alliance .............................................................. SNA
Somali National Democratic Union ............................................. SNDU
Somali National Movement ........................................................ SNM
Somali National Organizing Council ........................................... SNOC
Somali National Peace Conference .............................................. SNPC
Somali National Reconciliation Conference ................................ SNRC
Somali National Salvation Council .............................................. SNSC
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phrase</th>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Somali National Union</td>
<td>SNU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somali Patriotic Front</td>
<td>SPF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somali Patriotic Movement</td>
<td>SPM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somali Peace Alliance</td>
<td>SPA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somali Reconciliation and Reconstruction Council-Nakuru</td>
<td>SRRC-Nakuru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council</td>
<td>SRRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somali Salvation Democratic Front</td>
<td>SSDF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Somali National Movement</td>
<td>SSNM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Somali National Movement-BIREM</td>
<td>SSNM-BIREM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Representative of the Secretary-General</td>
<td>SRSG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supreme Revolutionary Council</td>
<td>SRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transitional Federal Charter</td>
<td>TFC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transitional Federal Government</td>
<td>TFG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transitional Federal Institutions</td>
<td>TFIs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transitional Federal Parliament</td>
<td>TFP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transitional Government of National Unity</td>
<td>TGNU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transitional National Assembly</td>
<td>TNA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transitional National Charter</td>
<td>TNC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transitional National Council</td>
<td>TNC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transitional National Government</td>
<td>TNG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unified Task Force</td>
<td>UNITAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union of Soviets Socialist Republic</td>
<td>USSR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
<td>UAE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
<td>UNHCR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Monitoring Group</td>
<td>UNMG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime</td>
<td>UNODC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Operations in Somalia</td>
<td>UNOSOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Political Office for Somalia</td>
<td>UNPOS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Secretary-General</td>
<td>UNSG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
<td>UNSC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations</td>
<td>UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Somali Party</td>
<td>USP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States Institute of Peace</td>
<td>USIP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>US</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of California Los Angeles</td>
<td>UCLA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virginia</td>
<td>VA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War-torn Societies Project</td>
<td>WSP</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ABSTRACT

PREDATORY POLITICS AND STRUGGLES OF PEACEMAKING IN SOMALIA

Roba D Sharamo, Ph.D.

George Mason University, 2012

Dissertation Director: Dr. Andrea Bartoli

The nature and characteristics of certain conflicts and their impact on peace processes makes the study of civil war peacemaking a critical one. This dissertation posits that there is an intricate link between the characteristics of certain types of conflicts and the experiences of key peace processes. Understanding that some civil conflicts are harder to settle than others, this dissertation uses a case study of Somalia’s Mbagathi (2002-2004) peace process to examine the links and dynamics between a high degree of economic predation, pervasive war economies and wartime actors’ dominant economic agendas and struggles of peace talks. Principally, it is argued that peace processes in cases of civil wars characterized by high degrees of economic predation, pervasive war economies and wartime actors’ dominant economic agendas make negotiations difficult because such characteristics undermine conflict ripeness.

This dissertation utilizes a qualitative case study research design. The data was collected through a comprehensive review of secondary data and through 15 months of fieldwork.
in the Horn of Africa region and in the United States (US). The field research methods included face-to-face and email interviews and focus group discussions in the Horn of Africa region and with Somali diaspora residents in the US. A purposive sampling method and snowballing techniques were used to identify knowledgeable respondents. The data was thematically analyzed through a thick description and careful process tracing of the Somali conflict, its economic and social logic, and the consequent challenges to peace settlement.

This dissertation contributes to the theory and practice of civil war peace negotiations and peacebuilding in many ways. Importantly, it generates a theory that even in a resource poor conflict environment which lacks high-value resources, a form of predation and wartime organizations may be generated that rely upon social structures such as clans that in turn make peace settlement difficult. The study’s findings suggest that the difficulty of peace settlement in Somalia was due to a high degree of economic predation and pervasive war economies perpetuated by wartime actors’ dominant economic agendas over political agendas, giving rise to a new model of predation which is mutually reinforced by both economic and social logics grounded in transformed social structures of clan politics, thereby hindering conflict ripeness. The findings further suggest that such interactive dynamics results in a triangular predation web that made inter-party and intra-party negotiations and bargaining harder and more difficult in the management of the key peace processes in Somalia.
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

This dissertation focuses on how the political economy of predation, war economies and wartime actors’ economic agendas dominate political agendas, thereby influencing peacemaking processes. The subject of civil war peacemaking is complicated, with significant implications for the success or failure of a particular peace processes. From Liberia to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Afghanistan to Somalia, El Salvador to Sierra Leone, the search for sustained peace under prolonged civil war situations has presented complex challenges for the international community. Hence, this dissertation intends to critically advance an understanding of peacemaking under civil war situations where predation relies on both an economic and social logic and where wartime actors manipulate and use clans to pursue their economic agendas. This is crucial for enhancing our understanding of why some civil conflicts are harder to settle than others.

Civil war situations differ in types, intensity and motivations of the insurgent groups waging wars. Often, insurgent groups wage wars to pursue specific political, ideological, economic, social or other identity-related goals. The literature on civil wars has identified a wide variety of possible explanations for their motivations and the related challenges for conflict resolution. When the state has collapsed to the extent it did in Somalia, in addition to dispersal of authority, critical economic, political and social
structures were greatly weakened leading to institutionalization of new structures. Consequently, parties to the conflict are often dominated and influenced by competing wartime actors whose predatory economic agendas tend to override political goals. Such domination leads not only to the institutionalization of pervasive predatory war economies but also entrenches wartime actors’ economic agendas as they compete for the control of the resources of the state. In certain cases, notably Somalia, a high degree of economic predation, pervasive war economies and wartime actors’ dominant economic agendas were critical variables that influenced the dynamics of the Mbagathi negotiation process.

Therefore, using a case study of Somalia’s Mbagathi (2002-2004) peace talks, this dissertation seeks to understand how a high degree of economic predation, pervasive war economies and wartime actors’ dominant economic agendas over political agendas influenced and shaped the negotiation processes. It is argued that the aforementioned conditions significantly contributed to the struggles of peacemaking in Somalia by making negotiations and bargaining much harder and more protracted and difficult to conclude.

The dissertation is organized into six chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the dissertation, presents background to the study, makes a key problem statement and provides an overview of the research methodology. Chapter 2 situates the study in the existing theoretical and empirical literature of the political economy of civil war by reviewing the theories of rebellions focusing on greed and grievance debates, new wars and war economies in shadow states, organization of insurgent institutions and strategies
of resource mobilization, the nexus between natural resources and rebellions, and revisiting civil war peacemaking by focusing on the ripeness theory and factors and barriers to successful negotiation. Finally, the chapter identifies the gap in the literature that this study seeks to address. Chapter 3 examines the nature of the conflict and the dynamics of state collapse in Somalia, revisits the Arta peace talks and its outcome and documents the story of the Mbagathi peace process. Chapter 4, focusing on the Mbagathi peace process, analyzes the political economy of the Somali conflict by examining how a high degree of economic predation, associated pervasive war economies and dominance of wartime actors’ economic agendas over political agendas contributed to the peacemaking struggles in Somalia. The nature of the war economies, the types and tactics and economic agendas and sources of revenue for the wartime actors will all be analyzed and mapped in order to understand how peace settlement was made so difficult in Somalia. Chapter 5 recaps the key findings of the study focusing specifically on how the identified variables influenced and contributed to the difficulties of peace settlement during the Mbagathi process. Chapter 6 provides a summary of the dissertation, discusses the major findings, lessons learned and meanings of the study. Finally, the chapter advances a framework for civil war peacemaking by exploring how an effective peace negotiation could be designed to overcome struggles of peacemaking under the aforementioned civil war situations. The chapter also suggests areas for further research.
1.1 Background to the Study

The world over, the 1960s and 1990s were considered peak eras of devastating civil wars with some leading to state failure. These devastating civil wars not only triggered dispersal of central authority but also claimed and displaced millions of people, with economic costs of war running into billions of dollars. Observing the possible origins of such civil wars, Reno (2000) pointed out that:

Some internal warfare, and the rise of so-called warlords and other armed factions, develop out of a particular Cold War-era relationship between private power, commerce, and state institutions in weak states. It is this dynamic that shapes and guides the pursuit of interests and that enhances the salience of economic interests in this equation.

Importantly, the end of the Cold War resulted in diminished external assistance to clientist regimes and insurgent movements in Africa. Hence, various dictatorial regimes sought creative avenues of resource mobilization to finance wars including resorting to officially sanctioned predatory governance styles, misappropriation of donor aid, reliance on external diaspora ties and diverse patrons’ support and assistance. Moreover, as Duffield (2001) argued, globalization and weak state systems enabled such dictatorial regime leaders, host of war profiteers and rebel leadership to establish lucrative business

---


ties with transnational criminal networks, arms dealers and other external business actors – effectively linking local and global markets.³

Whereas the nexus between economic factors and warfare in the world is well appreciated, it is only recently that economic dimensions of civil wars began receiving reinvigorated scholarly studies and policy focus. From the mid-1990s, a rich academic and policy literature has emerged offering critical insights into the complex political economy of armed internal conflicts and civil wars.⁴ The self-financing nature of these violent civil wars fueled the increased research in this new domain.⁵ Importantly, Ballentine and Nitzschke (2008) have noted with concern the limited understanding of “…how the legacies of war economies create distinct challenges to conflict settlement and peacebuilding” and caution that “if inadequately understood or left unattended, the legacies of war economies may undermine sustainable peace and recovery.”⁶ Such scholarly and policy gaps in knowledge and practice of peacemaking inspired the undertaking of this study. Grounded in the political economy of civil war approach, this

⁵ See Ballentine and Sherman, *Political Economy of Armed Conflict*.
study focuses on the troubled nation of Somalia (post-1991), which not only experienced a total collapse of central government but also experienced devastating civil wars. In Somalia, the 22-year dictatorial rule by General Mohamed Siad Barre from 1969 to early 1991 ignited the formation of violent clan-based armed factions such as the Somali National Movement (SNM) and the United Somali Congress (USC), which eventually engulfed and led to the disintegration of the nation in late January 1991. By November 1991, about 30,000 people had been killed, thousands displaced and the capital city totally destroyed. Cumulatively, the subsequent vicious civil wars, coupled with the 1991-1992 famine killed approximately 250,000 people, generated over 1.6 million refugees and 320,000-350,000 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) throughout the country.

In the post-Black Hawk Down period, following the failure of the 1992-1995 US-led United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) I and UNOSOM II humanitarian interventions, Somalia ceased to exist as a nation state—but hobbled along as a collection of patched-together warlord fiefdoms. Clan-based factional fighting further fractionalized the country along clan lines and clan-based warlord governance set in—dividing the country into three major zones: the breakaway Somaliland in the northwest, Puntland in the northeast and the central and southern zones of Mogadishu and Kismayu. For the previous two decades, poverty, lack of basic infrastructure, international isolation, widespread violence, warlordism and pervasive predatory war economies painfully

---

8 Ibid.
marked the lives of the majority of the Somalis. Moreover, as Menkhaus et al (2005) observed, the country’s per capita income remained a miserable US$226; life expectancy sank to 47 years; infant mortality rose sharply to 240 per 1000 births; and primary education enrollments sank to and malnutrition levels rose to 17%. The enduring hope for many Somalis was the diaspora remittances of about $500 million to $1 billion annually, which became a major driver of the Somali wartime economy and formed the basis of survival for many families.  

Two decades later, the country still remains in a critical violent condition without a functional central government. Overall, the country’s conflict history is characterized by the lack of a functional state authority succeeded by social structural transformation including internal fragmentation and dispersal of authority; pervasive clan politics; extensive contestation for legitimacy, recognition and power; a high degree of economic predation and pervasive war economies; and resilient and dominant wartime actors’ economic agendas over political stakes of reconciliation. Over twenty peace processes have been initiated but no sustainable peace settlement has been realized. Despite this paralysis, as Menkhaus (1998) argues, although Somalia became stateless it did not fall into an anarchic situation, as a form of governance without functional authority took

---


10 Ibid, 38.

11 See table 1 for detailed outline of conflict’s characteristics.
Thus, as shall be discussed later, the Somali nation experienced violent prolonged civil wars and equally protracted negotiations as dominant wartime actors competed for economic and political dominance in a deeply contentious political and unstable environment. Therefore, this dissertation, focusing on the case study of the Mbagathi talk is concerned with how a high degree of economic predation, pervasive war economies and wartime actors with dominant economic agendas over political agendas undermined nearly two dozen peace settlement initiatives in the country.

1.2 Dynamics between the Political Economy of Conflict and Peace Processes

1.2.1: Problem Statement

The research problem that this dissertation addresses is a critical one. Noting the limited scholarly research and policy analysis of the impact of political economy of civil wars on conflict prevention and reconstruction processes, scholars have pondered on the implications of legacies of war economies for peacebuilding and conflict resolution processes. Thus, civil wars’ increasing intractability and the complex nature of entrapping war economies stimulated analysts, policymakers and academicians to pursue this new frontier of knowledge. Analysis of the contemporary conflicts, violence or civil wars and subsequent challenges of peacemaking from a political economy lens allows for a deeper understanding of complex drivers and dynamics of such wars. Such an
understanding enhances the development of successful peace talk strategies and other conflict management and practical policy approaches.

Moreover, it is an appreciated fact that political economy is key to understanding civil war financing by wartime organizations and also gives critical insights into why some civil wars are harder to settle than others. It thus emerges that political economy of conflict has a bearing on the settlement of a specific conflict. Without getting immersed in fine-line distinctions, this dissertation acknowledges that from one conflict situation to another, civil wars differ in various ways: actors’ identities, conflict aims, origin and objectives; degree of insurgents’ motivations and interests; intensity of conflicts and levels of violence; natural resources endowment; degree and nature of economic predation and prevalence of war economies and black market networks; insurgents’ resource endowments and mobilization strategies; and the nature of internal and external support. The above conflict characteristics existed, albeit at varying levels, in representative civil wars or other internal conflicts as experienced in Angola, DRC, Sri Lanka, Liberia, Somalia, Uganda, Mozambique, El Salvador and Burma among others.

Nevertheless, although there has been growing emphasis on the links between natural resource endowments and an onset and the persistence of Africa’s destructive civil wars, little research has been conducted to examine the different forms of predation that occur in resource-rich versus resource-poor environments. This dissertation argues that different forms of predation were operational in different cases. Political economy literature indicate that in the resource-rich countries such as Liberia, Angola and DRC, wartime actors engage in pervasive economic predation over the control of conflict
minerals such as ‘blood diamonds’, timber, coltan and other high value resources to meet their economic interests, finance their war and perpetuate their wartime empires. Hence, these lootable resources aided predation and supported greed-based organizations. In the well-documented greed-based ‘blood diamonds’ model, wartime organizations seized lootable resources by mobilizing individuals by utilizing economic incentives. For instance, Charles Taylor of Liberia, Fodah Sankoh of Sierra Leone and other armed groups in the DRC perfected this practice during those respective civil wars. Due to economic incentives in such a conflict environment with high-value lootable resources, warring parties benefit from economic incentives, which hinder conflict ripeness as they perpetuate civil war to benefit financially. In this case, economic-driven logic of predation dominated the wartime actors’ thinking, behaviors and actions.

But how do economic predation and wartime actors’ dominant economic agendas manifest in a context that lacked high value easily lootable resources such as diamonds or coltan? Few studies have examined the role and impact of predation with a societal-driven logic rather than an economic-driven logic and how it impacts a given peace process in conflict environments like Somalia where clan structures are dominant. Therefore, in Somalia, predation and perpetuation of wartime actors’ economic agendas required a kind of wartime organization that used social structures (notably clans) in order to amass resources in a context that lacked high value resources (such as diamonds or coltan). Somali wartime organizations have historically been simultaneously clan-based militias and armed gangs’ behaviors characterized by looting and greed. This study posits that Somalia’s wartime actors used a combination of economic and social logic to
exploit economic resources to further their economic agendas and finance their clan-based insurgent organizations. Furthermore, this type of predation and economic agendas (that links economic motives with social structure) makes ripeness more difficult to achieve and cases such as the Somali conflict more difficult to settle.

Addressing this knowledge gap and advancing from the tradition of political economy of civil wars, this study looks at the conceptual linkages between a high degree of economic predation and associated war economies and wartime actors’ dominant economic agendas, and their respective impact on the peace processes in Somalia. Specifically, the study poses key research questions: firstly, how did a high degree of economic predation and pervasive war economy shape Somalia’s Mbagathi peace process?; and secondly, how did wartime actors’ dominant economic agendas over political agendas influence and shape the dynamics of Somalia’s Mbagathi peace processes? This study advances and investigates the key proposition that peace processes which take place in civil war environments characterized by a high degree of economic predation, pervasive war economies and wartime actors’ dominant economic agendas over political agendas are harder to negotiate and settle.

As captured in the conceptual framework below (figure 1), it is important to note that wartime institutions sustained by a high degree of economic predation and pervasive war economies and driven by dominant economic agendas shape the negotiation environments and hence influence the initiation, structure, dynamics and outcomes of the aforementioned peace process. It is conceptualized that fundamental to a wartime actors’ power are well-defined economic and social mobilization strategies based on key
determinants: dominance and control of critical territories, infrastructure and tradable resources and commodities; capacity to command, recruit and sustain a well-armed militia with the capability to wage war, initiate violence and spoil peace; and capability to manipulate and mobilize support from clans, business groups and other networks and allies.

A high degree of economic predation is linked to the presence of exploitable economic and marketable resources and critical infrastructure\textsuperscript{14} that can generate revenue to enhance the capacity of the rebel or insurgent\textsuperscript{15} institutions. Existence of such economic resources attract wartime actors and like-minded allies and other black market operatives, which then tend to be more committed to the pursuit of their economic

\textsuperscript{14} Infrastructure is conceptualized as economic generating assets and critical installations like seaports, airports, airfield, major highways, office and industrial complexes.

\textsuperscript{15} The terms rebel or insurgents will be used interchangeably.
interests rather than engender genuine peace talks. In resource-based conflicts such as in Liberia, DRC, Angola and Sierra Leone, local and foreign militias and mercenaries lucratively appropriated high value resources, thereby adding a complex layer to the already intractable conflicts. As will be explored in the empirical case study chapters, in comparison with Liberia’s rich extractable economic resource base of diamonds, rubber and timber, among others, Somalia lacked any such vast lootable economic resources. However, the country’s wartime actors, principally the factional warlords and war profiteers pursuing dominant economic agendas, controlled and creatively squeezed revenue out of any available exploitable economic assets and infrastructures such as airports and seaports of Mogadishu, Kismayu and Merka, and various other airstrips; exploited maritime resources and license fees; printed counterfeit money; and controlled khat\textsuperscript{16}, charcoal trade, critical road junctions; and engaged in arms deals and drug farming, among other economic predatory activities.

Insurgents’ capabilities to exploit economic resources and the presence of facilitative war economies (ready markets for such conflict goods) are key elements of constituting a predatory wartime empire, which greatly undermine peacemaking processes. Economic predation is anchored on pervasive and facilitative war economies, which link local, regional and international black market actors, thereby making the pursuit of sustained economic agendas possible and rewarding. It is thus conceptualized that a high degree of economic predation and pervasive war economies are

\textsuperscript{16} Khat or Miraa as it is known in the East and Horn of Africa, is a popular leafy stimulant which when chewed produces green paste and acts as a stimulant. Although legal in East and Horn of Africa, London and Canada, other Western countries particularly the US considers it a class A drug.
interdependent, mutually reinforcing and coexistent—however, they are in need of a critical third element: for these economic networks to be functional, wartime actors must possess dominant economic agendas to perpetuate the conditions and effect the transaction completing a critical predation triangle. In Somalia, in addition to the economic-driven logic that characterized wartime actors’ predatory politics, the critical element of a dominant societal-driven logic grounded in clan structures shaped the dynamics of the conflict environment—giving predation a social face. These economic agendas are socially engineered using clan networks, but on the surface to an uncritical eye, they appear as raw clan politics. By controlling these resources, Somalia’s wartime actors generated rich revenue to support their predatory war efforts as they jostled for political power at their respective clan levels as well as at the negotiation table. Politics was just a means to an economic end.

How did the above dynamics influence peace talks? Overall, the Somali wartime actors used their predatory economic and social power structures and resources to define and advance their economic, political and military interests; mobilize recruits and clans to build strong armed militia organizations; nurture internal support among clans; instill fear and finance violence to force or coerce and intimidate contenders; build and maintain alliances with internal and external actors to propagate their economic agendas and sustain predatory wartime economic empires. They did so by creating and institutionalizing their economic predatory networks and clan membership and affiliations to generate profit and accumulate wealth; recruit insurgents and maintain their militia organizations and dominate and steer political negotiations to their advantage as
they pursued their economic agendas over political reconciliation. In a nutshell, as shall be explored in the subsequent empirical case study chapters, such strategies inhibited ripeness and undermined peace settlement in Somalia.

1.2.2 Operationalization of Key Concepts and Terms

The major features of the political economy of civil wars of interest to this study relate to how the nature of economic predation and prevalence of war economies perpetuated by wartime actors with dominant economic agendas shape and influence peace negotiation processes. Hence, it is important to define key concepts around which this study is anchored. First, economic predation relates to processes, activities, tactics and strategies pursued by wartime actors in accumulating profit, protecting wealth and capturing economic power by engaging in diverse activities relating to resource extractions, and the sale and disposal of public and private economic assets in their controlled territories. Predation is also a strategy and a technique of mobilizing economic resources to finance rebellions, recruit and maintain fighters and perpetuate wartime actors’ economic agendas. However, it is important to state that for predation to be meaningful and rewarding, facilitative war economies connecting interests of internal and external predatory networks must exist. Second, war economies broadly refers to the all-encompassing economic activities, which takes place during the war period which finances insurgents’ activities, draw in black market organizations and other conflict entrepreneurs from within and outside the conflict zone. It becomes pervasive and facilitative when wartime actors have perfected the act of appropriating economic
resources which they in-turn trade in a conflict system, bringing in external black market networks – which supports the perpetuation of their predatory economic agendas. It also refers to mechanisms and activities undertaken by external agencies and civilian populations to cope with the vagaries of civil wars. Hence, facilitative or pervasive war economies must be present for economic predation to take root and forms the essential bedrock on which wartime actors’ economic agenda are anchored.

- They involve the destruction or circumvention of the formal economy and the growth of informal and black markets, effectively blurring the lines between the formal, informal and criminal sectors and activities;
- Pillage, predation, extortion, and deliberate violence against civilians is used by combatants to acquire control over lucrative assets, capture trade networks and diaspora remittances, and exploit labour;
- War economies are highly decentralised and privatised, both in the means of coercion and in the means of production and exchange;
- Combatants increasingly rely on the licit or illicit exploitation of trade in lucrative natural resources […];
- They thrive on cross-border trading networks, regional kin and ethnic groups, arms traffickers and mercenaries, as well as legally operating commercial ties, each of which may have a vested interest in the continuation of conflict and instability.

Figure 2: Distinctive features of war economies

Characteristically, as Ballentine and Nitzschke summarized in the figure above, the conflict landscape becomes dominated by self-sustaining predatory war economies with specific characteristics.\(^17\) Typologically, according to Goodhand, three different types of war economies exist: combat (predatory and directly support and sustain actual

---

\(^{17}\) Ballentine and Nitzschke, *Political Economy of Civil War*, 2.
combat operations), shadow (includes black market operations and illicit dealings) and coping (includes coping mechanisms such as economic relationships and networks which provide humanitarian aid and other benefits to noncombatant population to assist and sustain civilian survival and livelihood). These different war economies co-exist and predatory wartime actors’ exploit each sector in the execution of the war and perpetuation of their predatory economic agendas.

Finally, wartime institutions/actors are defined broadly as those non-state actors or informal structures (whether armed or unarmed) that emerge after the collapse of the central authority and are transformed into distinctive ‘governance’ units—taking the place of the collapsed regime. In Somalia, state failure triggered political, economic and social transformations facilitating dispersal of authority, perpetuating non-state actors’ contestations for power and legitimacy, which in turn stimulated the emergence of diverse wartime actors. These wartime actors mostly emerged in the forms of either well-structured or loose networks of factional leaders, warlords, armed factions, gangs, clan alliances, business groups, civil society actors and black market networks with regional and or international connections. Early on, the emergent wartime actors primarily tend to be military and political entities, which quickly dominate the various political, economic, social and security vacuum in the collapsed state. In essence, particularly under state collapse conditions—where the central state authority has disintegrated —the dominant wartime actors assume the role of a nation-state exercising a monopoly of force, violence,

---

coercion and contested legitimacy over the control and utilization of the spoils of war in their controlled territories.

In practice, the emergent wartime institutions are preoccupied with incessant political struggles constantly fighting off a multitude of smaller and typically weaker factions. To exist, such wartime actors are sustained by an opportunistic culture of greed, economic predation and facilitative war economies – hence the pursuit of self-preservationist tendencies and economic agendas by crafting well-defined economic strategies. They often engage in factional competition with a view to capture, dominate and control economic infrastructures and ‘resource nerves’ such as strategic seaports, airports, roads, exploitation and trade of forests and marine resources, among others. They often use clan affiliations, fear and violence as modes of mobilization to pursue their predatory economic interests and agendas. Utilizing their power and resources, these wartime actors use mixed strategies of force, fear, violence, coercion and patronage politics to create predatory economic networks to dominate economic, political, security and social environments as they pursue their economic agendas and work to steer political negotiations in their favor.
1.3 An Overview of the Research Methodology

1.3.1 Description of the Selected Case Study

Why study Somalia? In contrast to the well-developed political economy literature which assumes that resource rich environments with high value natural resources generate economic predation, the Somalia case study was chosen because it is not sufficiently explained by this economic logic. In the first model, political economists have clearly articulated that the presence of lucrative lootable natural resources such as ‘blood diamonds’ or coltan undermine peace settlements. However, the Somali conflict, which lacked easily lootable resources, was not explained by this economic (greed-based) model whilst the country experienced repeated failures of peace processes for two decades. Therefore, a case study focusing on Somalia gives the opportunity to examine and generate a theory of how predation with both economic and social logic relying on social structures (such as clans) unfolds in a resource-poor environment and thereby undermines peacemaking processes.

Using a qualitative case study approach of Somalia’s Mbagathi peace process, this dissertation examines the conceptual linkages between a high degree of economic predation, pervasive war economies and wartime actors’ dominant economic agendas over political agendas and their resultant impacts on peace settlement processes. The study utilized a qualitative case study research design with thick descriptions and careful process tracing of the Somali conflict, its economic and social logic, and the consequent challenges to peace settlement. To investigate these dynamics, the study posed the following key research questions: firstly, how did a high degree of economic predation
and pervasive war economies shape peace talks during Somalia’s Mbagathi peace process?; and secondly, how did wartime actors’ dominance of economic agendas over political agendas influence and shape the dynamics of Somalia’s Mbagathi peace processes? Such an investigation not only enhances our understanding of why and how political economy of civil war matters for peacemaking, but also tells us certain things about relationship between a high degree of economic predation and associated war economies and wartime actors’ dominant economic agendas and their related impact on peace negotiation processes in a resource-poor environment. Importantly, this dissertation demonstrates that beyond economic predation, a social logic existed whereby wartime actors recruited and mobilized support for the wartime organizations using clan structures in Somalia, thereby undermining peace settlement.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Defining Features</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Insurgents origin and mobilization strategies</td>
<td>At the onset, rebels used grievances to sell their clan-based rebellion and clan-based ties were used as mobilization nodes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Although initially the target was Barre’s dictatorial regime; but after the regime’s collapse, greed dominated as the war prolonged.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nature of parties and internal fragmentations</td>
<td>Central authorities had collapsed leading to a dispersal of authority. Hence, there was no state party to negotiate with and intense parties’ contestations for recognition, legitimacy and power; and emergence and proliferation of multiple clan-based militias.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Several wartime actors and numerous clan-based factions initially emerged to protect individual clan’s</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Nature of war economy and predation | Several competing wartime actors benefitting from predation and war economies.  
Lacked easily lootable high-value resources but had several infrastructures, assets, facilities, marine resources and other income generating assets which wartime actors creatively appropriated to further their economic agendas. Thus, economic predation was present but camouflaged as clan politics giving it both an economic and a social face.  
Dominant wartime actors had connections with external allies including black market networks, foreign firms and other entities. |
| Nature of the neighborhood and regional involvement | External patronage and meddling and interferences by neighboring states with agendas as wartime actors such as the Somali Reconciliation and Reconstruction Council (SRRC) and the Transitional National Government (TNG) and Mogadishu warlords in Somalia shaped the negotiation and security environment.  
The Mbagathi talk was led by IGAD with Kenya and Djibouti taking prime role. However, it was widely perceived that behind the scenes, Ethiopia played a dominant role pitting her against Djibouti and other Arab states while other member states took a backseat.  
Despite support from the IGAD’s Partners Forum (IPF), weak international political will and divergent politics persisted between 2002 – 2004. |
1.3.2 Research Methods

This dissertation utilized a qualitative case study research design. A qualitative design was preferred for two major reasons. First, it allowed for evolution as the research progressed. Such an approach permitted the respondents to share their experiences and knowledge of the complexity of the peace negotiations and associated experiences without being confined to statistical rigor. According to Lijphart (1971) and Yin (1994) this method is useful when cases are too few for statistical analysis, the issues being studied cannot be easily manipulated and the questions posed tend to begin with how and why.\(^\text{19}\) Such a case study approach, as Yin noted, permits an in-depth examination of a phenomenon in its everyday context by drawing data from multiple sources utilizing multiple methods.\(^\text{20}\) More importantly, the qualitative approach was imperative because the major target group (the Somali community) is predominantly an oral one—where accounts of communities’ experiences, knowledge, history and events are primarily conveyed through oral communications such as descriptive oral recollections and events narrations from generation-to-generation. Thus, in-depth interviews and focus group discussion methods were preferred and utilized for data collection. Data on the Somalia’s peace negotiations was acquired through direct conversations, small group discussions and one-on-one interaction with the respondents.

For the Somali case, both primary and secondary data were collected over 15-months of fieldwork from July 2007 to November 2008 in the Horn of Africa region and


\(^{20}\) Yin, *Case Study Research*. 
the US along with continuous desktop research. First, extensive secondary data was collected and documented from various sources such as scholarly academic journals, newsletters, media reports, regional policy briefs, speeches or press statements by different actors related to the peace processes and numerous documents and confidential reports from regional sources such as IGAD, the African Union (AU) and the United Nations (UN), among others. Second, fieldwork focusing on Somalia’s Mbagathi peace talks was conducted utilizing a purposive sampling method based on respondents’ knowledge of the Mbagathi peace talks, the nature of economic predation and war economies, the nature of wartime actors’ economic agendas, the dynamics of clan politics, the role of clan structures, the organization of insurgent groups and sources of support, and the political and security dynamics in Somalia. During the fieldwork, key research methods such as confidential interviews, focus group discussions (posing structured and unstructured questions) and extensive review of secondary data sources were utilized. The snowballing technique was used to identify and interview key respondents and regional experts. Additionally, a major criteria was that the selected interviewees either directly participated in the Mbagathi talks or closely observed the process.

Overall, the respondents’ pool comprised of 50 carefully selected participants including journalists, civil society representatives, business community leaders, politicians, officials of the TFG, scholars, diplomats, and regional experts; mediators and officials of the IGAD Technical/Facilitation Committee on Somalia (ITCS/IFCS), legislators, and government officials; government and intelligence officials from
Somalia, Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti; and Somalia diaspora community members and opinion leaders in Minneapolis, Minnesota (MN) and Washington, District of Columbia (DC), US.

It was essential to undertake extensive fieldwork in the Horn of Africa focusing on the Mbagathi process because the excruciating failure of the peace process and the general insecurity in Somalia not only isolated the country from the global community of nations but also greatly obstructed the conduct of serious academic research since 1991. Furthermore, in Somalia, scholarly literature and research efforts fizzled out with UNOSOM’s departure in 1995. Hence, a study that extensively focuses on Somalia significantly addressed the dearth of scholarly literature in post-1991 Somalia and more dramatically highlights the difficulties of peacemaking as the country remains chronically stateless. Access to population is critical for successful field research. In addition to being a Kenyan of Cushitic origin, my familiarity with Somali culture and professional networks provided me access to a rich network of Somali scholars, politicians, diaspora members, civil society actors and other practitioners in the Horn of Africa, particularly Kenya, Somalia, Djibouti and Ethiopia and the US. Importantly, having secured

---

employment in Kenya’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs in October 2007 and through referrals by my Somali academic and professional colleagues and other experienced regional experts, I attained excellent access to secondary documents and key diverse groups of respondents both in the Horn of Africa region and among the diaspora community in the US.

A comprehensive thick description method was used to analyze and develop analytical narratives to demonstrate how a high degree of economic predation and prevalent war economies driven by wartime actors’ pursuing dominant economic agendas over political agendas, influenced the dynamics of the talks. Throughout, as the research unfolded in the field, heeding wise counsel by Miles and Huberman (1994), the detailed memos method was used to take note of key ideas, emerging themes, patterns and relationships. Then, respondents’ responses and emerging thematic patterns from reviews of secondary materials were thematically categorized and analyzed in order to map correlate and interpret the sources of struggles of peacemaking during the Mbagathi talks.

During the research process, the study’s validity and reliability was enhanced through three major ways. First, a data triangulation strategy was employed using reviews of secondary documents, expert consultations, focus group discussions and face-to-face confidential interviews at different settings with diverse categories of respondents. As Denzin (1988) noted, various forms of triangulation: data, observer, methodology and

---

theory are key to enhancing research validity and reliability.\textsuperscript{23} Second, I used peer-support particularly in the Somali study to make sense of data and events in the Mbagathi process. The research design, findings and analysis were shared with knowledgeable scholars and practitioners to verify soundness. Finally, through conceptual triangulation, the data was examined from multiple perspectives and interpretive frames. Throughout the research process, the study’s reliability was enhanced through careful and detailed record keeping. Heeding advice by Robson (2002), the study also employed the audit trail approach—which entails keeping detailed entries of the entire research process and undertakes detailed recording and keeping reflective journals in the form of field notes.\textsuperscript{24}

1.3.3 Conclusion

This chapter provided the background to the study and presented the study’s problem statement and key propositions, defined and operationalized key terms and provided an overview of the research methodology employed in the conduct of the research. Through using a case study of Somalia’s Mbagathi peace process, the study argues that economic predation (with both economic and social logic), pervasive and facilitative war economies and wartime actors’ dominant economic agendas hindered successful peace settlement by making bargaining harder and negotiations more difficult. The next chapter reviews the relevant theoretical and empirical literature on the political economy of conflicts by focusing on concepts of civil wars; theories of rebellion; and the


\textsuperscript{24} See Robson, \textit{Real World Research}, 174-6.
interface between new wars and war economies in shadow states; organization of insurgent groups and strategies of resource mobilization, highlighting the nexus between natural resources and civil wars; and briefly recasts ripeness theory and revisits some aspects of civil war peacemaking processes. In the concluding section, the chapter identifies the gap in the literature and maps out the focus of this study.
CHAPTER 2 POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CIVIL WARS AND PEACE PROCESSES

This chapter reviews a large body of both theoretical and empirical literature on the nature of the political economy of conflicts by focusing on concepts and drivers of civil wars and theories of rebellion; new wars and war economies in shadow states; organization of insurgent groups and their resource mobilization strategies and the nexus between natural resources and civil wars; and civil war peacemaking that forms the basis of the present study. The chapter concludes by identifying the gaps in the literature, which this study seeks to address.

2.1 Theoretical Framework: Understanding the Political Economy of Civil Wars

The dissertation’s theoretical approach centers on the political economy of civil war and specifically on how a high degree of economic predation, associated war economies and dominance of wartime actors’ economic agendas influence and shape peace processes. This dissertation begins from the standpoint that the political economy of civil war is a process that takes place in political and economic environments and thereby shapes not only the dynamics of civil wars and the organization of insurgent groups and behavior of its members but also subsequent peacemaking processes. In contemporary times, the political economy approach has advanced our understanding of civil wars that gripped many parts of the globe. As Alt and Shepsle (1990) posit, political
economy is a study of rational choices in the setting of political and economic institutions. Political economy is understood as economic processes’ impacts and role in influencing societies and historical developments. It embodies class and structuralized connotations, which impact on various processes ranging from political, social, cultural and environmental dimensions of a society. Therefore political economy is about interactions of politics and economics in a given setting which entails an understanding of political actors’ rational decision-making processes which thereby influence economic decisions further shaping the society. But how does the political economy interface with civil war onset and the organization of insurgent groups, thereby shape peacemaking processes?

Conceptually, Wallenstein and Sollenberg (2000) characterized civil wars as the leading type of violent conflicts all over the world. In their seminal study, Small and Singer (1982) defined a civil war as, “…any armed conflict that involves (a) military action internal to the metropole, (b) the active participation of the national government, and (c) effective resistance by both sides.” For Fearon (2007), a civil war is “…a violent conflict within a country fought by organized groups that aim to take power at the center or in a region, or to change government policies.” In these conceptualizations, scholars stressed the internality of violence within a recognized national boundary rather

than interstate conflicts that occur between two or more sovereign states. Therefore, civil wars or internal conflicts are wars between organized armed groups within a specific country or at times, they occur between two independent nation states and result in what Tilly (2003) termed a form of “coordinated destruction.”

Scholarly categorizations of when an internal armed conflict is a civil war and not a politicide, intercommunal violence or another form of violence have elicited heated debates and divergence. A major challenge has been disagreements on clear criteria relating to thresholds of deaths that define a civil war. Despite criticisms of being too broad as evidenced by the vast scholarly utilization of the Correlates of War (COW) datasets, a measure of acceptance that a civil war situation is characterized by 1,000-war related deaths per year seems to have won. Nevertheless, contentious debates have also emerged over the acceptable criteria for classifying civil wars whether by 1,000 cumulative casualties annually or a figure of 1,000 dead from each party during multi-year battles or some other combination of variables. Following on the work of Small and Singer, Sambanis (2004) argued, “…civil war was further distinguished from other forms of internal armed conflict by the requirement that state violence should be sustained and

reciprocated and that the war exceeds a certain threshold of deaths (typically more than 1000).”

For Sambanis, settling on a conceptual definition of civil wars is problematic due to: the difficulty of distinguishing between intrastate and extra-state wars, errors in calculation of threshold of deaths due to poor data and inadequate reporting, lack of clear demarcation between the termination and resumption of old and the start of new wars, respectively, and the extent of conflict parties’ expected organizational capacity to differentiate the conflict from one-sided state supported violence. To elucidate further he singled out post-1991 Somalia (where the government had collapsed) and intercommunal clashes in Kenya’s Rift Valley (where the regime in power used proxy ethnic militias to fan violence) as problematic conflicts which are each still coded as civil wars.

Sambanis also argued that a key distinctive feature of a civil war is the large-scale destruction that it produces and instead of relying on a threshold of 1000 deaths annually, he proposes adoption of a coding rule based on a range of 500-1000 deaths. He posits that civil wars are characterized by reciprocal violence through which well-organized groups with clear political objectives confront sovereign nation states. Small and Singer argued that a measure of effective resistance, which “…implies that the stronger side

---

32 Ibid, 816.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid, 820.
35 Ibid.
should suffer at least 5% of the casualties of the weaker side”\textsuperscript{36} be used, but later Fearon and Laitin (2003) called for the relaxation of the coding rule to 100 state deaths.\textsuperscript{37} For Sambanis, an armed conflict is to be considered a civil war when the war possesses several identified characteristics totaling over ten but a few relevant ones are reflected here.\textsuperscript{38} First, the war occurs within the territory of a nation state that is a member of the global system with a population of over 500,000. Second, the actors are well organized both militarily and politically and have clearly articulated political agendas. Third, a sovereign government is one of the principal combatants (directly or indirectly). Fourth, the insurgency or rebel group is geographically located inside the country, controls a territorial space within national borders and is able to recruit locally even though they might receive external support or operate from another neighboring state. Finally, the capacity of the weaker actor to undertake effective resistance, which constantly results in 100 deaths per year, particularly in the first year of war, meted on the stronger actor. Of particular interest to this study is how insurgencies emerge, articulate their agendas and mobilize resources to finance their warfare and thereby influence the dynamics of peace processes. The next section turns to this.

\textsuperscript{36} Small and Singer, \textit{Resort to Arms}, 214-15
\textsuperscript{38} See Sambanis, “What is Civil War,” 830-1.
2.1.1 Theories of Rebellion: Revisiting the Greed and Grievance Debates

Theories of rebellion help us understand the relationship between political economy and predation that is common in civil wars. Studies of civil wars have proposed various theoretical explanations for the initiation and sustenance of these violent civil wars using the greed versus grievance models. First the greed model theorists led by Collier et al (2005), Collier and Hoeffler (2004), Collier and Hoeffler (1998), Keen (1998), and Berdal and Malone (2000) putting forth the greed model argue that economics, greed and opportunisms driven by individual or a group’s economic interests are major drivers of civil wars.\(^\text{39}\) Inspired by the COW experts and using their numerical definitions, economists Collier and Hoeffler developed and advanced the ‘greed and grievance’ models to explain civil wars.\(^\text{40}\) They argued that “…the political science and economic approaches to rebellion have assumed both different rebel motivations – grievances versus greed–and different explanations – atypical grievance and atypical opportunities.”\(^\text{41}\) According to this model whereas greed was linked to opportunities, grievance was driven by democratization, levels of economic growth and ethnic identification measures. Over and above, according to this Collier-Hoeffler model, there is an increasing acceptance that economic and structural conditions are significant drivers of civil war occurrence.\(^\text{42}\)


\(^{40}\) Collier and Hoeffler, Greed and Grievance in Civil War.

\(^{41}\) Ibid, 2.

\(^{42}\) Collier and Hoeffler, Greed and Grievance.
Specifically, according to their model, the critical trigger factors for civil wars include: economic dependence on easily extractable and exportable primary commodities such as diamonds and timber, the presence of large diaspora (financiers of ethnic rebellions), a high number of uneducated and unemployed young males, a high population density and dispersions in rugged terrains and a longer time lapse (reduced chances of rebellions due to depreciation of resource capitals and increased opportunity-costs of restarting wars).\textsuperscript{43} Particularly, Collier and Hoeffler (2005) established significant correlation between high quantities of primary products exports, low per capita income and the existence of past conflicts and violence and the risk of civil war occurrence.\textsuperscript{44} In as much as the above factors trigger civil conflicts, the availability of high value easily lootable natural resources and promises of lucrative returns from predation allows insurgents to operate, sustain and finance civil wars. Indeed, the existence of such lucrative resources anchors the economic logic for the continuation of war, which perpetuates economic interests and hence predation takes root.

Consequently, war becomes a lucrative business and economic motivations are central to the perpetuation of new predatory wars and resultant war economies in the affected conflict environment. In understanding factors influencing the duration of wars and conflicts, Jung (2003) advised analysts to pay close attention to the material issues rather than just embracing the often-tortured ethnicity factors to explain the underlying

\textsuperscript{43} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{44} Collier and Hoeffler, \textit{Greed and Grievance}, as summarized in \textit{Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis}, Vol. 1 and 2 (2005), 9-12.
causes of civil wars. Perceptively, Keen noted that war, “...is not simply a breakdown in a particular system, but a way of creating an alternative system of profit, power and even protection.” Contrary to the conventional thinking that nation states or other actors engage in warfare with a view to win the battle or defeat an enemy, Keen (2000) in advancing the greed thesis, observed that, “...the image of war as a contest has sometimes come to serve as a smokescreen for the emergence of a wartime political economy” which may benefit governments and the rebels among other actors. Hence, during war, groups’ political and economic interests interact and warfare becomes the instrument through which wartime actors pursue economic agendas and ensure security for business interests and properties. During such wartime periods, Keen observed that shrewd dealers and elites harvest through pillage, impose protection fees, hike prices, open trade in previously banned illegal products, appropriate cheap or free and forced labor by uprooting populations and illegally taking over land, water and mineral resources, raid relief aid and finally, militarize governance process by increasing investments in military numbers. Similarly for Collier (2000), economic factors such as greed and predation and looting are more salient than grievances such as raw ethnic or religious hatred, economic and political inequalities in the sustenance of such wartime conditions.

49 Collier, “Doing Well out of War.”
Regarding the grievance column, studies by Collier and Hoeffler and Collier and Sambanis revealed that only lack of democracy showed significant effect while inequality remained insignificant and astonishingly ethnic and religious divisions posted insignificant effects.\(^{50}\) In fact, as Collier and Hoeffler noted, the rebels capitalize on ‘grievance’ explanations of their cause as a way of mobilizing supporters but it remains a mere smokescreen to rationalize their predatory lifestyles.\(^{51}\) Similarly, Keen (1998) also advanced that deep-rooted economic interests lie at the root of violent conflicts and perpetuate warfare as groups or rebels fight to accumulate profit, wealth and protect their economic concerns.\(^{52}\) Considering more political dimensions, studies by Fearon and Laitin supported Collier and Hoeffler’s findings and argued that primary commodity exports, particularly oil, showed high correlation with the onset of civil wars.\(^{53}\) These studies linked the high value resources to the onset of civil wars.

Critiquing Collier and Hoeffler’s greed thesis, scholars such as Ballentine and Nitzschke (2005) caution against using statistical correlations to come to conclusions regarding individual motivations to engage in rebellions and predatory behavior, as such tendencies do not entirely explain their core character and outlook.\(^{54}\) They further faulted Collier for ignoring the role of the state as an actor and institution, which generates or lengthens conflicts.\(^{55}\) Similarly, based on studies from Guatemala, Preti (2002) critiqued greed theorists such as Keen (1998) for emphasizing actors over structures and for paying

\(^{50}\) Collier and Hoeffler, *Greed and Grievance*, 10; Collier and Sambanis, *Understanding Civil War*, 13.
\(^{51}\) Collier and Hoeffler, *Greed and Grievance*; and Collier, “Doing Well out of War.”
\(^{52}\) Keen, “Economic Functions of Violence.”
\(^{54}\) Ballentine and Sherman, *Political Economy of Armed Conflict*.
\(^{55}\) Ibid.
little attention to the systematic analysis of the working of political and economic structures.\textsuperscript{56} In support of Keen’s position, in weak states such as Somalia, governmental structures were extremely weak or non-existent and therefore wartime actors, often emboldened by economic power sourced from predatory war economies, dominated over the weakened state systems. Under such situations, wartime actors tend to dominate social, economic and political structures which they then manipulate to perpetuate their predatory economic agendas.

Furthermore, the grievance model has also received support among some scholars. From his early studies in 1968 of the drivers of civil strife, Gurr (1968), using a social-psychological model, quantitatively studied factors driving protests and rebellions.\textsuperscript{57} Advancing the theory of relative deprivation (in forms of resource or political deprivation), Gurr (1970) provided some useful insights to enhance the understanding of individual motivations to participate in protests or rebellions and later examined and developed key social and political determinants of collective contention as a measure of conflicts that could be applied cross-nationally.\textsuperscript{58} Gurr’s theory points to the gap between the actual state of affairs and the expected state of affairs (perceived deprivation) as a recipe for rebellions.\textsuperscript{59} He later specifically studied conflict situations

\textsuperscript{59} Ibid.
affecting minority groups and dimensions of inequality and deprivation in various internal conflicts.\(^60\)

However, other scholars such as Muller and Seligson (1987), Midlarsky (1988) and Russett (1964) have challenged Gurr’s theory of relative deprivation arguing that structural inequality is a major driver of internal unrests and revolutions.\(^61\) While scholars such as Brush (1996) welcomed relative deprivation’s logical instinctive attraction, despite the evidence not being very commanding, others including Moore and Gurr (1997) and Lichbach (1990), made improvements and counterarguments to the model.\(^62\) Importantly, Tilly (1978) and Tarrow (1998) have convincingly argued that the mere presence of individual or group’s perceived relative deprivation or feelings of inequality do not automatically lead to organized violence or conflicts but groups must be mobilized to act collectively.\(^63\) Nonetheless, the theorists putting forth the grievance model argue that a group’s collective grievances, motivated by the group’s perception of political and economic marginalization\(^64\) and their feelings of identity exclusions based

---


upon ethnic and religious dominance and other social categorizations, are the major sources of civil wars occurrences.\textsuperscript{65}

While appreciating the logic of the grievance arguments and notwithstanding certain weaknesses of the greed model, greed still emerges as a better explanation for the perpetuation of violent African civil wars. Hence, opportunities tended to be a more convincing explanation for rebellion than grievance-based factors.\textsuperscript{66} Regan and Norton (2005) discussing the connections and transitions between greed and grievances in explaining the onset of civil wars, insightfully observed:

Grievance-based issues are at the core of the processes that leads to civil conflict but that “greed” becomes salient when the rebel leadership begins to face a difficult task of motivating soldiers. In effect, grievance leads to collective behavior, but defection is always a problem, so rebel leaders resort to selective benefits that tap into self-interested behavior.\textsuperscript{67}

Many times, rebel recruits join insurgent organizations with a view to economically benefit from the expectations of current gains or future anticipated victories in a given nation. With a view to buy their fighters’ support, loyalty and commitment to participate in the war, rebel leaders often times seize resources to not only sustain the organizations but also to pay their soldiers or allow them to enrich themselves through unrestricted looting and pillage. Such provision of selective benefits is possible in areas endowed with lucrative economic resources and infrastructure and assets over which armed wartime actors fight to control and appropriate with a view to generate economic

\textsuperscript{65} For an excellent analysis see Berdal and Malone, eds., \textit{Greed and Grievance}; and Sambanis, “What is Civil War,” 856.
\textsuperscript{66} Collier and Hoeffler, \textit{Greed and Grievance}, 11; as summarized in Collier and Sambanis, \textit{Understanding Civil War}, 17.
resources to enrich themselves and acquire revenues to sustain their insurgency initiatives. It is thus possible to conclude that economic realities shape civil wars’ origins, dynamics and durations.

Some sort of a complex transition occurs between greed and grievance models during the onset of civil wars. For example in Somalia, there was considerable rebel leaderships’ politicization of the grievance thesis – at the start of rebellions, there existed a complex mosaic of grievance assertions but later greed took over as the various wartime institutions sunk into predatory economic politics and associated war economy. Consequently wartime actors’ economic agendas (greed) outplayed the original political ideals. Hence, in clan-based societies such as Somalia, group’s social-cultural environments in which these economic motives play out shape the nature of predation. Often communities or clans’ social systems and structures are mobilized and co-opted to support a specific rebellion, but in the end wartime organizations’ economic predatory agendas tend to be resilient and dominant. Although Somalia’s Siad Barre (pre-1991) or even Mohamed Farah of the USC mobilized their respective clan constituencies with a view to promote good governance in the country, they created predatory institutions which engaged in official predation and perpetuated their own personal economic agendas or clans’ economic interests.

The above section briefly examined the definitions, concepts and drivers of civil war and theoretical literature on theories of rebellion by focusing on greed and grievance models and other related arguments. A closer examination of scholarly literature on the political economy of civil wars and conflicts reveal the existence of an intricate web
between inherited practices from new wars and war economies in shadow states on which predation and wartime actors’ economic agendas and structures are anchored and operationalized. Therefore, against this backdrop, the next section examines empirical literature on new wars’ transformative capacities, the genesis of shadow states and resultant war economies, and highlights associated influences on peacemaking struggles.

2.2 Transformative Capacities of News Wars

Another critical point of departure for this study is the link between prolonged civil war situations in weak states influenced by new wars and associated war economies coupled with wartime actors’ economic agendas that dominates over political agendas of reconciliation and impact peacemaking processes in Somalia. Pursuant to this line of thought, I concur with scholars who have argued that Africa’s ‘new wars’ are driven by the functionality of war as processes of alternative institution building and creative wealth accumulation processes and are not necessarily due to ancient hatred, ethnic barbarism or irrationality. Importantly, I argue that the interlocked legacies of new wars and war economies in shadow states are anchored and operationalized. Therefore, against this backdrop, the next section examines empirical literature on new wars’ transformative capacities, the genesis of shadow states and resultant war economies, and highlights associated influences on peacemaking struggles.

2.2 Transformative Capacities of News Wars

Another critical point of departure for this study is the link between prolonged civil war situations in weak states influenced by new wars and associated war economies coupled with wartime actors’ economic agendas that dominates over political agendas of reconciliation and impact peacemaking processes in Somalia. Pursuant to this line of thought, I concur with scholars who have argued that Africa’s ‘new wars’ are driven by the functionality of war as processes of alternative institution building and creative wealth accumulation processes and are not necessarily due to ancient hatred, ethnic barbarism or irrationality. Importantly, I argue that the interlocked legacies of new wars and war economies in shadow states are anchored and operationalized. Therefore, against this backdrop, the next section examines empirical literature on new wars’ transformative capacities, the genesis of shadow states and resultant war economies, and highlights associated influences on peacemaking struggles.

2.2 Transformative Capacities of News Wars

Another critical point of departure for this study is the link between prolonged civil war situations in weak states influenced by new wars and associated war economies coupled with wartime actors’ economic agendas that dominates over political agendas of reconciliation and impact peacemaking processes in Somalia. Pursuant to this line of thought, I concur with scholars who have argued that Africa’s ‘new wars’ are driven by the functionality of war as processes of alternative institution building and creative wealth accumulation processes and are not necessarily due to ancient hatred, ethnic barbarism or irrationality. Importantly, I argue that the interlocked legacies of new wars and war economies in shadow states are anchored and operationalized. Therefore, against this backdrop, the next section examines empirical literature on new wars’ transformative capacities, the genesis of shadow states and resultant war economies, and highlights associated influences on peacemaking struggles.

wars, shadow states and the emergent war economies draw wartime actors into seductive predation traps which compel them to pursue predatory politics and economic agendas over political agendas and hence lead to the protracted peacemaking struggles in Somalia.

Civil wars, as do other internal conflicts, create opportunities for political, social and economic transformation of the affected nations or societies. Scholars such as Clapham (2002), Yannis (2002), Duffield (2001), Herbst (2004), Zartman (1995), Allen (1990) and Duyvesteyn (2005) among others, have linked such wars to state formation and nation-building processes, which ignite internal opposition and challenge the stability and survival of emerging post-colonial states. Moreover, according to Kaldor (1999), these ‘new wars’ were the outcomes of the dark side of globalization negatively affecting the state’s national economic and political structures leading to the loss of central government’s coercive capacity, emergence of various sources of power and authority, increased informalization of the economy and degeneration of the majority of the citizens’ economic and social security.

Kaldor further notes that an increase in the number and types of armed groups and the employment of diverse methods of warfare, including the termination or mass displacement of targeted identity groups and armed factions’ financing, characterize the ‘new wars’. Although Rotberg (2004) perceived


Kaldor, New and Old Wars.

Ibid, 92-106.
failed states as “…a mere geographical expression, a black hole,” for Duffield (2001), these states are “…the sites of innovation and reordering resulting in the creation of new types of legitimacy and authority.” Thus, these wars are not meaningless, but purposive. Such new wars facilitate the reconfiguration of social, political and economic structures thereby promoting the emergence of non-state actors—the architects of new wartime institutions, which then craft predatory economic strategies, engage in predatory politics and perpetuate economic agendas. As Duffield argues, these new wars were the outcomes of political actions or strategies, “…representing viable and innovative non-state forms of political authority.” Hence, these new wars are means of perpetuating economic interests in the name of politics. The perpetrators of such wars are rational actors and committed to the pursuit of clear economic agendas.

Consequently, Duffield noted that state collapse triggers social transformation and institutional reengineering processes facilitated by complex global networks of interdependence—what he called ‘strategic complexes.’ These include new relational webs of connections involving governments, non-state actors, civil society groups, entrepreneurs, military, non-governmental organizations and private sectors that transcend beyond the traditional concept of legitimacy and territorial prerogatives of the

---

74 Duffield, Global Governance, 82.
official state. Such ‘strategic complexes’ present us with a web of wartime actors, which include factional leaders, warlords, political and armed factions, clan and ethnic social groups, business and diaspora community members, and “…transborder resource networks of state incumbents among others.”

Studying the wars in Somalia and Liberia, Duyvesteyn argues that the nature of these wars have greatly shifted from the traditional Clausewitzian perspective where wars brings together the “…trinity of political leadership, a followership, and military potentials” to one where, in the absence of a state, “…warlords, bandits, drug barons and other enterprising individuals [are substituted] . . . as the main actors in warfare today.” Such strategic complexes play critical roles in advancing predatory war economies in weak states and aids advancement of wartime actors’ dominant economic agendas.

Similarly, drawing similarities in the nature of modern warlordism and medieval times, Marten (2006/7) argues that such wars undermine a state’s opportunities for enhanced economic prosperity and security at both local and international levels. For Crawford and Lipschutz (1999), the wrecked social contracts and weakened repressive institutions expose political space for political entrepreneurs to mobilize support. Indeed, in Somalia, dominant wartime actors mobilized societies’ social structures and manipulated clan loyalties to build their wartime empires. As shall be explored in the

---

76 Duyvesteyn, *Clausewitz and African Wars*, 2 (Added words).
subsequent empirical chapters, in Somalia, a close link developed between dominant wartime actors and clan structures giving predation a social face.

The emergence of the strategic wartime forces in collaboration with regional and global networks upset the balance of power among different social groups in failed states. In the view of Yannis, interactive globalization-driven dynamic social and economic forces at local, regional and international levels further shape and transform these new wartime institutions.\footnote{Yannis, “State Collapse and its Implication,” 822.} Both Duffield and Reno (1995) have argued that global marginalization has given local actors the chance to rework the nature of political authority.\footnote{Duffield, “Post-modern Conflict”; William Reno, \textit{Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Reno, “African Weak States.”} Failed states, as Clapham asserts, “…are often hollowed out from within, before they are toppled from without; and the logic of private transactions with the global market plays a vital role in this process.”\footnote{Clapham, “Challenge to the State,” 793.} Such processes, as Herbst also observed, trigger power devolution as non-state actors become powerful and begin to control territories, most often, curtailing the ability of the government to exercise authority beyond the capital city.\footnote{Herbst, “Let Them Fail,” 304.} Furthermore, Duffield argues that the emergent non-state actors are uninterested in establishing a political authority over a specific territory, but rather desirous of maintaining some international networks with structures of the outside world.\footnote{Duffield, “Post-Modern Conflict,” 97.} Such networks become useful for wartime actors engaged in predatory politics and pursuit of economic agendas to profit from war’s dynamics. Hence, failed states’ environments rather become the playgrounds for various powerful wartime actors, which
have been empowered by globalization and development of global governance networks that transcend national borders. Such local-global connections and networks become key arteries and lifelines for the resultant war economies that flourish and perpetuate economic interests particularly under shadow states.

Therefore, a reconfigured landscape facilitates the emergence of new power structures evidenced by the proliferation and entrenchment of powerful and resilient wartime non-state actors such as armed groups, business groups, militia leaders and transnational black market networks, which then pitch their clan, ethnic or factional, or predatory business claims to a region or a specific resource base to further their individual and collective interests. At the heart of Somalia’s wartime actors’ operations exist deep-seated economic motives—economics of predation and a culture of greed nurtured by what Allen diagnosed as the perpetuation of African nation’s system of ‘spoils politics’—whereby competitive power politics driven by a desire for self-enrichment and patronage politics (where a ruler or contender dishes out ‘material benefits’ to allies) and coupled with poor economic performance, slips into ‘terminal spoils.’

Indeed, prolonged ‘spoils politics’ and ‘terminal spoils’ rooted in cultures of greed, economic predation, violence and patronage politics were highly developed and pervasive in collapsed state such as Somalia. Indeed, as shall be explored later, in the nearly anarchic Somalia, a new form of predation driven by both economic and social logic took shape – critically influencing peacemaking processes.

---

2.3 Shadow states and Institutionalization of War Economies

An intricate link exists between political economy and new wars and war economies in shadow states, which over time degenerates and fosters a predation web that continue to perpetuate wartime actors’ economic networks and interests. Reno (2000) uses the term ‘shadow state’ to describe the interaction between political organizations and economics.\(^85\) For Reno a ‘shadow state’ is a concept that describes the interaction between corruption and politics, which he further conceptualizes “…as the product of personal rule, usually constructed behind the face of de jure state sovereignty.”\(^86\) New wars occur predominantly under shadow state environments thereby shaping the political, economic and security dynamics in the conflict environment. Shadow states are the natural sanctuaries for perpetuating economic predation and provide a fundamental basis not only for the growth and institutionalization of war economies but also for the proliferation of resilient wartime actors. Well incubated, these wartime actors establish economic networks which work to propagate and perpetuate their economic agendas. Hence, weak states or civil war and state collapse conditions are characterized by the presence of diverse war economies which operate on the margins of the formal economies through the activities of the wartime actors and eventually dominate the economic space. Reno posits that in shadow states:

The short-term risks of building bureaucratic institutions outweigh long-term benefits for the builder. This situation enhances the attractions of using direct control over people and economically valuable territory to

\(^{85}\) Reno, *Corruption and State Politics.*
\(^{86}\) Reno, “Shadow States,” 45.
accumulate resources for the private benefit of the organization’s members.\textsuperscript{87}

He further argues that behavior of rulers in shadow states to personalize power and accumulate private wealth using their authority, motivates regime opponents and other non-state actors to pursue entirely economic interests and motives during the wartime.\textsuperscript{88} Indeed, state-sanctioned predation, looting and accumulation of wealth are features of shadow states and early signals for the institutionalization of war economies. Under such situations, Reno also observed that rulers in shadow states embrace abridged political horizons and engage in predation by collecting external revenues from allied superpowers or financiers interested in financing specific operations instead of encouraging taxable independent bodies of local manufacturers.\textsuperscript{89} Similarly, in the collapsed states such as Somalia, non-state wartime actors exhibit the same predatory behaviors and tactical alliances with external economic networks.

Importantly, scholars have observed that state collapse creates an ideal environment for the nurturance of wartime institutions fronted by war profiteers, economic predators and black market operatives.\textsuperscript{90} Concurrently, writing insightfully on the experiences of internal warfare in nations such as Liberia, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Sudan, El Salvador, Chechnya and Cambodia, Reno observed that the belligerent actors’ economic motivations might have been powerful obstacles to the ending violent conflicts as “…they may use war to control land and commerce, exploit labor, milk charitable

\textsuperscript{87} Ibid, 56.
\textsuperscript{88} Ibid, 45.
\textsuperscript{89} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{90} Collier, “Doing Well out of War; Ibid; Keen, Economic Functions of Violence; Keen, “Incentives and Disincentives for Violence,” 19-41.
agencies, and ensure the continuity of assets and privileges to a group.”

Thus, under such situations, the business of war becomes a key deterrent to war termination and peacemaking initiatives. Hence, wartime actors continue to pursue their vested economic objectives favoring perpetuation of war, violence and conflict.

Moreover, the prolonged civil war situations become fertile ground for the perpetuation and grounding of resilient wartime actors linked to the economics of predation and war profiteering agendas. The different wartime actors engage in a ‘resource race’ characterized by competition for power and resource control as a means to accumulate profits, protect wealth and extract vital resources to further their personal and collective interests. Hence, it is argued that wartime actors’ pursuit of economic interests prominently fanned and sustained the civil war situations as experienced in Somalia. Uncertain about the future political order prescribed by the peace talks, dictators like Barre and subsequent clan-based factional leaders tended to engage in predatory politics to enrich themselves and hence their weak commitment to early political dialogue and peace talks in Somalia.

The process of institutionalization of war economies occurs through key stages. The collapse of the shadow state is the beginning of the emergence of powerful wartime actors who then become the engine of the resultant war economies. As Reno argued, shadow states’ disintegration “…is more likely to leave the field to fragments of the shadow state – groups of entrenched elites who will seek to protect their own private

91 Reno, “Shadow States,” 64.
privilege." Allen insightfully argued that ‘spoils politics’ is a predominant feature in weak states. Providing critical conceptual insights, Allen identifies five key characteristics of prolonged spoils politics. First, there is massive and highly concentrated corruption. Second, is a regime’s failure to provide basic social services to its people, which in-turn may prompt citizens to refuse to pay taxes or uphold law and order. Third, is the eruption of ethnic conflict (taking on a religious or regional character) and perpetuation to warlordism. Fourth, a ruler’s monopolization of power ultimately leading to the state’s loss of control of coercive power—perpetuated by failure to pay government officials and security agents hence resorting to looting in order to survive (for example the Zaire Army). Finally, is a split within the security forces due to disputes over spoils’ allocation resulting in the growth of rebellious armed groups.

Moreover, as Allen noted, the above characteristics of prolonged spoils results in ‘terminal spoils’, eventually promoting two situations. First, corruption and state withdrawal promotes an implosion of the state where its ability to exercise sovereignty (administrative and legal functions) is confined to the capital city, thereby losing control over the periphery with the elites engaging in massive corruption and looting. Hence, the state fades away and might at times experience some violence. Second, eruption of ethnic violence and warlordism, monopolization of power and loss of control of coercion promotes an explosion of the state, that is, where it turns on its own citizens or some regions and/or armed factions take control of the state. As Allen observed, the above

96 Ibid, 379.
situations are perpetuated by two broader phenomena—post Cold War economic marginalization and resource loss due to a weakened state’s internal capacity, intense internal competition and lack of external interest and support.\textsuperscript{97} Subsequently, as summarized in Table 2 below, ‘terminal spoils’ results in extreme political, social and economic crises, eventually plunging the state into total collapse.\textsuperscript{98}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Crisis</th>
<th>Economic Crisis</th>
<th>Social Crisis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Functional disintegration and disappearance of state bodies such as security, banking and outsourcing of services to external agents for example Executive Outcomes.</td>
<td>Economic decline and contraction due to the collapse of state revenue base leading to decay in infrastructure and inability to provide security.</td>
<td>Striking degeneration of communities’ social structures or institutions (such as traditional elders’ institutions, peace actors) and family and communal moral decay exhibited by massive rape cases, prostitution, spreading of diseases, population displacements, refugees, and destruction of local economies, among others.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pervasive abuse of official power and whatever is left of government institutions by security agents (army and police) imposing illegal taxes on imports and exports.</td>
<td>Acute decline in trade and agricultural production causes severe poverty and famine.</td>
<td>Violence, exploitation and criminality significantly mark social relationships.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fragmentation, contraction and disappearance of central state authority.</td>
<td>Proliferation of illicit economy as licit economy is replaced and what Allen called the ‘second economy’ flourishes due to predatory activities of warlords and other black market traders.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence, mutual avoidance and resource predation marks the relationship between the state apparatus and the society such as looting and illegal taxation.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{97} Ibid, 379-80.  
\textsuperscript{98} Derived from Ibid, 379-80.  
\textsuperscript{99} Ibid.
Indeed, the deepened political, economic and social crises transform societal institutions. Particularly, the dispersal of central authority permitted non-state actors to emerge to take control of the situation – giving room for the rooting of predatory practices, open war economies and perpetuation of wartime actors’ economic agendas. In the same vein, Francois and Sud (2006) have argued that ‘ungoverned spaces’ left by the fallen regimes become hotbeds for criminal networks, global terrorists and drug traffickers.\(^{100}\) As the case of Somalia reveals, those alleged ‘ungoverned’ economic and political spaces did not remain vacuums but were instead contested, occupied and dominated by transformed wartime actors and other factional identities seeking economic and political power and advantages. Under such situations, deep-seated economic predation and pervasive war economies flourish. A critical nerve center of war profiteers and wartime institutions and the economics of predation are black market networks, which most often are more prevalent and well executed under prolonged civil war conditions linking their predatory businesses to regional and global markets. Both Duffield (2000) and Reno argued that wartime actors creatively evade the trappings of global order to protect their wealth.\(^{101}\) Such war profiteers and black market networks linked their predatory internal trade to global and international foreign firms to market their illegally acquired, exploited and looted products.

During wartime, different types of war economies flourish. In this regard, an important addition to the political economy literature are studies by Goodhand (2004)


who argued that in violent civil wars such as in Afghanistan, there exist diverse stakeholders or actors participating in different layers of the war economy: combat, shadow and coping economies.\textsuperscript{102} Goodhand argues that such wartime economies aid warring parties to conduct war, generate income and economic rewards, manage and subsist.\textsuperscript{103} First he conceptualizes ‘combat economy’ as those economic activities and interactions, which directly support real combat during wartime and are driven by factional commanders, conflict profiteers, fighters and other associates including arm suppliers. These are based on predation and geared to generate resources to finance the war, accumulate wealth and meet livelihood needs of the fighters. As shall be discussed in the empirical case study chapter, various dominant wartime actors, notably the armed militia leaders and their fighters, vigorously pursued predation and economic agendas and jealously protected their resource-generating assets and territories. Linked local, regional and international war profiteers from the facilitative war economies were deeply rooted in Somalia. As a result, as shall be demonstrated, economic predation, pervasive war economies and wartime actors’ pursuit of economic agendas over political agendas contributed to the struggles of peacemaking processes.

Furthermore, Goodhand posits that the ‘shadow economy’, also known as the ‘black market economy’ refers to those informal interactions which occur sometimes before the actual state collapse on the margin of warfare where various black market operatives mingle with rebels, war profiteers, drug dealers, mafia groups, transporters and


\textsuperscript{103} Goodhand, “From War Economy to Peace Economy?”
other criminal elements in unregulated trade environments linking together to make high profits.\textsuperscript{104} In the same vein, Ballentine and Nitzschke observed that upon the onset of an insurgency war, the shadow economy is often seized by the rebels and thus becomes the foundation of the combat economy.\textsuperscript{105} Indeed, rebels capitalize on such war economies to generate revenues to support combat operations.

Under such circumstances, devoid of customary regulatory mechanisms, the boundary between what is legal and illegal is blurred. In a 1999 study, Naylor observed that licit and illicit economic activities are quite often intertwined: where every segment of the legal economy has a black market counterpart facilitated by a worldwide transport and communication infrastructure and foreign firms’ trade with illicit wartime business networks.\textsuperscript{106} Impoverished youth and freelance security agents join the bandwagon of armed factions to reap the ‘spoils of war’—hence providing ready recruits for the perpetuation of factional violence. As shall be demonstrated in the Somali case study, the distinction between what is licit and illicit was totally blurred and attracted war profiteers from within and outside the region creating a complex web. The actors accrued immense revenue and wealth, which they used to purchase arms, strengthen their militia group, oil patronage wheels and weaken and break up enemy factions and alliances. Perpetuating such shadow economies, economic predation and wartime actors’ dominant economic agendas using both economic and social logic to mobilize clan structures through social appeals, fear and violence were clearly evident and predatory politics became the norm of

\textsuperscript{104} Ibid, 165.
\textsuperscript{105} Ballentine and Nitzschke, \textit{Political Economy of Civil War}.
\textsuperscript{106} Naylor, \textit{Patriots and Profiteers}.
operation endorsed and sustained by Somalia’s wartime actors, particularly the armed warlords.

Lastly, during war, as Goodhand argued, often the largest casualty is the local population whose livelihood systems are destroyed. Thus, ‘coping economy’ refers to the various economic relationships and networks which provide relief and benefits to the non-combatant population to support and sustain civilian survival and livelihood including local farming, communal trade, smuggling and aid from diaspora groups among others. In various rebellions such as in eastern DRC, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, Colombia, Somalia and Liberia, the civilian communities (particularly the weaker, poorly organized and less armed ones) were devastated and reduced to humiliating circumstances by the occupying rebel groups.

Hence, these three economies were intricately connected. To effectively understand the dynamic interactions between these war economies and respective actors, Ballentine and Nitzschke called for careful analysis of the actors and for a distinction to be made between the real conflict profiteers and those “…who are forced to participate in war economies to sustain their civilian livelihoods.”

Thus, the interplay between combat, shadow and coping economies are driven by complex networks of wartime actors and their associates significantly shaping the nature of the emergent war economies and thereby influencing political, economic and security dynamics in the affected nations and cross-border environments.

---

107 Ballentine and Nitzschke, Political Economy of Civil War, 9.
In addition to the entrenched war economies, privatization of the provision of security by diverse non-state actors further complicates civilian and private security of the populace edging on anarchic governance styles which eventually undermine the security of regimes or factions that tend to engage in wild looting, pillaging and overt predation. In various African shadow states such as Nigeria and Sierra Leone, Reno observed that an:

Elite strategy of control also put weapons into the hands of agents who obey no bureaucratic rules, which encourages these subordinates to invade economic activities of other people, especially those who have little to offer the shadow state beyond existing as targets for direct exploitation.  

The infamous ‘Operation Pay Yourself’ was common practice by African militaries and insurgents, particularly such as the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebels of Sierra Leone during wartime, leading to what Abraham (1997) termed the ‘sobel phenomenon’ depicting situations where some elements which are, “…government soldiers by day become rebels by night.” Similarly, in Somalia, long before collapse, Barre’s soldiers engaged in forceful extortions and dehumanized resident populations, particularly in northern Somalia. Later, the powerful Hawiye faction of Farah Aideed ravaged the farming communities of Juba and Shebelle Valleys. Subsequently, as a form of adaptation, different clans organized themselves creating their own militias – vigilante groups to safeguard their economic interests. However, due to the pervasive culture of predation and the dominance of economic agendas, the emergent groups became local

---

predators – thereby enlarging the predation web and predating on the same populations they were hired and entrusted to protect.

In a nutshell, wartime economic interactions are characterized by heightened wartime actors’ competition for profitable resources and markets and as such, war becomes a lucrative business enterprise. Under such war economies, wartime actors’ economic interests dominate over intra-ethnic identity loyalty as cross-ethnic commercial relations flourish between war profiteers. In his study focused on the ethnic wars in Bosnia, Andreas (2004) observed that an illicit black market economy was not necessarily affected by ethnic or clan-based hostilities, but that an impressive cross-ethnic cooperation existed in the smuggling operations even during the war period. In Somalia, as shall be explored shortly, although predation was often organized along clan lines, war entrepreneurs engaged in mutual dealings across the clan divides—hence predation and pursuit of economic agendas knew no clan boundaries. Such interactions and high stakes of predatory war economies significantly influenced the dynamics and outcomes of subsequent peace talks.

This section reviewed the scholarly literature on new wars and its transformative capacities underscoring the greed thesis and exposing the centrality of predation and dominance of wartime institutions in some civil war situations. The section also reviewed dynamics, types and effects of different war economies in shadow states and how they evolve and influence predatory politics in weak states. As previously articulated, this study is concerned with exploring the linkages between a high degree of economic

---

predation, pervasive war economies and wartime actors’ dominant economic agendas contributing to peacemaking struggles in Somalia. However, the puzzle is not complete without an understanding of how wartime insurgent organizations operated and how through predation and perpetuation of their economic agendas they sustained themselves. By understanding how the various insurgent organizations sustained themselves, it will be easier to comprehend why peacemaking was so difficult in Somalia. It is to this, that the next section turns.

2.4 Understanding Wartime Rebel Institutions

Undertakings aimed at comprehending the complexity of the political economy of civil wars would be incomplete without an effective understanding of the nature of the insurgent actors, their motivations and organizational base and how they generate resources to sustain themselves. This section briefly reviews theoretical and empirical literature on insurgent rebellions, the role of natural resources and insurgents’ resource mobilization strategies utilized to sustain such organizations.

Rebel or insurgent institutions are key players in the initiation, sustenance and conduct of civil wars. Somewhat an offshoot of the previously discussed tensions between the greed and grievance models of civil war, studies of the motivation of rebel groups to initiate and engage in violent civil wars spark interesting debates. Two major camps emerge: those who believe that rebellions are due to grievances and those who support the greed thesis. Scholarly literature on how insurgent groups’ resource bases and related endowments influence the character, membership, structure and behavior of rebel
groups in conflict zones is quite illustrious. From his research in Uganda, Mozambique and Peru among others, Weinstein (2006) advancing knowledge on the organization of rebellions identifies two types of rebellions. First, ‘opportunistic rebellions’ – dominated by participants with low-commitment to the movement and in pursuit of short-term rewards and gains with fewer risks anticipated. In this case, economic logic dominates and shapes such opportunistic rebellions and greed outplays grievance-based causes of war. This view is among others supported by research by Collier and Sambanis, who assertively termed rebellions as commercial enterprises that create profit from plundering. Second, ‘activist rebellions’ – dominated by participants with a high commitment to the movement, in it for the long risky journey and committed to invest both their time and opportunity cost in anticipation for future gains or rewards. Hence, social logic dominates and shapes such activist rebellions and grievance outplays the motivation of greed. Indeed, the type of rebellion shapes the structure, orientation and organization of insurgent groups and the impact on their outward behavior and relations with local communities. This in turn influences the dynamics of peace processes.

However, despite Weinstein’s insightful conceptualization, in practice, greed and grievance dichotomies are not so neatly compartmentalized. Rebel groups are not static but rather transform with times as they adapt to unique challenges and opportunities as the rebellion takes root. Since rebel groups are in contention with the state, the concerned state’s counter activities will shape them to an extent. As Tarrow (2007) critiques, both

112 Ibid, 9-10.
113 See Collier and Sambanis, Understanding Civil War.
114 Weinstein, Inside Rebellion, 8-9.
the opportunistic and activist types have social and ideological imperatives and conditions under which they operate and they are influenced by external factors such as activities of the state.\textsuperscript{115} For instance, as Tarrow observed, when denied resources, opportunistic types could become activists and once they gain access to resources, nothing prevents activist group from becoming opportunists as well.\textsuperscript{116} Additionally, Tarrow commented that Weinstein failed to factor in the impact of processes such as training rituals, effect of comradeship, solidarity and local influences on recruits’ behavior and attitudes.\textsuperscript{117} Indeed, insurgent organizations’ political indoctrination and social trainings are key elements of building a cohesive force in many settings where the recruits are brainwashed and inducted into the mainstream force.

Nonetheless, such ideological orientations and tactics are castles in the sand without strong economic imperatives and logics to hold wartime organizations together. Recruits must foresee tangible economic benefits and social rewards in order to commit to the conceived struggle. Indeed, beyond those social appeals and political education, recruits’ commitments and loyalty are maintained by selective incentives and rewards and as a result, leaders are forced to engage in predation or to strategically allow their fighters to engage in looting and pillaging to survive and even prosper. Therefore, economic predation is key to building a formidable wartime organization. However, under resource poor environment such as Somalia, both economic and social logics of predation are essential mechanisms for building a strong wartime organization.

\textsuperscript{116} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{117} Ibid.
Considerable political, social and resource mobilization and networking are essential to organize, finance, nurture and sustain a credible rebel institution and discipline the fighters toward a desired goal. Importantly, scholars of social movements such as Jenkins (1983) have made plausible arguments that resource mobilization is a critical element of an organizations’ resource base in order to maintain its collective action initiatives.\(^\text{118}\) As Weinstein (2005) indicated, insurgent groups display variations in opportunity (resources, support systems, food and arms, among others), identity (ethnic and religious and regional mixes, make-up and allegiance) and strategy (trust, commitment and loyalty building approaches) based on the initial environmental circumstances.\(^\text{119}\) Such interlocking factors have important implications on the nature, structure and the strength of emergent rebel institutions and their predatory tactics and behaviors.

Essentially, insurgent groups utilize different strategies to mobilize rebel participants.\(^\text{120}\) Importantly, as McAdam et al (1996) observed, critical sources of insurgent institutions’ organizational strengths termed ‘mobilizing structures’ include social networks, personal connections and pre-existing organizations.\(^\text{121}\) Studies by scholars such as North (1990) and Putnam (1993) show that rebel leaders use existing societal norms, mutual beliefs, reciprocal agreed expectations and communal trust to


mobilize support and build cohesive insurgent organizations.\textsuperscript{122} Scholars of political mobilization theory note that people are rational beings and their political actions are rationally informed.\textsuperscript{123} The literature further suggests that insurgents make rational choices regarding whether to participate, support, oppose or stay away from a rebellion by examining its expected costs and benefits.\textsuperscript{124} To illustrate, Somalia being a resource-poor environment, insurgents tended to rely more on social endowments and social structures such as clan more than, for example, in Liberia and the DRC where insurgency was largely aided by opportunism due to the availability of easily lootable, exploitable and tradable mineral resources such as blood diamonds or coltan, respectively. However, as shall be explored later, such reliance on social structures did not prevent shrewd Somali warlords from engaging in opportunistic predation and war profiteering activities and agendas or from selling pristine beaches to nuclear waste dumping companies or from selling government assets to arms trade in order to build their wartime economic empires.

To enhance a faction’s viability and survival, Weinstein notes that their leaders require a supply of weapons and ammunitions, an ample recruitment base of fighters to execute the war and sustain the rebellion, resources to provide food, furnish and bankroll the insurgent institution; and equally as important, to build technical capacity to enhance


observing that resource endowment influences the character and behavior of insurgent groups, Weinstein asserts that economic endowments in conflicts such as Angola, Congo, Liberia and Sierra Leone attracted ‘opportunistic joiners’; while in resource-poor conflicts (such as Eritrea, Ethiopia, Uganda and Rwanda), rebel leaders relied on social networks, class, local ties and nationalistic appeals to recruit. He writes, “...while the presence of economic endowments makes it possible for leaders to recruit on the basis of short-term rewards, these groups tend to be flooded with opportunistic joiners who exhibit little commitment to the long-term goals of the organization.”

Hence, resource-based and greed-driven rebellions tend to result in weaker organizations due to an over abundance of opportunistic rebel participants.

Further, as argued by McAdam et al (2001), a group’s endowments influence its potential strategic approaches—whereby they translate their economic strengths to selective incentives or tap on social opportunities in resource-poor circumstances. Building on the same line of thought, Weinstein also argued that in resource-poor circumstances, rebel leaders utilizing social networks “...make credible promises about the private rewards that will come with victory.” He posits that the credibility of the promises is founded on key social endowments such as a group’s identity ties, and interests to protect one’s reputation is critical.

For example, in other resource-poor conflicts such as Ethiopia and Eritrea during their various civil wars, rebel leaders used

---

125 Weinstein, “Resources and information problem,” 599.
126 Ibid.
127 Ibid.
129 Weinstein, “resources and information problem,” 599.
130 Ibid, 603.
social ethnic appeals to voluntarily or forcefully recruit participants with a promise of future rewards or improved status.\textsuperscript{131} Given such enticements, Weinstein argues that ‘opportunistic joiners’ give way to committed activists. This factor might explain the success of both the Eritrean and Ethiopian revolutions.

However, although Weinstein asserts that material incentives remain a central attractor for rebel participants\textsuperscript{132}, considerable uncertainties exist regarding the true commitment of a potential rebel participant, which poses unique challenges for rebel recruiters. Particularly, under resource-poor circumstances, leaders have to tap into social capital and structures such as clans to mobilize populations. Nonetheless, often in chaotic conflict situations such as in the failed state of Somalia, daily survival and immediate short-term economic returns outweigh long-term political rewards to self and to the clan. Hence, economic predation and economic agendas of wartime leaders, their fighters and clan constituent tends to dominate their decision-making processes.

Factions need economic resources to wage successful wars. Scholarly and policy studies have established links between the abundance of natural resources and the onset and duration of internal conflicts.\textsuperscript{133} Experiences of various conflicts reveal that predation


\textsuperscript{132} Weinstein, “Resources and information problem,” 603.

tends to be one of the dominant strategies of rebel financing through exploitation of natural resources or other conflict goods. From the ‘blood diamonds’ trade in Liberia to opium production in Asia and South America, the political economy of civil war underlies the various devastating civil wars. The linking of the abundance of natural resources to a high likelihood of violent conflicts has dominated many of the contemporary debates relative to civil wars. In the studies of civil wars, two streams of scholarly work have emerged from economic studies and political science schools of thought.

On the one hand, Collier and Hoeffler (2005), fronting the economic literature’s ‘resource curse’ arguments, posit that there is a link between natural ‘resource curse’ which “leads to low-income growth rates and low levels of income” later resulting in “low opportunity costs for rebellions and make civil wars more likely.”134 Similarly, studies by Ross (2003) also reveals a connection between the presence of lootable resources and the occurrence of non-separatist insurgencies in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Afghanistan, Angola, DRC, Colombia, Peru and Cambodia, where armed groups were bent on exploiting lootable resources such as coltan, alluvial gemstones, narcotic crops and timber, among others.135 On the other hand, political scientists front the argument that there exists a link between “…natural resources and weak institutions.”136 According to these groups, violent conflicts are not necessarily due to ‘resource curse’

---

135 Ross, “Oil, Drugs, and Diamonds.”
assertions but instead are indicative of weak institutional governance and poor
democratic practices among the affected states, which unwisely utilize patronage politics
in the exploitation of such resources and revenue thereof. However, this argument does
not hold under state collapse environments such as Somalia, as there are no functional
government structures.

In most African conflicts there exist an intricate link that binds resources,
predation and patronage which are essential for cultivating and maintaining not only
predation but perpetuate economic agendas. In fact, studies by Robinson and Verdier
(2003) showed that patronage ties are maintained through ensuring flows of resources
and incentives rather than provision of assets to build resilient dependency.137 For
example, Collier and Hoeffler citing Botswana’s excellent utilization of its rich mineral
endowments for the greater public good and economic advancement argue that, “…large
resource rents are not intrinsically a curse.”138 This view casts the ‘curse’ not as being
due to resource abundance but because of the political elite and weak institutions’
inability to effectively utilize them to promote collective well-being. Further in an
interesting case study, Dunning (2005) observed that Botswana’s dependence on minerals
was not affected by market shocks relating to commodity-generated revenues because of
fruitful relationship with De Beers.139

Such shrewd rulers and conflict entrepreneurs tend to ration patronage resources
to their clients to maintain some form of loyalty over a period of time. In Somalia, just

---
137 James A. Robinson and Thierry Verdier, *The political economy of clientelism*. Center for Economic
139 Thad Dunning, “Resource dependence, economic performance, and political stability,” *Journal of
like Barre, the emergent shrewd wartime actors tended to use economic patronage to solicit and maintain support from clan structures as they continued to engage in predatory economies and perpetuate their economic interests. Other studies have linked predation of agricultural-based commodities (which essentially provides modest rents) to significant risk of conflicts. Indeed, predatory resource or commodity-based wars were aggressively fought over the control of key commodities such as bananas and khat in Somalia because these products provide quick cash to the insurgent group’s political and militia commanders as well as to the fighters.

Key situational complexes help us understand wartime actors’ resource-based predatory behaviors and decision-making processes. Writing on why rulers engage in predation and looting, Collier and Hoeffler suggest that decisions to engage in sanctioned predation and looting of resource rents over investments in long-term public goods for enhanced national growth tend to be influenced by four circumstances as follows. First, a ruler’s shorter time horizon. Second, elites’ narrow base where the populace is dominated by elites from a smaller minority group, which tends to loot feverishly. Third, the existence of deep perceptions and a mismatch between low societal incomes and the presence of highly valuable public assets, whereby looting becomes more attractive than larger societal benefits. Finally, where patronage politics dominate over electoral democracy, due to easy availability of cash and fewer requirements for taxation further weakens institutional checks and balances. Further, they add that in an autocratic society,

---


the autocrat’s time horizon becomes a key determinant in the looting game, as “…in conditions of extreme regime instability, whoever is in power will rationally loot.”\textsuperscript{142} Thus, wartime actors make rational decisions to loot state resources by performing a cost-benefit analysis between present gains and future reward scenarios, with their regime security being a key determinant.

However, a long time horizon does not necessarily deter looting. Giving examples of dictatorial rulers such as Bokasa of Central African Republic and Mobutu of Zaire, Collier and Hoeffler further argue that even dictators who anticipate being in power for many years, often adopt predatory tactics when “…incomes are so low that the opportunity cost of growth foregone is small.”\textsuperscript{143} Additionally, they add that even under situations where growth opportunities are favorable and when the regime leader relies upon a narrow ethnic minority for support (such as among military juntas in Nigeria), then resource looting still becomes a preferred option.\textsuperscript{144} For example, in DRC, Somalia and Liberia, the regimes of Mobutu Seseseko, Said Barre and Samuel Doe, in addition to dependency on foreign aid, relied heavily on the support from core clan or ethnic groups to ensure survival of their respective feeble dictatorial regimes. But most of those regimes crumbled as Cold-War patronage funds began drying up and looting and maintenance of communal alliances became more costly. However, like other conflict situations, previous ruler’s predatory behaviors and tactics were adopted by emergent wartime actors during the war period in Somalia.

\textsuperscript{142} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{143} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{144} Ibid.
In sum, there is a degree of interdependence between predatory regimes and patronage networks which benefitted situations like Somalia – as patronage ties driven by wartime actors create resilient war economies-based markets for illicitly acquired wealth. Collier and Hoeffler conclude that resources bankroll conflicts also produce shocks that become a direct risk factor for conflict eruption and importantly, stimulate patronage politics.\textsuperscript{145} A key lesson is that lootable resources are easily extractable, moveable and marketable and access to such resources extends the duration of the conflict as inflow of revenues enable factions to arms themselves and delay the onset of a hurting stalemate. Indeed, patronage politics (be it from legitimate governments or black market operatives) bent on supporting wartime actors linked to predatory war economies undermine peacemaking efforts.

The above section reviewed the literature on the structure and organization of rebel institutions, their predatory resource mobilization and financing strategies and linkages with the availability of natural resources. Indeed, economic predation, facilitative war economies and wartime actors’ dominant economic agendas are key elements in the organization and sustenance of rebel institutions and hence impact civil war peacemaking processes. Before examining the empirical case study of Somalia’s Mbagathi peace process to effectively understand how the above key elements contributed to its peacemaking struggles, it is essential to review key literature on civil war peacemaking, focusing on the ripeness theory and to briefly revisit conditions that

\textsuperscript{145} Ibid, 631-2.
promote successful negotiations and related obstacles. The next section concludes by restating the gaps in the literature that this study seeks to address.

2.5 Civil War Peacemaking: Role of Negotiations in Civil War Termination

Over the years, substantial knowledge has emerged from scholarly studies analyzing and documenting several pathways through which civil wars end. Pillar (1983) conceptualized civil war termination as a bargaining process between two conflicting parties and the signing of a peace agreement as the conclusion of such an initiative. Pillar identified five ways through which wars ended: absorption, termination, expulsion, capitulation and withdrawal. In his study of 142 wars (69 inter-state, 52 extra-systemic and 21 civil wars) fought between 1800-1980, Pillar observed that 68 percent of those wars ended through negotiation between warring parties. Although a review of civil war termination literature suggests that despite the complexity of civil wars and the fact that only a quarter to one-third of civil wars ended through negotiation, in the post-cold war period, scholars such as Zartman (1995) and Pillar assert that negotiation still remains the best process for war termination. Wagner (1993) observed that civil wars that ended through military victory, capitulation or

---

149 Ibid, 25.
extermination by one actor over the other had lesser chances of resurgence than those concluded through negotiation.\textsuperscript{151} Licklider (1995), in his study of negotiated settlements from 1940-1992 of the internal civil wars, found that only a third culminated in successfully implemented peace agreements.\textsuperscript{152}

According to Licklider, the key factors that make negotiations of such wars difficult include: the complexity of the wars; the need to adhere to the principles of noninterference in the internal affairs of states; and the absence of credible institutions or power to implement the peace accords.\textsuperscript{153} Licklider established that overall “…negotiated settlements of civil wars are less likely to endure than the results of military victories.”\textsuperscript{154} He observed that 27 percent of the negotiated civil wars relapsed to fresh wars within five years as opposed to 13 percent of militarily concluded wars.\textsuperscript{155}

Similarly, expanding on this, Miall (1992) observed that greater intensity arising from emotional and political investments and a greater scope of fighting defines the increasing intractability of such wars.\textsuperscript{156} Other scholars have emphasized that timelines are important in shaping the long-term outcomes of civil war termination. Although various scholars pushed for negotiated settlement to quickly end civil wars and save human life, others such as Luttwak (1999) have argued that war should be given a chance so that the

\textsuperscript{153} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{154} Ibid, 685.
dominant victorious actor emerges. In attempts to bridge the divide between the two camps, Toft (2010) notes that extending time horizons to fully understand the outcomes of negotiated settlement of civil wars is important. Toft argued that the negotiated peace settlements from 1940 – 2002 stopped civil wars and saved lives in the short-term, but set the stage for eruption of new wars and authoritarianism; while rebels’ victories in the long-term promoted and sustained peace germinating to democracies. Therefore striking a balance between a premature termination of civil conflicts through negotiated settlement and rebel victories is critical for realization of durable peace and inculcation of sustainable democracies in post-conflict situations. As explored below, another important element is an understanding of the conditions that favor or impede successful negotiation of civil wars. The next section briefly revisits the ripeness theory and examines conditions favoring successful peace negotiations.

2.5.1 Conditions Favoring Successful Peace Negotiations: Ripeness Theory Revisited

Peace negotiation is a vital political process for constructing positive relations in war-torn societies. Asserting that negotiation is an arena and a process through which groups compete for power and status, Druckman and Green (1995) defines negotiations as “…a cooperative game influenced by an interplay between values (or ideologies) and

---

159 Toft, “Ending Civil Wars.”
interests...” Ikle (1964) mapped out five typologies of negotiation objectives: extension, normalization, redistribution, innovation (where parties engage in constructive problem-solving orientated negotiation) and ‘side-effects’ negotiation’. Boutros-Ghali (1995) pointed out that a successful peace process is one that “…must come to include comprehensive efforts to identify and support structures which will tend to consolidate peace and advance a sense of confidence and wellbeing among people.” Similarly, emphasizing the transformative capacity of a peace process, Darby (2001) argued that its central goal is “…to alter human behavior from a helpless acceptance of fell deeds to the civilized conduct of human relations.” Concurring, Saunders (2001) noted that the purpose of a peace process is to create an avenue through which parties to the conflict are assisted to resolve their differences and build constructive human relationships. Thus, a successful peace process should alter the conflict’s structure and relationship between the belligerent parties to one of compromise, accommodation and benign relation.

How do we recognize a successful peace process? Measuring success or a failure of a peace process negotiation is certainly a value judgment, context specific and is impacted by the parties’ levels of commitment to war or peace. Mitchell (1989) argued

---

162 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Agenda for Peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping (New York: UN Department of Public Information, 1995), 11.
that success is inherent and context-based. Generally, the key features of successful negotiations include: shared interests and values, joint gain and a satisfying formula that moves the talks toward a negotiated solution. In the case studies of peace negotiations of protracted internal conflicts in Lebanon, Afghanistan, Liberia, Colombia, Cambodia, South Africa and Mozambique, among others, scholars place emphasis on specific conditions and generally observed that nine key conditions nurtured successful negotiations. These include: i) the presence of ripeness (for example a mutually hurting stalemate, valid representatives and acceptance by the parties that negotiation is the option to redressing their grievances); ii) power symmetry; iii) legitimate and strong parties; iv) shared interests and values; v) expectations of joint gains; vi) a satisfying formula; vii) the presence of strong internal and external pressure (such as changing contexts, carrots or sticks); viii) strong leadership structure within the parties; and ix) a mediator’s leverage and tactics. It is necessary to expand on some of these factors.

First, ripeness is a major condition for favorable negotiation. Advanced by Zartman (1989), the ripeness theory greatly enhanced our understanding of the conditions that make conflicts amenable to successful negotiations. Ripeness, as Zartman (1989, 2000) pointed out, is not an automatic process but has to be tactically nurtured by three elements: existence of a mutually hurting stalemate, conflict parties’ realization that negotiation is the only solution to the conflict and the existence of valid spokespersons

---

166 See Zartman, ed., Elusive Peace; and Druckman and Green, “Playing Two Games.”
167 For detailed discussions on these case studies see Zartman, ed., Elusive Peace.
among the conflict parties to ensure commitment to the deal. These three elements underlie the conditions that sustain successful negotiations. It has been argued that timing also has significant implications for ripeness. Whilst observing that conflict ripeness holds the key to the success of diplomatic negotiations, Hass (1990) cautioned against excessive meddling by mediators and diplomats in an unripe conflict which might become counterproductive. Hence, sustainable peace talks are a product of a clearly ripe conflict situation.

Second, another critical element for successful negotiation is power symmetry between conflict parties. Scholarly research findings inform that successful negotiations depend on the existence of some form of equality where parties possess collective veto power over specific outcomes. During wars, parties pursue their interests, needs and aspirations through violent means. Often times, wartime actors engage in predatory war economies to perpetuate their economic agendas with a view to marshal political power in order to be seen as a formidable political force at the negotiating table. Essentially, balance of power, strength and the convergence of parties’ interests nurture the negotiation process. On another level, negotiation is the business of deal making and an arena where parties engage in the competitive politics for power and status as they strive

---

to meet groups’ needs and interests with the desire to preserve, propagate or impose their values and ideological positions on the rivals. Therefore, the extent to which a negotiation process peacefully accomplishes and creates some form of convergence of groups’ interests is a critical measure of its success and sustainability.

Third, competent leadership is key because ripeness and power symmetry alone cannot nurture successful negotiations. The parties to the conflict must possess sufficient strength and competent leadership to initiate and execute the complex tasks of negotiations in the midst of ongoing violence. In a study of negotiations in the Philippines, Druckman and Green observed that legitimacy, strong parties, ripeness and a satisfying formula signified successful negotiations.172 Similarly, in the studies of peace negotiations in Mozambique between RENAMO (Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana) and FRELIMO (Portuguese Frente de Libertação de Moçambique) and in Afghanistan, which involved several internal actors, scholars observed that power symmetry (balance of power between the government and the rebels) and the presence of weak but legitimate factions were critical factors that nurtured the peace negotiations.173

Negotiation is a cyclical process, which at times reaches special points of divine encounters between adversaries in talks. Scholars such as Morris and Wheeler (2001) and Druckman (2001) used key terms to label these critical junctures—as critical moments or

---

172 Druckman and Green, “Playing Two Games,” 299-331.
choice points\textsuperscript{174} or turning points\textsuperscript{175} to capture the special moments of significant shifts and breakthroughs in the negotiation process. Druckman (1997) conceptualized and advanced the concept of turning points, which he defined as, “…events or processes that mark passage from one stage to the next, signaling progress from earlier to later phases.”\textsuperscript{176} There exists a symbiotic relationship between ripeness and turning points or critical moments in the negotiation process. Echoing the conditions of the ripeness theory, Zartman elaborates that a turning point is fostered by:

An inconclusive victory, an inconclusive defeat, a bloody standoff that suddenly brings costs home, a loss of foreign support or an increase in foreign pressure, a shift of fortunes that weakens the stronger side or strengthen the weaker, all accompanied by a new perception of the possibility of a negotiated solution.\textsuperscript{177}

For the parties, Zartman argued that future uncertainties, costly wars, natural calamities, economic sanctions and the presence of an overwhelming hurting stalemate and leadership changes could translate into a critical turning point favorable to the negotiation process.\textsuperscript{178} To reach a critical turning point and move towards a negotiated solution, Zartman argues that parties must be able to have an informed outlook based on their perception of both incentives and disincentives that confront or might confront them at a future date.\textsuperscript{179} In a nutshell, Zartman observed that during peace talks, parties exchange “…a perception of unpromising ambiguity…for a perception of promising

\textsuperscript{177} Zartman, “Dynamics and Constraints,” 18.
\textsuperscript{178} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{179} Ibid.
ambiguity.”\textsuperscript{180} Turning points are influenced by a variety of exogenous and endogenous factors and are a function of overcoming various barriers in the negotiation process and related environments.

Hence, the literature asserts that ripeness conditions including strong leadership and strong and united factions aid peace processes, while weak and divided batch undermines such efforts. However, how does ripeness emerge or get curtailed under resource poor environments such as Somalia where both economic and social logics of predation are present? It emerges that the ripeness theory does not sufficiently explain how predation influences ripeness and particularly how economic agendas facilitate or hinder ripeness, particularly under resource poor environments. In Somalia, which is a resource poor environment, what forms a mutually hurting stalemate, shared interests and values, joint gains and satisfying formula for the predatory wartime actors in the negotiation processes? I argue that for the Somali wartime actors, their shared interests and values, joint gains and satisfying formula rests on the convergence of their predatory interests and values around rewarding war economies and uninterrupted access and control of predatory war economies. As for the satisfying formula, it relates to power-sharing agreements which promise them a political future to dominate and continue with predation, protect their wealth and economic interests and perpetuate the economic agendas. Power symmetry is linked to the level of predatory resources that the dominant actor controls.

\textsuperscript{180} Ibid.
Thus, with all the above conditions working in the favor of wartime actors coupled with commitment to the pursuit of economic agendas over political goals of reconciliation, no strong and legitimate leadership emerged to push for genuine reconciliation. Instead, a mutually beneficial stalemate took root thereby undermining the emergence of ripeness. Indeed, as long as the Somali parties continued benefitting from predatory war economies and pursuing their economic agendas unrestricted, turning points and ripeness are difficult to reach – hence the struggles of peacemaking.

2.5.2 Barriers to the Negotiation Process

A successful peace negotiation also depends on the existence and nature of barriers and the ability of the mediators to assist the parties in overcoming them. Three major categories of barriers to the negotiation process exist. These include: context-based barriers which encompass the structural power asymmetry and other social, cultural, political, and regional complexities that affect the negotiation environment; issues-based barriers which emerge from the very conditions of the negotiation itself and are tactical in nature; and violence.\footnote{181} Context-based barriers might include differences about the initiation of talks, reluctance to go first, talks’ venue, the particular participants and their level of representation, recognition and status problems and leadership struggles.\footnote{182} At times, parties may also be reluctant to take the first step to initiate peace talks for fear of domestic constituents’ pressure, fear to be seen as weak or eager for talks by the other

party, or due to uncertainty and distrust not knowing how the other party reacts.\textsuperscript{183} Issues-based barriers could also arise from the constituents’ pressure, motivations and commitment to war, inter-party fears, mistrusts and suspicions of how the other party responds or sequencing and discussion of substantive issues.\textsuperscript{184} Additionally, as tactical moves, parties engage in what Ikle called ‘side-effects’ based negotiations.\textsuperscript{185} As such, Pillar notes that in negotiation, parties tend to exaggerate their hostilities and use the talk as a public relation and image-building opportunity, while demonizing the other party with a view to position themselves favorably at the expense of their adversaries.\textsuperscript{186} This enables parties to claim the moral high ground in the public’s eye. The barrier of violence that may accompany negotiation processes is the work of peace spoilers who operate in fragile security situations and the inherent uncertainty in war-torn societies.

Spoilers often undermine peace processes. In his influential article, Stedman (1997) advanced the concept of peace spoilers.\textsuperscript{187} Noting that peace talks generate spoilers, he categorized spoilers into two camps: the insiders and outsiders, which are further, ranked as total spoilers, limited spoilers and greedy spoilers.\textsuperscript{188} Stedman argued that spoiler problems arise from three major conditions.\textsuperscript{189} First, due to what he called ‘strategic deception’ by conflict parties who enter into peace agreements not due to the commitment to resolving the conflict for mutual gain, but rather to use the peace

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{183} Pillar, \textit{Negotiating Peace}.
\item \textsuperscript{184} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{185} Ikle, \textit{How Nations Negotiate}, 43-58.
\item \textsuperscript{186} Pillar, \textit{Negotiating Peace}.
\item \textsuperscript{188} Ibid, 8.
\item \textsuperscript{189} Ibid, 8-11.
\end{itemize}
agreement as a springboard to win the war against their adversaries. Second, parties’ collusion with determined spoilers to disrupt a signed peace agreement; and finally, the implementers’ uncertainties and vast complexity—the fog of peace.\textsuperscript{190} For example, writing on the role of elites (from the state, private sector and military actors) and dominance of their interests during peace talks in Guatemala, Jonas (1999) observed, “… a peace negotiation is a matter of cold calculation of power and advantage by two warring parties, by all standards the most Machiavellian of events.”\textsuperscript{191} Similarly, McClearly et al (1999) found that the interests of the military and private sector elites dominated the Guatemalan peace process and the ‘elite accommodation’ nurtured the transition to peace.\textsuperscript{192} Hence, oftentimes, spoilers act to protect their political and economic interests.

As shall be explored in the empirical case study of Mbagathi peace talks, it will be demonstrated that especially economically motivated greed spoilers were determined to derail the process either with the hope of gaining an advantage at the negotiating table or because peace threatens their economic interests and aspirations or even as a result of an intraparty power struggle for prominence. Violence tends to be one of the most frequently used predatory tactics of wartime actors to protect their predation havens, expand war economies and perpetuate their economic agendas. Particularly, during peace talks, spoilers benefitting from predation and economic opportunities pose great challenges to peace processes that threaten to disrupt the status quo or obstruct the advancement of

\textsuperscript{190} Ibid, 17.
their economic agendas. Wartime actors use fear and violence as tactics to intimidate rivals, and even mediators, and to secure resources for predation. Hence, violence during peace talks becomes just another strategy of predation.

This section examined dynamics of civil war peacemaking, revisited the ripeness theory, and demonstrated that civil war peacemaking literature is quite mature and shows that conflict ripeness is key for sound peace negotiation. The next section maps out the focus of the study.

2.6 Conclusion: Establishing the Gap in the Literature

In conclusion, this chapter began from the standpoint of the political economy of civil war and its possible impact on peacemaking processes and addressed key relevant interlocked theoretical and empirical literature. It reviewed a large body of both theoretical and empirical literature on the nature of the political economy of civil wars by focusing on concepts, drivers and theories of rebellion (greed and grievance debates). It also examined dynamics and challenges posed by new wars and war economies in shadow states; revisited types, structure and resource mobilization strategies of insurgent organizations by highlighting the nexus between natural resources and rebellions; and examined key aspects of civil war peacemaking and the ripeness theory that forms the foundation of this study.

Revealing the complex interactions between greed and grievance theories of rebellion, the reviews enhance our understanding of contemporary civil wars such as in Somalia. The disintegration of shadow states deepen and accelerate the
institutionalization of war economies and emergence of dominant wartime actors, which then become the drivers of the war economies and other black market operations. The existence of an intricate web knitting together the inherited practices from shadow states, new wars and war economies on which predation and insurgent groups’ structures are anchored and operationalized, greatly impacts on peacemaking processes. Importantly, it also emerges that quite often, predation with economic logic is dominant in conflicts occurring in areas endowed with easily lootable high-value natural resources which become critical for financing insurgent organizations. Moreover, it emerges that opportunistic and activist rebellions exist from one war to another. It also emerges that rebel recruits make informed decisions to either join or stay away from rebellions through calculations of costs and benefits grounded on expectations of immediate gain or future rewards. Oftentimes, wartime actors use fear and violence to protect their economic interests, accumulate wealth and amass political power to dominate security and political environments. At the heart of most insurgent organizations lie deep-seated actors’ economic motives with economic agendas trumping political agendas and thereby becoming the permanent trademark and major obstacles to peace settlement. Additionally, the chapter revisited the literature on civil war peacemaking, focusing on the ripeness theory and factors promoting or hindering successful negotiation processes. The ripeness theory has made significant contributions to our theoretical and practical understanding of peacemaking. It states that three principal conditions nurtures ripeness: existence of a stalemate; conflict parties’ realization that negotiation is the only way out; and participation of valid representatives. This is the promise of the ripeness theory.
The existing literature on the political economy of civil wars assume that high value, easily lootable natural resources generate predation and support greed-based organizations. There are at least two types of predation. The first is the model in the existing literature – the greed-based ‘blood diamonds’ model in which wartime organizations seize lootable resources by mobilizing individuals on the basis of economic incentives. Somalia, however, is not explained by this model. There is a gap because this literature does not explain non-resource based patterns of predation such as Somalia. Indeed, using Somalia as a case study, this dissertation makes a critical contribution to knowledge by developing a second model of predation which is based upon wartime organizations that have both an economic and a social logic and that mobilizes people on the basis of social structures such as clan. Thus, this dissertation investigates how under the conditions of a high degree of economic predation, pervasive war economies and wartime actors’ dominant economic agendas undermined the peace settlement initiatives in the troubled state of Somalia. It is argued that the lack of easily lootable natural resources in places like Somalia compels wartime organizations to develop non-economic as well as economic incentives to recruit supporters and sustain predatory wartime institutions. Although, the ripeness theory offers insights, it does not sufficiently explain how predation under resource-poor environments such as Somalia impedes peace settlement where predation with both economic and social logics, aided by facilitative war economies and coupled with wartime actors’ dominance of economic agendas over political agendas, characterize the peacemaking landscape.
This dissertation will enrich both the academic and policymaking communities with critical theoretical insights and practical knowledge on the dynamic interactions between key features of the political economy of civil wars and peacemaking initiatives. It will enable the design of effective peace negotiations and practical policy decisions to enhance ripeness under such civil war situations. The next chapters provide narratives of the empirical case study of Somalia’s Mbagathi peace process and provide an analysis of how the identified variables influenced the peacemaking environment.
CHAPTER 3 DYNAMICS OF STATE COLLAPSE AND EXPERIENCES OF 
EARLY PEACE NEGOTIATIONS IN SOMALIA

This chapter provides a brief background to the Somali conflict and describes key 
interventions and peacemaking initiatives in Somalia. The Mbagathi peace process also 
known as the Somali National Reconciliation Conference (SNRC)\(^{193}\) of 2002-2004 was 
in a way, a reaction to the outcomes of the Arta peace process. Hence to better understand 
its genesis, structure, dynamics, outcomes and struggles, it is instructive to revisit the 
Arta peace talks. Through the narratives, this chapter sets the stage for the key objectives 
of chapters four and five.

3.1 The Path to Collapse and Overview of the Conflict

The fragility of Somalia as a nation state was exposed during the early years of 
independence. In the pre-independence period, the various regions of Somalia were 
colonies of various European powers: the British ruled over northern Somalia (now 
Somaliland) while Italy ruled over the southern, central and Puntland regions. The British 
Somaliland and Italian Somaliland gained their independence on June 26, 1960 and July 
1, 1960 respectively.\(^{194}\) The two regions formed the new Somali Republic on July 1,

\(^{193}\) Please note that the peace process initially started as Somali National Reconciliation Conference 
(SNRC) in western Eldoret, Kenya but because of its final venue at the Mbagathi College in the suburb of 
Nairobi, it is commonly referred to as the Mbagathi peace process. This study adopts this name.

\(^{194}\) Hussein Adam, *From Tyranny to Anarchy: The Somali Experience* (New Jersey, Trenton and Asmara: 
Red Sea Press, 2008), 1.
1960 in a Union, which soon got afflicted with cancerous problems of clannism, nepotism, corruption and political wrangling among the political elites. In 1961, northern military officers unsuccessfully launched a secessionist coup against the regime. In 1967 through a clever manipulation of multiparty elections, Egal became Somalia’s Prime Minister (PM) of Somalia. For Somalia, 1969 was a momentous year as about 60 political parties competed in a multiparty election that was followed by violent post-election violence and in the frenzy, President Abdirashid Sharmakhe was assassinated, driving the country into anarchic chaos. Taking advantage of the post-election anarchic situation, General Mohammed Siad Barre staged a successful coup and grabbed power. As Adam (1995) noted, Barre, “…more or less, practiced relatively proportional clan arithmetic: the inclusion of diverse clan representatives in the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC), the cabinet and various official bodies.” As we shall see shortly, this arithmetic of clan balance greatly featured in the constitution of Somalia’s governing bodies. The perception that elites from Italian Somaliland dominated key governmental institutions to the dissatisfaction of the elites from the British Somaliland not only brewed inter-regional conflicts but also threatened the Union from inception.

So, what went wrong in the attempts to harmonize inter-clan relations in Somalia leading to the horrific factional fighting in the streets of Mogadishu and the eventual disintegration of Somalia? In understanding the dynamics of conflicts in Somalia, certain

---

195 Adam, *From Tyranny to Anarchy*, 1.
196 Ibid.
197 Ibid.
key drivers can be identified, notably: militarization of power and dictatorial governance, clan-based politics, regionalization of politics between the northern and southern Somalia, emergence of powerful non-state actors and economic predation, changes in international environment, and the role of patronage politics – international assistance and the nature of state relations in the Horn of Africa. Scholars put forth various explanations to make sense of the collapse of such a highly homogenous Somali nation.

First, militarization of politics and dictatorial governance played critical roles in the eventual disintegration of Somalia. Adam, describing the imminent collapse of Somalia writes:

When a candle is about to flicker out, it tends to shine more brightly for a while. For a decade or more, the military regime headed by Mohamed Siyad Barre manifested a strong Somali military state that extended its influence into both urban and rural areas. Its legitimacy and functioning receded during the 1980s, ending in violent collapse in January 1991. The Siyad’s regime concentrated power fell into a vacuum created by years of violent oppression of Somali society.\(^{198}\)

Barre’s personalization of power critically fostered the militarization of politics in Somalia. As Adam argues, over time Barre transformed his dictatorial ruling styles from “…prophetic to autocratic to tyrannical.”\(^{199}\) From 1970-1997, pursuing ‘scientific socialism’ Barre emerged as a prophetic ruler with a grand vision to unify all Somalis and build a ‘Greater Somalia’ but quickly became an autocrat (1978-86) and later a tyrant (1987-91), until his fall in 1991.\(^{200}\)

\(^{198}\) Adam, “Somalia: A Terrible Beauty Being Born?” 69. For detailed accounts of the nature of Barre’s governance see also Adam, From Tyranny to Anarchy, 35-75.
\(^{199}\) Adam, From Tyranny to Anarchy, 38.
\(^{200}\) Adam, From Tyranny to Anarchy, 9; Adam, “Somalia: A Terrible Beauty Being Born?” 71.
Heavy militarization was a key factor in the process of degeneration and state collapse. At independence, the country had only a 3,000-member army, but the Union of Soviets Socialist Republics (USSR) assisted in the training of another 12,000 soldiers and at the onset of the Ogaden War in 1977, reaching a 120,000-strong force and considered one of the best armies in Africa.\(^{201}\) Adam commented that, “The army of liberation had been converted to a huge army of repression.”\(^{202}\) Echoing the above, Samatar and Samatar (2002) providing a historical perspective on the militarization of the Somali state describes:

The rot started with the commandeering of the state power by the armed forces after the assassination of President Sharmarkee in 1969. Immediately, a culture of militarism descended on the country and displaced what until then was a relatively flexible and relaxed society. In addition, the rigidity of militarist ethos was accompanied by everyday demonstrations of force and fear as the primary tools for the management of public affairs, large military procurements, and high visibility of new privileges for officers. With the structure and staffing of the state redone in the image of a military garrison, centralization as well as concentration of power, hitherto unheard of, became the norm. Increasingly, the arguments goes, those changes produced their own logic—one that would turn Siyaad Barre into the only permissible source of knowledge and wisdom.\(^{203}\)

Second, to solidify his power, Barre pursued paternalistic patronage politics by consolidating power and creating a monopoly of violence into his own hands and those of trusted family, relatives, and clan and sub-clan members drawn from Darod’s Marehan, Ogaden and Dulbante clan families to key government’s institutions. Young (1986), writing on a ruler’s institutionalization of power by rewarding loyalists argued:

\(^{202}\) Ibid.  
Beyond and often in addition to affinity, personal interest is the most reliable collateral for loyalty. Accordingly, rulers must reward generously and impose severe sanctions for any weakening or zeal. Thus, public resources become a pool of benefits and prebends, while dismissal from office, confiscation of goods, and prosecution face those who show slackness in their personal fidelity. Holders of high office individually tend to become clients of the ruler and collectively a service class.²⁰⁴

Similarly, as Menkhaus (1997) argued, Somali ruling elites used a deeply entrenched culture of governmental patronage to hold Somalia together in order to counter other forces working against stability.²⁰⁵

Hence, clan politics played a critical role in the perpetuation of the Somali crisis. In Somalia, clan-based governance was key in what Adam called a shift “…from Nomenklatura to Clan-Klatura.”²⁰⁶ Being a linguistically and religiously homogeneous country, Adam observes that Somalia’s history reveals that its “…ethnic conflict has only one axe to grind: clanism.”²⁰⁷ In the same vein, Somali expert and anthropologist, Ioan Lewis (1994), writing on the collapse of Somalia noted, “…the collapse of the colonially created state represents technically a triumph for the segmentary lineage system and the political power of kinship….”²⁰⁸ Hence, this assertion speaks to the role and power of clans as a key component of social structure and the governance of the Somali nation. Barre excessively relied first on nomenklatura – following in the footsteps of his USSR ally where appointments to strategic positions were based on political loyalty to control

²⁰⁷ Adam, From Tyranny to Anarchy, 116.
²⁰⁸ Lewis, Blood and Bone, 233.
civilian and military affairs. Then, he shifted to clanism as the basis for appointments to key institutions advancing what is popularly known by the code name MOD – a clan-family network: his clan, Marehan; his mother’s, Ogaden and the Dulbante – the clan of his favorite son-in-law and the head of National Security Service (General Mohamed Hersi Morgan). Indeed, the Somali state was perceived as the personal property of Barre’s extended family. Further, as Samatar and Samatar noted, the dreaded military intelligence force known as Dabarjebinta, meaning the backbone breakers staffed by his family and extended clan family networks became the popular instrument of societal domination and power accumulation. Writing in 1992, Africa Watch and Physicians for Human Right (PHR) observed that Barre:

Destroyed all independent institutions, making it difficult for voices of moderation to emerge. He manipulated clan loyalties and encouraged regional rivalries in order to maintain his grip on power. The absence of democratic channels to protest and to curb severe and widespread human rights abuses made armed resistance the only possibility for challenging Barre’s monopoly of power.

Barre effectively used extensive patronage politics to solicit and maintain internal loyalty.

Third, through the institutionalization of clan rule, Barre used fear, intimidation and violence to silence and punish opposition and other dissidents. Through such manipulations of the social structure, he favored his clans and discriminated against other clan members despite their qualifications in the appointment to key institutions. Adam reflects, “the damage done to the Somali elite class partly explains both the total state

---

209 Lewis, Modern History of Somalia, 222.
collapse and the delay in Somali state renewal.”

Adam argues that Barre ‘poisoned clan relations’—armed clans and triggered interclan warfare especially in the rural areas with his military most times leading the way in clan battles. Indeed, as Lyons and Samatar (1995) point out, such poisoned clan relations fed into current failures to unite competing clan interests to resurrect the state. Clan politics were driven by what Adam termed, “…negative clan consciousness… [which was]…provoked as a result of memories of past clan conflicts due to competition for resources or prestige.”

Additionally, Barre’s regime utilized urban state terror through which the state deliberately targeted young men and terrorized them in cities, especially in the north during 1989-1990 resulting in horrific massacres of religious protestors and other targeted clans. In this state-driven politics of violence, northern Somalia (now Somaliland) was greatly affected and victimized. Through what Adam called ‘Neofascist Campaigns Against the North’, the south dominated the north. Adam notes that during the unification of the north and the south, the south to an extent monopolized top government positions while even the north’s former PM was appointed to a low-key position as the Education Minister. In Somalia’s governing bodies, the southerners saw the northerners as junior players in the country’s political future, which perpetuated politics of regional dominance among the country’s elites. Hence, the ‘poisoned clan

213 Ibid, 73.
215 Adam, From Tyranny to Anarchy, 61 (Added words).
relations’ and societal wounds continued to foster inter-clan rivalry, politics and fear, which became some of the major obstacles to several initiatives to rebuild the country.

Consequently, Barre’s militaristic, autocratic, tyrannical governance and clan-based discrimination, to an extent, triggered societal armed response evidenced by the emergence of clan-based armed groups. Initially, clan-based opposition groups emerged in the north (now Somaliland) among the Isaaq clan and later other clans joined the bandwagon of armed opposition to Barre’s regime. First, in April 1978, a group led by Colonel Abdullahi Yussuf, consisting of the Somali national army officers, unsuccessfully attempted to topple Barre and later fled to Ethiopia and formed the first clan-based armed opposition group Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF). Additionally, established in 1981 in London, the Somali National Movement (SNM) operated from its bases in Somali-dominated cities in Ethiopia and other border areas with Somaliland. Furthermore, in 1989, the Hawiye clan dissidents formed the USC with Ali Mahdi and General Farah Mohamed Aideed leading the civilian and military wings, respectively. Similarly, soldiers and officers from the Ogaden clan of the larger Darod clan from both southern and northern Somalia defected and created another armed group – the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) led by Colonel Omar Jess and General Gabyow. In 1988, another group of the SNM, mainly composed of members from the Isaaq clan, attacked the northern part of Somalia in an attempt to drive Barre out of power.

---

218 See figure 3 on Early Somalia’s armed factions.
219 Adam, *From Tyranny to Anarchy*, 119.
220 Ibid, 121.
221 Ibid.
Reactively, in addition to adopting a dangerous divide-and-rule policy and brutally dealing with dissident voices, Barre responded heavily to the threat through massive bombing, killings and displacement of the local population. Thereafter, he used inter-clan warfare and ethnic massacres and politically motivated mass starvations as intimidation tactics to entrench his rule over the dissenting Somali clans and regions.²²² For example, declaring war on the northerners, Barre recruited young Ogaden refugees into the army and made them serve as paramilitaries to contain the SNM rebel group, destabilize the north and occupy Isaq’s properties. This produced almost 1 million Isaq refugees who later returned to Somaliland after the fall of Barre’s regime in January 1991. Due to these discriminations and marginalization, the northerners fostered resentment against the southern-dominated regime. The collapse of Somalia’s central government in January 1991 provided the northern elites with a long-sought opportunity to free themselves from slavery and domination by the south. Not surprisingly, the north declared a Unilateral Declaration of Independence just four months after Barre’s fall. The northerners’ collective memory of the oppressive south greatly featured and shaped their participation or opposition to subsequent Somali talks including both the Arta and Mbagathi ones.

Fourth, competition over the control of productive economic resources significantly shaped the dynamics of the Somali conflict. Particularly, as Besteman and Cassanelli (1996) argued competitions over land resources have been a deep-seated

problem that shaped the dynamics of war in southern Somalia. Additionally, a 2005 World Bank study observed that at the root of conflict drivers in Somalia was competition for the control of the state through which economic and political influence are accrued. Similarly, Alex de Waal (2007) argues that class and power linked to resource predation (competition over valuable land resources) were the major drivers of violence in Somalia. He demonstrates that particularly in the riverine areas of southern Somalia, minority groups such as Digil, Rahanweyn, Shebelle, Gabwing, Gabaweyn and other Bantu groups—the traditional inhabitants and owners of rich fertile lands—were forcefully evicted and their rich lands irregularly allocated to powerful political cronies during the 1960s and 1980s. Their lands were systematically grabbed and turned into plantations for bananas and other crops. De Waal observed that from 1991 onwards, a new group of ‘landowners’, predominantly being the Darods and some Hawiye’s from north Mogadishu, and from 1991-1992, a new group of ‘liberators’ led by General Farah Aideed of the USC, occupied the riverine areas with a view to evict the illegitimate landowners and appropriate the rich farmlands for their personal enrichment. Thus, De Waal links the recurrent factional violence in the Juba and Shebelle Valley regions since the disintegration of Somalia to the presence and activities of ‘state-mediated capitalist landowning class’ which fan competition between the original ‘landowners’ and

226 Ibid.
227 Ibid.
‘liberators.’\textsuperscript{228} In the same vein, a 2003 report by the International Crisis Group (ICG) echoes:

Ownership of grazing lands in central Mudug claimed by both the Majeerteen and the Habar Gidir remains unresolved despite a 1993 agreement. Water wells in central Somalia are also a common source of strife, especially when rehabilitated by donors without due regard for local context....In Kismayo, members of the resident Harti clans consider the newly arrived Habar Gidir and Marehaan from Galguduud region unwanted occupiers. But the newcomers quickly point out that the Harti community in Kismayo is itself “foreign”, having migrated from the Northeast around the turn of the century.\textsuperscript{229}

In addition to polarized clan politics, these predatory resource-based politics continued to shape the security and political dynamics and thereby influence peacemaking processes in the country.

Fifth, international, external patronage networks and relations with key superpowers shaped the dynamics of conflicts in Somalia. As De Waal noted, the ruling elite pursued ‘rent-seeking’ strategies to enrich them and grew increasingly dependent on foreign aid and assistance.\textsuperscript{230} International financial and military assistance, although propping up Barre’s dictatorial regime, also contributed to his downfall as international political environments changed. By 1980s, with 57% of Somalia’s Gross National Product comprised of international aid and the dwindling foreign assistance during the 1988-1989 period, which came as external actors’ response to the regime’s atrocious human rights record (the killings in the north) strongly voiced by the US Congress, it was

\textsuperscript{228} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{229} International Crisis Group (ICG), \textit{Negotiation a Blueprint for Peace in Somalia}. ICG Africa Report No.59 (Brussels/Nairobi: ICG, March 6, 2003), 12.
\textsuperscript{230} De Waal, “Class and Power in a Stateless Somalia.”
revealed that the powerful Somali nation was just a castle built on sand. Adam argues that international aid and investments from the USSR, Arab nations and the West, especially Italy, US and China was what maintained the Somali state through the dictatorial period of Barre’s rule.

Consequently, the cancellation of the US military assistance to Somalia in 1988 and economic aid in 1989 and the abrupt drying up of aid after many years of abundance sent the regime crumbling. The decline in external patronage support and shift of political will from friendly to adversarial relations critically undermined the regime’s capacity to respond to the demands of the loyalists or to counter threats from dissidents. Erosion of international patronage ties and dampened political will and support from key allies weakened Barre’s capacity to govern. Regionally, Ethiopia, informed by historical experiences, such as the 1977-78 Ogaden War and Somalia’s irredentist vision of Greater Somalia and fear of Islamic fundamentalism and historical relationship with western powers such as the US, did not favor the emergence of a stronger central government in Somalia—preferring a federal system of government with a weak central government. Such an arrangement would enable Ethiopia to build lasting beneficial ties with strategic federal regions to counter any threats from the center. But such meddling tended to have counterproductive effects as it not only undermined peace but also continued to attract opposition or alliances from Somalia and within the Horn and the Gulf regions.

233 Ibid.
Finally, the collapse of the Somali government triggered the emergence and proliferation of armed and political non-state institutions that competed to occupy the seat of power. Adam observed that, ‘elite fragmentation had led to political paralysis’ which continued to feed the Somali conflict.\(^{234}\) In the post-state collapse of Somalia, such competition unleashed a pervasive culture of economic predation where the different emergent wartime actors pursuing economic agendas competed for the control of strategic resources, infrastructures and assets with a view to generate and accumulate wealth. Fragmentation led to internal fractionalization, predation and mushrooming of numerous wartime institutions in Somalia. These wartime actors utilized militaristic means to pursue political goals and perpetuate their economic interests—factors which greatly protracted negotiation processes in Somalia.

However, reports by the Mogadishu-based Center for Research and Dialogue (CRD) interrogates another interesting dimension of the Somali crisis –why Somaliland and Puntland regions became relatively stable while south-central sunk further into violence and anarchic predatory conditions.\(^{235}\) In the analysis of the divergent trajectories of the nature of relative stability in Somaliland and Puntland, various explanations come to the fore. Bradbury et al (2003) argue that in Somaliland, the long history of SNM’s struggle against despotic Barre’s regime fostered a cohesive political identity among the

\(^{234}\)Adam, *From Tyranny to Anarchy*, 151.

populous Isaq clan family. Similarly, Menkhaus (1998) linked the relative stability of Somaliland to the ability of President Egal to develop a functional governance structure, reconstruction of economic infrastructures and revitalization of commercial economy (predominantly the livestock sector), provision of social welfare and reinstitution of law and order. Menkhaus linked Puntland’s stability to relative homogeneity (due to the dominance of the Marjerteen clan), powerful traditional elders’ leadership which managed inter-clan relations, informed leadership of the dominant faction (SSDF), which despite internal wrangles managed to nurture a strong and practical regional administrative structure; and the port of Bosasso’s flourishing revenue have helped to an extent. In the same vein, in an interview with Feldman and Slattery (2003), it was observed that:

In Somaliland, there are generally more public-private partnerships. The administration exercises more control over the economy and public goods like airports and ports. It provides modest financing for education and health services; some municipalities continue to manage public utilities…For the rest of Somalia, where authority is weaker and contested, a complex mix of community organizations, private companies, Islamic foundations and local and international aid agencies have steeped in to fill the vacuum left by government to manage public goods and run social services…

Thus, peace in Somaliland was possible because the traditional structures (clans) and business community remained strong and united and therefore managed to collectively obstruct wartime actors’ access to resources. Indeed, the wartime actors were

237 Menkhaus, “Somalia: Political Order in a Stateless Society,” 221.
238 Ibid.
unable to manipulate and mobilize social structures to support their predatory efforts. Similarly, De Waal linked relative stability in the Somaliland and Puntland regions to the success and ability of some segments of the ‘mercantile class’ that succeeded in controlling the state-like institutions in those territories. The successful Boroma peace conference dealt with the majority of conflict issues and won the hearts and minds of the inhabitants of the region and thereby facilitated the creation and institutionalization of the Somaliland government.

However, the situation was different in south-central Somalia. As De Waal argues, in Mogadishu particularly, “…competition between fractions of the mercantile classes is the sharpest of all, because of the level of investment in real estate during the former regime, and the anticipation of the rewards accruing to the future capture of state power.” The roots of violence lie in the unresolved disputes over real estates in Mogadishu and Kismayu and the riverine farmlands of the Juba and Shebelle Valley continue to fan antagonistic and factional politics. He argues that rapid fractional fragmentations, enhanced capacity to resolve conflicts and disputes among actors, the constructive role of the dominant Isac livestock business class, establishment of a new state with only one region and ‘lowered expectations of the resources that statehood’ confers contributed to the stabilization in Somaliland.

Importantly, Menkhaus also linked south-central Somalia’s troubles to fragmentation of political authority, contestations and general insecurity driven by looters

---

240 De Waal, “Class and Power in a Stateless Somalia.”
241 Ibid.
242 Ibid.
243 Ibid.
and kidnapping syndicates, further compounded clan rivalries, divisions and politics due to dominance by occupier clans. Unlike in Somaliland, in the south-central region, private actors such as civil society groups, business and factional leaders solely dominated the provision of services, which infused culture of profiteering, greed and predation. Basically, wartime actors’ dominance of critical economic resources and pervasive factional competition and weak traditional structures undermined political stability in south-central Somalia.

- Somali National Movement (SNM) (Isaq)
- Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) (Darod’s Majerteen)
- United Somali Congress (USC) Italy and Ethiopia – (Hawiye)
- Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM)—formed by military officers who defected from Barre and headed by Omar Jess (SPM-Somali National Alliance (SNA) with Kismayu as the base (Ogaden)
- SPM (General Gabiyo—Ogaden and other Darod)
- Somali Democratic Movement (SDM)—(formed after the collapse of the Barre regime by smaller clans from Baidoa particularly Rahanweyn clan comprising mainly of Digil-Mirifle sub-clan)-one became allied to Aidid’s USC faction
- Southern Somali National Movement (SSNM) (Dir)
- Somali African Muki Organization (SAMO) –(farming clans of the Bantus)
- Somali National Union (SNU) (comprised of multi-clan coastal communities)
- Somali Democratic Alliance (SDA) (Gadabursi)
- Somali National Democratic Union (SNDU) (other Darod)
- SNA (comprised of SDM, SPM, USC factions)
- United Somali Front (USF) (Issa)
- United Somali Party (USP) (Dulbaante, Warsangeli and Darod).

Figure 3: Early Somalia's armed factions

244 Menkhaus, “Somalia: Political Order in a Stateless Society,” 222.
The above section has mapped the key factors that precipitated the collapse of the Somali regime. In sum, Barre’s clan-based dictatorial governance, militarization of the state, clan politics and struggle for state power, fractionalization and regionalization of politics and violence due to competing interests fostered internal and external networks, which worked to obstruct peacemaking processes in Somalia. In addition to economics of predation, inter-regional politics and competing Somali clans became operational instruments for organization and sustenance of armed opposition during and after the collapse of Barre’s regime. The next section provides an overview of the internal and external peacemaking efforts to prevent the disintegration of Somalia, reviews the dynamics and struggles of the Arta talks and events that lead to the initiation of the Mbagathi peace process.

3.2 Overview of the Early Interventions

Several internal and external attempts were made to save Somalia from disintegration. Internally, in May 1990 the Mogadishu-based Manifesto Group comprising of prominent clan members, retired diplomats, former military officers and businessmen (through what is known as the Manifesto Group’s publication) called for national reconciliation dialogue to prevent the occurrence of a civil war. From May-July 1991, through back channels, the Egyptian and Italian governments, preferring Ali Mahdi’s USC faction, facilitated the Manifesto Group by convening two dialogue processes in Djibouti. Aideed’s USC faction rejected the initiative and by December 245 Adam, From Tyranny to Anarchy, 21.
1990, armed rebellions led by Hawiye-dominated USC militia engulfed Mogadishu, ousting Barre’s regime in January 1991. The Manifesto Group swiftly appointed a prominent businessman, Ali Mahdi, as the interim President of Somalia. Mohammed Farah Aideed, the head of the USC’s military wing strongly rejected the move. The dispute triggered a serious intra-Hawiye clan power struggle pitting Mahdi’s Abgal and Aideed’s Habr Gedir, culminating in bloody clashes between their loyal forces in November 1991. Factional tensions festered despite the signing of the Nairobi Declaration on March 24, 1994 by Farah Aideed (on behalf of SNA and allied factions) and Ali Mahdi (on behalf of the Group of 12) whereby they agreed to convene a National Reconciliation Conference (NRC) on May 15, 1994 to elect the President, Vice-President and to appoint a PM.

Attempts to reconcile the leaders resulted in the Addis Ababa Agreement of March 27, 1993 whereby 15 Somali factional parties agreed to a cease-fire, disarmament of the militias and formation of a transitional body leading to the eventual creation of the Transitional National Council (TNC). Subsequently, political rivalry pitting Aideed, Mahdi and Mohamed Qanyare against one another festered, thereby eroding the little

---

246 USC was formed in Ethiopia and Italy in 1989. Mohammed Farah Aideed died in August 1996 from injuries sustained due to factional fighting for the control of Medina district in Mogadishu. His son, Hussein Farah Aideed (a former US Marine) succeeded him.

247 Key factions allied to the Group of 12 include the SDM, the SNF, the SPM and the USP, see UNSG, Further Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Somalia submitted in pursuance of paragraph 13 of resolution 954 (1994), S/1995/231 (March 28, 1995), 1.


trust and confidence that existed among them. In August 1994, the UNSG expressing doubts of building sustainable peace processes in Somalia, reported:

The two antagonistic groups, the [SNA] and the Somali Salvation Alliance (SSA), are continuing to encourage and facilitate the creation of new partisan factions, which are not parties to the agreements reached in Addis Ababa and Nairobi. This multiplication of factions will complicate further the prospects for the preparatory meeting and the subsequent national reconciliation conference and must be overcome without further delay.

Meanwhile, a severe drought hit Somalia and by 1992 a serious famine, mass starvation, malnutrition and diseases gripped the majority of the Somali population. In addition to pervasive factional fighting between different clan members throughout the country, the situation led to a mass exodus and relocation of refugees and internally displaced persons across the borders into various Horn of Africa countries; while others moved to areas, where their clans were predominant in search of collective security.

Externally, the unfolding humanitarian and political disaster in Somalia caught the attention of the international community. It was in response to media reports of the chaos and starvation of the Somali populations that the international community took steps to intervene. The UN had a long history with Somalia. First after World War II, the UN Trusteeship Council administered Italian Somalia. In 1950, the Somali territory was given back to Italy to nurture the country for independence. Another UN-Somalia relation came after the Somalia-Ethiopia war in 1977-1978 over the Ogaden region in Eastern Ethiopia, which generated about 5 million Somali refugees (largely indigenous Ogaden Somalis) who fled to Somalia, thereby prompting the United Nations High Commissioner.

---


for Refugees (UNHCR) to move in and provide aid for the massive refugee population. In the contemporary times, the UN intervention, dubbed the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM), began in December 1991. As Woodward (1998) noted, the then outgoing UNSG Javier Perez de Cuellar sent a team of top UN officials to help with political reconciliation and help create safe delivery of food aid to starving populations caused by deadly famine and the brutal violence that followed the collapse of Barre’s regime.²⁵²

The UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 751 of April 24, 1992 established UNOSOM, charged with a humanitarian mandate headed by Ambassador Mohamed Sahnoun, an Algerian diplomat. Familiar with third worlds’ politics, Ambassador Sahnoun quickly put his diplomatic skills to use and developed cordial relations with Somali warlords and elders to ensure that UNOSOM succeeded. In an attempt to restore peace and order to Somalia, Ambassador Sahnoun pursued a cultural engagement approach—displaying enhanced understanding, preference and appreciation for Somali culture, traditional mechanisms, which established impressive conversational harmony with the Somali leadership at various levels. Wisely, he sought to rebuild traditional social structures of authority (especially that of elders and religious leadership) to mitigate against the warlords’ power. Ambassador Sahnoun cleverly created and decentralized relief zones throughout the country hoping that such structures would be a springboard for regional reconciliation and also empower the traditional structures of governance and eradicate warlordism.²⁵³ It is important to note that early on Ambassador

²⁵³ Sahnoun, Missed Opportunities.
Sahnoun perceptively realized the destructive role that armed wartime actors could play in manipulating social structures and thereby undermine peacemaking processes in Somalia, and worked aggressively and effectively to cripple them.

Unfortunately, Ambassador Sahnoun’s presence in Somalia was cut short as in October 1992 when the UN unceremoniously forced him to resign.\textsuperscript{254} Seemingly, he had attracted enemies at the UN where many considered him ‘too much an independent player.’\textsuperscript{255} A fellow Muslim and an Iraqi diplomat, Ismat Kittani replaced him. However, as Hirsch and Oakley (1995) report, unlike Ambassador Sahnoun’s field flexibility and an excellent grasp on the dynamics of the Somali politics in the midst of chaos, Ambassador Kittani was thought of as a rigid personality who stringently adhered to official orders from New York rather than weave in practical field-based understanding of Somalia’s actors into his decision-making processes.\textsuperscript{256} Later due to worsening health, Ambassador Kittani was replaced by a retired US Admiral, Jonathan Howe.\textsuperscript{257}

The deteriorating situation and growing pressure on the international community saw the adoption of the UNSC Resolution 794 on December 3, 1992 geared to create safe passage for the humanitarian aid.\textsuperscript{258} On December 9, 1992, the US-led mission, dubbed Operation Restore Hope, saw the arrival of the first batch of the 38,000-member Unified Task Force (UNITAF) mandated under Chapter VII to not only create safe passage for the humanitarian aid but to also help restore peace in the troubled region. Conflicts soon erupted between the UN and UNITAF (staffed mostly by American soldiers) over how to

\textsuperscript{254} Ibid, 53.
\textsuperscript{255} Hirsch and Oakley, \textit{Somalia and Operation Restore Hope}, 22.
\textsuperscript{256} Ibid, 32.
\textsuperscript{257} Lyons and Samatar, \textit{Somalia: State Collapse}, 50.
\textsuperscript{258} See UNSC Resolution 794 adopted on December 3, 1992, S/RES/794.
approach the issue of disarmament. The UN favored disarming the militias but the UNITAF was reluctant arguing that the mission was deployed to ensure the safe passage of humanitarian aid to the needy. However, as Patman (1997) points out, various reports indicated that certain members of the UNITAF, particularly the Australian forces in Baidoa, carried out an ad hoc disarmament and weapons seizure operation.\(^{259}\)

Similar to Ambassador Sahnoun, executing his mandate, the US Special Envoy, Robert Oakley pursued a two-pronged political strategy in dealing with warlords in an endeavor to stabilize the country.\(^{260}\) First, with the objective to disempower the warlords, he worked to erode their support base and applied a ‘plucking the bird’ approach aimed at building the citizens’ power by slowly undermining the power of the militia leaders in the decision-making circles. Second, he pursued strategies of promoting political reconciliations among key contenders. From January to March 1993, building on the initial positive reception from Aideed and Mahdi, a conference aimed at reconciling 15 warlords took place in Addis Ababa. Termed the Addis Ababa Compromise, Oakley hoped that the Addis agreement would clear the way for voluntary disarmament and demobilization of the militias.\(^{261}\)

However, policy conflict emerged between the UN and US officials as the Boutros-Ghali preferred economic and political strategies to reconstruct Somalia; while

---


\(^{261}\) Ibid, 94.
the US preferred forced disarmament of the militias. With the US team gaining the upper hand in the strategic policy conflict, on March 26, 1993 UNSC Resolution 814 established UNOSOM II with a clear mandate to disarm Somali militias. Focused on implementing the mandate, Admiral Jonathan Howe, who replaced Ambassador Kittani, headed up the recharged UNOSOM with a 20,000-member force. The atmosphere in Mogadishu became quite hostile to the UNOSOM II’s disarmament initiative. Several armed clan militia organizations, notably the Farrah Aideed’s SNA faction, through Radio Mogadishu publicly drummed up civilian support for the militia groups against the UN’s initiative. In order to get access to money, the factional leaders used their militias to loot food aid, which they in-turn sold to merchants, utilizing the proceeds to enrich themselves and, more importantly, to buy weapons. From early on, the Somali wartime actors used strategies of predation and looting to finance the civil war and intimidate and dominate civilian populations.

Shortly, violent warfare and confrontational relations between armed Somali factions and the UNITAF erupted. June 5, 1993 was the initial turning point towards violent confrontation as an operation by the UNITAF to mop-up weapons turned bloody, resulting in the killing of 24 Pakistani troops and several Somalis. Afterwards, battle lines were drawn between UNITAF and Aideed’s USC faction and the UN deployed helicopter gunships and other heavy artillery and declared Aideed a wanted man, placing a monetary reward of $25,000 on his head. Admiral Howe’s coercive military operation

---

263 Ibid, 74.
against Aideed and the placement of a monetary value on his head proved fatally counterproductive. Admiral Howe hoped to destroy the power base of the wartime actors and rebuild civilian leadership by systematically eliminating troublesome faction leaders. The strategy to dismantle the warlords’ infrastructure could have worked. However, what Howe did not realize was the centrality of Somalia’s clan identity and strong communal blood connections—and placement of a monetary prize on Aideed’s head—was tantamount to provoking the whole Habr Gedir clan to the battlefield. This reveals the potency of clan loyalty in the Somali society’s psyche, whereby the mobilization of clans through blood ties is often employed by the warlords at the hour of need.

According to a Somali historian, Ioan Lewis (1961), key pillars of Somalia’s traditional governance systems were based on kinship and social contract. Mohamed (2007) states that beyond kinship issues, an understanding of the nature and role of social contracts is essential for the resolution of the Somali crisis. In Somalia, like in most pastoral societies, clan solidarity, particularly at times of troubles is sacrosanct. The traditional Somali society was considered ‘fiercely republican’ evidenced by outsiders’ views such as an observation by a Bugandian police escort who informed Drake-Brockman (1912) that, “Somalis, Bwana [Sir], they no good; each his own sultan.”

Due to such clan loyalties, external forces can sometimes unintentionally turn a warlord into an overnight hero in his clan—or even a saint. That is exactly what occurred. Through such clan manipulations and mobilization, on October 3, 1993 Aideed engaged

---

the international community in a deadly street fighting pitting the SNA militia against the UNITAF troops, culminating in the death of 18 US Marines and hundreds of Somalis in Mogadishu in what has become known as the Black Hawk Down incident. This tragic turn of events, forced US President Clinton to give his consent for the withdrawal of the US forces from Somalia on March 31, 1994. This event speaks to the role of armed wartime institutions particularly in clan-based societies like Somalia—which openly challenged an international force and greatly undermined efforts to restore security and build peace in the country. Thereafter, international political will towards Somalia greatly shrunk, except in dealing with perpetual humanitarian crises.

However, it is important to appreciate the fact that UNOSOM II saved thousands of lives and worked hard to reconcile the warring factions. Between late 1994 to early 1995, UNOSOM II helped establish an 8,500-strong Somali police force and by March 1, 1995 about 2,000 were stationed in the northwest region.\textsuperscript{267} By the end of 1994, some 2,179 police officers had undergone refresher courses and by January 1995, the force was deployed and operating in 82 districts.\textsuperscript{268} On a political level, in addition to facilitating the Addis Ababa Agreement and Nairobi Declarations, the UN-sponsored clan dialogue and reconciliation talks, including the Jubaland conference (June and August 1993), the Garowe Peace and Cooperation Conference (December 1993), the Digil/Merifle-Rahanweyn-Aulihan Conference held in Bardera (February 1994), the Lower Juba Region peace conference (June 1994) and the Absame conference (between June – July

\textsuperscript{267} UNSG, \textit{Further Report of the Secretary-General}, S/1995/231, 12. \textsuperscript{268} Ibid.
These talks and conferences greatly prevented and reduced inter-clan warfare, except in volatile regions of south Mogadishu.\textsuperscript{270}

In 1995, due to worsening security conditions, the remaining UN forces left Somalia, leaving the burden of peacemaking to the Somalis and the neighboring countries, at which point wartime actors took over. In the end, the UN military involvement failed and nothing tangible came out of the UN-led political negotiations in Somalia.\textsuperscript{271} But what do we make of that failure? Most importantly, strategically, the UN failed to understand and underestimated the power of Aideed’s SNA as a dominant wartime actor and the role of clan politics in buttressing clan-based armed militia organization. Operationally, the international community lacked a systematic mediation and security stabilization plan required for building grassroots momentum for national reconciliation in Somalia. The emerging policy confusion and international bureaucracies left the key decision-makers on the ground to design their own plans based on their limited experiences and personal instincts—in the face of stiff opposition from Somalia’s armed wartime actors.

Assessments of the UN’s legacy in Somalia bring forth divided opinions. On the one hand, some scholars such as Lyons and Samatar, and Boulden (2001) argue that the UN lacked consistency, political commitment and a clear diplomatic, political and armed

\textsuperscript{269} Ibid, 6.
\textsuperscript{270} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{271} Peter Woodward, “Somalia,” 151.
strategy for executing its mandate.\textsuperscript{272} Lyons and Samatar, arguing that the UN-intervention was doomed to fail pointed out:

The lessons of the attempts by the international community to promote political reconciliation in Somalia are ambiguous and complex. As the international operation evolved, different organizational imperatives and perspectives led to different ad hoc political strategies. The small and militarily weak UN Military Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I) had a diplomatic strategy but lacked the capacity to pressure militia leaders. The large and powerful U.S.-led United Task Force (UNITAF) had the resources but insisted that its mandate was limited and nonpolitical. The still large but militarily and organizationally weaker UNOSOM II had more ambitious goals but lacked a viable, coherent political strategy.\textsuperscript{273}

Similarly, Boulden describing the UN intervention in Somalia observed that, “…the UN response to the Somali crisis ran the gamut from the extreme total disregard to total involvement then back to total disregard.”\textsuperscript{274}

On the other hand, although UNOSOM I and II were generally considered failed operations, some scholars and analysts presented counter arguments. Discussing the lessons learned from the Somalia intervention and positing that the UN and the international community did not totally fail in Somalia, Crocker (1995) observed, “…the final lesson of Somalia may be the most humbling…military intervention…temporarily strengthened Somalia’s vestigial power civil society…by freezing in place the factional strife, it also checked the stronger factions and protected the weaker ones.”\textsuperscript{275} Leaning towards this view, Menkhaus, et al argued that although the UN failed to politically

\textsuperscript{273} Lyons and Samatar, \textit{Somalia: State Collapse}, 36.
\textsuperscript{274} Boulden, \textit{Peace Enforcement}, 54.
reconstruct Somalia, the UN operation stimulated economic growth and expansion of private sector businesses through creation of employments and contracts to the local workforce thereby diverting resources away from war economy. However, as shall be explored in subsequent chapters, the power base of key wartime actors was greatly enhanced as some factional leaders’ misappropriated the UN and other agencies’ humanitarian assistance and contracts to advance their economic interests.

Nonetheless, after the fateful UN and US withdrawal from Somalia, Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1996) commented that Somalia’s peace talks will not bear fruit until the warring parties gather more political will towards a negotiated settlement. Despite this insightful appeal, as the UNITAF’s term ended, no major disarmament occurred and armed wartime institutions divided Somali territories into predatory fiefdoms and wanton predation, associated war economies and dominant economic agendas flourished in a highly politicized clan environment. For over two decades, predatory warlordism prevailed in Somalia and despite numerous peace talks, Somalia, remained stateless.

The above section has reviewed the experiences of early internal and external intervention initiatives in Somalia that was undermined by armed wartime actors, clan politics and the failure of the UN to understand and manage the country’s factional environment to build lasting peace. The next section reviews the turbulent search for peace in Somalia by telling the history of the Arta peace process, its struggles and processes and outcomes. Specifically, the section will highlight how a high degree of

---

economic predation, pervasive war economies and wartime actors’ dominant economic agendas shape the Arta process and set the stage for the Mbagathi peace talks.

3.3 The Turbulent Search for Peace

Peacemaking in failed states remains a puzzle. So, what is the process or the entry point for resurrecting a failed state? Zartman (1995) shares insight into this puzzle:

Either the rebellion’s leaders and local warlords can be brought together, under the theory that the source of the problem must be the source of the solutions (foxes will act responsibly in hen coops if given responsibility), and leaders with the minds and means to break security must be given the legitimacy to make security; or new elites must be helped to emerge from the closet, representing the leaders of a civil society…. the best of the ruled being called on to replace the worst of the rulers. If warlords are allowed to form the new state, they assure the return of the system that brought about its own collapse…

As Zartman noted, building peace in collapsed states without a central authority brings forth multiple challenges—the first being where to begin? Could emergent institutions be the solutions or should investments be made at the traditional and civil society levels? These were questions faced by actors engaged in peace initiatives in Somalia. Pondering this, Lederach (1997) narrates a friendly exchange between two of his Somali friends:

A civilian friend: “…how is it that you warlords think that one of you has the right to be President?…Don’t you know…that without a frame the roof of a house collapses?”

---

The Warlord Chairman (Cousin to the Civilian Somali) replies, “the key to a healthy body is a good head. I have never seen legs walk or arms move without a head.”

The civilian Somali interjects, “dear Cousin…the house has failed. The legs have been crushed, the arms are bled clean. There is no body to be head of.”

By using such powerful narrations and metaphor of perception, Lederach illuminates on the complexity of political reconciliation under conditions of state collapse in Somalia.

Since collapsed states are not vacuums but contested spaces where various non-state political actors and armed factions compete, peacemakers must find partners in peace however illegitimate and criminal they might be—hence some form of actors’ transformational intervention must take place. But how? Lyons and Samatar, writing on the political reconstruction of Somalia, proposed two models: accommodate existing forces model and encourage new institutions model.\textsuperscript{280} In the former, the authors argued that most actors that have survived the state collapse have the potential to form the foundation for a new sustainable order and should thus be nurtured and strengthened by the international community. In the latter model, they argued that the forces that developed in the violence and anarchy of state collapse are unfit to form the foundation for a new sustainable order and that international intervention should encourage and support new institutions of civil societies.

\textsuperscript{280} Lyons and Samatar, Somalia: State Collapse, 36-39.
These models are conceptually stimulating and have significantly influenced the design and conduct of over twenty peace processes in Somalia. Samatar and Samatar noted, “...the Somalis are the first to smash the post-colonial state without putting anything in its place.” In Somalia, numerous state reconstruction initiatives have been undertaken. Adam identified several state reconstruction strategies initiated to reconstruct Somalia namely: top-down negotiations, the Islamic temptation, northern grassroots building and the Addis Ababa compromise. None of those strategies bore any fruit.

Overall, seemingly borrowing from the above models advanced by Lyons and Samatar, three major approaches have been used to conduct peace processes in Somalia. First, bottom-up grassroots reconciliation initiatives—a series of these took place at grassroots level, which were mostly led by clan and civil society leaders. IGAD, the UN and Western nations popularized the bottom-up model between 1996 and 2000 as a way to promote regional reconciliations and then move to the top actors. Examples include: Garowe, Galkayo and Boroma peace process with Arta having diverse participants including clan elders, political, business, religious and civil society actors and just a few warlords. Second, top-down approaches—these initiatives were mostly organized by IGAD with the backing of the international community although at times championed by governments of concerned regional countries such as Kenya, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Sudan, Yemen and Egypt, among others. With the Mbagathi process (2002-2004) being an

---


116
excellent example of an initiative driven from the top-down, the focus of such talks has been on power-sharing among powerful actors and ‘quick fixes’ and the creation of transitional governments. Although putting nothing in place from within, Somali peace spoilers often criticize the top-down approaches. For example, Adam captures the reaction of the late Somaliland’s President, Mohamed Egal to the 1993 Addis Ababa peace conference:

> With all due respect to the conveners of the Reconciliation Conferences in Addis Ababa, men of whose sincerity and good-will there is no shadow of doubt, these conferences become forums where faction leaders tried to score points against each other. The rest of the participants were only confused by the alien surroundings and the foreign chairmen and other organizers of the conference whose speeches and languages they could not even understand.\(^{284}\)

Almost thirteen years following Egal’s eloquent assertion, concurringly, Somali experts Menkhaus and others questioning the utility of the top-down approaches aimed at constructing peace in Somalia, lamented:

> This approach resulted in over a dozen failed peace conferences in the 1990s. Externally-sponsored peace processes in Somalia came to develop a reputation as a cottage industry, in which warlords gladly appeared, extending talks for months and even years while they resided in expensive hotels and ran up large bills without any intention to reach or implement the accords over which they met. The lesson that frustrated diplomats derived from this legacy of failure, is that Somali “warlords” were not serious about peace; some went as far as to argue that they had called the wrong representatives to convene.\(^{285}\)

Third, mixed approaches (fusion of both bottom-up and top-down approaches) have been attempted by nongovernmental organizations such as the Life and Peace Institute (LPI). In 1991, LPI utilized a programmatic approach termed the Blueprint

---


\(^{285}\) Menkhaus, et. al, Somalia Programming, 33.
Outline: Reconciliation Infrastructure based on Lederach’s vision and framework of peacebuilding to nurture national reconciliation in Somalia.\textsuperscript{286} The blueprint consisted of a top-level peace-coordinating unit, an in-country liaison unit; and advisory working group as structures to promote dialogue and reconciliation. Initially, the LPI’s intervention created an impressive integrated reconciliation network using local actors. However, the blueprint neither realized inter-clan reconciliation nor did it appease factional leaders and other wartime actors. Over two decades later, despite numerous attempts utilizing various approaches, the Somalia nation remains devilishly divided and lasting peace is yet to germinate. An anonymous writer who is a senior employee of an international organization lamented that despite the over a dozen peace talks from 1993-2000, “…Somalia [has] remained an orphan country.”\textsuperscript{287}

Overall, the search for peace in Somalia has been disappointingly elusive, stumping numerous scholars and practitioners.\textsuperscript{288} Similarly, as Menkhaus (2006/2007) summed, the failure of over a dozen peacemaking efforts, “…earned Somalia the dubious distinction of being the world’s foremost graveyard of externally sponsored state-building initiatives.”\textsuperscript{289} Ahmed and Green (1999) have questioned the utility of internationally led ‘quick fix’ approaches to peacemaking in Somalia, where warlords eagerly signed

\textsuperscript{286}Life and Peace Institute (LPI), \textit{The Blueprint Outline: Reconciliation Infrastructure} (Uppsala: LPI, 1991).
\textsuperscript{289}Menkhaus, “Governance without Government.”
various peace agreements without any commitment to live by them.\textsuperscript{290} Concurringly, Ahmed and Green note that international ‘quick fix’ approaches to peacemaking in Somalia repeatedly failed miserably despite warlords’ eagerness to sign any peace agreement while not following it through.\textsuperscript{291} The behavior of Somalia’s factional leaders reveals that they often enjoy elongating peace negotiation processes held away from the heat of battles and most often in five-star hotels in various regional cities, signing peace accords merely as tactics to buy time in order to re-arm, strategize or negotiate alliances, appease regional and international allies and use the accords to perpetuate their and their clan’s economic and political interests. Indeed, Somali factions seem to prefer endless talks and politicking, engaging in what Ikle terms ‘side-effects’ negotiations.\textsuperscript{292} Thus, frustrations with peacemaking in Somalia have prompted calls for rethinking political reconstruction strategies and approaches in Somalia—perhaps adopting the building blocks approach and learning from the encouraging experiences in Somaliland and Puntland regions.\textsuperscript{293} Jans, for instance, argued that Somalia needs a paradigm shift in its peacebuilding strategy.\textsuperscript{294}

Why did LPI’s all-inclusive national reconciliation structure and over twenty peace talks fail to build peace in Somalia? Beyond challenging the utility of the different peacemaking models, what really explains the protracted struggles of peacemaking in

\textsuperscript{290}Ahmed and Green, “The heritage of war,” 124.
\textsuperscript{291}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{292}Ikle, \textit{How Nations Negotiate}.
\textsuperscript{294}Jan, “Somalia: Building Sovereignty or Restoring Peace?”
Somalia? How did the nature and dynamics of economic predation, pervasive war economies and the role of wartime actors’ dominant economic agendas shape Somalia’s peacemaking initiatives and particularly the Mbagathi talks? This dissertation explores these conceptual questions to enhance our understanding of the challenges of post-state collapse peacebuilding in Somalia. As a point of departure, in order to effectively understand the foundation and struggles of the Mbagathi peace process, it is beneficial to briefly review the Arta process which preceded it. Thus, the next sections document the Arta process, highlighting specific challenges that contributed to its own struggle and subsequent collapse. A later section documents the experience of the Mbagathi process.

### 3.4 The genesis, dynamics and promise of the Arta peace process

In Garowe on August 23, 1999, a group of Somali leaders formed a group named the Somali Peace Alliance (SPA) – which included leaders from Puntland, Rahanweyn Resistance Army (RRA), the newly formed Hawiye Somali Consultative Council (HSCC) and the pro-Ethiopian arm of the SNF and visited Djibouti and Addis Ababa to brief and seek support in resolving the Somali crisis.\(^{295}\) According to a 1997 article by the African Confidential (AC), the factions in the SPA were assembled and supported by Ethiopia with a view to undermine Eritrea’s alliance with Somalia and weaken Hussein Aideed, whose influence stretched from parts of Mogadishu to Baidoa where his militia captured and occupied Baidoa and Balidogle airport.\(^{296}\) Similarly, in late September 1999, another group comprising of Hussein Aideed and Osman Ali ‘Ato’ met in Libya

---


\(^{296}\) AC, “No proxy peace,” *AC* 40, 20, October 8, 1999, 8.
with a view to boost reconciliation in the country.\textsuperscript{297} President Egal of Somaliland refused to attend the meeting and similarly, although arriving some days later, Colonel Abdullahi Yussuf of Puntland initially refused to meet the other factional leaders.\textsuperscript{298} Nonetheless, the two different groups established the mood for national dialogue and reached out to key governments for support.

The Arta talks were primarily the brainchild of President Ismail Omar Guelleh of Djibouti who championed the Arta peace process also called Djibouti Peace (DPI) or Djibouti I to its conclusion. On September 22, 1999, addressing the 54\textsuperscript{th} Session of the UN General Assembly in New York, President Guelleh shared with the global community his intentions of initiating a new dialogue process to reconcile warring Somali leaders and re-establish governance institutions in the country. In his speech, President Guelleh called on the international community to firmly deal with the armed factional leaders who have resisted any attempts at peaceful reconciliation and demanded that they be tried for war crimes and crimes against humanity and to be subjected to international sanctions.\textsuperscript{299} Grounded in the conviction that the Somali civil society could best nurture peace in the country, the Guelleh-led DPI got overwhelming support from the majority of the Somali community both within the country and with the diaspora. However, support for the process was not unanimous, as we shall explore later — because some powerful wartime actors and regional leaders of the autonomous regions of

\textsuperscript{297} UNSG, \textit{Report of the Secretary-General}, S/2000/1211, 1. Later Aideed visited Addis Ababa where he promised to cease support to anti-Ethiopia groups.
\textsuperscript{298} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{299} Ibid.
Somaliland and Puntland, with the patronage of Ethiopia, vehemently opposed the process and even its outcome.

Noting the virulent opposition to the Arta talks by key factional leaders and leaders of the independent Puntland and Somaliland administrations, third party actors reached out to popularize the Djibouti-led peace process. Regionally, on September 30, 1999, IGAD, through the Standing Committee on Somalia expressed its support for the DPI; and on November 26, 2000, an IGAD Summit meeting in Djibouti took a similar position; as did the IPF during their meeting of October 19, 1999. However, siding with the Puntland administration, Ethiopia sabotaged the talks through an extensive patronage networks inside Somalia.

At the global level, the UN continued to support the reconciliation process in Somalia through three key structures: Ambassadorial meetings of external actors on Somalia in New York, a Somali Contact Group in Nairobi chaired by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) for Somalia and extended support to the UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS). The SRSG for Somalia, David Stephen and later Ambassador Winston Tubman, and Special Adviser, Ambassador Mohammed Sahnoun engaged in several diplomatic initiatives to consolidate internal and regional support for the Djibouti-led peace and reconciliation in Somalia. In January 2000, following intervention by Special Representative Stephen who met and consulted with key Somali leaders in Baidoa, Hargeisa and Garowe, Somaliland, Puntland and RRA, despite expressing concerns over some issues, the leaders reluctantly endorsed the

---

300 Ibid, 2.
However, the endorsement did not effectively win the hearts and minds of the autonomous Somaliland and Puntland leadership. Characteristic of earlier peace processes, the parties were entrapped in context-based barriers encompassing structural power asymmetry and other social, cultural, political, and regional complexities that affected the negotiation environment, leading to their objections to participate in the talks.\textsuperscript{302}

Nonetheless, the Arta talks’ pre-negotiation phase began in March 2000. Despite opposition by key players due to reports of funding support from Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to the tune of $4 million\textsuperscript{303}, the DPI commenced with a March 2000 meeting known as the ‘technical consultative symposium’ hosted by Djibouti and attended by 60 Somalis from within the country and within the diaspora who largely participated in their individual capacities. President Guelleh informed the participants that the symposium was not a decision-making body, but rather one convened to obtain guidance and advice from the Somalis in the preparation for the launch of a more detailed peace process.

After deliberations, the symposium advanced several recommendations espousing the promise of the Arta talks: that the peace process be as inclusive as possible, to also include factional leaders who wanted peace; to strengthen the role of civil society; to propose the creation of decentralized governance structures; to consolidate peace in zones of stability; to create a human rights commission to assess violators of the peace talks; to

\textsuperscript{301} Ibid, 1-2.  
\textsuperscript{302} See Zartman, ed., Elusive Peace; Pillar, Negotiating Peace; Bell, Peace Agreements.  
\textsuperscript{303} AC, “Hope from the north,” AC 41, 6, March 17, 2000, 6. Reportedly, Italy’s pledge of $50 million to support the conference and transitional activities as long as Rome is involved as a central actor in the strategic and decisionmaking process, never materialized.
return stolen properties by occupiers; Mogadishu to remain the capital of Somalia (although a temporary capital of a future government might be established); to demobilize and reintegrate militias into the national army; to provide international support for the peace process, including a peacekeeping force to stabilize security; stricter enforcement of UNSC’s arms embargo; and an appeal to Djibouti to dispatch emissaries to various Somali regions in preparation for the Somali National Peace Conference (SNPC). Principally, the Arta talks promised a broad-based reconciliation with a mixture of carrots and sticks for spoilers including stiff sanctions and threats of war crimes trials for perpetrators of violence.

Djibouti, with the support of IGAD, the UN and the international community, served as the catalyst for the Arta talks to begin. To counter opposition, from March-April 2000, Djibouti diplomatically engaged and extensively consulted diverse Somali groups in preparation for the peace talks, winning considerable support from key actors such as the civil society, traditional elders, Islamic courts and the business community. In an effort to win external regional and international backing, President Guelleh visited a number of countries with key roles: Kenya, Ethiopia, Egypt, Yemen, Libya, Kuwait and Italy. Following endorsement of the Djibouti-led process by IGAD’s 7th Summit held in Djibouti on November 26, 1999, and following extensive preparations and consultations on May 2, 2000, Phase I of the Arta talks began in the town of Arta about 40 kilometers north of Djibouti as traditional and clan leaders met and discussed key

305 Ibid.
issues. Adopting the name Arta Peace Process, the deliberations were aired daily by the Arta Television station, hence aiding greater public awareness. For the first time, Somali civil society and traditional institutions led in the search for peace in Somalia, under the guidance of their ethnic kin, President Guelleh. The Arta process accorded non-armed actors the opportunity to shape the future of the country and its venue, Djibouti, gave the process a ‘Somali flavor.’ By being in the driver’s seat many Somalis felt that they were in charge of their destiny.

Structurally, the Arta process had three distinctive phases. Phase 1 (beginning May 2, 2000) focused on clan reconciliation to nurture sufficient commitments for constructive deliberations. Phase II started in mid-June, with the negotiations centered around key substantive issues such as: agreement upon selection criteria and number of delegates, desired structure of political and governance system in the country and the constitution, status of the capital city of Mogadishu, resolution of disputes over property rights, elections of legislators, and the formation of the transitional parliament and government. Phase III, which began in August, dealt with the elections of the Members of Parliament (MPs), Speaker and Deputy Speakers and eventually the President of the transitional government.

During Phase I, the participants deliberated on reconciliation issues among the different Somali clans, discussed and developed the agenda for Phase II and the list of the participants based on clan representation. Despite the various challenges, the Arta talks moved along with Phase 1 lasting for a month and a half, focused on reconciliations.

---

among the clans. Although not reaching any solid reconciliation or compensation for clans, Phase I broke the ice and allowed for less hostile deliberations among clan members. The participants agreed upon and released a six-point declaration: to nurture and promote peace and reconciliation all over Somalia; to create a transitional national government through a consultative process by all Somalis; to emphasize and uphold the sacrosanctity of the Somali nation; to appeal for the return, to the original owners, all stolen and occupied properties; to institute a commitment to respect human rights; and to appeal to the international community to support the Djibouti peace talks and recognize its outcome.308 Phase I ended on June 13, 2000. Immediately thereafter, President Guelleh officially opened Phase II on June 15, 2000.

Phase II of the talks got to the heart of Somali crisis and the negotiations centered on key issues: selection of the delegates, constitution and political order and structures of the desired government (focus on centralized and united Somali Republic), status of the city of Mogadishu, property rights and resolution of related disputes, selection of parliamentarians and creation of a transitional government.309 Phase II hobbled along for 35 days. Using the 4.5 formula for clan representation, a total of 810 delegates were selected to participate in the talks. The delegates comprised of 180 delegates representing each of the four major clans (including 20 seats reserved for women representatives from each clan) and 90 seats, in aggregate, for all of the minority clans (including 10 reserved for women). Interestingly, the elders who had participated in Phase I became observers

---


without voting power. Adopting the principle of inclusivity, the delegates were comprised of members from all Somali clans, traditional leaders, exiled professionals, representatives of the business community and the numerous civil society organizations that had emerged.

On June 17, 2000 the delegates unanimously appointed as co-chairmen, Mogadishu’s former Mayor and the then Secretary General of the RRA; and four vice-chairs, including one woman. Delving into substantive issues, the mediators created key committees as follows: charter committee; security committee; economic development committee; Mogadishu committee; education committee; health, industry and trade, agriculture and animal husbandry committee; and the developing sector committee. The reports and recommendations of the committees were discussed and adopted in the plenary. Phase II negotiations, centering on core issues during month-long deliberations, realized critical outcomes. The delegates approved a TNC to streamline governance of Somalia for a 3-year transitional period; provided the establishment of a 245-member Transitional National Assembly (TNA); provided for regional autonomy based on Somalia’s 18 regions that were recognized before the collapse of Barre’s regime as a basis of classification; identified key structures such as executive, judicial and legislative branches (agreeing to set aside 25 and 24 seats for women and minority clans, respectively); and espoused the rights of individuals. Further, it was agreed that the TNC would serve as the supreme law that will govern Somalia until a federal constitution of the Republic of Somalia could be drawn up and adopted.

310 Ibid, 2.
Like during Phase I, Phase II pushed along and the final Phase III, centered on the selection of members of the TNA and elections of speaker and deputies, and eventually the President of the transitional government, began on August 13, 2000. The 245-member TNA included 225 members selected through the 4.5 formula. The delegates permitted President Guelleh to nominate an additional 20 legislators as a measure to de-escalate the rising tensions among the clan delegates. The selection took place in a tension-filled process due to disagreements on the seats allocated to the clans. Based on this proportional criterion the larger clans took lucrative political positions with two contending clans—especially the Darod and Hawiye being the principal beneficiaries. As a respondent noted, the logic behind the formula, suggests the centrality of clan politics in shaping the Arta process and its outcome. When the TNA parliament convened, they elected Abdalla Deerow Issaq as their Speaker. Subsequently, in the third round, Abdiqassim Hassan Salat, a 58-year old Moscow-educated former deputy PM and Minister of Interior under Barre’s regime of the Ayer sub-clan of the Habar Gedir clan of the Hawiye was elected as the President of the TNG of Somalia for three years. He gathered 145 votes against 97 received by his closest contender, Abdullahi Ahmed Addow.

On August 27, 2000 several heads of state and government including the Presidents of Djibouti, Eritrea, the Sudan and the PM of Ethiopia; senior diplomatic representatives accredited to Djibouti; representatives of Kenya, Italy, France, Libya, Saudi Arabia and officials from the UN, Organization of African Unity (OAU), League

---

311 Interview with a former Somali politician and businessman, Falls Church, VA, June 22, 2007.
312 AC, “Possible president,” AC 41, 17, September 1, 2000, 8.
of Arab States (LAS) and IGAD graced his inauguration ceremony in Arta, Djibouti. This gesture signified diverse governments’ initial acceptance and confidence in the emergent transitional government. In his inaugural speech, President Salat appealed to the Somalis to turn in their weapons and promised that this new government will rehabilitate militias and absorb them into the new TNG army. Soon thereafter, following wider international recognition by various governments and international and regional bodies, the TNG took up Somalia’s rightful seats in the IGAD, AU, LAS and the UN Assemblies after a very long absence. A civil society participant in the Arta talks observed that the birth of the TNG brought great optimism to the Somali people.  

Internally, the TNG—a major outcome of the Arta process won overwhelming public confidence and acceptance judged by the huge crowd that welcomed the officials into Mogadishu and Baidoa. On August 30, 2000, President Salat and his entourage comprising of members of the TNA visited Mogadishu and Baidoa to an arousing reception. An overjoyed crowd of about 100,000 celebrated in the streets of Mogadishu and welcomed the formation and inauguration of the TNG. President Salat dressed in a bulletproof vest and with tight security of over 1,000 militiamen riding in about 100 anti-craft mounted pickups (‘technicals’), confidently strode into a soccer

---

313 Interview with an official of international NGO working in the Horn, Nairobi, Kenya, September 13, 2008.
316 A ‘technical’ is a Somali form of a combat vehicle - a pickup mounted with machine guns and manned by armed militiamen.
stadium where a massive crowd cheered him.\textsuperscript{317} A majority of the ‘technicals’ were owned by the business groups which were supportive of the TNG. Such a warm reception encouraged the TNG to immediately move to Mogadishu, bypassing Baidoa as originally intended.\textsuperscript{318} On October 8, 2000, President Salat appointed Professor Ali Khalif Galaydh of the Dulbaante sub-clan of the Darod as the TNG’s PM. The following week, Galaydh appointed a deputy PM and 22 cabinet ministers and later appointed 45 assistant ministers, 5 state ministers and the Governor of the Banadir region (Greater Mogadishu). It was widely argued that the TNG cabinet was dominated by ministers who had served under Barre’s regime (in fact the President, the PM and other key ministers served the Barre regime). Examined through the lens of patronage politics, the TNG’s cabinet face was reminiscent of the autocratic and dreadful era of Barre’s collapsed regime—a fact that the independent regions of Somaliland and Puntland, among other actors, found quite troubling. In an interview an ardent supporter of Colonel Yussuf, confidently commented that their camp (Yussuf’s) never took the TNG serious as it was dominated by anti-reformists and bound to fail.\textsuperscript{319}

Nevertheless, mandated to usher in a new prudent culture of political governance, popular democracy, reconciliation, civic tolerance, rule of law, civic and political freedom and committed to the reconstruction of the Somali state from the anarchic and despondent condition in which it had remained trapped for close to a decade, the TNG became the bedrock upon which many Somalis banked their hopes. President Salat

\textsuperscript{317} Vick, “Building a Government From Scratch.”
\textsuperscript{319} Interview with a supporter of Colonel Yussuf, Baidoa, Somalia, December 1, 2007.
undertook various regional and international diplomatic visits to solicit internal and external support for his government. The leadership called for an ‘Arab Marshall Plan’ for Somalia and took vigorous steps in search of funds to reconstruct the country: from August 2000 to May 2002, Arab governments, particularly Saudi Arabia, provided aid of about $20 million; however, western countries and donors adopted a ‘wait and see’ attitude of concrete progress on the ground.

Regionally, President Salat flew to Cairo where he attended and gave a speech at the Ministerial Council of the LAS member states and had official discussions with Egyptian government’s officials. In September 2000, President Salat, aided by financial support from LAS members that covered critical operational expenses and sustained his nascent transitional institution, traveled to the US to attend the Millennium Summit and addressed the UN General Assembly. President Salat participated in LAS Summit in Cairo, October 21-22, 2000 and the Summit of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) in Doha, Qatar, November 12-14, 2000; while his top officials also visited Libya, Yemen, Kenya, Ethiopia and Uganda. Additionally, President Salat was the first post-1991 Somali leader permitted to take Somalia’s lawful seat at the IGAD Summit meeting held in Khartoum, Sudan on November 23-24, 2000. From December 17-19, 2000 in a rather symbolic gesture, President Salat also visited the Vatican hoping to counter the perception that the TNG is an Islamist Arab-leaning regime.

---

Although the international support did not rise to the anticipated levels, the TNG did receive both financial and military support from various governments. According to a 2003 UN report, Eritrea and Yemen supported the TNG and several private Yemeni and Yemen-based arms dealers engaged in arms business in Somalia.\(^{322}\) The same report noted that Djibouti provided arms for the TNG and Egypt donated uniforms and training support to the TNG’s police while other Arab governments provided financial and material support to the TNG’s government: Saudi Arabia ($15 million), Qatar ($3 million) and Libya ($2 million in addition to uniforms and other supplies), Kuwait ($0.5 million), and Sudan ($1 million, military uniforms in 2001-2002 and supported Farah Aideed and Al Itihaad Al Islamiya (AIAI) in mid-1990s).\(^{323}\) However, the Gulf governments failed to earmark their funds for specific projects and provided little oversight (if any)\(^{324}\), a situation, which gave the TNG’s political leaders considerable flexibility to divert the funds and arm themselves for personal and factional interests.

In a nutshell, speedily negotiated and signed, such was the promise of the Arta peace agreement. However, the negotiation process and implementation of the agreement attracted hosts of challenges from powerful wartime actors, particularly armed factional leaders in Mogadishu, authorities of the Puntland and Somaliland regions and Ethiopia.

\(^{323}\) Ibid.
\(^{324}\) Ibid.
3.4.1 Troubles and Challenges of the Arta Peace Process

Many consider the Arta talks a people’s peace process. Indeed, it is for this reason that in spite of the above challenges that the talks made considerable progress due to the wider support it received from the Somali civil and business community, wherein their involvement greatly facilitated the maturation of the peace talks. As Menkhaus (2002) noted, for many, the Arta talks inspired a cautious optimism and hope because of the perception that it was, more inclusive and legitimate since delegates were selected based on clans and not factions.\footnote{Menkhaus, “Somalia: In the Crosshairs,” 210.} One of the fundamental features of the Arta talks (which, as we shall see, also dominated the Mbagathi talks) was wartime actors’ manipulation of clan identities, which greatly shaped the process and outcomes. Clan affiliation versus regions was the basis of representation and selection of delegates. In the Arta talks, since most armed warlords boycotted them, the political spoils game was between the dominant clans who competed for political positions and status.

Consequently, although receiving the UN’s recognition, the TNG was confronted with a plethora of problems notably: the inability to tame conditions of a decade-long crisis of state collapse; financial weakness and allegations of corruption; clans’ dissatisfaction due to lack of fairness and equity in militias’ integration into armed forces; fierce opposition from Mogadishu warlords; opposition by the leadership of the independent regions of Somaliland and Puntland; external interference by Ethiopia; and skepticism from Western powers. Save for the initial arousing applause from the Arab world, the TNG won little recognition and acceptance from particularly her watchful
neighbor Ethiopia and some Western nations which were uneasy with the Arab-leaning TNG leadership. Even the December 2000 visit to the Vatican did not soothe the nerves of Islamophobic Western nations. In addition to the deeply held perception that the TNG was an Arab-leaning Islamist regime, Ethiopia was unhappy with the adoption of a centralized political structure of government in Somalia and actors inside Somalia openly termed the TNG as an ‘Arta faction’ and were “…alarmed at what it perceived to be a sharp tilt by the TNG toward [the] Arab and Islamic world.”\footnote{Ibid, 212.} Indeed, an Ethiopian official confirmed that Addis felt quite uncomfortable with the outcome of the Arta talks and the regime made an internal policy of sabotaging it.\footnote{Interview with a senior Ethiopian diplomat, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, July 11, 2009.} In addition to sharing an extensive insecure border with Somalia, Ethiopia has an enduring rivalry with Egypt and some other Arab governments in the geopolitical and strategically competitive Horn of Africa region.\footnote{Ibid, 211; Ioan M. Lewis, “Recycling Somalia from the Scrap Merchants of Mogadishu,” \textit{Northeast African Studies} 10, 3 (New Series, 2003), 218.} Expectedly, Ethiopia immediately took steps to cripple the new transitional administration.

Principally, the key challenges that confronted the process were: opposition by the political leadership of the independent Somaliland and Puntland regions; clan politics and opposition by armed wartime actors, particularly from the Mogadishu south-central and Puntland regions; and the sabotaging role of Ethiopia which created a surrogate powerful coalition of warlords to counter the TNG. The Somaliland and Puntland authorities strongly opposed the initiation, conduct and outcomes of the Arta talks. Regionally, Puntland and Somaliland authorities preferred federalism (stronger autonomous federal...}
states and a weak center) to centralism (stronger central government) espoused by proponents of Arta, therefore they opposed the process and rejected its outcome. For example, in addition to his previous opposition to the talks, following President Salat’s election, President Egal of Somaliland asserted that “…he would enter into negotiations only with someone who could claim legitimacy over the southern regions of Somalia” and his Foreign Minister engaged in shuttle diplomacy overseas, including to the UN articulating Somaliland’s position. Similarly, Phase II of the talks ran into early troubles, for example, when on June 17, 2000, Colonel Yussuf proclaimed that the Puntland delegation had withdrawn from the Djibouti process and the elders who remained lacked the mandate of the people of Puntland and as a result would not honor the outcome of the process. Further, Colonel Yussuf questioned the dominance of the TNG by Ministers who served in the Barre’s regime—which he fought for many years. Thus, from the outset, the relatively better organized independent Puntland and Somaliland administrations joined the rejectionists’ camp and played a critical role in undermining the TNG from inception.

Beyond the above challenges, this dissertation argues that the salient threats to the TNG were economically motivated. Principally, the sabotaging role and spoiler tactics of predatory wartime actors with economic agendas undermined the Arta talks and its outcome. This emerged in the form of incessant opposition to the TNG by predatory factional leaders that espoused dominant economic interests. Early on, and cognizant of

330 Ibid.
331 World Bank, Conflict in Somalia: Drivers and Dynamics, 13.
the spoiler roles that these armed wartime actors could play, during the consultative phase in March of 2000, the Djibouti delegation reached out to armed factional leaders in south-central Somalia (Mogadishu, Baidoa and Beletweyn, but could not visit Kismayu due to intense factional fighting). Similarly, powerful armed actors in south-central Somalia, such as Muse Sudi, Hussein Aideed, Osman ‘Ato’ and Mohamed Qanyare opposed the talks. In the end, throughout the negotiation process, although some factional leaders such as Ali Mahdi attended, the political leaders in the autonomous regions of Somaliland, Puntland and key armed factional leaders in Mogadishu opposed and largely stayed out of the talks.

Notwithstanding spoiler roles played by Ethiopia, opposition by factional leaders from Mogadishu, Puntland and Somaliland regions undermined the Arta process from inception and eventually facilitated the collapse of the Accord. Indeed, despite the state failure, business was booming in Somalia and wartime actors had no intentions of ever abandoning their predatory engagements. Writing in 2000, while the Arta talks were being initiated, Africa Confidential observed:

The economy is budding, though inflation is a problem. Functioning commercial telephone systems help trade and Somalis keep in touch with far-flung relatives. Small scale industry is growing and Somalpasta factory is back on stream and even running a lottery…Recent history north and south suggests that life for the rich and powerful can be as good without a government as with. Off-road vehicles, private generators, mobile telephones, the Internet and well armed bodyguards are as useful for doing business as government, with the advantage of no taxes or regulations – and no risk of elections.

332 Johnson, ed., History of Mediation in Somalia since 1988, 43.
333 RRA’s Shattigudud made a technical appearance in June 2000 although his status was not clear, see AC, “Time to Talk,” 8.
The wartime actors benefiting from predatory war economies and possessing economic agendas over political goals of reconciliation undermined the process. A perceptive article in the *Economist* observed:

The warlords and militias had fought each other to a standstill and, amid the rubble; businessmen were starting to make money. At first they were partners with the gunmen but, as the gunmen found less and less loot and the businessmen did better and better, the relationship was gradually reversed: the gunmen became mere guards for the businessmen. The peace conference was driven by the entrepreneurs.  

Warlords’ politics of intimidation and superior resources and capacity to spoil peace made the TNG powerless against heavily armed and well-positioned factional leaders. In the complex power struggle game, only Ali Mahdi supported the TNG administration, while a powerful and stronger coalition of armed wartime actors comprised of four of the five Mogadishu-based armed militia leaders—Mohammed Qanyare, Hussein Aideed, Muse Sudi and Osman Ali ‘Ato’ furiously challenged and termed the transitional government irrelevant. For example, Johnson observed that, “In north Mogadishu, the faction leader Musa Sudi forced TNG forces out and positioned artillery guns towards the port to deter incoming marine transport. This not only rendered Mogadishu port unusable but also encouraged the use of natural beach ports, such as El Maan port, beyond the control of the TNG.” While the TNG remained holed up in a former police training college, armed militia leaders such as Hussein Farah Aideed fearlessly occupied a symbolic and prestigious old government building (Villa Somalia).

---


and Mohammed Qanyare occupied and resided in a bunkered former army headquarters 5 kilometers outside Mogadishu. In the end, the loose coalition of non-state actors comprised of warlords Muse Sudi, Mohamed Farah Aideed and Mohamed Qanyare prevented the TNG from entering their turf.

Asserting their authority, on October 30, 2000, six Mogadishu militia leaders released a statement accusing President Salat of undertaking measures that could result in a dangerous war and also criticizing the influx of new banknotes in Mogadishu and vowed to obstruct the opening of the Mogadishu seaport unless an all-inclusive government was constituted. For instance, reacting to the TNG’s plan to reopen the Mogadishu’s main port, warlord Qanyare threatened, “Your boys [TNG’s soldiers] can’t do that; the gun is loaded.” Qanyare’s confidence was bolstered by his economic wealth and military power as he reportedly at the time had about 800-strong militia force and 40 ‘technicals.’ Reportedly, Aideed “…drives, with his artillery, unmolested through the capital’s rubble-strewn streets.” The TNG exercised restraints and pulled back.

At the heart of Somalia’s wartime institution was an insatiable drive for power and resources and a deep-seeded culture of greed to dominate others. Qanyare argued that the TNG could not govern without sharing the spoils of war with warlords. He commented, “We don’t refuse peace, but (government members) are trying to take all of the cake…I am here for power. I want some of the power.”

---

338 Quoted by Vick, “Building a Government From Scratch.” (Added words).
339 Crawley, “A dovish Somalia offers militias training, food for arms.”
341 Crawley, “A dovish Somalia offers militias training.”
the UNSG, despite TNG’s negotiation with militias controlling the Mogadishu seaport in early 2001, the port remained closed as reigning warlords, particularly Muse Sudi effectively blocked its opening.\(^{342}\) Opening the Mogadishu seaport would not only have undermined warlords’ continued enjoyment of spoils of war to which they have become dependent for quite some time, but also threatened the long-term stability of their wartime empire. Consequently, these wartime actors curtailed TNG’s ability to govern beyond the Bandar region, while the Southern and Central regions remained under the control of powerful and armed wartime actors. The armed factional leaders, with power and resources, greatly undermined the TNG, preventing the nascent transitional government from gaining access to critical resources and infrastructure to institutionalize itself.

Nonetheless, the TNG concentrated on security stabilization and on October 17, 2000 appointed a former general as the chair of the National Demobilization Authority (NDA). Unfortunately, the following day, gunmen linked to an anti-TNG warlord assassinated the chairman at a coffee shop in Mogadishu and although reportedly the TNG officials knew to where the assassins retreated, they did nothing, hoping to keep the fragile peace. The armed Mogadishu wartime actors openly challenged and capitalized on every opportunity to drag the TNG into an open fight. Hence, the TNG became a lame duck in the face of stiff opposition from a variety of armed wartime actors with superior power, resources, military and financial strengths and patronage ties. As a weak

transitional authority, the TNG lacked capacity to deliver on the promises of the Arta
talks and equally lacked the means to counter spoilers of the peace process.

Management of spoilers is an art, and as Stedman advanced in his study of
spoilers, unique strategies such as inducement, socialization and coercion could be
developed to deal with and manage various kinds of spoilers.\textsuperscript{343} Widely, the TNG
applied a soft form of indirect coercion, then, mixed strategies of socialization and
inducement. Employing an indirect form of coercion, the TNG leadership avoided
military confrontation with war-eager warlords, while tactically employing soft coercion
to undermine and cripple the warlords. Relying on the support of the business community
and the growing Somali clans’ fatigue with warlordism, the TNG shifted from a
warlords’ appeasement policy in favor of an alliance with the business community. Vick
writes that the TNG leadership:

\begin{quote}
Adopted a strategy of determined patience toward the warlords, backed by
quiet strength. The 100 technicals that escorted Hassan into Mogadishu
are no longer on the streets, where they might encounter warlords’
checkpoints. The trucks have been gathered with 80 more--almost all
controlled by businessmen, who threw their allegiance from the warlords
to the government--in training camps for a new national army. Uniforms
are on order.\textsuperscript{344}
\end{quote}

The business community’s tactical shift of support to the TNG was aimed at
undermining the armed wartime actors to coerce them into recognizing the transitional
authority. A rich revenue base along with alliances and patronage ties with wealthy
business community is a realistic measure of the power of wartime actors. By enhancing

\begin{footnotes}
\item[344] Quoted by Vick, “Building a Government From Scratch.”
\end{footnotes}
ties with the business community, the TNG pursued an internal empowerment strategy which would have accorded them power, arms and resources to counter threats posed by the armed warlords. Despite the business community’s shift from supporting warlords to the TNG, the internal environment favored the warlords and the power balance was in their favor due to enhanced internal loyalty and support from their respective clans and the SRRC – which Ethiopia created and financed to topple the TNG.

As the politics of strategic avoidance and determined patience failed, the TNG leadership adopted a mixed form of inducement and socialization strategies pursuing a direct political appeasement and policy. The strategies were aimed at soothing the nerves of the militia leaders, war profiteers and their clan sentiments. The TNG leadership dished out lucrative cabinet appointments to violent militia leaders, not because of their professional qualifications or expertise, but rather due to clan affiliation and considerations and as well absorbing most of the militias into the national army. The strategy partially paid off. In December of 2000, the TNG managed to win the support of some of Mogadishu’s Big Five (warlords), namely, Hussein Hajji Bod; and later in February of 2001, Mohamed Qanyare was given a cabinet position as the Minister of Fisheries and Marine Resources; and Osman Ali ‘Ato’ engaged in positive discussions with President Salat and provided technical help in the ‘clean up of Mogadishu’ campaign.\(^{345}\) However, other powerful warlords such as Hussein Aideed and Muse Sudi remained major antagonists to the TNG’s expansion process, thereby undermining the government’s credibility. Despite setbacks in Mogadishu, the TNG reached a deal with

critical opponents when on June 18, 2001, the chairman of the Lower Juba Alliance proclaimed the formation of an 11-member inter-clan Council in Kismayu and expressed that they will work with the transitional government.\textsuperscript{346} Driven by both political and economic agendas and clans interests, political posturing, warfare and shifty negotiations festered in Somalia.

Once again, TNG’s warlords political appeasement policy failed miserably since the warlords were appointed to key positions largely due to considerations of the threats they posed to the transitional authority and their capacity to spoil peace. Naturally, their loyalty was vested more with their clans than with the appointing authority—the TNG. As a 2001 \textit{Economist} article observed the TNG “tried to buy them off in various ways: 15,000 ex-militiamen are now paid as policemen. This has cost the government most of its money, and it still dare not deploy the new policemen throughout Mogadishu for fear they will return to their former masters.”\textsuperscript{347} In an interview, a former Adviser to TNG’s PM observed, “we tried to buy them [warlords] off but failed to win their hearts and mind.”\textsuperscript{348} The TNG failed to solicit and maintain internal loyalty or appease militia leaders because for the contending wartime actors the benefits of economic predation and their desire to perpetuate economic agendas far outweighed the political goals of reconciliation and possible return to normalcy.

Beyond Mogadishu wartime actors’ opposition, the next biggest threat to the TNG was the SRRC. A critical turning point emerged on March 23, 2001 as Ethiopia convened

\textsuperscript{346} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{347} Economist, “A patchwork of fiefs.”
\textsuperscript{348} Interview with a former Adviser to the TNG’s PM Galaydh, Nairobi, Kenya, October 24, 2008 (Added word).
a warlords-dominated conference in Awassa, Ethiopia and subsequently formed a 17-member SRRC coalition of like-minded militia organizations comprised of several factional leaders based in Baidoa, united by a common mission to destabilize the TNG.\textsuperscript{349} Warlord Hussein Aideed of the SRRC coalition accused the TNG as being just a ‘platform for fundamentalism.’\textsuperscript{350} The SRRC faction, widely considered Ethiopia’s brainchild, emphasized that their goal was to initiate and complete an IGAD-led all-inclusive national reconciliation process within a 6-month period and create a representative Transitional Government of National Unity (TGNU). This stance clearly marked a fresh regional search for another peace process in which Ethiopia, as a regional patron, began flexing its political and military muscle through unquestioned support to the SRRC, with Puntland’s leadership – specifically President Yussuf – as her principal ally.

During 2001, this anti-TNG coalition broadened its base as several factional leaders who attended the Arta talks, such as General Imar Hajji Mohamed ‘Masale’ of the SNF, Hassan Mohamed Nur “Shatigudud” of the RRA and Abdullahi Sheikh Ismail of the Southern Somali National Movement (SSNM-BIREM), became major sources of opposition to the transitional administration.\textsuperscript{351} Piling pressure on TNG’s leadership

\textsuperscript{349} The TNG’s top leadership including the President, PM and Speaker of the TNA, repeatedly and in a letter dated March 21, 2001 (S/2001/263 to the UNSC accused Ethiopia of sponsoring and arming the SRRC and requested the Council to consider measures to prevent Ethiopian interferences in the internal affairs of Somalia. However, in a letter dated April 4, 2001 S/2001/325), addressed to the President of the UNSC, Ethiopia denied the allegation. See UNSG, \textit{Report of the Secretary-General}, S/2001/963, 2. For a list of the SRRC members see Table 3 and 8.


from October 25-26, 2000 officials of the RRA, Puntland and the Somali Patriotic Front (SPF) met at Garowe and adopted a powerful declaration which proposed a federal government structure; initiation of another reconciliation conference and establishment of a technical committee of experts to draft a charter; and the creation of the following Somali federal regions: Puntland, Somaliland, central state and southwestern state comprising of Lower Shebelle, Bay, Bakool, Gedo and Lower and Middle Juba. This gathering of wartime actors and powerful declaration, in addition to stiff opposition from principal Mogadishu warlords and Somaliland authorities, continued to critically undermine the efficacy of the TNG and to an extent set the tone for the initiation of yet another peace process (Mbagathi).

Realizing threats from the SRRC coalition, the TNG leadership sought regional assistance to make peace with this powerful wartime actors’ coalition. From May 16-17, 2001, President Salat undertook an official visit to Kenya and, in a meeting with President Moi, requested his assistance in mediating conflicts between the TNG and Ethiopia with a view bring the SRRC opposition forces onboard to support the implementation of the outcomes of the Arta talks. President Moi heeded the mediation request and met with the SRRC coalition in Nairobi on May 25, 2001 and promised to hold a larger Somali leaders meeting in July of 2001. However, according to the

352 Internal division within the RRA leadership intensified as some leaders were aligned to the TNG and the others to SRRC leading to late March 2001 arrest and imprisonment of Digil Mirifle elders returning from discussions in Mogadishu by the RRA leadership. See UNSG, Report of the Secretary-General, S/2001/963, 2.
355 Ibid.
UNSG Report of 2001, the meeting was postponed at the request of Ethiopia. Ethiopia wanted to maintain the status quo as her SRRC allies had the upper hand and TNG was cornered and weak. Undeterred, the TNG continued to pursue diplomatic options, and from June 13-16 sent a delegation to Addis Ababa, led by the Deputy PM, and the two sides reached an agreement to enhance peace in Somalia and strengthened their relationship.

Despite TNG’s diplomatic outreach, bent on initiating another peace process to achieve their desired outcome, Ethiopian officials continued to hold numerous meetings with the SRRC officials in Addis Ababa and on June 19, 2001, Ethiopia’s Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs visited Garowe and held discussions with Colonel Yussuf. Relations between Ethiopia and the TNG rapidly deteriorated as the transitional authority accused Ethiopia of fanning factional clashes between the militias of General Morgan and the RRA; conducting military incursions into the Somali territory on August 7, 2001; and alleged Ethiopian operations inside the country by an Ethiopian military officer. Ethiopia denied these accusations. Why were the wartime actors opposed to the Arta talks? Indeed, the SRRC’s federalist claims were largely a perfect excuse and a strategy by profiteering wartime actors and allied associates to maintain the economic status quo and fight off any powerful central body from emerging – to ensure their predatory domination and access to regional spoils to which they have been accustomed since 1991. Hence, political or ideological claims of federalism espoused by the SRRC members or

356 Ibid.
357 Ibid.
358 Ibid.
359 Ibid.
unitarianism, who fought frequently amongst themselves, were mere smokescreens for the perpetuation of economic predation and dominant economic agendas.

Besides the wartime actors, even the leaders in the TNG had and pursued economic interests and agendas instead of committing to genuine political reconciliation. Within the TNG leadership, as Le Sage argues, the “…Office-holders are little more than public symbols of the potential for cross-clan, national government…” Indeed, despite disillusionment in the government, in addition to political positioning for the future, most ministers stayed loyal hoping that they will reap from their strategic posts which came with “…a promise of gatekeeper earnings when making deals with foreign companies for trade, infrastructure development and mining.” For Le Sage, the TNG survived this long due to support of the business networks which saw the government as a political tool to protect and advance their economic interests. Key regional business players such as Abdulraham Boreh (a close ally of President Guelleh) bankrolled the Arta talks and closely associated with PM Galaydh as co-investors in the Somali telecommunication sector in addition to extensive business connections with a known sugar importer and currency dealer, Mohamed Delaif, operating in Mogadishu. Such business actors and external allies provided financial support to the TNG in its hour of need and also with a view to secure their future economic interests. Additionally, it is worth noting that in Somalia during the Arta talks’ negotiation process some rich business community leaders

361 Ibid.
362 Ibid.
and civil society actors not only led the process but also financed it. During the talks, unarmed politicians and business community members together with traditional elders edged out armed factional leaders during the negotiation process. The major beneficiaries of the Arta talks were not armed warlords but politicians, religious personalities and business community members.\textsuperscript{365}

The sustainability of a transitional government that isolates armed elements had its fate almost sealed, as we shall examine later. In Somalia, one thing has been clear—the business community and external patrons with resources play critical roles in either supporting or undermining transitional governments.\textsuperscript{366} Behind powerful warlords and clans, there exist either rich business community members or well-resourced and committed external patrons.\textsuperscript{367} Indeed, the Arta process although starting off as a Somali-owned and civil society-driven concerted grassroots effort to build peace in Somalia, prominently featured a clans-based political process which was manipulated by dominant factional and business leaders and clans.

Additionally, complex internal weakness crippled the nascent TNG, greatly undermining its effectiveness. As Awad observed, “…the euphoria that accompanied [TNG’s] birth had turned into bitter disappointments; and the hopes that had been vested in it had soon dissipated into a fleeting mirage.”\textsuperscript{368} Internal structural conditions sustained by decades of state collapse and lack of resources accorded the TNG few

\textsuperscript{365} Interview with a former Adviser to PM Ghedi, Nairobi, Kenya, October 11, 2008.
\textsuperscript{366} Focus Group Discussions with a group of Somalis, Minneapolis, MN, July 3, 2007.
\textsuperscript{367} Focus Group Discussions with a group of Somali politicians, Nairobi, Kenya, November 3, 2008.
institutional launching pads or a capacity to position or legitimize itself, or to restore law and order to the troubled country. Financial constraints hit the TNG as international pledges were tied to the ability of the TNG to deliver and an over-reliance on the Somali business community was unsustainable.\textsuperscript{369} The Arab League’s financial pledge of $400 million for the reconstruction of the country failed to materialize as well.\textsuperscript{370} In March 26-27, 2001, during the LAS Summit in Amman, Arab leaders appealed to all Somalis to work with the elected TNG government and appealed for an assistance package of $54 million to finance the costs of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reconstruction (DDR) and the restoration of national institutions.\textsuperscript{371} Saudi Arabia, although pledging tens of millions of dollars, only released an equivalent of $20 million; Libya gave only $2 million; and due to Western donors’ suspicion of President Salat’s connections with AIAI (an alleged Al-Qaeda affiliate in the Horn), an earlier UN’s pledge of $20 million remained largely unforthcoming.\textsuperscript{372}

However, the TNG received support from other sources. Hoping to reap from future reconstruction contracts and other business favors, three key business allies met TNG’s $1 million monthly operating expenditure.\textsuperscript{373} The lack of financial, economic and military muscle and the lack of loyal fighters weakened TNG politically and militarily in comparison with other wartime institutions with better means. Allegations of

\textsuperscript{369} Feldman and Slattery, “Living Without a Government,” 209. According to Le Sage, the TNG was protected by a cartel of powerful and well-armed business groups, see Le Sage, “Somalia: Sovereign Disguise.”
\textsuperscript{370} Economist, “A patchwork of fiefs.”
\textsuperscript{371} UNSG, Report of the Secretary-General, S/2001/963, 2.
\textsuperscript{373} AC, “Transition to where?” \textit{AC} 42, 15, 27 July 27, 2001, 8.
corruption were rife. In fact, ICG reports indicate that despite receiving $2.5 million aid from Libya in February of 2002, earmarked for its security forces, the money was mismanaged and several soldiers went unpaid leading to a short-lived revolt by the Presidential Guard and Banadir police.374 Taking a softer side, in an endeavor to stabilize security situation, the TNG government adopted as its priority demobilization of an estimated 75,000 armed militias and according to the then Defense Minister, Abdullahi Muse, about 2,000 militias returned their arms in Mogadishu, costing the government about $45 million as cash payout.375 It created a 2000-strong police force, which in actuality could only control a few streets in Mogadishu.376 Despite such initiatives, the operating environment remained hostile to the TNG’s attempts to exert its authority.

Despite facing complex challenges, hopes that the TNG might deliver lingered. In an October 2001 progress report, the UNSG noted:

The TNG inherited no personnel, buildings, archives, forces of law and order or tax-collecting capacity. Ministries are beginning to function and a number of buildings have been rehabilitated for their use. A judiciary is gradually coming into place with Sharia courts and their militia being absorbed by the TNG. Personnel are gradually being put in place to take charge of a police system in the capital and police have returned to all 14 district police stations in Mogadishu under a command structure.377

According to the same report, the TNA during its second session on February 20, 2001, approved TNG’s appointment of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Somalia, Attorney-General and Ministers; ratified the AU’s Constitutive Act and the charter of the

376 AC, “Transition to where?” 8.
Arab League; and deliberated on the TNG’s program of activities.\textsuperscript{378} In conformity with Article 30 of the TNC, on May 6, 2001, the TNG proclaimed the creation of a 25-member National Commission for Reconciliation and Property Settlement (NCRPS), chaired by the respected former Somali PM, Abdirizak Hajji Hussein, but the Puntland administration and SRRC coalition promptly opposed the move.\textsuperscript{379} Shortly thereafter, on July 25, 2001, the chairman resigned, blaming poor support from the PM, procedural concerns in the appointment of the NCRPS members and modalities of announcing its formation.\textsuperscript{380} The third parliamentary session held on September 17 dealt with other pending matters including local administration and taxation issues.\textsuperscript{381} Despite these positive developments, in the end, the TNG remained a feeble administration crippled by menacingly dangerous opposition from diverse wartime actors, notably the militia leaders from Mogadishu and the independent Somaliland and Puntland regions, among others.

3.4.2 The imminent collapse of the TNG and the search of a successor regime

Overall, unable to exercise territorial control, collect revenue through taxes and provide social services to the people due to stiff internal and regional opposition, the TNG became quite inept despite the initial optimism with which it was greeted. Due to growing discontent, several MPs filed a motion of no confidence in the TNG on October 12, 2001 accusing the regime of corruption and misappropriation of $3.5 million and

\textsuperscript{378} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{379} Ibid, 2.
\textsuperscript{380} Ibid, 2; Johnson, ed., \textit{History of Mediation in Somalia since 1988}, 50.
\textsuperscript{381} Ibid.
failure to boost security and economic condition in the country. The fatal blow came on October 28, 2001 when PM Galaydh’s government lost in a vote of no confidence motion with 141 votes versus 29, due to widening unpopularity, with the result that his 84-member cabinet had to be dissolved in a month. With the fall of Galaydh’s government, President Salat appointed Hassan Abshir Farah, the then Minister of Water Resources as the new PM. On February 16, 2002, Farah unveiled his new cabinet which gained TNA’s approval on March 9, 2002. The new PM re-emphasized his commitment to nurture peace and stability in Somalia. On March 13, President Salat visited the Galgadud and Hiraan regions, but due to clan tensions in Beled Weyne, on March 17, he flew back to Mogadishu. This rejection reflected not only the nature and the veracity of clan politics from the respective regions, but speaks even more to the impact of the institutionalization of wartime actors’ predatory behaviors and dominant economic agendas — consistently obstructing the expansion of the TNG into areas under their control to protect the spoils of war.

Undeterred, in November of 2001, the TNG officials intensified reconciliation efforts in various parts of the country with the President visiting the Lower Shebelle region, particularly the Merka district, and environs such as Afgoye, Wanlewein and Brava—with a view to establish effective local administration in Merka. Additionally, the new PM reached out to regional governments for support, including: continued dialogue with factional leaders such as Osman Ali ‘Ato’ and Jama Ali Jama of Puntland;
discussions with Ethiopia’s PM, Meles Zenawi and Ismail Omar Guelleh of Djibouti; and attending a reconciliation meeting with the SRRC coalition convened by President Moi in December of 2001. These initiatives were all geared to appease powerful wartime actors to support the embattled and resource-starved TNG.

The Moi-led TNG-SRRC reconciliation meeting took place between November and December of 2001 with key participants including: the TNG officials, Secretary-General of the SRRC, Osman Ali ‘Ato’, and Omar Mohamed Mahamoud “Finish” (deputy to factional leader Muse Sudi, who took part in Phase 1 of the negotiations held in Nairobi from November 1-4, 2001). However, the majority of the SRRC leaders were in Ethiopia and refused to participate or to send their representatives, vowing not to dialogue with what they termed the ‘Arta faction’ unless the TNG leadership ceased referring to themselves as a government and President Salat stopped calling himself President of Somalia, and appealed for holding an all-inclusive IGAD-led reconciliation process for Somalia in late 2002.

Despite the SRRC boycott, the Moi-led Nairobi meeting released a communiqué highlighting agreements coalesced around an eight-point agenda for future peace and reconciliation in Somalia: the implementation of the IGAD, OAU and UN decisions and proclamations on the situations in Somalia; power-sharing on the basis of clans; denouncement of violence as a means for resolving political differences; review of all state laws in preparation for reconciliation; conduct of national disarmament; working

---

386 Ibid.
388 Ibid, 3.
with the international community to eradicate terrorism and committing to principles of peaceful coexistence with neighboring nations.\textsuperscript{389}

In reaction, Ethiopia welcomed the outcomes of Kenyan’s meeting and called on the IGAD’s subcommittee on Somalia to take practical measures to initiate a tangible peace process in Somalia. Further, on November 12, 2000, upon receiving President Moi’s Special Envoy for Somalia, PM Zenawi lauded Moi’s effort, but asserted that he preferred an IGAD-led process.\textsuperscript{390} Despite diplomatic engagements with the TNG officials, Ethiopia continued to not only undermine the TNG but worked aggressively behind the scenes to prepare the ground for the initiation of another reconciliation conference with a view to prop up its ally—the SRRC coalition to the position of power and control of the governance space in Somalia. According to a report by ICG, “…alarmed by the influence of Islamist groups…Addis Ababa gave the SRRC political and military support between 2001 and 2004 in order to cripple and eventually replace the interim government.”\textsuperscript{391} Hence the bond between SRRC and Ethiopia was a critical blow to the TNG.

Nevertheless, determined, Moi convened the second phase of the Somali reconciliation meeting from December 13-24, 2001 resulting in three distinct peace agreements between the TNG and key factions: the SRRC faction led by Osman Ali ‘Ato’ (but the five co-chairmen boycotted the talks); Omar “Finish” led USC/SSA; and representatives of USC/SNA.\textsuperscript{392} The Nairobi agreement had two key provisions: setting

\textsuperscript{389} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{390} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{391} ICG, \textit{Can the Somali Crisis Be Contained?} 3.
a one-month deadline for the creation of an all-inclusive process and calling for the expansion of the number of parliamentary and cabinet positions to accommodate a broad-based government.\footnote{Ibid.}

Despite the hostile operating environment, the TNG struggled to hold on and to deliver. To aid the implementation of the Moi-brokered Nairobi agreement, on January 20, 2002 the TNA passed a parliamentary motion to increase cabinet positions.\footnote{Ibid.} A UN inter-agency assessment mission to Somalia that visited a number of areas between January 15-23, 2002, observed that the TNG and other authorities had extended their control with varying degrees of stability, law and order and that civilians have resumed their normal life to an extent.\footnote{Ibid, 5.} However, the mission reported that several de-facto entities commanded and ruled large parts of the country including some sections of the city of Mogadishu and the country was still heavily militarized with different groups competing for the command of the scarce economic, political and social resources resulting in unpredictable and violent factional warfare from time-to-time.\footnote{Ibid.}

In Somalia, due to a growing political and military stalemate and opposition from the armed coalition of the SRRC and the authorities of the independent regions of Somaliland and Puntland with political and military support from Ethiopia, coupled with the inability of the TNG to institutionalize itself since its formation, the regime steeply slid toward an imminent collapse. Meanwhile, politics between the TNG and Ethiopia festered. In a statement released on January 7, 2002, the TNG accused Ethiopia of not
only undermining the Nairobi reconciliation meetings, but also recruiting, training and arming 5,000 militiamen in the Somali territory, and officially lodged a complaint with the UNSC citing a December 30, 2001 arrival of 200 Ethiopian soldiers in Baidoa and appealed to the UNSC to condemn the hostile actions. Ethiopia denied the accusations.

Nonetheless, one thing was clear: Somalia remained entangled in a vicious predatory factional wars and power struggle that vociferously consumed the already tired and mutilated soul of the collapsed nation. With the collapse of the TNG imminent, factional violence and weapons stockpiling in a fresh power struggle gravely concerned the UN and regional governments. Regionally, IGAD governments concerned about the expiry of the TNG mandate on August 12, 2003 triggered a feverish regional search for an alternative transitional authority to prevent Somalia from falling into a total state of anarchy. On its part, Kenya expressed its plans to set up an international secretariat to execute and source funds for the proposed Somali peace process.

In sum, the Arta process in addition to TNG’s internal weakness to institutionalize itself, collapsed particularly due to opposition from wartime actors, connected to predatory war economies and pursuing dominant economic agendas, opposed to the creation of a politically viable governmental entity in Somalia. The next section examines the genesis and promise of the Mbagathi peace process of 2002-2004 by focusing on its birth, dynamics, structure, organization and outcomes; with the struggles of the talks discussed in the subsequent chapters four and five.

---

397 Ibid, 3.
3.5 Genesis and the Promise of the Mbagathi Peace Process

The birth of the Mbagathi peace talks sought to identify and avoid the sources of problems in the Arta process of 2000—the failure to include the powerful wartime actors in the negotiation process and to accommodate their interests. The Mbagathi process emerged out of the ashes of failure of the Arta process and was significantly shaped by the opposition from anti-TNG forces drawn from Mogadishu warlords, the SRRC and Somaliland that worked to largely protect their predation turfs and perpetuate economic agendas.

Regional discussions to initiate a successor peace and reconciliation process to the Arta talks took place in early 2001, championed by Kenya and Ethiopia. In addition to the continuing state of anarchy in the country and the collapse of the TNG notwithstanding, internal, regional and international dynamics made the emergence of the Mbagathi process possible. First, the weakness of the TNG, its inability to institutionalize itself and the advancing expiry of the TNC Charter in August 2003, added time pressure dimensions to the need for a successor regime. Second, a political stalemate in the face of stiff opposition from armed wartime actors such as the Mogadishu warlords, the SRRC coalition, Somaliland and Puntland authorities and regional hegemony (Ethiopia), delegitimized the TNG leadership – which lost the confidence of many internal and external actors. Third, regional leader President Moi of Kenya was near the end of his 24-year rule and wanted to conclude his tenure by brokering peace in Somalia. Others also saw Moi’s regional engagements as a way of creaming his regional statesmanship but also diversionary tactics from domestic challenges that continued to confront his regime.
Fourth, Ethiopia and her Western allies, particularly the US, preferred replacing the current regime with a friendly SRRC coalition with a view to root out AIAI from the Horn of Africa. Finally, Sudan as the chair of IGAD, with its image tainted due to its previous association with global terrorist leaders such as Osama Bin Laden—the mastermind of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack in the US—and facing the heat of the US Global War on Terrorism, used the possibility for successful Somali peace talks as an opportunity to appease the Americans and positioned itself to play a more constructive peacemaking role in the Horn. Thus, the convergence of interests pushed for the initiation of another all-inclusive peace process to unseat the perceived Arab-leaning TNG. The opportunity was legitimized by IGAD’s 9th Heads of State Summit held from January 10-11, 2002 in Khartoum, Sudan which mandated three key IGAD states—Kenya (as the Coordinator), and Ethiopia and Djibouti as the principal members of the ITCS to initiate another all-inclusive Somali National Reconciliation Conference in Kenya within two months.

Drawing its legitimacy from the IGAD’s 9th Heads of State Summit and robust international support from the European Union (EU); US; IPF, particularly Norway, Italy, and Ireland; China; and Kenya, the sub-regional organization embarked on a determined journey to organize the Mbagathi process with the goal of establishing a broad-based and

---


an all-inclusive government of national unity.\textsuperscript{401} Following on the heels of the failed Arta peace talks of 2000 that created the TNG, the Mbagathi peace process was the 14\textsuperscript{th} attempt to restore peace and stability to the notoriously stateless Somalia. The birth of the Mbagathi process, as a senior former adviser of the TNG administration admits, provided a safe opportunity for the collapsing TNG’s leadership to save face.\textsuperscript{402} The Mbagathi process hoped to avoid the endogenous and exogenous factors that troubled the Arta process, which eventually led to the collapse of the TNG by accommodating the interests and concerns of regionalists or federalists (armed factional leaders and the SRRC coalition) and the interests of Ethiopia. Hence, the process was hinged on the pursuit of an all-inclusive approach to build a durable peace in Somalia. Seeking to narrow divisions among both internal and external actors such as IGAD member states, the process appealed to the Somali warlords as an opportunity to transform themselves and embrace new roles as leaders in peacemaking rather than as a destabilizing force.

Organizationaly, the ITCS prepared the ground for the initiation of the process. On September 6, 2002, the ITCS presented its report based on field findings to the IGAD Ministerial Committee on Somalia and decided that the peace process would start in Eldoret, western Kenya on October 15, 2002. The IGAD Ministers directed the ITCS to develop criteria for allocating delegation seats members of various major political groups, with due consideration for clan and gender balance. Earlier, members of the Somali

\footnotesize

\footnotesize
\textsuperscript{402} Interview with a former Adviser/official of the TNG Administration and now a UN official in Minneapolis, MN, US, July 3, 2007.
business community met in Nairobi on August 28, 2002 and called for the creation of a committee composed of Somalis to play an advisory role vis-à-vis the ITCS. Additionally, the Somali peace process received pledges of political, diplomatic and financial support from representatives of various regional governments and other organizations and countries, including the UN, EU, LAS and US, among others.

Wisely conceived, the Mbagathi process drew up a promising framework hoping to avoid the pitfalls of the Arta process. Structurally, Mbagathi was a three-phased peace process with fundamental attributes of a successful peace process. First, it won broad-based delegates’ political trust as it embraced principles of inclusivity by inviting large delegations from both the federalists and centralists camps and other sectors of the society for open plenary discussions. Second, the process focused on reconciliation and nation building. Third, the talks had an open and flexible timeframe for enhanced deliberations. Fourth, it ensured regional inclusivity and took on-board concerns of a key regional power and patron to the SRRC—Ethiopia, which was opposed to the Arta’s outcome. Fifth, it created a representative consultative structure of the ITCS led by Kenya, with Ethiopia and Djibouti as principal members. Sixth, it had international support and was well-attended by the international community especially the UN, AU, World Bank, LAS, EU and US, among others. Finally, the process and the delegates were provided with externally funded technical support and expertise-sharing services which enhanced the quality of the process and deliberations. These key fundamentals heralded a well-designed process that attempted to reconcile divergent positions among internal and
external actors, thereby avoiding what had led to the failure of the Arta process and its chief outcome – the TNG.

As scheduled on October 15, 2002, in an atmosphere of renewed hopes and high expectations, President Moi officially inaugurated the talks in Eldoret. Several IGAD Heads of State and Government and high-level personalities including PM Zenawi of Ethiopia, President Omar al-Bashir of Sudan, President Museveni of Uganda, the Executive Secretary of IGAD, Djibouti’s Foreign Affairs Minister, Eritrea’s Minister for Agriculture, the interim Chairman of the AU, the Special Envoy of LAS for Somalia, and the UN represented by Ambassador Mohamed Sahnoun, Special Adviser to the Secretary General and Ambassador Winston Tubman, SRSG for Somalia attended the opening ceremony. Additionally, key states such as Eritrea, Egypt, Italy and Sweden sent high-level representatives. On the Somali side, in addition to the civil society and women representatives, the major delegations included: TNG led by PM Farah; Puntland led by Colonel Yussuf; the SRRC coalition and allied warlords Colonel Abdirizak Issaq Bihi of the SNF faction, Mohamed ‘Dheere’ from Jowhar, Muse Sudi, Hussein Aideed, General Aden Abdullahi Nur Gabyow and Colonel Mohammed Nur “Shatigudud” of the RRA among others; and other factional leaders such as Ali Mahdi, Hussein Bod and Abdullahi Ahmed Addou. Just like during the Arta talks, the leaders of the Somaliland region refused to participate in the Mbagathi talks.

During the opening ceremony, addressing the over 450 participants, President Moi, hinting at regional fatigue with Somalia, asserted that “…even patience, time and
resources have their limits”⁴⁰³ and reminded the delegates that, “…more than 13 peace initiatives have been held, yet Somalia still bleeds.”⁴⁰⁴ Further Moi asserted, “the Somali people require peace and reconciliation; they neither need factions or slogans…If you fail, history will judge you harshly.”⁴⁰⁵ Similarly, President Museveni of Uganda, observed, “Somalia has become Africa’s teacher by negative example.”⁴⁰⁶ PM Zenawi reminded the participants that the talks should be seen as “the last hope for peace in Somalia.”⁴⁰⁷ The representatives of the international community called for the imposition of stiff sanctions on any party that acts to derail the peace process. The then, IGAD’s Executive Secretary, Dr. Attala Bashir, stated that the Mbagathi process was unique and will bear fruit if the political leadership, factional leaders and the Somali civil society provide “…the necessary goodwill and sacrifice.”⁴⁰⁸ The Chairman of the ITCS and Kenya’s Special Envoy for Somalia, Elijah Mwangale, highlighted the objectives and expectations from the Mbagathi process as to:

Reconcile all the warring parties in Somalia and establish some sort of peace and stability in the country…The Somali peace process is Somali-owned and Somali-operated. The work of the IGAD frontline states’ Technical Committee is just to facilitate for them to have an enabling ground. It is expected that the warring parties will engage in dialogue at

---

⁴⁰⁶ Ibid.
Eldoret to resolve the issues of power struggles…This should culminate in a decentralized, all-inclusive Somalia government.\textsuperscript{409}

In general, the speech by the chair seemed to suggest that federalism, as the desired future system of governance in Somalia, seemingly appealed to the concerns of the federalists such as the SRRC coalition, authorities of the independent Puntland and Somaliland and the Ethiopian leadership. Many hoped that the peace process would succeed. Agreeably, Abdullahi Addou, a delegate and former Somali Ambassador reflected, “I cannot imagine any Somali group that will in any way sabotage this conference…The people will not allow the warlords to resist peace.”\textsuperscript{410} A European diplomat termed the Eldoret talks as one of those few moments when the international community fell, “…completely in line with the process.”\textsuperscript{411} Essentially, the Mbagathi process hoped to have a government in place to quickly seal an emerging power vacuum as the TNG term was set to expire in August of 2003.

\textbf{3.5.1 Structure, Phases and Outcomes}

Spearheaded by the Kenyan mediators with the support of the IGAD member states, the ITCS and the IPF, the peace process trudged agonizingly along for two years from October 2002 – October 2004 in Eldoret town and later at the Mbagathi College on the outskirts of Nairobi, Kenya. The Mbagathi process had three distinctive phases each designed to accomplish key tasks. Phase 1 constituted the delegations and entailed discussions and determination of core issues for negotiations and set expected outcomes.

\textsuperscript{409} PANA, “Delegates Hinge Success."
\textsuperscript{410} Crawley, “Somalia restarts search.”
\textsuperscript{411} Ibid.
of the talks. Phase II dealt with core issues through the work of six technical committees. Phase III, building on the discussions and agreements during Phase I and reports and recommendations of the various technical committees convened in Phase II, addressed key contentious issues such as the provisions of the transitional charter which set the basis for the future system of the governance in the country and dealt with power-sharing concerns. The next section analyzes the promise, structures, dynamics and outcomes of the different phases of the Mbagathi process. The specific discussions of the struggles of the Mbagathi process will be the crux of discussions and analysis in chapters four and five.

### 3.5.1.1 Pre-negotiation Phase I: the Eldoret Process

Phase I instituted a process whereby 300 delegates drawn from military, political, traditional and civil society organizations convened to discuss and agree upon the expected outcome of the talks, to determine the core issues to be handled and to reach a ceasefire agreement. Phase I was convened in Eldoret town (far away from the trappings of Nairobi) as the ideal venue for the conflicting Somali factions to dialogue and work towards a negotiated political settlement—a much-needed break from decades of statelessness. A participant in the talks, Awad observes:

> The atmosphere at Eldoret was conducive to reconciliation, and the optimism in the conference for ending the conflict in Somalia was contagious. The majority of the delegates had been accommodated in close premises. Former foes and friends, long separated by the civil war, now found each other again in friendly settings and intermingled in the
lush lawns of the Sirikwa hotel…the chance for a lasting peace and reconciliation in Somalia had never looked better and brighter.\textsuperscript{412}

True to the spirit of reconciliations and high expectations from the talks, the Eldoret-leg of the Mbagathi process had its first breakthrough in less than two weeks when on October 27, 2002, twenty-two (two later added their signatures bringing the number to 24) factional leaders signed the “Declaration on Cessation of Hostilities and the Structures and Principles of the Somali National Reconciliation Process”—known as the Eldoret Declaration.\textsuperscript{413} The Eldoret Declaration had the following seven key elements to which the signatories signified their commitments:

- cease all forms of hostilities;
- agree on a new constitution/federal charter;
- establish inclusive, representative and decentralized federal governance structures acceptable to all the parties in the talks;
- comply with the UN Arms Embargo (UN Security Council resolution 733 of 1992);
- commit to combat terrorism;
- welcome the international community to observe and monitor the Accord’s implementation; signify their commitment to guarantee safety and security of humanitarian and development actors working in Somalia and provide a safe corridor for passage of aid; and

\textsuperscript{412} Awad, “Reflections.”
\textsuperscript{413} One representative of the Somali civil society also signed the Declaration. The Leaders Committee excluded Jama Ali Jama who also had a claim to Puntland’s Presidency and Aden Madoobe of the RRA and later Omar Jess, the Chairman of Juba Valley Alliance (JVA) replaced by Colonel Barre Hirale.
commit to accept and abide by the processes’ outcomes and support the creation of a mechanism to enforce the peace process.\footnote{For a copy see IGAD, \textit{Declaration on Cessation of Hostilities and the Structures and Principles of the Somali National Reconciliation Process} (Nairobi, October 27, 2002).}

The international community comprised of representatives of the IGAD nations from Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, IPF, UN, EU, US, LAS, Egypt and Italy witnessed the signing of the Accord.

The birth of the Eldoret Declaration was heralded as a quick success, raising hopes for the realization of lasting peace in Somalia. Phase I ended on October 27, 2002 with the signing of the Eldoret Declaration as its major outcome, anchoring the hopes of the Somalis and the international community at large. A Western diplomat who closely followed the peace talks and the myriad of troubles in Somalia observed, “the tragedy of it all is that it's probably better positioned than any conference in the past to accomplish something…I wouldn't say it's hopeless, although it certainly looks hopeless when you're there.”\footnote{Marc Lacey, “Despite chaos at Somalia peace talks, there is hope for a deal,” \textit{International Herald Tribune}, January 20, 2003.} Similarly, in a focus group discussion in Nairobi, a group of Somali politicians who were at the talks, confided that despite the general mood of optimism, large segment of the Somali population notably the beneficiaries of the Arta talks – the TNG leadership – remained quite skeptical of the outcome of the process and intentions of the organizers.\footnote{Focus Group Discussions with Somali politicians, Nairobi, Kenya, November 3, 2008.}

Overall, the Eldoret Declaration was a convenient warlords’ peace agreement to protect their economic, political and social status through a staged political deal. Several factors hastened the birth of the Eldoret Declaration. First, massive pressure from the
IGAD and the international community on the demonized warlords to show their commitment to the process and halt all violence before constructive talk could start, precipitated its birth. Largely isolated during the Arta talks, the armed militia leaders were eager to show the world and their respective regional and international patrons and allies that they were for peace and should be viewed as credible partners in the search for peace and reconciliation in Somalia. This cabal of war profiteers managed to, albeit temporarily, converge their interests and rally around a political process as a means to power and peaceful political perpetuation of their predatory economic interests. In fact, dialoguing at the luxurious Sirikwa Hotel in Eldoret, the warlords were largely playing to the international gallery. A Somali delegate at the talks noted, “We [the delegations] were amazed at the speed with which the warlords signed the declaration.”

The warlords appearing equal to one another at the negotiation and feeling superior to clan leadership (who were excluded from the talks), enjoyed some sort of power symmetry and sought to collectively protect their economic interests through a quick political deal.

Second, emergent political and military paralysis (a hurting stalemate) among the wartime actors — characterized by a weak TNG (eager to find an exit strategy and save face), the powerful but illegitimate SRRC and numerous relatively strong-armed wartime actors triggered the search for a way out. Thus, the promise of cessation of hostilities and disarmament, in principle, exuded confidence among the participants that such a gesture would facilitate the initiation of constructive peace negotiations. More assertively, the then TNG’s PM Hassan Bashir Farah, observed:

---

417 Interview with a female civil society representative, Nairobi, September 12, 2008 (Added words).
Even the civilians are armed for their safety…The militias are armed, the warlords are armed, the government is armed. So one of the tasks of the international community is to commit itself unequivocally to disarmament and demobilization, and provide economic and diplomatic support to Somalia.\footnote{418}{PANA, “Delegates Hinge Success.”}

So a lasting peace process will be more energized if the participants, especially the factional leaders, commit to the cessation of hostilities and disarmament—a condition that will also help them participate in the talks effectively without worrying endlessly about whether their respective turf has been overrun by other militias in their absence.

Third, time constraints and pressure due to Kenya’s December 2002 election and imminent retirement of President Moi solidified the process. The factional leaders signed the Agreement as a gesture of appreciation to outgoing President Moi (who was in his last leg of political life and retiring from active politics).\footnote{419}{AC, “Arta I, Arta II,” AC 44, 16, August 8, 2003, 4.} Many of the factional leaders came to Mbagathi not because of genuine commitments to the process, but out of fear of regional and international pressure. Speaking to ICG, one of the Mogadishu’s factional leaders confided, “…of course we will all go. No one wants to take the responsibility for opposing the process. I have to lift the noose from around my neck.”\footnote{420}{ICG interview, January 2003 as cited in ICG, Negotiation a Blueprint for Peace in Somalia, 3.} Many of other factional leaders were also at the talks for politicking purposes and with a view to save face and exit graciously. All-in-all, the Eldoret Declaration promised to usher in a different kind of peace process. As ICG (2002) reported:

The Eldoret framework was thus designed to overcome the problems of past initiatives: it offered scope for broad participation within a large plenary; it required detailed agreement on the structure of a future Somali state, as well as in-depth discussion of substantive issues of reconciliation;
and it placed power-sharing last on the agenda, rather than first as it usually, and destructively, had been. No previous peace initiative had combined these elements so advantageously. On paper at least, the framework was promising.421

Despite the optimism and even though the quick signing of the Eldoret Declaration brought some glimmer of hope that the Mbagathi process would succeed, it was a short-lived enterprise as factional leaders failed to honor the Accord. Phase I concluded with shaky progress of the talks and the threat of collapse of the Eldoret Declaration due to eruption of violent factional clashes inside Somalia. Principally, the Eldoret Declaration failed due to a lack of factional commitment to honor the agreement and spoilers who seriously undermined the Accord. In the end, unfortunately, the Eldoret Declaration proved unworthy of the paper on which it was signed by the factional leaders who championed the process under the umbrella of the Leaders Committee—which in itself was basically a coalition of like-minded wartime profiteers with vested economic and political interests. The specific challenges and struggles during Phase I will be discussed in the next chapter.

---

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Title and Factional Affiliation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hassan Abshir Farah</td>
<td>PM, TNG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel Abdullahi Yussuf</td>
<td>President, Puntland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdulla Derrow Isaak</td>
<td>Speaker, TNA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hussein Farah ‘Aideed’</td>
<td>Co-Chairman, SRRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel Hassan Mohamed Nur ‘Shatigudud’</td>
<td>Chairman, RRA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohamed Qanyare Afrah</td>
<td>Chairman, USC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel Hassan Abdulla Qalad</td>
<td>Chairman, Hiraan Political Alliance (HPA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mowlid Ma’ane Mohamoud</td>
<td>Chairman, SAMO/SRRC Nakuru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muse Sudi ‘Yalahow’</td>
<td>Chairman, USC/SSA/SRRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Omar Mahamoud Mohamed ‘Finish’</td>
<td>Chairman, USC/SSA/SRRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Osman Hassan Ali ‘Ato’</td>
<td>Chairman, USC/SNA/SRRC Nakuru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohamed Sayyid Aden</td>
<td>Chairman, SNF/SRRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdirizak Isaak Bihi</td>
<td>Chairman, SNF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Mohamed Siad Hersi Morgan</td>
<td>Deputy Chairman, SPM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barre Aden Shire ‘Hirale’</td>
<td>Chairman, JVA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohamed Omar Habeeb ‘Dheere’</td>
<td>Chairman, Jowhar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdullahi Sheikh Ismail</td>
<td>Chairman, SSNM/BIREM and Co-chairman, SRRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hilowle Imam Omar</td>
<td>Co-Chairman, SRRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdulaziz Sheikh Yousuf</td>
<td>Chairman, SSNM/SNA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Aden Abdullahi Nur ‘Gabyow’</td>
<td>Chairman, SPM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohamed Aden Wayel</td>
<td>Chairman, SPM/SRRC Nakuru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr Sharif Salah Mohamed Ali</td>
<td>Representative of the Somali civil society</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.5.1.2 Negotiation Phase: Phase II Technical Deliberations

Phase II and III were critical substantive negotiation stages of the Mbagathi talks. Conducted from November 29, 2002 – May of 2003, Phase II delved into reconciliation issues whereby a 75-member committee identified by the 300-member delegation (from Phase I) constituted six technical working committees charged with the responsibility to discuss and draw up recommendations on key issues such as land and property rights, demilitarization and demobilization, economic recovery and revenue sharing, conflict resolution, federalism and constitution, and international relations. Phase II dealt with quite contentious and substantive issues of the peace negotiations structured around the work of six technical committees: federalism/future system of government; demobilization and security; land and property rights; economic recovery, institution building and resource mobilization; regional and international relations and monitoring arrangement; and conflict resolution and reconciliation.

As shall be discussed later, the committees of federalism/future system of government and land and property rights dealt with issues at the heart of the peacemaking struggles in Somalia. Despite protracted disagreements, factional politicking and prolonged delays, particularly on the recommendations of the committee that dealt with the contentious issue of the future system of government (shall be discussed in the next chapters), the committees presented their findings and recommendations which were later discussed in plenary at the start of Phase III.
3.5.1.3 Substantive Negotiation Phase III: The Tortuous Road to Villa Somalia

Initiated from May 15, 2003 – October of 2004, the third and final phase encompassed the heart of the negotiation process. It involved two major deliberations: presentation of reports by the six technical committees in June of 2003 and negotiations on power-sharing formulas and a proposed framework for a transitional federal government. Presented at the start of June of 2003, the reports of five of the six committees were approved in a plenary through consensus but that of the committee working on Federalism and Provisional Charter (conceived on a federal structure) resulted in a glaring factional split with the committee producing two versions of the proposed Charter due to disagreements on several areas, including the duration of the transitional period to the state of affairs in a federalized Somalia, among other issues.

Nonetheless, after an almost 24-month long negotiation, a glimmer of hope for a peace accord and factions’ readiness emerged in early 2004. Building on the key elements of the July 5, 2003 Agreement at State House in Nairobi brokered by Presidents Kibaki and Museveni which resulted in the harmonization of the divergent positions of various internal and external actors on the report of the Committee on Federalism and Provisional Charter, consensus emerged at the end of a tortuous and protracted negotiation process. A major outcome of the final phase of the Mbagathi process was the agreement on the provisions of Somalia’s Transitional Federal Charter (TFC) and its final adoption. Despite complex struggles and several false starts, on January 28, 2004,

---

Somali delegates achieved a critical momentum, culminating in an agreement on the content and provisions of a new TFC providing for the creation of a federalized government structure with a 275-member Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP) based on a 4.5 formula with 12% of the seats reserved for women and also provided for militia demobilization in order to create conditions for peace in war-torn Somalia.423

Additionally, in February of 2004, the delegates reached a critical turning point in the history of Somalia and approved the TFC of the Somali Republic, in which the preamble in part states “...the determination to live in peace and unity as one indivisible, free and sovereign nation.”424 Importantly, Article 2 addresses the inviolability and indivisibility of the territorial integrity of the Somali Republic and maintains its international boundary as it existed at the time of the union in 1962.425 The 14-chapter TFC had 71 Articles and four schedules, which complimented the Charter’s contents and provisions: Schedule I stipulated the powers of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG); Schedule II set out the powers of the state governments; Schedule III contained reports of the six reconciliation committees during the talks; and Schedule IV contained lists of the delegates, political leaders and political groups. The TFC was quite comprehensive and stated that until such a point when through a national referendum (scheduled for late 2009) to culminate in the adoption of a new federal Constitution, the TFC would serve as Somalia’s interim constitution.426 Basically, although professing

424 See The Transitional Federal Charter of the Somali Republic.
426 In matters or areas where the Charter does not provide guidance, it was agreed that the 1960 Somali constitution applies.
indivisibility of the Somali Republic, the Charter provided for federal arrangements and it was widely believed that the federalist camp opposed to the TNG, led by the SRRC and patronized by Ethiopia, carried the day. Principally, Article 11 allowed for a decentralized governance system as a new political order with two or more regional federations as determined by the free will of the residents.\textsuperscript{427}

Despite the twists and turns of protracted Somali negotiation process, a bright moment dawned as the region prepared for the inauguration of a 275-member TNA selected by the various clans.\textsuperscript{428} With that hurdle overcome, on August 22, 2004 through clan nominations, 194 members of the TFP (excluding the nominees of Darod’s Harti clan who failed to reach a consensus) were inaugurated in a festive ceremony at the UN Headquarters in Gigiri, Nairobi.\textsuperscript{429} A week later, Kenya’s Vice-President graced the swearing-in of an additional 66 MPs, with a total of 265 members sworn in by mid-September, except for 7 members who were unavailable for various reasons.\textsuperscript{430} During the ceremony, tears of joy and statements of jubilations were echoed the world over. According to IGAD’s Chief Mediator of the Mbagathi talks, the inauguration was one of the high moments during the process.\textsuperscript{431} During the ceremony, Ambassador Kiplagat, a seasoned diplomat who had shown prudence, persistence and enviable resiliency, reflectively and appealingly poured out his heart, “…this is not an easy moment for me, as I stand before you seeing that the light at the end of the tunnel we have been going

\textsuperscript{427} See \textit{TFG Charter}, 6–7.
\textsuperscript{428} Despite the provision of the TFC to reserve 12% of the seats for women, clans failed to uphold this provision and only 23 women were elected and sworn in.
\textsuperscript{430} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{431} Interview with IGAD’s Chief Mediator, Nairobi, Kenya, August 2, 2007.
through is not far from us…If we have gone this far, for God’s sake, let's finish the race.”

Across the Atlantic, in New York, the UNSG Kofi Annan’s spokesperson stated that the Secretary:

Would like to stress that this is the beginning of long-awaited reconciliation… [Annan] expresses the hope that the new parliament will meet its first challenge with the necessary resolve that is required for the election of a president for Somalia and thereafter the realization of governance structures for the country…The secretary-general expresses the readiness of the United Nations to do its utmost to support the peace process in Somalia.

Encouragingly, on September 2, the TFP convened under the interim Speaker, Farah Hirsi Bulhan, who at age 83 years old was the eldest Somali MP. On September 15, 2004, a gathering of 266 MPs elected a 58-year old Dubai-based Hawiye clansman, Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden, as the Speaker of the TFP after he secured 60.5 per cent of the votes (161 votes) beating his closest challenger, Sheikh Aden Mohamed Nur “Madobe”, of the RRA who got 39.47 per cent (105 votes), in a competitive field of 11 contestants. A week later, on September 22, 2004, the Parliament elected two Deputy Speakers. The high moment came on October 10, 2004 as the TFP elected Colonel Abdullahi Yussuf of the Darod clan and the serving President of Puntland region as the President of the TFG of the Republic of Somalia beating 28 contestants (17 men and 1 woman). In a landslide victory, Colonel Yussuf received 70 per cent (189 votes) of the votes against 29.25 per cent (79 votes) of his closest opponent, Abdullahi

---

433 Ibid (Added word).
435 Ibid.
Ahmed Addow, with only two ballot papers spoiled.\textsuperscript{437} The voting took place in Nairobi amid accusations of money-based lobbying, corruption and massive arm-twisting from Ethiopia—but nonetheless, the process paved Yussuf’s path to Villa Somalia. Further, it was alleged that political seats were being bought for about $7,000.\textsuperscript{438} According to a former Somali legislator, some parliamentary and presidential contestants bribed the voters with up to $10,000 to win specific seats.\textsuperscript{439} Nonetheless, a virulent opponent of the Arta talks’ outcome, Colonel Yussuf captured the Presidency of Somalia and became the head of the TFG – a new transitional authority to succeed the embattled TNG.

Patronage politics also largely influenced the outcome of the Mbagathi talks. Writing on the role of Ethiopia in the Mbagathi process and subsequent election of Ethiopia-allied President Yussuf and PM Ghedi, according to Adam, the SRRC “…with massive military support from well-equipped and well trained Ethiopian troops, its victory was assured.”\textsuperscript{440} According to a US-based Somali scholar, “the whole thing [the Mbagathi] process was Ethiopia’s conspiracy to impose her allies on the people of Somalia. From the beginning to the end, Ethiopia overtly or covertly influenced the process and its major outcome – the ascension of their ally, Colonel Yussuf to power.”\textsuperscript{441} As ICG notes, Yussuf was both an endearing and a polarizing character, with a complex mosaic of divergent perceptions surrounding him: “Yusuf's supporters portray him as

\textsuperscript{437}Irish Times, “Ex-warlord elected leader of Somalia,” \textit{Irish Times}, October 11, 2004. Surprisingly, initially the two contenders to Yusuf were: former TNG President Salat, former minister of Finance and Ambassador under Barre’s regime (1969-1991), Ambassador Abdillahi Ahmed Addow (despite his association with Farah Aideed, he was liked by the diplomatic community).


\textsuperscript{439}Interview with a former Somali MP, Nairobi, Kenya, August 11, 2008.

\textsuperscript{440}Adam, \textit{From Tyranny to Anarchy}, 5.

\textsuperscript{441}Interview with a Somali scholar, Minneapolis, MN, US, July 5, 2007.
decisive, nationalistic and statesmanlike; his detractors see in him an incipient dictator, a parochial clan chieftain, and a fifth columnist for neighbouring Ethiopia.\footnote{ICG, Somalia: Continuation of War by Other Means? 1.} With Yussuf’s election, Ethiopia realized their long cherished dream and unseated the ‘Arta faction’ from power and strategically put Villa Somalia within their allies’ grip.

On October 14, 2004, President-elect Yussuf was inaugurated at a ceremony held at Nairobi’s Kasarani Sports Centre attended by over 600 Somalis and several Heads of State and Government including Presidents Mwai Kibaki of Kenya, Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria, Ali Abdullah Saleh of Yemen, Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, Paul Kagame of Rwanda and Ismail Omar Guelleh of Djibouti graced the colorful ceremony.\footnote{Xinhua, “Update: Somali president-elect inaugurated in Kenyan capital,” Xinhua, October 14, 2004.} Shortly, President Yussuf appointed another Ethiopian ally, a veterinary doctor from the Hawiye clan, Professor Mohamed Ali Ghedi\footnote{According to the Charter appointment to the PM or cabinet requires one to be an elected MP. In order to comply with the Charter to appoint his preferred PM, Yussuf persuaded Mohammed ‘Dheere’ to step down as an MP in favour of Ghedi. This swap facilitated the appointment of Ghedi as PM.} as his PM based on the 4.5 power-sharing formula. ICG keenly observed that Yussuf’s selection of Professor Ghedi, who lacked “political experience or visible constituency within his Hawiye clan, was read by many as an attempt to sideline the Hawiye.”\footnote{ICG, Can the Somali Crisis Be Contained? 3.} Indeed, according to an Abgal businessman who participated in both the Arta and Mbagathi talks, “for many Hawiye’s the design of the TFG was to a plot to erode Hawiye’s power in Mogadishu.”\footnote{Interview with an Abgal businessman, Nairobi, Kenya, December 2, 2008.}

Subsequently, on December 1, 2004, PM Ghedi formed a bloated 73-member cabinet comprised of a PM, 3 deputy PMs, 33 ministers, 8 ministers of state and 34
deputy ministers, many with conflicting and duplicitous duties.\textsuperscript{447} Contrary to the TFC’s provision, the cabinet had only one woman, but nonetheless, 27 members of the new cabinet were hastily sworn-in the same evening at a ceremony in Nairobi witnessed by President Yussuf.\textsuperscript{448} As ICG commented, the cabinet appointments:

Concentrated power within a narrow circle, mainly pro-Ethiopian allies from the SRRC, at the expense of clans and movements from the failed TNG...while Mohamed Qanyare Afrah, a willful and openly anti-Ethiopian Hawiye factional leader, was named national security minister, greater authority in that sector was exercised by Hussein Aydiid, also a Hawiye but an SRRC loyalist.\textsuperscript{449}

Many structural problems confronted the nascent TFG, chiefly perceptual ones. For many Somali participants, the newly created TFG lacked credibility in design as its composition was faulty and heavily Ethiopian-influenced and dominated by its SRRC allies. ICG argued that due to Ethiopian manipulation of the list of the delegates, “...the result was a government from which core TNG supporters and Islamic groups were in effect excluded.”\textsuperscript{450} More frightening and discrediting was the emergence of a video recording a secret meeting between President Yussuf, PM Ghedi and an Ethiopian diplomat, with the Ethiopian allegedly dictating the cabinet composition.\textsuperscript{451}

Thus, the Mbagathi process’ outcome was perceived as a victory for the SRRC (the federalists) and Ethiopians and a big loss for the TNG (and allied centralist camp) and their patrons, Egypt and the members of the Arab governments. According to

\textsuperscript{449} ICG, \textit{Can the Somali Crisis Be Contained?} 3.
\textsuperscript{450} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{451} Crisis Group interview, Nairobi-based diplomat, December 2004 cited in ICG, \textit{Somalia: Continuation of War by Other Means?}, 8.
observers, Yussuf’s allies and the members of the SRRC coalition dominated the cabinet composition taking up about 12 key positions. In addition to receiving two of the three Deputy PM positions, other key positions allocated to the SRRC-allied members and Yussuf’s close allies from the Puntland region included ministries of foreign affairs, interior, defense, planning and international cooperation, fisheries and marine resources, petroleum and energy, telecommunications, road transport and aviation. These were lucrative positions where the office holder has access to critical economic resources and thus it was basically a continuation of predatory politics. More specifically, Yusuf’s Darod clan, particularly his Majeerteen sub-clan, obtained lucrative and sensitive positions such as the minister of defense, minister of international cooperation and planning, chief political adviser, chief economic adviser, commissioner of police, and director of intelligence, at the expense of other clans. This greatly centralized power of the TFG within the SRRC coalition and Yussuf’s close family members and cronies. However, as ICG argued, to the majority of the Somalis, Yussuf’s rise to power and the creation of the TFG embodied, “not a step toward peace but continuation of the war by other means.” Nonetheless, whichever way one looks at it, the federalists carried the day, but that victory, like that of the Arta process, was short-lived.

Consequently, political faultlines deepened between centralists (led by the Speaker of the TFP) and federalists led by President Yussuf and PM Ghedi, with Somaliland rejecting and ignoring the formation of the TFG, which did not recognize

---

453 ICG, *Somalia: Continuation of War by Other Means?* 8.
454 ICG, *Can the Somali Crisis Be Contained?* 3.
455 ICG, *Somalia: Continuation of War by Other Means?* i.
their independence. Living comfortably in Nairobi protected by a force of MPs, Somalia's newly formed government remained weak and deeply divided. The political leadership in the TFG and the TFP was split into two major camps: the Jowhar or Baidoa camp of President Yussuf and PM Ghedi, and the Mogadishu camp of the Speaker of the TNA, Sheikh Sheriff Aden, and his followers of multi-clan Islamic Courts Union (ICU) and the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS).

Following regional and international pressure, the TFP began relocation from Nairobi to Somalia between March and April of 2005 and finally, the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) transitioned in June of 2005. In the end, the SRRC-dominated TFG’s promised ascent to the Villa Somalia remained a stark mirage as the TNG and allied clan militias and business groups prevented Yussuf's TFG from institutionalizing itself in Mogadishu. It was only in 2007 that Yussuf, under heavy Ethiopian escort, managed to temporarily occupy Villa Somalia.

3.6 Conclusion

In sum, the Mbagathi process was the 14th attempt to rebuild Somalia. Considering its structural design and provisions, the Mbagathi process made a dramatic shift from the Djibouti-led Arta process (that largely isolated the warlords), by putting prominent wartime actors (factional leaders) in the driver’s seat as Leaders Committee—but encountered equal trouble. In practice, the opposition by Ethiopia and the Puntland

and Somaliland autonomous regions notwithstanding, the TNG failed to exert its authority in Somalia due to opposition by Mogadishu-based factional leaders.

Essentially, high-level predation and wartime actors’ dominant economic agendas undermined the Arta process and prevented the TNG from establishing itself in Mogadishu. Some of these challenges were also present in the Mbagathi process. Indeed, although originally estimated to last 6-9 months, the negotiations were protracted for almost 24 months. Why? Careful analysis uncovers that despite bearing key fundamentals of a well-designed peace process and having the cooperation of armed warlords, in practice things were not so rosy at Mbagathi. Through thick description, the next chapter explores how a high degree of economic predation, pervasive war economies and wartime actors’ dominant economic agendas over political agendas contributed to the struggles of the Mbagathi peace process as well.
CHAPTER 4 PREDATORY POLITICS AND STRUGGLES OF PEACEMAKING IN SOMALIA

This chapter, by building on the experiences and struggles of the Arta talks and by keying into the different phases of the Mbagathi process, delves into the heart of this dissertation by analyzing why the peace talks struggled on for two years from October 2002-October 2004. The Mbagathi process inherited the pitfalls and troubles of the Arta process that led to the subsequent collapse of the TNG. As explored in the previous chapter, the Arta process, in addition to opposition from the autonomous regions of Puntland and Somaliland and from Ethiopia, primarily failed because it isolated wartime actors, which were linked to predatory war economies and committed to the pursuit of economic agendas over political goals. In the end, the TNG failed to establish itself, especially in the Mogadishu and Kismayu regions.

Principally, this chapter demonstrates that a high degree of economic predation (with both economic and social logics), pervasive war economies and wartime actors’ dominant economic agendas over political agendas shaped and contributed to the struggles of the Mbagathi peace process. This chapter through thick description examines the emergence, types and characteristics of wartime actors; and the structure and sources of predatory war economies; and maps wartime actors’ economic agendas in Somalia. Highlighting the social logic of predation, the analysis reveals how wartime actors manipulated and mobilized clan’s social structures and shaped the design of predation –
giving it a social face. Finally, the chapter presents the findings of the study through an analysis of how the identified variables impacted the peace negotiation process by undermining the emergence of ripeness, which made bargaining much more difficult and protracted.

4.1 Structure and Anatomy of Somalia’s Predatory War Economies

4.1.1 Characteristics and Typology of Somali Wartime Actors

As elucidated in chapter 1, wartime actors are conceptualized as those non-state groups that emerged after the collapse of the central authority, and later transformed into distinctive and dominant ‘governance’ units—occupying the place of the collapsed regime. In the post-collapse period, several non-state actors that were products of state collapse emerged. As Menkhaus noted, “Somalia shows that local communities in Africa have proved more resilient, more politically innovative, and less passive in the face of a crisis of governance than Kaplan and others have assumed.”

Being at the forefront of innovation, Menkhaus argues that in the post-collapse Somalia, a new trend has emerged where “…informal systems of adaption, security, and governance” defined by enterprising alliance of business groups, civic associations and traditional authorities—creating some sort of ‘organic’ forms of public order and rule of law practices. First, there were non-state institutions that developed during the war such as from the business networks, neighborhood self-help organizations, civil society, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and ICU to charities within Somalia. Additionally, the types of

---

459 Ibid.
diaspora groups, networks and social structures that characterized the populations in refugee camps and in Eastleigh, Nairobi and Minneapolis were also responses to state collapse. Non-state actors moved in to provide services (security, justice, health and education) that the state no longer delivered.

The defining characteristics of Somali wartime actors include: dependence on clans for identity, support and legitimacy; weak political vision and agendas; predatory and dominance of economic agendas; ingrained culture of collective glory, guilt and punishment; regional character based on clan and resource distributions; religious ideology espoused by groups such as AIAI and ICU; tendencies to keep negotiations open; and readiness to use violence and play spoiler roles to raise their profile and demand recognition (for example seats at the negotiating table). Overall, the wartime actors tended to be quite shifty and mutative alliances and counter groups were often formed from time to time.

The post-state collapse Somalia was defined by the emergence of relatively powerful armed wartime actors, which significantly contributed to the struggles of peacemaking efforts since 1991. Although several peace initiatives were undertaken, as Dagne (2009) observed, a durable peace has failed to germinate. One of the challenges has been the emergence of diverse wartime actors. As Peterson (2000) notes, estimates indicate that by 1991, about 40 clan-based militia groups existed. In the post-January 1991 period, Somalia was divided into about 24 fiefdoms ruled by various armed

---

factional leaders, often changing hands from time-to-time. Addressing the proliferation of armed actors in Somalia, Yusuf (2004) argues:

Because of the fortunes made by the first few warlords after the ouster of the dictator Muhammad Siad Barre in 1991, their numbers have been increasing in the last few years. In the capital, Mogadishu, there are no less than six warlords, each controlling a different section of the city and its rural hinterland.462

Concurringly, in an interview with Jerry Okungu of *Kenya Times*, Lady Edna Adan Ismail, Foreign Affairs Minister of the break-away region of Somaliland, linked the struggle of peacemaking in Somalia to high turnover of warlords.463 Although initially, most armed groups emerged to protect their respective clan’s interests, their orientation and strategic agendas changed with time. Around 2002, during the Mbagathi talks, Somalia had about 60 factions presumably each with a factional leader running their own individual fiefdoms. Organizationally, the insurgent groups often used clan affiliations and relations as modes of mobilization for support, legitimacy, internal loyalty and alliance-building across clans. During the Mbagathi talks, the principal factional coalitions were: the SRRC coalition and the TNG and alliances such as the Somali National Organizing Council (SNOC), Somali National Salvation Council (SNSC), Group of Eight (G8) and Group of Thirteen (G13).464

Conceptually, Somalia’s factional leaders of the post-state collapse period were grouped into three fluid categories. First, conquerors – those actors driven by thirst for

464 About 60 Somali factions existed at one point or another. For details of the dominant ones see Tables 6 and 8.
economic power and preoccupied with wealth accumulation through resource extractions, predation and perpetuation of economic agendas. These included predatory armed factions and business groups that dominated economic arenas in the country and busied themselves with war profiteering, wealth creation and assets protection. They tended to be expansionists and fought to extend clan boundaries into rich areas and dominate weaker groups. Often they represented powerful and populous clans that drove away minority clans in order to occupy their land and confiscate their property. Two examples included the Habr Gedir and Ogaden militias in Mogadishu, Kismayu and the riverine areas. Second, liberators – refer to actors that were formed to liberate or shield clan (s) against vagaries of war (mostly clan warlords) and were committed to safeguard or liberate occupied groups, particularly the minority clans. Examples included the RRA and SAMO factions. Finally, networkers—referred to actors who possessed sophisticated skills to link like-minded actors into regional and global international black market trade cartels. They often worked in alliances with occupiers so their relations and engagements could be economically meaningful and rewarding. Osman Ali ‘Ato’ and other business actors and black market operatives fit this category. These categories are also defined by different characteristics as well – their motivations to accumulate, occupy, protect, liberate, network and connect. It is sometimes difficult to objectively pinpoint who is a conqueror, liberator or networker among the various factional leaders in Somalia. Nonetheless, despite these classifications, a common feature of Somalia’s armed wartime actors was the incessant desire to dominate the political and economic arena through predation and pursuit of economic agendas.
Similarly, as the CRD mapped, different types of militias can be identified.\textsuperscript{465} These include: factional militias – often the remnants of the collapsed regime and recruited from respective clans, which tends to be the most powerful and well-armed group with sophisticated weapons and ammunitions. Second, business militias – comprised of joint armed factions recruited from the clans of the business groups in order to protect their businesses and infrastructure. Third, the Islamic Shariah militia – which came into being with the rise of the Islamic Shariah courts and were considered well disciplined and organized in comparison with other armed factions. Fourth, freelance militias which were ill-disciplined and infamous for predation, looting, kidnapping and hired-to-kill executions. Finally, private security guards were often recruited by individuals, groups, and local and international organizations for protection, who although they were well disciplined; at times they resorted to looting, violent robberies and kidnappings.

This dissertation reveals that multiple parties do not undermine peace by their mere existence. Although earlier clan-based warlords who had emerged had held near messianic roles within their respective clans, during the turbulent civil war periods they quickly degenerated into an exploitative class turning to economic predations and reaping from the pervasive war economies as they pursued economic interests. As the state collapse conditions intensified, deeply embedded in predatory economics and uncertain about promises of a peacetime Somalia, these armed groups, particularly the armed

\textsuperscript{465} CRD. \textit{Conflict Analysis South-Central Somalia, Phase II}. A consultancy report for the Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Team, Social Development Department, World Bank (Mogadishu: CRD, 2004), 40.
factional and business group militias, often undermined peace negotiation processes and dishonored the terms of the Eldoret Declaration (as shall be explored in detail later).

4.1.2 Institutionalization of Predation and Wartime Actors’ Economic Agendas

Despite the diverse characteristics of Somalia’s wartime actors, this dissertation argues that two key characteristics which shaped the peacemaking environment were their predatory tendencies and links with pervasive war economies and their commitment to the dominant pursuit of economic agendas facilitated by the clan ties. In this dissertation, the key proposition is: peace processes which take place in civil war environments characterized by a high degree of economic predation, pervasive war economies and wartime actors’ dominant economic agendas over political agendas are harder to negotiate and conclude. Hence, of particular interest to this dissertation is the role and impact of wartime actors and black market networks driven by economic interests and the pervasive culture of greed that undermined peacemaking efforts in Somalia. The dissertation demonstrates that the wartime actors’ were driven by a desire to acquire, protect and secure spoils of war and other strategic resources and also to perpetuate their economic agendas.

Although some Somali leaders such as Ali Mahdi and Colonel Abdullahi Yussuf could be thought of as having some political agendas despite the divide between the centralists and federalists (as revealed during the Arta talks), the majority lacked clear or sustained national political agendas and visions beyond their narrow predatory and
dominant economic interests. Concurringly, in an interview a US-based scholar of Somali origin, narrated:

Even before the state collapsed, the very foundation of the Somali state was seen a private enterprise for ethnic plunder and personal/group enrichment. As Somalia degenerated into series of catastrophes far beyond collapse sinking into what I will call the ‘chaos of Allah’ political and economic institutions decomposed and degenerated without any counter forces to hold it together. Clannistic forces buttressed by warlords with immature leadership positioned themselves to reign over the debris of the state and capture the big prizes such as airports, seaports and rich agricultural lands and state facilities.\footnote{Interview with a Somali scholar, Minneapolis, MN, US, July 5, 2007.}

Indeed, state collapse conditions in Somalia created opportunities for social, economic and political realignment of the society by dominant forces. The wartime actors emerged as dominant players in post-state collapse Somalia – critically undermining peacemaking efforts in the country. As Kaldor and Duffield wisely noted, war had become a process of creating alternative institutions.\footnote{Kaldor, \textit{New and Old Wars}; Duffield, \textit{Global Governance}.} In Somalia, many wartime actors capitalized upon state failure as an opportunity to recreate and reconfigure the state to actualize their diverse interests. Writing on the early experiences of the Somali crisis (1990-92), describing the evolution and behavior of the complex web of predatory forces in the country, Menkhaus wrote:

A vast array of interest groups profiteered from armed conflict and the humanitarian crisis it provoked. Warlords used the threat of violence to maintain constituent support, sought conflicts and conquest to provide war
booty for their militiamen, and provoked famine to attract relief agencies and food aid that became a major source of revenue. Militiamen fed their families by pillaging occupied villages and government buildings. Merchants of war profiteered from diversion of food aid, export of scrap metal, and gun sales. Some clans acquired valuable real estate in Mogadishu and the riverine region by armed conquest.468

The emergent wartime actors lacking sound political visions engrossed themselves in predatory governance and were less committed to political reconciliation and state building. Concurringly, in a 2004 report, CRD narrates:

After fourteen years of war, the newly emerged Somali business elite are not willing to renounce the privileges accorded to them by the civil war, nor do they contribute to the social services delivery. These are elites who are mostly heavily armed and are in position to demand further privileges in the Somalia post-war society. The new business groups in the region have developed a variety of different businesses. The endless strife of the Somali people prevented the formation of a state with regulative institutions. The war-economy groups want to maintain the status quo (their economic strategies and systems). Families of the new socio-economic class enjoy relatively good standards of living; their children attend schools and enjoy adequate access to the basic social services.469

The above narration was a perfect example of what Chris Allen called the ‘second economy’470 which flourishes under state collapse conditions dominated by powerful non-state actors. The above-described socio-economic class comprised largely of rich and powerful factional leaders and allied businesspersons, through manipulation and mobilization of their clans, were deeply engaged in the pursuit of personal enrichment and clan interests at the expense of stability and peace in Somalia.

Economic predation becomes much more meaningful and rewarding if facilitative war economies exist internally and externally. Importantly, the country

470 Allen, “War, Endemic Violence.”
experienced fusion of combat, shadow and coping economies as Goodhand observed – which with predation and dominant economic agendas shaped the dynamics of economic relations and the political future of Somalia.\(^{471}\) Concurring, Sharif argued, “…the world should be concerned by the fact that the warlords -- sadistic thugs, wannabe presidents and their apologists -- are driven by neither ideology nor a political agenda but greed and the desire for wealth. With the right amount of money, they may well rent out more than beaches for nuclear materials.”\(^{472}\) Thus, the post-state collapse not only triggered the emergence of diverse groups, but significantly facilitated and institutionalized economic predatory networks and cultivated economic agendas with a view to sustain and expand their business empires.

Such transformation of agendas begot a new class of wartime actors. A 2004 report by CRD, noting the emergence of entrepreneurial class and institutionalization of war-economies in the failed state of Somalia, observed:

New social, political and economic interest groups have formed to defend their interests together. Many former rural people have now settled in the cities and are unlikely to go back to rural life. Women have transformed themselves into new social class that provides support to their families. New breed of business groups have established themselves in major cities and dominate many business activities. Another common practice, since 1995, also inherited as legacy of the civil war, is the misappropriation of private and public properties i.e. houses, state buildings looted by armed groups. Muqdisho city is provided with electricity by groups that have misappropriated former public generators.\(^{473}\)

The ensuing predatory competition accentuated the wartime actors’ fight for control of the resources of the state – through power, violence, force and fear – and was

\(^{471}\) Goodhand, “From War Economy to Peace Economy?”
aimed at generating resources for war. Overtime, predation and pervasive war economies and wartime actors’ dominant economic interests became the key features which greatly influenced the peacemaking environment in the country. As Kaldor, Duffield, Collier and Keen observed, war is a creative enterprise for some non-state actors.\textsuperscript{474} Evidently, in Somalia, war was viewed as a business and various actors aggressively undermined reconciliation talks, realizing that peace would threaten their predatory economic enterprises and interests. According to IGAD’s Chief Mediator, Somalia’s non-state actors were trapped in a ‘terrible spiral’ of predation which greatly undermined the peace talks and reconciliation in the country.\textsuperscript{475}

Predation, in addition to being an effective tactic to intimidate populations into submission, was utilized as an overt strategy to accumulate economic resources to boost factions’ political and military status and spoil peace which threatened the status quo. As set out in chapter 1, the wartime actors’ predatory approach is based on a well-defined economic strategy founded on control of critical infrastructure, resources and tradable commodities; capacity to recruit, command and sustain a well-armed militia force with capabilities to spoil threatening peace; and internal loyalty and support base among clans or region’s residents. As articulated earlier, overall, the power of a wartime actor relates to its strategic ability to build a wartime empire and craftily utilize their predatory economic power to build insurgent’s capacity, undermine and break-up rivals and reward and build alliances with like-minded actors to strategically position themselves as


\textsuperscript{475} Interview with IGAD’s Chief Mediator of the Mbagathi talks, Nairobi, Kenya, August 3, 2007.
political and economic dominators with a view, in post-state collapse Somalia, to influence dynamics and outcomes of peace negotiations.

The wartime actors’ economic strategy was centered on capturing economic resources to perpetuate economic agendas through predation and manipulation of social structures to sustain their wartime organizations. Indeed, during the post-state collapse Somalia, as a respondent asserted, “…the state became a prize to capture” 476 – setting off wartime actors into vicious competitive politics centered around critical high-value economic targets such as Mogadishu’s seaport, airport and road junctions; symbolic Villa Somalia; rich riverine areas; and Kismayu port, among others. In 2004, discerning wartime actors’ overarching economic motivations and expansive predatory activities, Somali Peace Rally (2004), observed:

The main motives of Somali warlords for the perpetuation of civil war and for the breakdown of any peace process strongly stem from the fact that they do not want to see their unbridled passion of assets and power to be constrained by a united Somali State with the capability to make rules, collect revenue and enforce the rule of law. The issues at stake for warlords are inter alia: power, money, land and the control of export crops such as bananas…Some warlords have entered into fishing vessel licensing arrangements with a number of foreign companies, by illegally providing fishing access rights in demarcated area of the Somali fishing zone and by illegally cutting down tropical rainforest trees.477

The different wartime actors’ predatory behaviors and economic strategies were focused on capturing valuable resources. Similarly, speaking to the complex organizational structure of Somalia’s wartime actors and the predatory war economies, Yusuf analyses:

Then there are the warmongers, the financiers and business allies of the warlords. They run the plantations and manage the ports and airports; they organize the drug-trafficking and arms trade; they establish contacts with foreign companies for banana exports and fishing licenses. They promote the image of the warlords to the outside world as "faction leaders" or "clan elders," and generally put their racketeering activities in a positive light. Every year or two, they print new banknotes which are exchanged against the dollars or euros received by the impoverished population as remittances from relatives abroad.⁴⁷⁸

Hence, Somalia’s wartime actors have been quite resilient due to their ability to dominate the political and economic spheres by creating and sustaining complex economic networks of predatory forces. Since 1991, the prolonged state failure opened the belly of the Somali state to predatory economic scavengers, which, undeterred, engaged in predatory war economies and pursuit of economic agendas, thereby retarding the prospects of peace. Perceptively writing on Somalia’s wartime actors’ economic agendas, Yusuf observed:

The warlords are the worst of the lot… The warlords have neither an ideology nor a political agenda. Their actions are solely driven by the pursuit of illicit enrichment and war booty. The individual fiefdoms they have carved out are used as a base for the exploitation of confiscated properties, plantations, ports and airports, as well as for drug trafficking, the issuance of fishing licenses for foreign concerns and for arms trade.⁴⁷⁹

Whereas proceeds from diamonds and timber and coltan were the lifeline of wartime actors in Liberia and DRC, respectively, Somalia was resource poor; therefore, the wartime actors had to utilize both economic and social forms of predation to sustain their insurgent organizations. Overall, the wartime actors’ economic strategy was founded on the promise and rewards of factional predation and competition for the

---

⁴⁷⁹ Ibid.
control of strategic resources and trade in essential commodities. Lacking easily lootable resources, Somalia’s wartime actors adopted creative economic strategies and mobilized clan groups and engaged in predatory war economies and pursuit of economic interests through exploitation of marine resources and taxes and revenue from seaports, airstrips, checkpoints and highways, khat, charcoal, arms and weapons trade, money laundering to fake currency and passports printing, among other predatory activities which became dependable sources of revenue and insurgents’ power.

Before, discussing specific sources of revenues for the wartime actors, it is prudent to briefly map the key regions in Somalia, highlighting their resource endowments and clan distribution with a view to expose the regional dimensions of predation. Such a regional mapping will show how wartime actors’ manipulated societal structures and implemented their predatory economic agendas by setting up clan-based wartime administrative organizations.

4.1.3 Regional Administrative Structures and Resource Endowments

A key characteristic of Somalia’s wartime actors was the regional and geographical dimension that influenced predatory behavior with some fusion of clan-based regional organizations – which shaped a unique system linking economic and social logic of predation. Naturally, without a functional central government, several wartime actors formed regional administrative structures which further designed and created regional predatory structures in the form of administrative councils or autonomous regions. Indeed, these wartime actors with a regional face and linked to
predatory war economies and pursuing economic agendas, shaped regional discourse and often undermined peace talks, which threatened their economic interests.

Before delving into the specific predatory nature of wartime actors, it is instructive to undertake a regional scan to enhance our understanding of the nature and dynamics of predation that took root in Somalia. As explored below, in the respective Somali regions, familiar predatory politics emerged as armed wartime actors not only exploited resources in their controlled territories but also established some sort of administrative structures to dominate economic, social and political arenas to implement their economic agendas. For instance, as Menkhaus and Prendergast (1995) observed, defined regions and entities, formed around clan networks, emerged in the post-UNOSOM period. Some of these included: Somaliland, Puntland (a product of the 1998 Garowe reconciliation conference), the High Council of Baidoa (1995), the Digil-Mirifle Supreme Governing Council (1995), the Rahanweyn Resistance Army’s Administration at Bay and Bakool regions (1998-2002), the Banadir Regional Authority (1996) and Hiranland among others. In June of 2004 during the height of the Mbagathi talks, a joint 63-member Hiraan Council of Elders was formed by the Hawadle and other clans in the region to administer the area. Overtime, these regional administrations

---

480 See figure 5 for the map of Somalia.
483 Johnson, ed., Community-based Peace Processes in South-Central Somalia, 73. In July 2007, following the formation of the TFG, Hiraan Regional Administration was formed with key positions shared according to clans in the region. Key positions included: Governor, vice-governors, regional military commander, regional police commander, regional court, Belet weyn district commissioner, vice-commissioner, head of local government and vice-head of local government, see Johnson, ed.,
became multi-political entities and vehemently opposed the creation of central administrative structures and polities (such as TNG) which threaten to undermine their predatory operations. As such, these diverse regional institutions became resilient wartime actors, nerve center of predation and the locus of clan mobilization and alliances crafting in Somalia.

An understanding of regional characteristics and the nature of predation aids in clear comprehension of the underlying motivations, interests and drivers of specific behavior among key wartime actors during the Mbagathi talks. Regionally, war actors’ politics, predation and competition for resources and control of fertile riverine lands and displacement of weaker and minority clans were pervasive, particularly in south-central Somalia. To set the stage for subsequent analysis and discussions of the structure of predation and sources of revenue for the wartime organizations, it is important to provide a brief overview of the key regions to expose the regional character of predation and the nature of clan identities – giving predation some sort of a social foundation. One of the most contentious regions, which had persistently been at the heart of predation and conflict, was the Banadir region. That region hosts Mogadishu, the capital city of the Somali Republic and the seat of the government, with the prestigious Villa Somalia being the most sought-after symbol of power and legitimacy. Mogadishu is endowed with a seaport, an airport and other important public and private institutions, major commercial enterprises, real estate and the symbolically strategic Villa Somalia, among others. Hence, Mogadishu became the epicenter of predatory violence and looting upon the fall.

Community-based Peace Processes in South-Central Somalia, 78.
of Barre’s regime. Mogadishu is a metropolitan city and inhabited by mixed Somali clans including: Hawiye (Abgal, Murusade, Reer Xamar, Habr Gedir, Jareer); Darod and Dir, among others. Traditionally, the Hawiye sub-clans of Abgal, Murusade and Reer Xamar claim that they are the predominant sub-clans in the region. The region’s major armed factions included: the USC, USC/SSA/SRRC, USC/SSA and Islamic militia allied to the ICU.

The Bay and Bakol areas situated in the inter-riverine region are fertile, and in the pre-1991 period were considered the food basket of Somalia, producing major staple food such as maize, beans, sorghum and groundnuts. Dominated by the Rahanweyn clan (Digil-Mirifle), the region suffered from severe famine in 1992 after their grain reserves were looted by fleeing Barre troops in 1991. Although in 1995, the region formed the Digil-Mirifle Supreme Governing Council, from 1995-1999 the Farah Aideed’s SNA faction occupied the Bay and Bakol region.\textsuperscript{484} Such predatory domination of weaker clans earned the SNA and its leaders, an occupier identity. During the occupation, the SNA militia not only looted machinery and equipment from relief aid agencies and diverted relief food but also committed grave human rights atrocities including indiscriminate killing of civilians, burning of villages and towns, blockage of boreholes and wells and denial of access to humanitarian food.\textsuperscript{485} According to a US-based diaspora group - the Bay Centre for Conflict Prevention (BCCP), until December 9, 1999 when the RRA created Bay and Bakol Autonomous Administration of Southern Somalia, 

\textsuperscript{485} Ibid, 20.
the Rahanweyn community was brutalized and several atrocities were committed against them by warlord Aideed’s militia. Gaining ground in late 1999, the RRA recovered the control of the Bay and Bakol region, created its own administration, brought some normalcy and stability and participated in the Arta peace process of 2000.

The Gedo region bordering Kenya and Ethiopia lies in southwestern Somalia and is blessed with the Shebelle River, which is a major lifeline for the region supporting livestock production and irrigation farming. In terms of clans, the region is dominated by the Darod (Marehan and Ogaden), Dir (Gadsan), Degodia, Ajuran and Jarer (Bantu) clans. Quite a volatile region, the major challenges to the peace and stability were due to insecurity, rivalry and power struggles between SNF/SRRC (that controlled the Luuq, Dolow and Beledhawa Districts) and SNF (that controlled the El-Wak, Bardera, Burdubo and Gerbeharu Districts); and external conflicts with RRA/SRRC from the Bardeere Districts. The region also experienced frequent communal clashes because of competition over the use of pasturelands.

The Middle Juba region is endowed with the Juba River that supports agricultural and other farming activities and was once home to a hydroelectric power plant and the Marerey sugar factory, which has since been looted by militias. However, during the post-state collapse period, the region experienced high degrees of economic predation which triggered environmental degradation due to charcoal exploitation, conversion of mango trees for timber production and drug plantations. Predatory competition for the

---

487 SNRC, *Committee Six*, 21.
control of the region’s rich resource endowment fanned incessant and devastating conflicts among resident and migrant groups and other wartime actors erupted frequently.\textsuperscript{488} The region is dominated by the Hawiye (mainly Sheikhaal), Darod (mainly Ogaden) and Jarer (Bantu) clans.

The Lower Juba region bordering Kenya is also endowed with the Juba River and boasts of rich agricultural viability and marine resources and includes the hotly contested port city of Kismayu as its capital. The region is endowed with an international airport, a functional seaport and several industries such as a meat canning factory, maize mill and fish processing plant, among others.\textsuperscript{489} The region is dominated by the Darod (Harti, Ogaden and Marehan), Hawiye and Bajun clans. Due to its resource-rich endowments, Kismayu and the surrounding area became a site of protracted predatory violence and factional power struggle, frequently changing hands between various warring armed factions led by factional leaders Hussein Aideed, General Morgan and Barre Hirale. The region’s major contending factions included: Juba Valley Alliance (coalition members include USC/SNA, SPM/SNA, SNF, SDM/RRA, SSNM and SAMO) formed on June 11, 1999 which often competed for power, territorial and resource control with SPM/SRRC. For instance, on June 11, 1999, the port city of Kismayu came under the control of Hussein Aideed’s alliance after defeating the RRA administration.\textsuperscript{490} During the wartime, the region was poorly administered by an 11-person Executive Committee

\textsuperscript{488} Ibid, 21.
\textsuperscript{489} Ibid, 20.
\textsuperscript{490} BCCP, “Somalia: Offensive Operations.”
drawn from the SNF, USC/SNA and SOM/SNA factions, assisted by a committee of the traditional elders which helped in dispute and conflict resolution.  

The Lower Shebelle region with Merka as its capital has rich farmlands, grazing lands and fishing potential in Merka and Barava. The region’s dominant clans include: the Digil (Shanta-Alen, Geledi, Begedi, Tunni, Jiddo, and Garre); mixed Bantu; Dir (Biyomal majority); Rer Hamar and Barawani; and Hawiye (Abgal, Habr Gedir and Murusade) clans. The region lacked competent administrative structures and thus became a hotbed for frequent predatory warfare, looting, plunder and occupation by armed factions from other regions who controlled and devastated most of the cities, particularly Afgoye, Barava, Awdegle, Qoryoley, Wanleweyn and Merka. The various wartime actors generated revenue through looting and placing baad or levies on farm products, control of airstrips such as K-50 operated by businessman Ahmed Duale ‘Heef’ who had his own militia which also controlled the Balidogle airstrip (used by the UN and other aid groups), and a local NGO affiliated with the USC/SNA, while the SSNM-BIREM factions controlled Eel-Ahmed airstrip in Merka.

Additionally, armed militias patrolled the Somali coastline to prevent illegal fishing vessels from entering the ports of Merka and Barava. Further, in their vociferous predatory efforts, the factional militias prevented traditional structures of governance from managing communally owned local resources. The militias exercised their dominance through enforcement of residents’ compliance with baad payments,

---

491 SNRC, Committee Six, 22.
492 Ibid.
493 Baad refers to something a person extorts from others for his own good.
494 SNRC, Committee Six, 22.
495 Ibid, 23.
controlled residents’ access to river water for irrigation use and during dry spell they imposed water usage fees, which led to constant conflicts between the occupiers (militias) and the occupied (indigenous populations). Like other regions, Lower Shebelle suffered from a high degree of predation involving conversions of mango trees to timber, charcoal exports and exploitation of marine resources, as the dominant wartime actors pursued economic interests to enrich and sustain their organizations.

The Middle Shebelle region with Jowhar as its regional capital is also endowed with the River Shebelle and boasts of rich agricultural, farming and marine resources. Previously, the area had textile and sugar factories, but militias looted the sugar factory and occupied most of the farmlands. The region’s dominant clan is Hawiye (Abgal, Gal-Je’el, Shidle and Bantu being common in the area). Factional leader Mohamed Omar Habeh (also known as Mohamed ‘Dheere’) controlled the region for quite some time, although local communities opposed his military dominance, taxation, and levies. Overall, the fertile riverine areas of the Juba and Shebelle Valleys were endowed with high livestock population and frequently experienced vicious inter-clan violence due to competition for control of resources.

Geographically, the regions of Hiraan, Galgadud and Mudug share critical borders with neighboring Ethiopia. The Hiraan region’s capital city is divided into two parts by River Shebelle—a major lifeline of the region supporting fertile agricultural and grazing lands. The region’s dominant clan is the Hawiye clan with main sub-clans being those of Hawadle, Ujejen, Badi’adde, Jidle, Jajelle, Gal-je’el, Shidle and Makanne (Bantu).

---

496 Ibid, 22-23.
497 CRD, Conflict Analysis, 32.
Administered by the Hiraan Political Alliance (HPA) – a coalition of several clan factions, chaired by Colonel Hassan Abdulle Qallad and deputized by Dr. Ahmed Omar Gagale, the city had two Islamic courts which operated on both sides of the river, with local elders committees to deal with disputes and key conflicts. The region experienced extreme forms of radicalization, Islamic fundamentalism and religious violence. The Galgadud region is located in central Somalia and shares the border with Ethiopia. With Dusamareeb as its capital, the region is dominated by the Darod (Marehan) and Hawiye (Habr Gedir, Abgal, Murusade and Duduble) clans. Although arid, the region is endowed with good pasturelands, marine resources, rain-fed agricultural farms and rich potential for mineral resources. The region remained largely peaceful despite occasional pastoral conflicts between various groups. The Mudug region lies in central Somalia with Galkayo as its capital. The South Mudug region is dominated by the Habr Gedir (Solayman and Saad) sub-clan of the Hawiye clan and the Dir clan. The region possesses rich pastoral and marine resources and has salt producing farms on the coastline. Although arid, the region is endowed with a high livestock population and was often afflicted with inter-clan conflicts due to competition for resources.

The above background on regional dimension of Somalia’s wartime institutions is important for a variety of reasons. It enhances our understanding of regional endowment, resource base, geographic characteristics and borders of the respective regions. Importantly, it enables us to appreciate the complexity of clan distributions, relations and the mosaic of wartime actors operating in the region, the nature of their predatory

\[498\] SNRC, Committee Six, 24.
behavior and warfare and economic agendas, and sources of revenue for the different insurgent groups. It sets the stage for the following detailed discussions and analysis of the structure of predation and sources of revenue for insurgent organizations which perpetuated predatory war economies and institutionalized wartime actors’ economic agendas, thereby contributing to the struggles of the Mbagathi peace process.

4.1.4 Rings of Predation in Somalia: Sources of Revenue

In Somalia, a unique kind of economic predation developed where shrewd wartime actors designed elaborate predatory economic strategies, utilizing both economic and social logic to engage in predation and implement their economic agendas. As stated in chapter 1, in comparison with countries like Liberia, DRC and Angola, Somalia lacked high-value easily lootable resources. Over time, Somali wartime actors creatively squeeze any form of revenue from a rather resource poor environment sustain their insurgent organizations and perpetuate their economic interests. They created and sustained sanctuaries of diverse predatory economic networks to institutionalize their black market empire. Revenues were realized from ten critical sources as follows: systemic looting including from humanitarian agencies; control of airfields and bush airstrips; control of khat and other drugs trade; control of seaports; organized gangs and kidnapping rackets; charcoal trade; control of critical checkpoints and highways’ levies; money laundering and currency and passport printing; exploitation of marine resources; and finally, arms trade. Through these various sources, the wartime actors perfected the art of predation
with both economic and social logic and perpetuated their economic agendas undermining peacemaking efforts in the country.

During the early years of war, clan militias and factional leaders used different tactics to accumulate wealth and boost the strength and power of their insurgent groups. Factional violence and predation took various forms but the motives were the same: economic empowerment with a view to enhance wartime actors’ economic, political and military status locally and in the eyes of the regional and global community. In the early 1990s, immediately following the collapse of the Barre’s regime, the emergent armed groups engaged in various forms of predatory war economies with the predation belt moving along strategic resource nerves, particularly the cities of Mogadishu and Kismayu, and along the agriculturally rich valleys of the Shebelle and Juba Rivers. These areas not only experienced the fiercest predatory violence and warfare but also became the hotbed of factional predation and warlordism shaping the political dynamics of conflicts in Somalia. According to a UN report released in 2003, Somali nation’s assets worth $4 to $5 billion had been stolen, looted and appropriated by several factional and business leaders and their militias since the fall of Barre’s regime.\(^99\)

There existed direct relationships between a wartime actor’s factional strength and clan membership and the quality of the resources they appropriated or strategic trade and transportation routes controlled. Predatory competition for the control of such critical infrastructures was the motivating factor underlying numerous resource wars in Mogadishu and Kismayu, among other regions. These two cities, being the nerve centers

of the Somali Republic, were the ultimate prizes to capture and thus had every wartime actor’s eyes and agendas set on them. For example, as Bradbury accounted despite repeated armed conflict:

Mogadishu’s Bakarah market has remained Somalia’s most lucrative market. In Mogadishu – a place often described as the most dangerous city in the world—there are now several TV and radio stations and telephone companies, whereas before the war there was only one of each. Here development is financed by an economy that does not rely on local production or on state institutions.\(^{500}\)

In addition to the presence of a vibrant Somali diaspora, the forces of privatization and globalization aided the evolution and reconfiguration of the emergent political economy of the war in the country.\(^{501}\) In fact, Mogadishu became the epicenter and bedrock of the proliferation of Somalia’s wartime empire as several clan-based actors competed for the control of the state’s resources, particularly symbolic, prestigious and economically viable resources and infrastructure such as Villa Somalia, airports, ports, communication centers, transport, roads and defense facilities among others. As a result, Mogadishu and Kismayu became the heartland of Somalia’s wartime empire. Over the years, the strategic cities of Mogadishu and Kismayu experienced several vicious inter-clan and cross-clan predatory wars driven by a desire to profit and capture resources in order to enhance their economic and political future.

On another level, exposing the social face of predation, a collectivist culture of clan-based predatory investments became a common feature in the country. Such predatory wars led to the rise of a new social class as powerful clans driven by economics

\(^{501}\) Ibid, 203-4.
of competition for land and real estate in areas such as Mogadishu and Kismayu dominated other clans. For example, the Habr Gedir sub-clan of the Hawiye clan dominated Mogadishu and intra-Darod conflicts led to Marehan domination of Majerteen in Kismayu.\textsuperscript{502} Often clans engaged in collective predatory investments. Somalia’s wartime actors were divided deeply to the clan and sub-sub clan levels in almost every matter except in waging wars and profiteering from the spoils of war. For instance, when the $8.3 million Coca Cola Company opened a bottling plant in an anarchic business environment in Somalia between March-July 2004, clan affiliation was used to select the 400-plus investors (each contributed a minimum of $300)—drawn mostly from the Abgal and Habr Gedir sub-clans of the Hawiye clan.\textsuperscript{503} Due to security and fear, the owners encircled the plant in a mortar-proof wall and hundreds of militias were recruited to protect distribution routes.\textsuperscript{504} The clans also provided a rich recruitment pool for clan-based militia organizations.

Owing to the lack of government and regulatory frameworks, doing business was much easier and more profitable.\textsuperscript{505} A striking example was the expansive telecommunication sector which boomed despite state collapse and security fears—reportedly, Nation Link, one of Somalia’s mobile phone operators enlisted the service of 300 militiamen to protect its 500 staff members.\textsuperscript{506} For protection, business groups had their own militias—known as business militias to protect their installations, assets and

\textsuperscript{502} Interview with a Somali University student in Minneapolis, MN, US, July 3, 2007
\textsuperscript{504} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{505} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{506} Ibid.
goods in-transit. To ensure loyalty and manageability, often militia recruits were drawn from clan and sub-clan families.

As mentioned earlier, the structure of Somalia’s predatory war economy was sustained by nine key sources as follows. First, profiteering from aid agencies and private security business was one of the major sources of revenue for the wartime actors and insurgent organizations. Uniquely, in addition to being the capital city of Somalia, Mogadishu possessed critical infrastructure and as one Somali respondent observed, the city became attractive to the wartime actors because it received about 90% of aid money and humanitarian relief.507 In the post-Barre period, Mogadishu became the home to UNOSOM and other international agencies; hence, following the ‘resource trail’ the war profiteers competed and fiercely fought for control of the city and its revenue-generating infrastructure and resources. In Mogadishu alone, as shall be reviewed shortly, pursuing dominant economic interests, key warlords converted the city into their resource turfs and in the process monopolized the control of government infrastructure such as Villa Somalia, army bunkers, airports and Mogadishu and Kismayu seaports.508

This reality, to an extent, explains the contentious nature of the Somali capital because controlling Mogadishu was tantamount to controlling the country’s economic nerve and thereby the political future. Hence, wartime actors veraciously competed for the control of Mogadishu and Kismayu, often shaping the nature of clans’ political

507 Interview with a Somali civil society official, Minneapolis, MN, US, July 1, 2007.
508 Adrian Blomfield, “Americans hunt for al-Qa'eda in Mogadishu ruins Ten years after its ignominious withdrawal, the US has returned to Somalia,” Daily Telegraph (London), March 27, 2004.
relations and the dynamics of peace talks in the country. For example, according to a 1995 Human Rights Watch (HRW) Report:

The wealth of Mogadishu in particular enabled the rival warleaders to maintain and deploy larger forces of better-armed men than those controlling other regions of the country. Many were actually on U.N. and relief agency payrolls, as nominally private guards…As a center of recruitment for standing militias, in turn, Mogadishu also attracted large numbers of young gunmen looking for employment, or spoils, with many would-be recruits from nomadic backgrounds integrated into the urban military retinues of the warleaders.509

In addition to local motivations for predation, predatory wartime actors, particularly the clan-based factional leaders, entered into partnerships with UNOSOM and foreign firms. Powerful factional leaders became Sultans unto themselves and dominated the political, economic and security environments in their fiefdoms where they set rules to benefit themselves, their allies and thereby advance their predatory economic strategy and agendas.

Interestingly, in the early years of war, UNOSOM’s contracts, ranging from provision of security, escorts, rentals of buildings and other services, were provided by persons and militias affiliated with the powerful Mogadishu armed actors such as General Mohamed Farah Aideed. A 2003 UN Panel of Experts report validating other observations noted that wartime actors’ predation web was cast wide, and, “…even United Nations agencies and other aid providers must pay exorbitant fees to rent vehicles and property and for security, which is a significant source of revenue for Somali

Ironically, the same institutions working to clip the wings of armed factional leaders, as Oakley attempted, were inadvertently empowering the notorious warlords. For instance, shockingly it was reported that some of the 8,500 Somali police and the 5,000-6,000 UNOSOM staff were allied to General Aideed and other factional leaders. Reportedly, Aideed got handsome kickbacks from houses rented by the UN and salaries paid to the staff of the various UN agencies and security teams working for the UN and other NGOs. Moreover, as a humanitarian official narrated, Aideed’s networks and allies were deeply embedded in UNOSOM and other international agencies:

The currency exchange was done for UNOSOM by Abdi Rashid, a close Aideed colleague. He would give UNOSOM one rate, and turn around and sell the dollars at a higher rate. The chief of the Somali staff unit was a Sa’ad relative of Aideed. UNOSOM rented 300 cars, fifty to sixty houses, as well as paying the salaries of 2,500 employees: all of this was paid for in shillings converted from dollars by Abdi Rashid. The original misperception was that the Abgal-Habr Gedir conflict was the central problem. But 50 percent of the resources went into Aideed’s stronghold in South Mogadishu. There were cars, houses, rents, commerce and security contracts; many people moved to South Mogadishu for employment.

In addition to this elaborate predation and extortion cartel, armed factional leaders also forced international agencies working in the controlled territories to abide by certain protocols. Reportedly, as Richburg (1993) noted in a July 1992 letter, dispatched to all organizations working in Mogadishu, one of Aideed’s lieutenants warned them to seek clearance from General Aideed before they recruited local staff, hired vehicles or entered

---

511 Ibid.
512 HRW interview with a senior Somali official, Nairobi, January 20, 1995 as cited in HRW, Somalia Faces the Future.
into rental agreements. Aideed was not the only beneficiary from the exploits of international agencies, as his close ally, Osman ‘Ato’ was the one of the main beneficiaries of UN’s construction related contracts. Fitting both the accumulator/occupier and networker typologies and as a wealthy businessman and political dealmaker, he reportedly carried Kenyan, American and possibly Italian passports and was well-connected to international business groups, particularly Italians. Possession of such documents was critical for movements and flexibility in transacting business and advancing wartime actors’ economic interests.

In addition to the maze of predatory warlordism in Somalia, resilient ties sucked in a host of external forces such as intelligence groups (from the US, Europe, Italy, Egypt, Ethiopia, Eritrea, etc), NGOs, Embassies and neighboring governments, creating a web of self-sustaining interest groups, with most using Nairobi as the operational base, particularly in the post-UNOSOM period. According to a former senior official of the Puntland government, a cozy relationship bloomed between warlords and Nairobi-based organizations such as UN agencies and other international organizations that inadvertently economically empowered criminal armed warlords through the payments of fees for the use of airports, seaports, highways and roadblocks under their control. Infringing on the ‘Do No Harm’ philosophy that Anderson advanced, although some

515 Ibid.
517 Interview with a former official of TFG and a close confidant of President Abdullahi Yussuf in Minneapolis, MN, US, July 4, 2007.
might argue that such unmanaged aid flows economically empowers and politically legitimizes criminal networks, the humanitarian imperatives to reach and save lives of vulnerable populations seemed to outweigh the costs of working with wartime actors.

Often, these humanitarian organizations and foreign missions relied on loose networks of agents and informers to gather information and intelligence about what was happening in Somalia. Most wartime actors, personalities and the Somali elites operating in the region readily sold and resold critical intelligence or even misinformation at a fee to an intelligence-hungry external world. This became a predatory economy of its own, leading to the development of what one Somali politician termed ‘the Gigiri Republic’ referring to the UN agencies, other international organizations and Embassies which worked out of Gigiri, Nairobi and shape political, economic and security dynamics in Somalia. To an extent, Somalia’s wartime actors co-opted unsuspecting external agencies into their triangle of predation and a measure of interdependence matured. Through such expansive ‘professionalized’ predatory networks, Somali wartime actors influenced external actors’ roles and humanitarian assistance to boost their insurgent militia organizations. They equally influenced the actions of external actors regarding policies and peacemaking processes.

Second, during the wartime, warlords and allied businessmen controlled several airports and airfields in Somalia and they charged landing and takeoff fees to other traders or groups to use the facilities in their controlled fiefdoms. The control of these facilities became critical sources of revenue for the various wartime actors including

---

519 Interview with a former Somali female politician, Nairobi, Kenya, November 22, 2008.
insurgent groups, militia and factional leaders and the allied clans and business groups and other black market networks. Despite the state failure and incessant insecurity, Somalia continued to receive relatively good flight traffic. In a November 2003 report, the UN Panel of Experts estimated the monthly flights into Somalia at 2,500, with more than half coming from Kenya. The other hub was Djibouti transited by flights from the Gulf States, particularly the UAE with internal connections to various cities in Somalia provided by airlines such as Daallo Airlines, Juba Airlines, Gallad Air, Damal Airlines and Star African Airlines. Reportedly, some of the airline companies were so dubious and frequently changed registration numbers. Such a relatively busy airspace in a rather anarchic country was a boon for predatory armed Somali wartime institutions. Running airports and airstrips as their personal assets and businesses, the same report observed that wartime actors charged between $200 and $200 to $300 landing and handling fees, respectively, for cargo flights. To make sense of how much money flowed into Somalia’s wartime empire, taking just a modest average landing fee of $200 and handling fee of $250 per flight (a total of $450 per plane) with an average of 2,500 flights per month, the Somali warlords accumulated about $13.5 million per year just from landing and handling fees. Due to such profitability, around 2004, it was estimated

that there were about 11 airstrips near Mogadishu controlled by different warlords.\textsuperscript{524} Moreover, in a 2004 article in \textit{L’ Express}, it was reported that warlords manned about 240 bush airstrips, facilitating trade in black market products, arms, contrabands and narcotic drugs.\textsuperscript{525} In an interview, commenting on the proliferation of airstrips in Somalia, a Somali businessman noted that, “it reached a point where greedy warlords and business persons began constructing air strip like kiosks.”\textsuperscript{526} Fees charged depended on the type of the aircraft and the proximity to big cities such as Mogadishu and Kismayu, while in the hinterland, the rates were often lower. For example, Bartholet, a journalist returning to Somalia in 1999 reported that his pilot paid $50 as landing fees to the local militia to use an old Soviet airbase at Baledogle (controlled by the RRA militia) in the Baidoa area.\textsuperscript{527}

In Mogadishu, factional and business leaders controlled key strategic airfields: Bashir Raghe and Abubakar Adane controlled Isaley airfield and El Ma’an; while Ahmed Duale ‘Heef’ operated the K-50 airfield (on the road to Merka) and his militia manned a key checkpoint on the road leading to Mogadishu.\textsuperscript{528} Indeed, devoid of a functional government, Somalia’s airspace, despite utilization by humanitarian flights delivering the much needed relief to save civilian lives, largely became a haven for black market operatives and arms smugglers and a host of wartime actors. The reason why armed militia leaders were able to gain control of these strategic resources rather than other

\textsuperscript{524} Okungu, “The Acid Test.”
\textsuperscript{526} Interview with a Somali businessman, Nairobi, Kenya, November 6, 2008.
\textsuperscript{527} Ibid.
actors was that they controlled and monopolized force and violence in the form of gunmen.

Interestingly, some entrepreneurial militia leaders, in pursuit of their economic agendas, socially mobilized clans and like-minded predatory investors to rebuild or upgrade income-generating facilities. For example, using a combination of economic and social logic, militia leader Bashir Raghe built the Isaley airstrip from private financing and charged clients between $3,000 to $20,000 to use the airstrip, and annually from various fees generated about $1.2 million. Likewise, other wartime actors displayed the social face of predation and rolled out elaborate strategies of spoils sharing with other factional leaders and related clan families. For example, according to a UN report by Schiemsky et al (2006), militia leader Qanyare received about $1.5 million annually from Daynille airport in Mogadishu (which he shared with allies Osman ‘Ato’, Omar ‘Finish’ and Ifka Halane Sharia Court); Ahmed Duale ‘Heef’ received about $1.4 million annually from the K-50 airstrip; and Baledogle airport in south-western Mogadishu and Kismayu airport generated $300,000 for factional leaders of the Ayer sub-clan of the Habr Gedir and those associated with and led by Colonel Barre Hirale of the JVA. In addition, Mohammed ‘Dheere’ controlled the Middle Shebelle region and its capital Jowhar and rehabilitated an airstrip at Jowhar while manning about four strategic roadblocks; and the embattled TNG utilized the Baledogle airport (previously a military airport).

---

530 Hogendoorn et al, S/2003/223, 43.
Often, common predatory economic agendas brought wartime actors together to hatch a mutually beneficial deal to increase their profit margin and revenue base. For example, in 2006, key business and factional leaders met and revised Mogadishu international airport’s taxes structure as follows: flight landing and security fees, $1700 per flight; passengers, $20; and cargo (60 tons), $152.5—generating an estimated daily income of $18,350, monthly $550,500 and annual income of $6.6 million.\(^\text{532}\) Indeed, going by earlier estimates of 2,500 monthly flights to Somalia and assuming 2,000 of these lands in Mogadishu, the Mogadishu’s wartime actors made about $40.8 million from flight landing and security fees alone. Certainly, such dominant economic incentives explain why wartime actors seldom pushed for a peace deal for the common good – but rather for the perpetuation of a state of chaos, which is mutually beneficial for them and their associates.

Third, competition for the control of the *Khat* trade and other drugs was a major source of economic revenue and power for the wartime institutions and a critical disincentive to the Somali peace talks. *Khat* is a leafy mild stimulant popularly known as *miraa* in Kenya. Although legal in Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Uganda and even the United Kingdom (UK), it was classified as a Class A narcotic drug in most western countries, particularly in the US. In 1992, Somalia had the highest percentage of consumers of *khat* in the world with an estimated 75 percent of the adult male population consuming it and a smaller number of women as well.\(^\text{533}\) *Khat* or King *khat* as Somalis

\(^{532}\) Schiemsky et al, S/2006/913, 78.
call it, had become a tranquilizer that provided temporary ‘hope’ through hallucinations to thousands of unemployed youth otherwise leading despondent lives in the collapsed Somali state. As an article in the Guardian noted, “…everywhere there are gunmen, slim legs dangling over the sides of pick-up trucks, their mouths filled with a green paste - the shredded leaves of the narcotic plant qat [khat].”

From direct khat trade and associated businesses such as the control of airstrips to transport the product, wartime actors cashed in on the commodity to finance their predatory empires. Around 2004, according to a report by the UN Panel of Experts authored by Tambi et al (2004), some airlines charged a lump sum figure of $6,500 per flight of khat to Somalia, inclusive of airport charges, fees for pilot, fuel and other related costs. At that time, khat was sold for $3.5 per kilogram almost the same as the daily wage of militiamen which ranged from $3 to $5. It was estimated that, on average, a militia man spent about $1.75 daily on khat and other accompaniments; while the general Somali population spent about $300,000 on khat daily. Prominent warlords and businessmen invested in this trade. Reportedly, in the 1990s, factional leader Osman Ali ‘Ato’ (an accumulator and a networker) secured shares in Kenyan-registered Bluebird Aviation and engaged in lucrative khat import business.

---

536 Ibid, 22.
537 Ibid, 24.
Inadvertently, regional governments and communities from Kenya and Ethiopia not only supported and financed Somalia’s war but contributed to the strengthening of insurgent organizations. Regionally, *khat* trade, while impoverishing the already fragile Somali population and empowering armed factional and business leaders in Somalia, enriched the states and traders from neighboring countries particularly, Kenya and Ethiopia. By 2003, it was estimated that annually Kenya exported to Somalia about 5,000 – 7,000 tons of *khat*.\(^{539}\) Additionally, in 2003 a group of Somalis in Kenya in a trade dominated by Ren-a-Kan (a company associated with factional leader Hussein Aideed) recorded monthly exports of about 7 to 10 tons to Britain selling at a lucrative retail price of $6 to $8 per kilogram of the *Kangeta* variety.\(^{540}\) With an assumed monthly tonnage of 8.5 and an average of $7 per kilogram, the dealers received about $59,500 translating to about $714,000 annually – a lucrative income which went to fund insurgent organizations, procure arms, support allies, break up rivals, spoil peace and enhance the profile and negotiation power of Aideed in the Mbagathi talks. In addition to Ethiopia, another major exporter of *khat* to Somalia, Somaliland and Djibouti, Kenya in 2006 earned an estimated $250 million from *khat* exports largely destined for Somalia.\(^{541}\) This was a substantial increase from the annual revenue of about $100 million received in 1993.\(^{542}\)

---

\(^{539}\) Ibid, 37.


\(^{541}\) Irish Times, “Educated Somali women dominate lucrative khat trade,” *Irish Times*, April 19, 2006. However, in 2004, the UN estimates Khat revenues to total US$180 million (with $120 million accrued to Kenya and $60 million to Ethiopia), see Tambi et.al, S/2004/604, 24.

Khat was so important to Somali wartime actors that the Kenyan government officials often banned khat flights to the country as sticks to punish or push factional leaders to participate in peace talks. However, such moves often elicited irate reactions and opposition from both the khat growers in Kenya and the consumers in Somalia. For example, during the Mbagathi talks following a June 2003 Kenyan government’s ban on khat flights to Somalia due to security concerns, khat growers from the Meru region (the hub of khat production) of Kenya protested and appealed for the lifting of the ban as they were adversely economically affected.\(^{543}\) The ban was quickly lifted. But again, during the Mbagathi talks, in an attempt to pressure the warlords to commit to the process, in April 2004 Kenya imposed another ban eliciting an equal outcry from Kenyan miraalkhat farmers and traders in Meru and consumers in Somalia. In 2006, a Kenyan MP from the Meru region argued that the ban of khat flights undermined his region’s economy as they export about 20 tons of khat every day to Somalia earning the region approximately $800,000 daily.\(^{544}\) In fact in an interview, a senior official of Kenya’s Civil Aviation Authority informed that about a dozen Somali-owned chartered cargo flights flew out of Wilson airport in Nairobi to Somalia daily loaded with khat.\(^{545}\) In 2003, the UN


\(^{545}\) Interview with a senior official of Kenya Civil Aviation Authority, Nairobi, Kenya, December 5, 2007.
estimated that about 250 *khat* flights landed in Mogadishu daily, with Bluebird, Knight Aviation and other smaller airlines being the principal route dominators.\(^546\)

In the unregulated Somalia economic environment, creative and entrepreneurial wartime actors utilized every opportunity to amass profits and accumulate wealth, directly generating revenue and imposing taxes on commodities and drugs imported or exported through their controlled territories and facilities. According to a Nairobi-based Somali diplomat, the taxes on the flights depended on the size of the aircraft and the nature of the cargo.\(^547\) In 2008, according to a former Somali legislator/businessman familiar with the *khat* trade, about 15 flights landed in Mogadishu daily and Somali warlords such as Qanyare (who controlled the Daynille airport preferred by the UN, other agencies, and *khat* importers due to better security) charged $200 dollars per landing and between $500 to $600 was paid to owners of ‘technicals’ to secure the airport and protect the precious commodity.\(^548\) According to other sources, for *khat* flights, the landing fees for smaller and large aircrafts were pegged at $200 and $700 respectively and a levy of $12.5 per bag of *khat* (on average a plane carries about 60 bags).\(^549\) With an average of 6 flights daily, from *khat* flights alone, factional leader Qanyare took home about $170,000 per month.\(^550\) Based on an average of 15 *khat* flights per day (including weekends), Qanyare made about $84,000 per month translating to $1 million annually

\(^{546}\) Hogendoorn et al, S/2003/223, 37. It was also reported that some of these flights also transport arms into Somalia and provide logistical support in transportation of militias in the country, see Hogendoorn et al, S/2003/223, 38.

\(^{547}\) Interview with an official of the Somali Embassy, Nairobi, Kenya, August 22, 2007.

\(^{548}\) Interview with a former Somali legislator and currently a UN official, Nairobi, Kenya, November 6, 2008.

\(^{549}\) Interviews with Somali researchers and nongovernmental organizations personnel, Somalia, 25 January 2003, see Hogendoorn et al, S/2003/223, 39.

\(^{550}\) Ibid.
from landing fees alone. Additionally, using the average of 15 khat flights a day and $550 as protection fee, just over a 30-day period, Qanyare and other providers of armed ‘technicals’ escorts to the important commodity took home about $247,500 translating to a lucrative annual income of $2.97 million from one airstrip alone. The accrued revenues were often socially shared with loyal clan militias, elders and other allied militia leaders. Exposing another form of social and economic logic of predation, reportedly Qanyare shared the revenue generated from Daynille airport with his factional allies Osman ‘Ato’ (25 percent) and Omar ‘Finish’ (15 per cent).

Such guaranteed economic revenues enormously empowered wartime actors economically, politically and militarily enabling them to buy arms and ‘technicals’, pay and reward their militias, fan violence and spoil peace that threatened their interests, nurture political alliances and break-up rivals, and become indispensible actors to the negotiation process. Two examples will suffice. According to Menkhaus, Qanyare’s wealth made him an independent entrepreneurial warlord with diversified sources of income and this economic capacity and financial independence enabled him to pay his militias regularly and hence exercised greater command and control over his forces due to less reliance on external patronage or support from clans and business groups. Others such as Mohammed Deylaf (also known as Delaif) confided that he spends about 30% of his profits from his predatory businesses to provide for his militia and security.

551 Interview with a former Somali legislator and currently a UN official, Nairobi, Kenya, November 6, 2008.
552 Interviews with a member of Somali civil society, Somalia, 23 February 2003, see Hogendoorn et al, S/2003/223, 39.
escort of his goods in-transit.554 In the Kismayu region, reportedly General Morgan (infamously known as the Butcher of Hargeissa) was able to maintain his militia force due to proceeds from his *khat* trade.555 In 2005, it was estimated that on average the Kismayu airport, which had been an international airport during Barre’s regime, received about 2 *khat* flights daily each loaded with 60 kilograms of *khat* with an import tax of $12.5 per bag, landing fee of $200 and $20 per individual (most often there were two pilots; however, the fee did not apply to pilots who were Somali citizens) generated an estimated revenue of $58,200 per month.556 On an annual basis, this translated to about $698,400 lining Morgan’s pockets and strengthening his militia and allied clan institutions. Perhaps influenced by such economic incentives, Morgan stayed away from the Mbagathi talks and only joined the talks in September 2004 after a devastating battle where he lost most of the territory to a rival warlord, Colonel Hirale of JVA.

On relatively rare occasions, in addition to trade in *khat*, some Somali factional leaders engaged in a black market trade of hard drugs such as cocaine and *Hashish* trade to Kenya and Ethiopia.557 Notably, according to a 2005 report by the UN Panel of Experts, Sheikh Yussuf IndoAddhe generated revenue from about 10 *Hashish* farms located in places such as Janaale, Shalambood, Qoryooley, Buulamarer and Kurtun Waarey, among others.558 He utilized modern irrigation methods, fertilizers and pesticides to ensure high quality harvests and employed a qualified staff, rewarding them

---

handsomely. A poorer grade product was sold in Somalia and neighboring countries, with a higher grade exported via Merka to the international markets.\textsuperscript{559} With a special official representative and militia guarding his investments, from drug business alone, it was estimated that he accrued about $600,000 annually (there were six harvests per year with each netting approximately $100,000).\textsuperscript{560}

Globally, according to statements by top officials of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), proceeds from drug trafficking continue to be a critical source of revenue for insurgency groups and terrorists world over including Somalia.\textsuperscript{561} However, according to a Kenyan intelligence official who follows Somali affairs, the drug business in Somalia was low key and used to finance militia activities.\textsuperscript{562} In Somalia, some warlords controlled \textit{khat} trade directly or through black market networks and used the revenue to buy arms or barter for arms and thereby sabotaged peace efforts in order to protect and dominate the lucrative trade.\textsuperscript{563} Trade in \textit{khat} and other drugs was a useful revenue generating venture as it provided the wartime actors with the much-needed financial and economic power to purchase arms and enhance militias’ loyalty.\textsuperscript{564} Hence, in an otherwise collapsed Somalia, entrepreneurial wartime actors made profits and accumulated wealth from \textit{khat} and other drugs with the incomes thereby oiling their wartime empires and perpetuating their economic agendas.

\textsuperscript{559} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{560} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{561} Speech by Antonio Maria Costa, the Executive Director of UNODC during a conference on \textit{Combating Terrorist Financing: Drugs, Crime and Terrorist Financing - Breaking the Link} (Vienna: UNODC, November 9, 2005), 5, accessed July 19, 2008, www.unodc.org/pdf/ED\%20speech\%20to\%20OSCE.pdf
\textsuperscript{562} Interview with a Kenyan intelligence official, Nairobi, Kenya, September 16, 2008.
\textsuperscript{563} Peleman et al, S/2003/1035, 21.
\textsuperscript{564} Observatoire geopolitique des drogues, “The geopolitical stakes of khat in Kenya,” 189.
Fourth, factional predation, looting, kidnapping, abduction and protection rings took root—becoming rewarding economic enterprises. The rise of predatory militias fed off each other as war economies and competing economic agendas aggravated the situation. These predatory warfare activities facilitated an exponential growth of militias, whereby in 2001 there were an estimated 75,000 militias countrywide with about 20,000 in Mogadishu alone.\(^{565}\) Although the militias often had a single-clan composition, there existed other multi-clan militias, particularly those formed by business (business militia) and religious (Islamic militias) groups.

Despite these typologies, they all had one overarching common feature – factional predation and looting were their enduring trademark (see table 8 for details on the pervasiveness of predation in Somalia). Authoritatively, the report of the technical committee on Land and Property Rights exposed the vastness of Somali wartime actors’ predatory activities and other looting behaviors and incidents.\(^{566}\) The committee developed a list of major occupied or looted public, private and foreign properties by different wartime actors, primarily clan militias, in south and central Somalia.\(^{567}\) For example, the report noted that militias looted and at times occupied residential houses, businesses, schools, hospitals, universities, government and NGOs offices, police stations, military barracks, power stations, airports, oil refineries, water systems and dams, communication and transportation and sports facilities, Embassies, villas, hotels, 


\(^{567}\) For an extensive discussion of the depth of economics of predation of Somalia’s private and public property see SNRC, Committee III: Land and Property Rights, 1-15.
boreholes and over 28 agricultural farms, among others.\textsuperscript{568} Research by the same committee revealed that after the collapse of the Somali state, new airfields and customs posts emerged and various private and public properties, foreign Embassies, villas and farms and ground spaces were destroyed or looted or occupied by dominant warlords and clan militias.\textsuperscript{569} The emergent wartime actors dismantled and exported infrastructure, equipment and machinery ranging from state maritime transport facilities, aeroplanes, industrial plants, monuments and artifacts, telecommunication equipment, electric cables and poles amongst others.\textsuperscript{570} All military barracks and recreation facilities along the coastline were occupied by dominant factional leaders and clan militias.\textsuperscript{571} Writing on the pervasive looting, McNeil (2002) observed:

\begin{quote}
The languid coastal boulevards are awash with garbage and sand. The cathedral in Mogadishu is shot to pieces, statues have been sold for scrap and the American Embassy was demolished for its reinforcing steel bars. Blocks of houses stand stripped not just of furniture, but of tiles and toilets for resale. With so much else gone, the warlords now extort "tolls" on roads and tiny airstrips and buy arms to fight for more spots for toll booths.\textsuperscript{572} 

Indeed, the pervasive looting in Somalia led by a group which Lewis termed ‘scrap merchant warlords’ accumulated massive economic wealth which enhanced their political and economic fortune and undermined peace talks.\textsuperscript{573} These ‘scrap merchant warlords’ looted public and private properties and everything from water pipes to electric
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{568} SNRC, \textit{Committee III: Land and Property Rights}.
\textsuperscript{569} For details see Ibid.
\textsuperscript{570} For details see Ibid, 10.
\textsuperscript{571} For details see Ibid.
poles to trees turning them into charcoal which they exported to Gulf States for profit.\footnote{Ibid, 2.}

In fact, as Stevenson (1995) reported, the US Embassy in Somalia valued at $35 million was looted, including the Ambassador’s office furniture, sink and toilet seat and even steel structures sold as scrap metal.\footnote{Jonathan Stevenson, \textit{Losing Mogadishu: Testing US Policy in Somalia} (Annapolis, MD: US Naval Institute Press, 1995), 34.} Additionally, Menkhaus noted that the Juba Sugar factory valued at $250 million Juba Sugar factory was looted, dismantled and sold for scrap metal in Kenya for $1 million; while other assets such as Mogadishu airports’ runways and a Parliament building, among others, were dismantled and used as raw materials for new construction projects.\footnote{Menkhaus, “Governance without Government,” 81.}

For instance, playing critical networking roles, as Reno (2003) observed, factional leaders such as Osman Ali ‘Ato’s’ militia organization became notorious for looting, kidnapping and other organized crime with the sole purpose of making money, and as Farah Aideed’s ally, he organized looting of farm equipment in the riverine areas.\footnote{William Reno, “Somalia and Survival in the Shadow of the Global Economy,” Queen Elizabeth House Working Paper 100 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 10.} According to an Ethiopian intelligence official with an intimate knowledge of the activities of key Somali leaders, in the early years of civil war, ‘Ato’ looted and relocated a cigarette and match factory to Uganda, looted and sold various factories such as Spaghetti, Coca Cola and Kismayu Sugar and shipped and organized the sale of Somalia’s stolen artifacts in Dubai.\footnote{Interview with an Ethiopian intelligence official, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, June 11, 2009.} ‘Ato’ profited extremely from the war and established a lucrative transport business with long-distance tankers (oil and good trucks)
which operated in Somalia, Kenya, Uganda and South Africa.⁵⁷⁹ With his family living in the comfort of Nairobi and other foreign cities, through his relatives and business allies, ‘Ato’ manned an oil depot base in Eldoret in western Kenya (ironically the same town hosting the Somali reconciliation process) from where he exported fuel to Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi.⁵⁸⁰ The sources intimated that ‘Ato’ lacked a specific political agenda, but as a dealmaker and diplomatic broker, he pursued economic interests during the war period.⁵⁸¹ Hence, typologically, he could be classified as both an accumulator and a networker factional warlord.

Uncontrolled looting was the order of the day in post-1991 Somalia. In an interview a Somali civil society official commenting on the pervasive lootings noted, “Young mooryaans [hooligans] looted neighborhoods in groups and even my cousins participated in looting our own home. Due to the high volume of looting sprees that they were engaged in, often they forget what they looted from specific homes and one day my cousin came to our house wearing my dad’s shirt! I was horrified.”⁵⁸² Thus, looting was ‘business’ and knew no relation or clan considerations — for the mooryaans, it was a means to economic riches. Nurudin Farah, a 60-year old Somali poet and novelist exiled in South Africa, writing on the precarious state of factional predation that perpetuate insecurity in Somalia observed, “…it’s an extreme form of lawlessness now…Many different interest groups are at each other’s throats. There are freelance executioners all

⁵⁷⁹ Ibid.
⁵⁸¹ Ibid.
⁵⁸² Interview with a female Somali official of an international Italian NGO, Nairobi, Kenya, November 1, 2009 (Added word).
Moreover, Masciarelli (2002) argued that Somalia’s stateless environments fostered ideal conditions for the perpetuation of various income generating endeavors such as organized kidnappings for ransom. Similarly, Menkhaus pointed out that, “An enduring stereotype linked to Somalia’s protracted state collapse is the ‘Mad Max’ anarchy of young, armed gunmen riding battlewagons and terrorizing citizens.”

At times, predatory strategies were adaptive to situations. As Marchal (1997) observed, most of the militias transformed themselves by changing their crude looting and pillaging behaviors to charging or taxing or seeking protection fees from business and villages. The absence of effective structures to provide security for citizens and their property facilitated the formation of ‘neighborhood militias’ which provided security at a fee. Organized abductions, kidnapping syndicates and protection rings, motivated by the need to cover debt or to generate profit, became lucrative business for Somali warlords and armed militias on the mainland.

According to a 2004 report by Amnesty International, about 300 kidnapping incidents occurred in Somalia in 2003. In October 2003, due to fear of rampant kidnappings, influential Somali persons relocated their families to Nairobi and the

McNeil observed that Mogadishu was saturated with AK-47s and in a bid to ensure the safety of their guests, business owners employed heavily armed ‘technicals’ to escort and protect them from “…unemployed gunmen seeking kidnapping victims.”

Likewise, according to Vick (2000) in lawless Mogadishu, foreigners had to part with $200 per day for services of private security teams of about six young men armed with AK-47s to deter kidnappers. Similarly, a 2003 study by Menkhaus, the Somali business community had to hire their own militias paying them about $1 to $2 per day. Indeed, the kidnapping industry was quite profitable with young neighborhood militias charging daily protection fee of $0.15 per house. It was estimated that ransom fees to secure the release of kidnapped victims differed as follows: a local Somali person, $10,000 and a foreigner, $80,000 and reportedly, Mohammed ‘Dheere’ pocketed $1.2 million for freeing some captives in early 2004.

However, the ransom requested tended to fluctuate and seemed to be rising, as in June 2008 to secure the release of a German couple kidnapped in west Bossaso, $650,000 was paid to the kidnappers from the Warsangeli, Ali Saleebaan and Isse Mohamud clans. Such clan-based sharing of the ransom money exposed another form of social and economic logic of predation that was prevalent in Somalia. If the Mbagathi process bore fruit and stability returned to the embattled country, demands for militia protection

---

589 McNeil, “A New Scrutiny.”
590 Vick, “Building a Government From Scratch.”
593 Tambi et al, S/2004/604. 27.
would surely decline and the war profiteers would be out of business. Such were war profiteers’ fear of peace that continued to undermine peacemaking in Somalia.

Fifth, wartime actors generated revenue through the control of strategic seaports which not only became rewarding business but also an epicenter of predatory warlordism, factional contestation and violence. Somalia’s key seaports included: Berbera (managed by Somaliland), Bossaso (managed by Puntland) and El Ma’an (Mogadishu), Kismayu and Merka, operated by the different wartime actors including factional leaders and allied clans and business groups. In 2004, despite state collapse, the different seaports experienced a business boon registering the following tonnage of cargo imports: El Ma’an, 2 million metric tons; Berbera, 552,000 metric tons; Bossaso, 368,000 metric tons; and Kismayu, 3,000 metric tons. Of particular note, reportedly, El Ma’an could berth 10 vessels of 20,000 tons at any given time, with a daily throughput capacity of 8,000 tons. According to the UN Monitoring Group (UNMG) during the 2003-2004 period, El Ma’an generated $22.5 to $30 million annually. In an interview, a US-based Somali journalist confided that between 2002-2004, leading business groups and factional leaders made an average of $30 to $40 million annually from port business in El Ma’an. Jointly owned by three business groups, in 2005, El Ma’an recorded annual imports of 396,000 metric tons at a fee of $40 per ton, thereby generating $15.8 million. The port also charged an anchorage fee of $1,340 for a cargo ship of more

598 Interview with a Somali Journalist, Minneapolis, MN, July 3, 2007.
than 3,000 tons and $450 for a load less than 3,000 tons. In 2005, the port had a workforce of 320 and physical assets comprising of tugboats (6), other types of tugboats (340) and trucks (310). The port was considered Somalia’s primary entry point for arms and military equipment. A strategic resource for the wartime actors (factional and allied business groups), at any given time, about 40 ‘technicals’ guard the port. According to a top official of President Sheikh Shariff’s government, in 2008-2009, El Ma’an generated an average of $300,000 per day — revenue which earlier had greatly empowered Mogadishu warlords and preventing President Salat’s TNG from establishing itself.

Such revenues and prospects for more control of strategic resources and facilities motivated entrepreneurial warlords to design and develop new infrastructures to facilitate their predatory economic agendas. For example, on January 9, 2000, warlords Muse Sudi and Colonel Abdi Hassan Awaleh Qaybdid inaugurated Jasira port—a new natural seaport just 12 kilometers away from Mogadishu greatly denting the ability of the other actors to revive Mogadishu’s main seaport. Pronouncing that the port will be free of clan politics, the enterprising warlords set the charges at $6,000 and $3,000 for large and small vessels, respectively and that the warlords will be paid 50% of the proceeds and the

---

600 Ibid.
601 Ibid, 22.
602 Ibid, 23.
604 Interview with a former member of the ARS and a PM of the TFG, Bujumbura, Burundi, November 4, 2009.
contributing businessmen will share the rest.\textsuperscript{606} In the first day of launch, Jasira welcomed its initial two vessels, with one delivering an entire Pepsi Cola Factory.\textsuperscript{607} The most influential shareholders, Nuridi Hajji Dalfa and Abdirishid Il-Qayteh, fearing retaliation from their business rivals, mobilized and stationed their battle-wagon ‘technicals’ to safeguard the port’s business traffic.\textsuperscript{608}

Expectedly, the opening of the Jasira port was promptly opposed by other Mogadishu warlords such as Mohamed Qanyare, Hussein Aideed and Hussein Hajji Bod due to the concerns that the port’s revenue would militarily and economically empower their rivals in the never-ending battle of supremacy for the control of Mogadishu and its trade. Beyond the symbolic value of Mogadishu, the mushrooming new ports and airstrips obstructed the opening of the main Mogadishu port and airport that were closed in 1995. Competition for the control of these critical economic infrastructures and assets, business rivalry and profit motives triggered factional clashes, often along clan lines. The proposed opening of the Mogadishu port and airport significantly threatened the dominance of the trade by the El Ma’an business group (led by Abgal/Warsengeli sub-clan), which enjoyed protection from allied militia leaders such as Bashir Raghe and Mohamed ‘Dheere’. Thus, such protection enabled the group to not only control the El Ma’an port but also dominate maritime trade in Mogadishu. The group had expansive business networks extending to Dubai ranging from construction companies, tugboat

\textsuperscript{606} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{607} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{608} Ibid.
companies, and importing sugar, oil and other products, including arms into the country.\textsuperscript{609}

Predation was not a preserve of Mogadishu wartime actors as other regional actors also accumulated massive wealth from the chaos of state collapse. For example, the business-militia leaders such as Abdurashid Ilqayte of Lower Shebelle dominated the banana export business shipping out about 90,000 boxes every month, receiving lucrative economic gains in addition to proceeds from the printing of currency notes, drug peddling, and investing in real estate and foreign banks.\textsuperscript{610} Other wealthy businessmen, notably Djibouti’s Abdirahman Boreh (one of the major financiers of the TNG) was linked to the importation of contraband sugar from South America and through his agent in Mogadishu (Mohamed ‘Delaf’) and by taking advantage of the Common Market for East and Southern Africa’s (COMESA’s) one-year grant to Kenya to import the commodity from outside the regional trading block, flooded the neighboring countries with cheap sugar, particularly in 2004.\textsuperscript{611} Similarly, factional leaders such as Bashir Raghe and Musa Sudi, who engaged in black market trade of sugar imports, used the revenue and profits to procure arms for themselves.\textsuperscript{612} They became key players in the Mbagathi talks.

Wartime actors in other regions such as Kismayu and the autonomous region of Puntland engaged in predatory economic spoils of war to profit, accumulate wealth and build strong insurgent organizations. For the Puntland government, the seaport of

\textsuperscript{609} Interview with a TFG official and businessman, Nairobi, Kenya, August 18, 2008.
\textsuperscript{610} Tambi et al, S/2004/604, 26.
\textsuperscript{611} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{612} Ibid.
Bossaso was the major revenue earner for the leaders and allied militias. As Reno observed, for Colonel Yusuf, revenues from Bossaso’s seaport together with Ethiopia’s military assistance accorded him with both the opportunity and suppleness to develop and plan his military strategies and build his force. Through partnership with allied businessmen, Colonel Yusuf was also involved in the importation of counterfeit currency ordered abroad, thereby disrupting financial markets and skyrocketing food prices in the country to the disadvantage of the vulnerable segments of the population.

Similarly, Kismayu’s seaport was another critical strategic hub which fattened armed wartime actors’ pockets and boosting their status in the region and also at the Mbagathi negotiating table. The battle for the control of Kismayu, its seaport and other strategic infrastructure and resources frequently pitted Colonel Barre Hirale’s JVA militia against those of General Morgan, preventing the two leaders from effectively participating in the Mbagathi talks. Prior to 1999, General Morgan was one of the wartime actors and a beneficiary of predatory war economies in Kismayu. Applying social logic to predation, Morgan carefully manipulated social structures and designed administrative organs, harmonized interests of key clans and ensured smooth operations as long as such initiatives oiled his war machines and predatory fiefdom. HRW observed:

Political and military control of Kismayu, the port city in the southern region of Lower Juba, has been consolidated under the war leader General Morgan. Managing through a reputedly astute balancing of Majerteen and Marehan clan interests, Morgan has also claimed to have built alliances with other clans there. An uneasy truce has been maintained over recent

---

614 Interviews with a Somali civil society actor and former Minister in the TNG, Nairobi, September 2009.
months between Morgan and forces of the Habr Gedir clan warleaders General Aideed and Osman Ato.\textsuperscript{615}

Indeed, during that period, as one relief worker put it, “…there is a strategic mix of businessmen, politicians, and elders in Morgan's alliance. The DC [District Council] is Morgan's puppet. Sayid Hussein is his most important ally. UNOSOM legitimized Morgan's DC in order to turn over the port and airport to someone.”\textsuperscript{616} Morgan tactically co-opted traditional social institutions and structures into his predatory empire—to an extent making it beneficial for all. Reportedly in his fiefdom, “…the elders make decisions, then bring decisions to the district council. The elders’ council [Golaha Tashiga Odayasha] is the most important decision-making body in Kismayu…. The district council manages the police and taxes at the port and airport and market. Water, sanitation, and electricity are all private.”\textsuperscript{617} He perfected predation through the district council.

On the operational front, Morgan also boasted of having an intelligence unit to aid in his conquest and that for him, participation in fighting is a sure way of getting experience and that “…discipline depends on motivation.”\textsuperscript{618} His economic wealth endeared many to join his militia. In 1995, commenting on Morgan’s capability, an aid official noted, “Morgan is rich; he has the khat trade as well. The militia have no uniforms, but some wear the U.S. Army-provided uniforms given during Siad Barre's

\textsuperscript{615} HRW, \textit{Somalia Faces the Future}.
\textsuperscript{617} HRW interview with a senior elder, Kismayu, January 27, 1995, cited in HRW, \textit{Somalia Faces the Future}.
Being Barre’s favored son-in-law and senior military official, General Morgan might have stockpiled arms and other supplies upon the collapse of the regime and it highly likely that he used the same to arm and maintain his predatory militia. Certainly, true for Morgan as for any other militia leader, economic wealth and predation enabled him to generate hard cash to buy arms, provide economic incentives to his fighters and thereby build and sustain a strong insurgent organization.

Just like Mogadishu, the control of Kismayu was critical to the status of factional leaders and militia organizations. In a confidential interview, an Ethiopian intelligence official familiar with the operations of Kismayu port (controlled by the JVA) confided that during the 2002-2004 period, the port generated about $1.5 to $2 million per month. This estimate was verified by UN report which noted that in 2005, Kismayu’s seaport generated an average of $1.4 million per month. According to UNMG’s report, since May 2005, Colonel Hirale was fully in charge of the Kismayu and the Lower Juba region where he established administrative structures and appointed key personnel such as the chair of the local administration, District Commissioner and Mayor of Mogadishu, among others. He also impressively revamped and redeveloped both Kismayu’s airport and seaport, set up a revenue collection system and recruited key staff (providing uniforms and issuing official documents) for both infrastructures: the airport had a supervisor assisted by 11 revenue and customs officers, 5 immigration officials and


a host of other permanent staff; while the seaport also had a supervisor, 7 revenue and customs officers, 3-4 immigration personnel and 3 dock captains.\textsuperscript{623} Despite the existence of such elaborate administrative structures, on a daily basis, the supervisors of the airport and seaport reported the amount of collected revenue to Colonel Hirale directly.\textsuperscript{624} Reports indicated that between January-April 2005, Kismayu’s seaport generated revenue of nearly $1.4 million from imports of sugar, rice flour and other miscellaneous products and exports of charcoal (comprised 99.7\%) and scrap metals.\textsuperscript{625} Every month, about 18 vessels berthed at the port with the majority of the traffic originating from UAE and 2-3 ships coming from India, Yemen or Saudi Arabia.\textsuperscript{626} In Puntland, according to a 2004 UN report, the seaport of Bossaso generated estimated monthly revenue of $100,000.\textsuperscript{627} However, the UNMG’s report of 2006 put the figures much higher, noting that during the 2003-2004 period, annually the Bossaso port generated $9 million and $12 million, respectively.\textsuperscript{628} Such economic revenue and wealth continued to enhance the capacity of Colonel Yussuf’s militia and Puntland administration, which gained the upper hand over the rival militia led by Jama Ali Jama.

Sixth, exploitation of Somalia’s forests and conversion to charcoal provided the armed factional leaders with revenues which empowered them to buy arms, undermine rivals and reward allies. According to a report released in 2001 by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), although most regions in Somalia engaged in

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{623} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{624} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{625} Ibid, 22.  
\textsuperscript{626} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{627} Tambi et al, S/2004/604, 25.  
\textsuperscript{628} Schiemsky et al, S/2006/913, 38.}
charcoal trade, exports to the Gulf States was a major income earner for the JVA militia organization, who reportedly exported 1 million bags of charcoal (each 25-kilogramme) to the Gulf States every month through the port of Kismayu. Taxation at critical checkpoints was also a dependable source of revenue for various factional leaders. In 2002, costing only $3 in Somalia, a bag of charcoal fetched $10 in Dubai or Saudi Arabia. Hence, the factional leaders on average racked in about $7 million per month from just charcoal trade (assuming that they actually bought the charcoal in Somalia) and close to $84 million annually. Similarly, according to the UNMG’s report in October 2004, about 13,133 metric tons of charcoal was exported to Saudi Arabia and the UAE, with a ton selling for $240, the shipment generated revenue of $3,151,920 — most of which fattened the factional leaders’ pockets. With the projections that about 10,000 tons of charcoal was exported every month, simply, these dealers racked in about $28.8 million annually at the expense of depleting the already fragile environment. Similarly, in the Puntland region, according to the ICG, despite the officials’ proclamation of outlawing charcoal trade, they silently let it continue, but imposed taxes at checkpoints.

---

632 Ibid.  
633 ICG, Somalia: Continuation of War by Other Means? 7.
Table 4: Gross revenue from charcoal exports through ports

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of the Port</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Total Metric Tons</th>
<th>Price per Ton ($)</th>
<th>Revenue Generated ($)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kismayu</td>
<td>January-April</td>
<td>29,283.7</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>5,856,740</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Ma’an</td>
<td>March and June [April]</td>
<td>10,538</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>2,107,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Adde</td>
<td>March</td>
<td>1,025</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>205,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grand Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>40,846.7</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>8,169,340</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While the charcoal producers miserly paid the workers only $0.3 per 25-kilogramme bag, as the above tabulations reveal, the dominant factional leaders and other administrators of local fiefdoms pocketed huge profits which they used to enrich themselves, maintain their militias, buy arms and provide military and financial support to allies at times of dire need. Expectedly, the competition for the control of such trade often resulted in violent clashes. For example, Colonel Hirale came to the aid of his embattled ally, factional leader Mohammed Ibrahim Habsade, in a battle with the TFG militia for the control of Baidoa in May 2005.

Seventh, taxes and levies at critical checkpoints and major roads and highways were other sources of revenue for wartime organizations. The different wartime actors collected millions of dollars from key checkpoints, intersections and highways in their controlled territories. For example, in Jowhar, Mohammed ‘Dheere’, the self-declared

---

635 Ibid, 26-7.
636 Ibid, 27.
637 It is important to note that in June 2006, after taking power in most of Somalia, the ICU leadership dismantled almost all the checkpoints in their controlled territories and cities, and in some areas reduced tariffs (Mogadishu) while in others like Jowhar asked for increases which was met with resistance from
Governor of Jowhar, ruling over a population of about 100,000 people developed an elaborate predatory administrative council comprised of himself as the chair, a vice-chair, a secretary and a council of elders. He also appointed the Mayor of the city of Jowhar with revenue officers dispatched daily to collect taxes from the different parts of the municipality. Given the elaborate administrative structures and layers of command vested in the clan structures, ‘Dheere’ had total control over revenue collection and utilization—freely using the money to maintain his militia force which also assisted him administer the region. Taxes were collected from local businesses on products and services such as groceries and farm produce, livestock, telecommunication and money transfers and from transit goods such as lamb carcasses transported from the Hiraan region to Mogadishu via Jowhar. The territory’s four or so entry points were well-manned by 4-5 revenue officers who collected taxes from anyone in transit.

The Lower Shebelle Administration, governed by Sheikh Yussuf IndoAddhe with headquarters at Buulamarer, was strategically located on a rich banana plantation to the north-west of Merka. Using his Hawiye clan militia as tools of predatory governance, his territory had key seaports of Merka and Baraaawe (and had his own fishing vessels), the Merka airport, rich agricultural lands, ‘drug farms’ and critical checkpoints and NGOs from which he drew revenue and taxes. Reportedly, upon receipt of the

locals, see Schiemsky et.al, S/2006/913, 32-33, 77-78 for new taxation rates for Mogadishu seaport and airport as from July 29, 2006.
639 Ibid.
640 Ibid.
641 Ibid.
642 Ibid.
monthly revenues, IndoAddhe paid his militias, core team of advisers, elders and other allies; bought arms and kept an estimated balance of $50,000 every month for himself.\textsuperscript{644} Like other wartime actors, he closely monitored the activities of NGOs operating in his region and vetted the employees before recruitment (advocating for his clan members often) and received part of each employee’s salary, 15 per cent of the NGOs’ benefits or donations to the people and 50 per cent of rental income from buildings rented by the NGOs from local building owners.\textsuperscript{645} IndoAddhe’s predatory and extortionist strategies and agendas were similar to those applied by Aideed during the UNOSOM period and went a long way in enriching him, his factions and allied clan associates. Besides undermining peace, his militia became one of the loyal allies to the ICU and other fundamentalist groups in Somalia.

According to a 2005 UNMG’s report, there were about 32 checkpoints in the Bay region and 51 in the Mogadishu area alone, generating considerable revenue for the militia leaders and allied clan members such as: Muse Sudi from the Medina districts, Darmoole and Balad towns ($1.3 million); Osman Ali ‘Ato’, from the Afgoye areas ($4.2 million); Mohammed Qanyare from checkpoints around Bakarah ($600,000); and Abgal’s Waceysles sub-clan from the Sinai checkpoint in Mogadishu ($360,000); annually.\textsuperscript{646} Muse Sudi’s tax rates at checkpoints differed from point-to-point, for example at Medina, his charges were as follows: lorries (trucks), $27; charcoal (per load), $18; minibuses, $13; donkey carts, $4; and taxis, $2; while at Balad district, charges were

\textsuperscript{644} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{645} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{646} Schiemsky et al, S/2006/229, 17-18.
as follows: lorries (trucks), $80; minibuses to Balad, $4; minibuses in-transit, $16; and travelers to all other regions, $27.647

Seemingly, compensating for relatively less dense traffic in his territory, Mohamed ‘Dheere’ of Jowhar imposed the following higher tax regime: lorries, $60; charcoal (per load), $60; smaller trucks, $35; grass, $20; vegetables vendors, $15; minibuses plying Mogadishu to Jowhar route, $4; minibuses in-transit, $6; and transit vehicles to Mogadishu, Jowhar and Balad, $6.648 In 2006, unofficial data indicated that from checkpoints alone, ‘Dheere’ received about $1.3 million annually.649 Humorously, it was reported that he even took predation too far, allegedly collecting a ‘birth tax’ of $44 and $2.2, respectively, for male and female newborns in his territory.650 One wonders whether his predatory regime provided specific social services to communities he brutally ruled over. Further during the 2003-2006 period, the Jowhar city collected about $1.3 million in taxes annually.651 In 2003, commenting on regional predation in the Juba region, the Secretary-General noted, “…as a result, armed groups [JVA] are able to set up checkpoints to extort money from travelers….The number of checkpoints on the Mogadishu-Kismaayo road increased significantly in August.”652 Hence, using both economic and social logic of predation, Somalia’s wartime actors creatively reaped to flourish in a rather resource poor environment.

647 Ibid, 65, 66. For details of taxes at other checkpoints or products or businesses, see Ibid, 65-67.
649 Ibid, 76.
651 Schiemsky et al, S/2006/913, 32.
Eighth, engagement in black market operations such as money laundering and counterfeit currency and passports printing were other revenue generating enterprises driven by Somalia’s wartime actors. Although black market operations also occur in stable political environments, they are more prevalent and overt under state collapse conditions such as Somalia, characterized by lack of law and order aided by non-existent regulatory and enforcement frameworks. However, armed militias were not the only architects of predatory empires. In 2003, Menkhaus observed that high-level crimes and black market operations in Somalia were committed by rich businessmen and political leaders.\textsuperscript{653} Powerful factional leaders and businessmen were either members of the Leaders Committee, traditional clan leadership or key delegates in the Mbagathi peace processes.

These predatory black market operatives created violence and a state of chaos to further their predatory economic interests and engaged in foreign aid diversions, drug peddling, charcoal exporting, printing and circulation of fake currencies, land grabbing and displacement of weaker and minority clans, and maritime piracy, among other spoils of war. An article by Walsh reported that a UN report to the UNSC released in 2003, accused some members of the Somali business community (some claiming to be Somali Presidents) as the major culprits engaged in the printing and distribution of counterfeit currency in the country using Asian money factories.\textsuperscript{654} As McNeil observed, the lack of

\textsuperscript{654} Walsh, “Chaos of Somalia fosters.”
a functional Central Bank and other regulatory mechanisms gave currency printers and counterfeit dealers a free hand to print billions of Somali shillings.\footnote{McNeil, “A New Scrutiny.”}

Reportedly, in around 1998/1999 period, Aideed received a first consignment of 70 billion Somali Shillings (about $7.7 million) and in March 1999 an additional 35 billion were shipped to the Balidogle airstrip, however, other wartime actors got the largest share of the second batch, with Aideed receiving only 3 million.\footnote{AC, “Unfunny money,” AC 40, 12 June 11, 1999, 8. It was also reported that factional leaders like Ali Mahdi used new Shillings to empower themselves in the fight with Farah Aideed and even the leaders of Somaliland did print new notes. It is also reported that Abdullahi Yussuf, Ali-Noor Mohammed and members of TNG cabinet were involved in currency printing at one time or another using foreign embassies in Indonesia and Egypt as printing centers, see Hogendoorn et al, S/2003/223, 35 and Peleman et al, S/2003/1035, 35 for additional details.} A Somali businessman, Abdi Nur Ahmed Darman (the son of a former Somali Representative to the UN in New York, Ahmed Mohamed Darman), who at one time declared himself Somali President and was believed to be the Godfather of Somali’s money laundering business and counterfeit currency printing, in 1997 allegedly oversaw the printing in Canada of approximately 30 billion Shillings\footnote{Hogendoorn et al, S/2003/223, 41.} (about $3 million). This was made possible through security provided by British American Banknote Company, which at the time was a subsidiary of the Canada-based Quebecor Company, with a letter of credit secured through a Malaysian Bank by co-investor, Dato John Fang, the Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of the Adorna Group of Companies.\footnote{Ibid.} Apparently, they developed a sophisticated money-laundering practice where they ‘cleaned’ this counterfeit currency by exchanging them with legitimate foreign currencies sent by the
Somali diaspora to their families and relatives residing in the country.\textsuperscript{659} However, due to the failure by Aideed to pay for production costs and disputes with Fang, about 120 to 130 billion printed Shillings were withheld by the British American Banknote Company in Ottawa.\textsuperscript{660}

Other racketeers of counterfeit currency printing were prominent businessmen from the Hawiye Ayer sub-clan, including Mohamed Deylaf (Delaif), Hussein Hassan Golley, Saed Nur and Muridi Dalfac.\textsuperscript{661} Reportedly, Mohammed Deylaf’s business empire extended from Mogadishu to Dubai and other European capitals, and he apparently carried passports from various countries and significantly backed the TNG with his wealth and ability to mobilize financial, economic and military resources – hence considered “…a dominant actor who must be considered a primary facilitator and beneficiary of the military-political struggles of Somalia.”\textsuperscript{662} Hence, the influx of new currency into the local economy disrupted the balance of power as the Ayer sub-clan (from which Darman hailed) became quite influential and powerful in Somalia.\textsuperscript{663} Subsequently, other factional leaders and businessmen such as Colonel Yussuf, Jama Ali Jama, Said Dahir and Muridi Dalfac, entered into deals to print billions of Shillings, in 2003, leading to steep devaluation of the currency with $1 exchanging for 22,000 – 25,000 Somali Shillings.\textsuperscript{664} A 2005 UN report informed that the printing of Somali Shillings to the tune of 500 million (about $20,000) was reported in Mogadishu and the

\textsuperscript{659} Vick, “Building a Government From Scratch.”
\textsuperscript{660} Hogendoorn et al, S/2003/223, 41.
\textsuperscript{661} Ibid, 42.
\textsuperscript{662} Ibid, 35-6.
\textsuperscript{663} Ibid, 42.
\textsuperscript{664} Ibid.
Eastleigh area of Nairobi, with various dealers freely placing their orders and the printed money often transported by road via the Kenyan towns of Garissa and Liboi and across the border into Dhoobley in Somalia.\textsuperscript{665} The UNMG in 2008 reported an allegation by Somalia’s Central Bank official that without their knowledge or sanction or involvement, a Somali Shillings printing press was located in Colonel Yussuf’s (TFG President) compound in Baidoa with allied businessmen printing the currency.\textsuperscript{666} In an interview, a former Somali legislator confirmed that both the TNG and TFG governments were engaged in currency printing to offset operation costs and finance their regimes.\textsuperscript{667} The legislator confided that in 2001/2002 period currency printing became so rampant, forcing a rather embarrassed TNG government to send a high-level delegation to a South Asian government seeking their assistance in curbing the menace.\textsuperscript{668} Due to factional competition among the various wartime actors, different versions of the Somali Shillings were recognized and accepted in Somaliland, Puntland, Somalia [Mogadishu] and the Juba Valley regions.\textsuperscript{669}

Similarly, in addition to currency printing, cartels, and other high-level corruption and fraudulent dealings were rife in wartime Somalia. For example, reportedly Ali Mahdi, while he was the interim President of Somalia in the early 1990s, colluded with his then Director-General, Mohamed Hajji Ali and the Central Bank Governor, Ali Abdi Alamo, and withdrew $10 million stashed in a Swiss Bank.\textsuperscript{670} Further, a $70 million

\textsuperscript{665} Tambi et al, S/2005/153, 14.
\textsuperscript{666} Bryden et al, S/2008/769, 44.
\textsuperscript{667} Interview with a former female Somali legislator, Nairobi, Kenya, October 22, 2008.
\textsuperscript{668} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{669} Hogendoorn et al, S/2003/223, 42. Correction added in the original.
\textsuperscript{670} Ibid, 18.
grant from the Kuwait government was deposited in a Swiss account and $20 million was used to buy a Boeing 720 Somali Airline, but the balance of $50 million was unaccounted for and was possibly diverted to personal and factional interests. Such wealthy factional leaders continued to influence the dynamics of politics in Somalia.

Another source of revenue was black market passport printing. As a veteran journalist, Mohammed Addow reported the ease with which one could illegally acquire an ordinary Somali passport for $30 at the Big Beard shop in the Bakarah market in Mogadishu, a Kenyan passport for $1,000 in Nairobi and a diplomatic Somali passport, with a designated official title to a diplomatic post of one’s choice, complete with the official seal of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the streets for $100, was amazing. The black market operations involved in the printing of black market Somali passports connected local and international merchants—as these valuable counterfeit documents were printed overseas and shipped to Somalia. According to one counterfeit passport dealer, Omar Ali Sheikh, the demand for fake passports soon declined due to non-recognition of a Somali passport as an eligible travel document by various nations. For example, during the heat of the Mbagathi talks, in April 2004, the Kenyan government declared that the country would not recognize old Somali passports as a strategy to coerce the wartime actors to commit to the talks and honor the Eldoret Declaration. However,

671 Ibid.
determined spoilers not only ignored the ban but fought back – with Somali regions such as Puntland and Hiraan also threatening to not recognize Kenyan passports and expel Kenyan nationals working in their regions.\textsuperscript{675} Despite this ban on old Somali passports, the Mbagathi process continued to be troubled as wartime actors had various sources of revenue and other dominant economic agendas to continue the war.

Ninth, exploitation of marine resources and issuance of fishing licenses to foreign firms to operate in Somalia’s Exclusive Economic Zones without any governing institutions and regulatory framework was a major source of revenue for wartime actors. With dwindling looting opportunities on the mainland, criminals and gangs focused their energy to search far and wide—resorting to maritime piracy (sea rebels) and kidnappings along the 3,333-kilometers Somali coastline—Africa’s second longest. In fact, the prolonged state failure led to the intensification of maritime piracy along Somalia’s rich and expansive coastline that stretched from the Red Sea to the Suez Canal. At the heart of maritime predation in Somalia was the pervasive desire and culture of greed to accumulate wealth and maximize profits by Somali wartime actors and foreign companies. According to a UN report, proceeds from the exploitation of maritime resources did not enhance Somalia’s non-existent maritime regulatory industry, but instead empowered the warlords who used the income to buy arms, ammunitions and build up their militia forces.\textsuperscript{676} Indeed, the exploitation of these marine resources directly


\textsuperscript{676} Ibid, 44.
strengthened the country’s wartime actors economically, politically and militarily and further undermined prospects for peace.

The maritime predatory war economies linked local Somali wartime actors with foreign firms and companies. Aided by globalization and improved communication infrastructure and due to lack of regulatory frameworks, Somalia’s wartime actors established transnational black market business networks with foreign companies—creating an expansive wartime business empire with both internal and external constituencies. Hence wartime actors’ economic agendas drew in external interests, further expanding the web of predation leading to a pervasive exploitation of the country’s natural marine resources to build their militias, buy arms and create wealth and sustain mutually beneficial relationships with foreign firms. As Scott (1998), a member of UN inter-agency coastal assessment mission to Somalia, in February-March 1998 observed, the Somali Ocean was open for all to exploit. Making a similar observation, a 2005 UNMG report noted that, “…foreign fishing vessels have open access to Somali coastal waters. The commercial fishing industry is driven principally by foreign interests.” Further, according to a 2002 BCCP report:

Most of the fishing vessels are illegally involved in harvesting high-value tuna, shark and ray fins, lobster, deepwater shrimp and demersal whitefish due to growing demand for such marine products in world market. Such potential demand for marine products speeds up illegal harvesting in the Somali zone, and worsening the biodiversity damages; it also strengthens the Somali warlord’ economic power in Somalia’s anarchic system.  

According to various estimates during the pre-collapse period, with an estimated yearly catch of fish (300,000 tons) and crustaceans (10,000 tons), Somalia accrued $20 million annually from the fishing industry. Although it is hard to estimate annual revenue from the fishing industry in the post-state collapse period, for instance, in a 2005 study, the Marine Resources Assessment Group (MRAG) estimated that in the 2003-2004 period, the fishing industry (driven by illegal fishing and pirates) generated about $90 million annually.

Consequently, several foreign firms were sucked into Somali wartime institutions’ expansive web of predation, thereby internationalizing Somalia’s war economies from the country’s land to its rich and expansive coastline and virgin Ocean. Tapping into the global market, various Somali wartime factional leaders, “…entered into fishing vessel licensing arrangements with a number of foreign companies, by illegally providing fishing access rights in demarcated area of the Somali fishing zone…” Enticing spoils of war lured foreign firms (flying flags of their legitimate governments) into Somalia, some invited by Somali warlords and shrewd businessmen oblivious to the requirements of international law and illegally given permits and licenses to extract Somali resources for a fee (see the table 5 below). Foreign companies from Europe, the Far East, South Asian and Arab countries to armed rebel outfits such as Ethiopia’s Oromo Liberation

---

682 Somali Peace Rally, “Somalia Warlords have Vested Interest.”
Front (OLF) were sucked in.⁶⁸⁴ According to an insightful February 2000 report to the BCCP security team, conflict monitoring officials observed:

Somali warlords entered into fishing vessel licensing arrangements with a number of foreign countries, by illegally providing fishing access rights in demarcated area of the Somali fishing zone. Somali warlords have in turn received substantial military equipment and huge amounts of money. Consequently, huge biodiversity loses are caused in the Somali water zone, which in turn affect long-term socio-economic welfare of coastal communities. Such biodiversity losses have accelerated since the collapse of a central government...biodiversity losses in the Somali zone are mainly caused by by-catch of turtles and dolphin by foreign vessels, and destruction of critical reef habitat by foreign trawlers...biological resources such as lobster and shark are potentially at risk since they are intensely fished by mining operations.⁶⁸⁵

As summarized in the table 5 below, the same report identified various national flags of countries such as Egypt, France, Honduras, Japan, Korea, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka and Yemen were flown by different fishing fleets which entered into contractual agreements with Somalia’s various wartime actors including the authorities of the autonomous regions of Somaliland and Puntland.⁶⁸⁶ The report further noted that Korea harvested swordfish under a license from SomCan associated with the Puntland government and provided military uniforms to Puntland authorities and a London-based licensing company was accorded the right to operate in Somali’s coastline by paying royalties to local warlords, while a host of Arab countries and Eritrea engaged in deals with regional authorities, such as Puntland and Mogadishu warlords, to exploit the marine

---

⁶⁸⁵ Ibid.
⁶⁸⁶ Ibid.
resources.\(^{687}\) In 1996, about 61 long liners and 43 pursue seiners ‘licensed’ by the various Somalia wartime actors operated in the Somali waters.\(^{688}\)

According to a UN Panel of Experts report, Colonel Yussuf, then President of the Puntland region, was linked to this predatory business due to his enduring connections with a British private security and military company (Hart Group)\(^{689}\) and SHIFCO (a company based in Yemen and owned by a Somali tycoon, Farah Munyah). Reportedly, Munyah, the chairman and Chief Executive Officer of SHIFCO, in 1991, following the collapse of Barre’s regime, bribed Ali Mahdi with $500,000 in order to acquire the title of ownership of five fishing fleets belonging to the Somali Republic.\(^{690}\) Further it was reported that Munyah’s fleet was used to ship arms into Somalia.\(^{691}\) As ICG reported, Munye [Munyah] was closely linked to Puntland’s officials in a mutually beneficial relationship–five of Munyah’s fishing ships operated on the Puntland coastline and their lucrative catches were processed and packaged as being products of the Seychelles, and in exchange, he provided budgetary support to the Puntland Administration.\(^{692}\) After the Mbagathi talks, probably buying his way in, Munyah became a member of the TFP and was even floated as a possible Minister of Fisheries.\(^{693}\)

Further, other business dealings boomed. According to data from African Fisheries Management, during the 1996-1998 period, one Somali fishing company

\(^{687}\) Ibid.
\(^{688}\) Coffen-Smout, *Pirates, Warlords and Rogue Fishing Vessels*.
\(^{689}\) Hogendoorn et al, S/2003/223, 44.
\(^{691}\) Ibid.
\(^{693}\) Ibid.
accrued about $600,000 to $1 million annually, but by 2002, the proceeds shrunk to about $300,000.  

Apparently the money was paid through an account belonging to the African Fisheries Management and then transferred to Hussein Ali Ahmed, known as the ‘Mayor of Mogadishu’, and eventually shared among the factional leaders: Abdullahi Yussuf, Ali Mahdi, Hussein Aideed, General Morgan and Mohammed Abshir.

Table 5: Foreign companies in Somalia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Foreign Companies/Flags Flown</th>
<th>Vessel Type</th>
<th>Marine resources exploited</th>
<th>Warlord Controlling the area/Licensing authority</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Trawlers</td>
<td>Shark</td>
<td>Mogadishu warlords</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>Trawlers and long liners</td>
<td>Shark</td>
<td>Somaliland/Berbera port</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cobrecaf Food Company/France</td>
<td>Pursue seiners</td>
<td>Tuna</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Pursue seiners</td>
<td>Tuna</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Trawlers</td>
<td>Shark</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>Pursue seiners</td>
<td>Tuna</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Long liners</td>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td>Somaliland port or warlords?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>Trawlers</td>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td>Mogadishu warlords</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>Long liners</td>
<td>Swordfish</td>
<td>SomCan/Puntland Administration (in exchange for military uniforms)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>Trawlers</td>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td>Mogadishu warlords</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya (Mombasa-based)</td>
<td>Trawlers</td>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>Long liners</td>
<td>Swordfish</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

694 Hogendoorn et al, S/2003/223, 44.  
695 Ibid.  
697 Often used Belize’s flag of convenience but the ships were either France of Spain-owned but use Belize’s flag of convenience to evade EU regulations.  
698 Ibid.
Although the exact figures were unknown, marine experts familiar with the activities of fishing industry actors in Somalia’s exclusive economic zone estimate that annually about 500 vessels operated in the country with permits costing up to $150,000 per year for each vessel. Reports indicated that in 2005 about 700 foreign vessels illegally operated in the Somali waters. Simply, pegging the foreign vessels at 500, just from permit fees alone, the wartime actors generated about $75 million annually.

In addition to the exploitation of high-value marine life, the foreign companies were driven by economic interests to harvest seabed resources such as hydrocarbons and minerals with high potential commercial values. The UNMG’s report of 2006 also observed that an Australian company bought 50.1 per cent of the sole and exclusive rights to all seabed minerals, oil exploration and related development in Puntland including the Sanaag and Sool regions. Moreover, an entity calling itself “National Fishing Authority, Jubaland State” based in southern Somalia provided the proprietor of MFV Feng Jong, from an East Asian country, with a permit at the cost of $80,000. The warlords used such proceeds to buy arms, build and maintain militia force, undermine rivals and enhance their own economic, political and military status. In addition to these foreign companies, Mogadishu warlord Mohammed Qanyare, who vehemently opposed the TNG from establishing its authority in Mogadishu during the 2000 – 2002 period, possessed a sizeable commercial fleet which enabled him to amass

---

700 Sean Kane, *Fishing for the Motives that Lie Behind Piracy; Attacks on Vessels Can Often Be Attributed to Social Deprivation in Coastal Regions*, LLOYD’S LIST (March 5, 2008),19.
702 Ibid.
703 Ibid.
great wealth from the exploitation of marine resources in addition to other predatory endeavors.

Additionally, unscrupulous warlords also profited by facilitating the dumping of toxic nuclear and other hazardous wastes along the country’s pristine coastline beginning in the 1980s, which were stirred up by the 2005 Tsunami. Reportedly, according to a 2005 assessment report by the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) the dumping of toxic wastes cost $2.5 per ton in Africa, while in Europe it cost $250 — making the African continent an ideal dumping site. In 1992, as Vu (1994) observed some factional and business dealers entered into an $80 million deal with Italian and Swiss firms to dump toxic waste in Somalia.

As a counter strategy to the foreign exploitation of Somalia’s marine resources, reports by Chatham House (2008) and Anderson (2010) indicate that various local ‘marine guards’ and ‘defenders’ groups emerged to protect the Somali coastline. Over time, these groups became ‘sea bandits’ or pirates, as commonly known, and conducted several successful piracy operations from the Gulf of Aden to the Indian Ocean to the coasts of Kenya, Seychelles and Zanzibar. The problems of piracy grew exponentially leading to the deployment of international warships in Somalia’s High Seas to protect the maritime transport corridors. According to a UNMG observation, “…the main motive

704 See United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP), National Rapid Environmental Desk Assessment-Somalia (Nairobi: UNEP, 2005), 135.
behind acts of piracy in Somali waters appear [ed] to be an attempt by local administrations or individual warlords and militias to obtain large sums of money through ransom demands.”

Such revenues sustained economic agendas of wartime actors and strengthened their insurgent organizations.

Globally, it is an appreciated fact that piracy greatly affected the regional and global economy. Particularly, the growing piracy attacks on the Somali coast and the Gulf of Aden inflicted the fishing industry with a loss of approximately between $13 billion to $15 billion dollars. Indeed, as Kaur (2008) observed, such losses precipitated a sharp rise in insurance premiums from about $900 annually in the early part of 2008 to $12,000 by November of the same year. However, despite affecting regional and global maritime trade and increasing the costs of doing business, piracy immensely contributed to the booming war economies in Somalia, particularly enriching the key pirate cities, residents, pirates and the investors.

Some key piracy incidents, capture and ransom money paid are as follows: January 1998, a Bulgarian freighter pulled by a Syrian vessel held in Bossaso was

---

708 Anderson, “It’s a Pirate’s Life for Some.”
released following negotiations led by elders and businessmen after a payment of $110,000; April 1998, *MV Bahari One* from Kenya, ransom of $200,000 demanded and again recaptured in December 1998, near Eyl and moved to Kismayu, crew fined $500,000 and vessel released in February 1999 after ransom of $230,000 was paid to warlord General Morgan; January 1999, *MV Sea Johana* captured in south Kismayu and handed to AIAI, released after payment of $150,000 (plus costs of hostages’ upkeep). In July 2002, a Greece-flagged ship *MV Panagia Tinou*, released after payment of $400,000. April 2005, *Feisty Gas* (Hong Kong based), released after payment of $315,000; June 2005, *Semlow* (Kenyan) transporting World Food Programme aid, released after payment of $135,000; August 2008, a German ship, released after the payment of $1 million; and in November 2008, a Saudi oil-tanker *Sirius Star*, released after the payment of $3 million.712 Pirates’ ransom demands sharply increased up to $3.5 million in some incidences.713 In 2008, pirates attacked over 100 ships on the coast of Somalia and Gulf of Aden netting about $120 million.714

The proceeds of ransom were reinvested inside and outside Somalia. According to a commander with the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), Somali pirates

---

712 Ibid.  
racked in millions of dollars through ransom payments, which not only boosted local economies of towns like Eyl, Hobyo and Harardheere and others, but increasingly utilized by terrorist groups such as Al-Shabaab to arm themselves and filtering into neighboring countries’ real estates, especially Kenya’s.\textsuperscript{715} Maritime piracy had both economic and social logic to its perpetuation. Exposing another face of social predation, according to a UNMG 2008 report, pirates shared ransom money among key players as follows: maritime militia (30 percent and at times a vehicle as a reward); ground militia (10 percent); local community (10 percent); financier (20 percent); and sponsor (30 percent).\textsuperscript{716} Such predatory and reward systems redefined predation where social logics and incentives were utilized to maintain predatory practices and economic agendas of wider clans and the society at large.

Finally, trade-in of arms and light weapons were other means of revenue sources for various wartime actors. In wartime Somalia, military power was a function of human power (fighters), weaponry (arms, ammunitions and number of ‘technicals’), economic capacities, leadership command and control capabilities, and the nature of internal and external support. According to a UN report, it takes about $600,000 to build a powerful militia force.\textsuperscript{717} As explored in the previous analysis of the diverse revenue sources, Somalia’s wartime actors racked in millions of dollars every year which enabled them to create powerful wartime organizations. In addition to fighters, arms and ammunitions, a faction’s possession of a ‘technical’ – Somalia’s version of combat vehicle which is an

open pick-up mounted with weapons, is a necessity. In terms of costs, estimates indicate that a relatively new ‘technical’ (a two-year old) costs approximately $30,000 and further equipped with two 45–caliber machine gun and operated by a crew of 30 militiamen.  

Although 30 to 50 ‘technicals’ can build a strong militia force, a factional leader with 100 ‘technicals’ was considered very powerful. In fact, no factional leader had that many, however, some large and prosperous clans like Hawiye and Darod or a coalition of Mogadishu’s business groups could collectively mobilize and assemble this number when situations demanded it. The social networks of clans make such arrangements and cooperation possible.

Trading in arms was a common business in Somalia, influenced by both internal and regional security environments. Following the collapse of Barre’s regime in January 1991, official government weapons stocks were released into the local market, but after 1994, the inflow was reduced due to oversaturation of the market. For example, during 1997-2000, as a consequence of the Ethiopia-Eritrea war, Somali groups began rearming themselves. According to a 2003 report by the UN Panel of Experts, militia leader Hussein Aideed greatly benefited from the 1998-2000 Ethiopia-Eritrea border war as each protagonist competed for allies in Somalia and he received the Eritrean government’s arms consignment including 43 air-defense system comprising of Strella

---

718 Ibid.  
719 Ibid.  

Overall, according to a UN official who follows Somali affairs from Nairobi about 55,000-75,000 armed clan-based militias existed in Somalia during the wartime.\footnote{Interview with a UN official, Nairobi, Kenya, November 18, 2008.} These estimates were confirmed in a statement by President Yussuf when he requested that the AU deploy 20,000 peacekeepers shortly after his election in October 2004, on the basis that the country had about 55,000 armed militiamen, 500 ‘technicals’ and 2 million small arms.\footnote{UNSG, *Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Somalia*, S/2005/89 (New York, February 18, 2005), 4.} In 2004, estimates indicated that on average militiamen were paid wages of $3 to $5 per day.\footnote{Ibid.} Evidencing a readily available supply of ammunitions in the country, according to an ICG report, “…in Mogadishu, ammunition ha[d] become a ready substitute for cash. Teashops, qaat [Khat] sellers and even prostitutes [were] said to accept payment in cartridges.”\footnote{ICG interview, January 2003, as cited in ICG, *Negotiation a Blueprint for Peace in Somalia*, 10 (Added words).}
Militarily, powerful armed factional leaders posed enormous challenges to the peace negotiation process due to their capacity to spoil peace by funding violence.\textsuperscript{729} As a result, the arms race and frequent factional violence led to violations of the UN Arms Embargo (1992) and the Eldoret Declaration of 2002 and thereby undermined peacemaking initiatives. Reactively, in a terse statement released on August 17, 2002, the UNSC condemned the incessant violations of the arms embargo on Somalia and extended for six months the mandate of the UNMG on Somalia charged with monitoring the 12-year arms embargo on the country.\textsuperscript{730} Further, on April 9, 2003, the UNSC passed Resolution 1474 of 2003 establishing for a 6-month period, a Panel of Experts to identify violations of arms embargo by warlords and neighboring states, identify the key supporters and recommend future steps.\textsuperscript{731}

Consequently, arms and weapons trade did not only boom in Somalia but the country was often the source or transit route of arms entering the volatile Horn of Africa region. Following the collapse of Somalia, access to credible sources of information remained scanty and thus various UN reports were considered the definitive source of data on the arms flow into Somalia. The UN Panel of Experts identified three types of arms traffickers and violators in the country.\textsuperscript{732} First, foreign governments which tended to arm internal allies to advance their political and strategic interests. Second, illicit arms dealers who engaged in arms deals, not for political purposes, but rather driven by

\textsuperscript{729} For details on Somali factions’ militia numbers and sources of support, see table 6 and 8.
economic and profiteering motives. These racketeers were often Somalis living in neighboring regions, particularly Yemen, and bringing in weapons by land or by sea in addition to dealing in poaching of ivory and other drugs. Third, armed factions in Somalia linked to international allies who provided arms not only for commercial purposes but to advance political and ideological interests. Factions’ sources of resources to purchase arms came from local predatory activities and looting, diaspora remittances, foreign governments and international actors’ donations, and revenue from black market and other illicit activities and actors, including terrorists.\(^733\)

Although Mogadishu remained the epicenter of Somalia’s arms trade, the weapons were smuggled in through fishing vessels or hidden in air cargo flown through the ports of Bossaso in Puntland, Kismayu and Mogadishu (Merka and El Ma’an) and via numerous airstrips controlled by armed wartime institutions around Mogadishu (for example Balidogle, Kilometer-50, Isaley, Daynille) and the rest of Somalia.\(^734\) According to the same UN report, in addition to the porous and unmanned 1,600-kilometer Somali-Ethiopia border, dhow traffic from Yemen was the busiest of arms’ trade routes (arriving 2 to 3 times per week); while about 2,500 inward monthly flights arrive in Somalia, most often, uninspected.\(^735\) In its 2006 report, the UN Panel established Djibouti, Yemen, Ethiopia, Eritrea and the UAE as the sources or transit countries through which arms were brought into Somalia.\(^736\) According to a 2003 UN

---

\(^733\) Ibid, 4.  
\(^734\) Peleman et al, S/2003/1035, 23.  
\(^735\) Ibid, 5.  
Panel of Experts report, Yemen not only facilitated the transit of weapons from Gulf States to Somalia but was known as a prime source of arms sold to Somalia. Further, a 2004 report of the UN Panel of Experts faulted arm dealers and businessmen in addition to warlords for supplying and dealing in illicit arms trade with key markets such as Bakahaarat, Argentin (south Mogadishu) and Irtogte (north Mogadishu). Due to oversaturation of the market, deadly weapons such as the AK-47, in December 2002, retailed locally for about $120 to $250. The report further listed certain countries which violated the UN arms embargo and allegedly supplied a variety of weapons to the various Somalia armed factions between October 1993 to June 2002 as follows: Iran (to Farah Aideed, 1993); USA (to the Somali Police force, 1994), Poland and Latvia (various beneficiaries, 1994), Libya (to Hussein Aideed, 1997); Ethiopia (to General Morgan and Ahmed Hashi Mohamed, 1997; to Hussein Hajji Bod, 1999 and militias opposed to the TNG notably those led by Colonel Abdullahi Yussuf, Muse Sudi and Mohammed ‘Dheere’, 2002); Bangladesh and Kuwait (to the AIAI, 1998); Eritrea (to Hussein Aideed and through him to the OLF, 1999 and 2001); Dubai via Djibouti (to Muse Sudi, 2000); and Yemen and Djibouti (to Jama Ali Jama, 2002). It was also indicated that although the sources were not known, Mohamed Qanyare’s militia received a weapons shipment in

March of 1997, as did the TNG’s militia that obtained an assortment of weapons in March and May of 2002.\textsuperscript{742}

Regionally, the report noted that Ethiopia was militarily involved and identified as a major supplier of arms to several Somalia armed groups under the cover of efforts to root out the AIAI in 1996 and 1997 period.\textsuperscript{743} Accordingly, in 1997, Ali Mahdi received 6 truck-loads of arms from Ethiopia, which he stored at the Hotel Paranoma in Mogadishu.\textsuperscript{744} Similarly, according to Colonel Abdirizak Bihi of the SNF, in addition to claiming to have benefitted from the 1997 training of 1,200 members of his militia, the group also received several arms from the Ethiopian regime.\textsuperscript{745} Hence, the 2003 report adversely mentioned foreign governments, particularly the neighboring states, for clearly violating UNSC Resolution 733 of 23 January 1992 arms embargo in Somalia through provision of arms, training, equipment and financial contributions to armed factions on Somalia.\textsuperscript{746}

In an interview with the UN Panel of Experts, the General Manager of SomCan (a Somali company contracted by the Puntland administration to handle the issuance of fishing permits and provide security to fishing companies), noted that in early 2003 the authorities received military uniforms from a fishing company, Sichai, from Thailand, as

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{742} Ibid, 20-21.
\textsuperscript{743} Hogendoorn et al, S/2003/223, 7.
\textsuperscript{745} Statement provided by Colonel Abdirizak Bihi to the Panel on December 8, 2002, as cited in Hogendoorn et al, S/2003/223, 21.
\textsuperscript{746} Hogendoorn et al, S/2003/223, 6.
\end{flushleft}
a down payment in exchange for fishing licenses and protection fees.\footnote{Peleman et al, S/2003/1035, 17-18.} It was also reported that 400 ‘Puntland Marines’ combat personnel, armed with both heavy and light weapons, provided security to SomCan’s fishing vessels.\footnote{Ibid, 18.} Furthermore, in June 2003, a Mogadishu-based Somali businessman and a fake currency dealer, Abdinur Ahmed Darman, who previously facilitated the access of foreign companies to exploit Somalia’s natural resources, extended his networks and through a local business contact—Hakeem Garments and Uniforms Trading in Ajman based in the UAE—acquired military uniforms from Pakistan via Dubai’s free economic zone and then airlifted the consignment to Mogadishu using Juba Airlines.\footnote{Ibid.} By July 2003, Darman developed his own militia force and at a public rally declared himself the Somali President in a well-televised power display by Al-Jazeera Television Network.\footnote{Ibid.} In June/July 2003, according to Darman’s assistant, he also had discussions with Malaysian businessmen about a military uniform shipment expected in Mogadishu once the Mbagathi process was concluded.\footnote{Ibid.}

Numerous respondents in the UN Panel’s research informed them that Yemeni authorities, military officials, Sheikhs and businessmen supported uninterrupted arms shipment to Somalia.\footnote{Ibid, 19.} Similarly, another UN investigation revealed that arms flowed into Somalia along the Puntland coastline, often with the full knowledge of Puntland
With most of the weapons imported for use by Puntland militias, the report further noted that in order to cover-up the shipments, Puntland authorities often staged fake arms-seizure operations. Nonetheless, the report noted that in Puntland, where a nascent administration existed, attempts at curbing arms inflow were made as officials provided the team with the names of 24 arms dealers and four vessels (with Yemeni registrations) involved in arms and weapons smuggling between Mukala, Yemen and Somalia.

Table 6: List of Somalia’s main armed factions, territories, clan and militia numbers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name/leadership</th>
<th>Territory</th>
<th>Clan</th>
<th>Number of Fighters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Security Forces of Somaliland</td>
<td>Northwestern Somalia</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>7,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIAI</td>
<td>Dispersed across Somalia</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdullahi Yussuf</td>
<td>Puntland region</td>
<td>Darod</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Omar Finish</td>
<td>Mogadishu</td>
<td>Hawiye</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohammed ‘Dheere’</td>
<td>South of Mogadishu</td>
<td>Hawiye</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muse Sudi ‘Yallahow’</td>
<td>Mogadishu</td>
<td>Hawiye</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hussein Mohamed Aideed</td>
<td>Mogadishu</td>
<td>Hawiye</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohamed Qanyare Afrah</td>
<td>West of Mogadishu</td>
<td>Hawiye</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Osman ‘Ato’</td>
<td>Mogadishu</td>
<td>Hawiye</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TNG</td>
<td>Parts of Mogadishu and environs</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>7,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuur ‘Shattigudud’</td>
<td>Baidoa region</td>
<td>Digil-Mirifle</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barre Hiralle</td>
<td>Kismayu</td>
<td>Ogaden</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohamed Said Hersi Morgan</td>
<td>Kismayu</td>
<td>Ogaden</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

54 Peleman et al, S/2003/1035, 34.
56 Derived and adapted from Anthony et al, S/2002/722, 19 (Added words and a column on clan).
4.1.5 Beyond the Veil of Clan Labels: Social Logic of Predation

Clan politics has often being cited as a resilient obstacle to peacemaking in Somalia. However this study asserts that beyond the veil of clan labels or identity politics in Somalia lie a deep-seated predatory culture where wartime actors’ pursuit of economic agendas dominate over political goals of reconciliation. As such, since the collapse of Barre’s regime, these predatory politics which exploited societies’ social structures (clans) effectively prevented the institutionalization of various transitional governments, including Ali Mahdi’s interim government in 1991 and Salat’s TNG in 2000. Somalia’s clan-based politics relied on the manipulability of clan relations to meet their factional objectives of predation and perpetuation of economic interests. As a former Somali PM noted in an interview, clan-based factional politics originated as “…clan-based thinking destroyed national consciousness and statehood was seen through a clannistic eye”757 and became more deeply rooted during the state collapse period. Hence, clans provided both a social and political basis for the wartime actors’ predation and rooting of economic agendas. As such, predatory forces tended to undermine political processes which threatened their economic interests and, to an extent, the future of their clans. The capture of political power was seen in the same view as the capture and domination of Somalia’s economic resources. Internal loyalty networks were central to the enhancement of the power of Somalia’s wartime actors.

As stated in chapter 1, Somalia, lacking easily lootable high-value resources, experienced a unique form of predation with both economic and social logic as wartime

---

actors mobilized and manipulated clan relations to generate internal loyalty and, more importantly, resources for war and perpetuate their predatory economic agendas. Hence, clan politics played a central role in the execution of predation and perpetuation of wartime actors’ economic agendas. Particularly, the emergent wartime actors manipulated societies’ social structures, especially clan membership, and sought the support of the allied business community. In an opinion piece Norway-based Ahmed Sharif (2004) laments, “…the facts on the ground mean that common people alone [didn’t] stand a chance against the warlords. The warlords in Mogadishu [did] not exist in a vacuum but within a social climate that is deeply poisoned by the self-perpetuating culture of clanism.”

Characteristically, the emergent wartime actors camouflaged their origin under different pretexts or assumed roles; however, factional leaders and clan-based warlords were the flag bearers of that predatory class of supermen – reaping from predation and committed to the pursuit of economic interests. Giving predation a social face through such manipulation of clan politics, these wartime actors dangerously empowered, militarily and economically, monopolized the capacity to spoil peace through predatory violence—hence the talks could not function without them. Thus, although clans or general Somali populations often are captives of the armed wartime institutions, there existed mutual interdependence between clans and armed warlords from time-to-time. Predation flourished within a facilitative social space provided for by the clans.

Clans were central locus to the organization of the Somali society and provided the social base for the institutionalization of a predatory behavior which sustained wartime actors and insurgent organizations. A key Somali proverb makes the point: “tolkaaiyo kabtaadaba wa lagu dhex jiraa,” translated as, “rely on your clan’s protection as you rely on your shoes” and another states, “tolkaa ama bar ka ahaw ama badhtanka kaga jiri,” translated as “either lead or be led by your clan, but do not stand aside.”

Somalia’s wartime actors were deeply embedded in the clan’s social support structures and a rich social base was a critical ingredient for perpetuating predation and the advancement of economic agendas. Evidently, in a rather symbiotic fashion, clan interests were secured and protected by militia who legitimized their existence through clan loyalty and internal support base. Indeed, the sources of wartime actors’ power to dominate were linked to their powerful positions at the helm of their respective wartime insurgent organizations and their capacity to mobilize and count on the acceptance and support from their clans and backing from allied business groups, diaspora or regional patrons.

In addition to predatory war economies discussed earlier, it will be prudent to highlight just a few cases where mobilized clan-based predation took shape in Somalia – drawing in foreign companies. For example, the Habr Gedir clan’s military strategies to conquer banana plantations were sponsored by international companies, notably the American Dole and Italian Somalfruit, and they were enjoined in predatory pacts and...
Italy’s dominance and control over banana plantations in Somalia dates back to the 1930s when the Societa Agricola Italo Somala registered as the dominant exporter of bananas to Italy and initiated the biggest commercial agricultural venture, as it enjoyed state subsidies and protection from import taxes. In 1935, Italian colonists recruited 40,000 Somali troops and forcibly evicted the Gosha farmers and distributed their farmlands in the riverine areas of Juba Valley to Italian companies—practically creating food shortages, a situation which forced weaker and minority local clans to become laborers in order to survive. Borrowing from Goodhand’s typology of war economies, the powerful Habr Gedir clan and the Italians were reaping from combat and shadow economies; while the Goshas and other minorities engaged in coping economies to survive and feed their families.

Indeed, during the early years of war, despite the deepening Somali crisis, banana exports to Europe generated considerable revenues for factional leaders and allied foreign investors: $26 million in 1990 and from $6 to $8 million in 1994. In the contemporary times, according to Luling (1997), the war pitted two business rivals: Italia’s Somalfruit Company created during Barre’s rule in the 1980s and Sombana, a subsidiary of America’s Dole Company which was established in 1993. The parties to the business footed the militia’s security bill as production depended on a stable security environment.

---

760 HRW, *Somalia Faces the Future.*
761 Ibid.
762 Ibid.
763 See Goodhand, “From War Economy to Peace Economy?”
Reportedly, Somalfruit was allied with Osman ‘Ato’, while Sombana relied on Hussein Aideed for protection and security. Dole designated Shalanbod as the assembly site for banana purchases, while exportation were handled by a local agent of the company, which also submitted fees to the areas’ dominant militia group. In the competitive business environment, both international companies engaged armed security teams and allied militias to protect their economic interests and reportedly Aideed got his cut from the exports. It was further reported that the rival companies’ militias often intimidated and harassed farmers, and 36 ‘technicals’ were stationed at Shalanbod, a collection depot in the Lower Shebelle, in readiness for any confrontation. In an interview with HRW in Nairobi, an American diplomat reflected on the Dole-Somalfruit business wars:

Dole saw an opportunity in the spring of 1994, so went in, providing fertilizer and pesticides. Dole bought 14,000 tons of bananas, a shipload every ten days. In August 1994 Italy mounted an aggressive effort to get Dole out, but eventually compromised at fifty/fifty. Now they're pushing Americans out again...Italian-supported Somalfruit hired technicals; both now have security forces; Dole doesn't pay militias, farmers do. Italians want a monopoly. It's not clear to what extent Dole and Somalfruit have forged alliances with the SNA and SSA [Somali Salvation Alliance].

In addition to the American and Italian companies operating in Somalia, reports indicated that in the Lower Juba region, an Australian firm known as Morris and Company undertook expedition for business prospects in the Badhaade region and recruited security personnel from Omar Jess as escorts up to the Ras Kamboni area.

---

767 HRW interview with UNOSOM officers, Mogadishu, February 1, 1995, as cited in HRW, Somalia Faces the Future.
768 HRW interviews with an aid official, Nairobi, January 19, 1995, as cited in Ibid.
769 HRW interview with a Somali aid official, Nairobi, February 2, 1995, as cited in Ibid.
770 HRW interview with an American diplomat, February 2, 1995, as cited in Ibid.
771 HRW interview with a Somali official, January 10, 1995, cited in Ibid.
In the various regions, the dominant clans used their militias to drive predation. For example, in the Bay region, by January 1995, the High Council of Baidoa, charged with running the region, began collecting taxes to sustain itself and clan militia, where taxes were collected regularly from shops, livestock traders and other traders engaged in import and export businesses, with receipts issued for payments. Likewise, in the region of Lower Shebelle, a traditional clan elder lamented that, “…the Digil-Mirifle were disarmed and [were] helpless. The Digil-Mirifle used to own farms; taken by the Habr Gedir; now they work on their own farms. The Digil-Mirifle Lower Shebelle do not have any say in decisions. We [were] slaves who [had] been conquered.” While the Habr Gedir clan was the major beneficiaries of the war in Somalia, clans such as Digil-Mirifle bore the negative brunt of war. In the northern Hiraan region, the town of Belet Weyne violently changed hands between the militias of the Habr Gedir and Hawaadle sub-clans. HRW reports:

The Habr Gedir accused the Hawaadle of major looting during what they refer to as the "Night of the Long Knives." After the Habr Gedir families left Belet Weyne, the SNA retaliated and attacked Belet Weyne, looting Hawaadle properties on the east side of town, while leaving the fourteen non-Hawaadle clans on the west side untouched. The U.N.’s Zimbabwean troops were completely outnumbered and stripped completely by the SNA forces. The U.N. evacuated the Zimbabweans by helicopter.

Later, in retaliation, Osman ‘Ato’, leading the SNA, took control of the area, broke up the District Council and created a new Emergency Council comprising of one representative from each clan, dishing out weapons seized from the Zimbabwean contingent of

---

772 HRW interview with a senior elder, Baidoa, January 24, 1995, cited in Ibid.
774 HRW interview with an aid official, Nairobi, January 21, 1995, cited in Ibid.
UNOSOM and from borderlands with Ethiopia to all clans but Hawaadle, with a view to balance military power on the ground and also his militia looted NGOs thought to be allied to the Hawaadle clan.775

The same trend occurred in the Lower Juba region. According to reported accounts, in 1995, in addition to violence meted out on the Bantu clans in Lower Juba by the Habr Gedir, competition to control strategic trade routes and access corridors to the rich riverine region brought Habr Gedir and Ogaden sub-clans into conflict.776 In the riverine areas, often the weaker minority groups, such as the Rahanweyn and Bantus (Goshas) clans, who previously were the traditional farmers and workers in the riverine environments of the Shebelle and Juba Rivers, however, they lost their lands through land grabbing and forced occupations by more powerful clans. During the wartime, these minority clans became targets of looters and were subjected to forced labor by the occupying powerful militias from, notably, Farah Aideed’s SNA, and other Habr Gedir and Ogadeni clans.777 According to a Bantu elder, in the town of Gelib, Ogadeni militias often raided farms during harvest period778, and reported that the militias from the clans of the Habr Gedir, Biyaamal, Sheikhaal, Galgaal, and Ogadeni were the nastiest looters of farm produce.779 A displaced Bantu elder narrating his clan’s ordeal at the hand of looters, lamented:

Bantus have to pay protection money throughout the Juba valley. The worst situation is in the Juba valley northwest of Gelib. The Ogadenis come from Bilegsa and Farshalbele [near Merere] to Bantu villages by

776 HRW interview with a Somali relief officer, Nairobi, January 21, 1995, cited in Ibid.
777 HRW interview with an aid official, Nairobi, January 19, 1995, cited in Ibid.
778 HRW interview with a Bantu leader, Kismayu, January 28, 1995, cited in Ibid.
foot and begin firing guns so people run away, and then they loot, day, night, anytime…. Sometimes they beat Bantus and force them to carry properties from these villages to Afmadow by foot. They are trying to move Bantus off their land; they loot and tell Bantus to leave. This only happens northwest of Gelib. Attacks are usually carried out by twenty or more men. About half the people of Mofi are gone...\(^{780}\)

Often the Bantus were allowed to return to their farms, not to repossess the properties, but to work for the new ‘landowners’ as laborers or contract workers, receiving payments in the form of either money or bananas.\(^{781}\) Elsewhere, in the Hiraan region, the Bantus were treated similarly.\(^{782}\) The problem was aggravated by the fact that the only faction apparently created to protect Bantu’s interests – SAMO was reportedly very weak and lacked connections with grassroots support and due to fragmentation with some factions allied to Aideed’s militia and others to Ali Mahdi, the factional leaders did not provide credible leadership to the group.\(^{783}\) For many respondents:

The Habr Gedir militia as an occupying force in much of the region extending from Mogadishu to the Juba River in the southwest, north to control the road to Belet Weyne, and throughout the coastal area of Lower Shebelle Region…. In many areas Habr Gedir forces in General Aideed's SNA have moved to control trade, to take over agricultural production in some areas, and to control key transportation routes.\(^{784}\)

Thus, as observers noted Habr Gedir’s predatory territorial conquest was aimed at ensuring control of the area’s economy, particularly in the riverine areas of the Shebelle and Juba Rivers, and its military strength and prowess was linked to the factions’ ability

\(^{780}\) Ibid.
\(^{782}\) HRW interview with a UN aid officer, Baidoa, January 22, 1995, cited in Ibid.
\(^{783}\) HRW interview with a UNOSOM officer, Nairobi, January 19, 1995, cited in Ibid.
to control these strategic resources and transport corridors—which secures Aideed’s grip over Mogadishu.

On another level, in Somalia, some sort of complex and shifty interdependence existed between clan militia leaders and clan business groups from time-to-time. For example, during the Mbagathi talks’ period, the TNG enjoyed the backing of some wealthy Mogadishu businessmen, members of the Djibouti clan and some Arab governments; while the dominant SRRC coalition enjoyed the backing of Ethiopia. Due to the nature of clan politics in Somalia, the interests of three key identity groups—clans, warlords and businessmen—were intricately interlinked, triggering a complex political and economic relationship—characterized by a complex mixture of love, hate and rivalry for opposing groups as dictated by interests at stake at any given time. Often times, in line with the social identity theory that Tajfel and Turner (1979) advanced, in Somalia the notion that in-group love reigns when clan or business group’s interests were threatened; while at other times of limited external threats, internal tensions between clan warlords and business actors featured prominently. As De Waal correctly argued, “…the importance of clans lies primarily in the fact that clan identity is the locus for physical security and militarization mobilization.” In post-state collapse Somalia, most warlords relied on the support and loyalty of the business actors within their clans and similarly some business actors relied on the military power of their clan warlords and militias to protect their strategic business interests or conquer new productive territories.

---

785 HRW, Somalia Faces the Future.
787 De Waal, “Class and Power in a Stateless Somalia.”
For example, powerful business groups financed and armed their clan warlords or coalition of warlords and other religious structures, such as the multi-clan ICU, to enforce law and order. Often powerful armed factional or political leaders in Somalia relied on the internal acceptance, loyalty and support from mobilized and well-resourced clan’s business groups. Such pragmatic clans-warlords-business group partnerships formed critical social logic as communities engaged in collective predatory agendas.

Interestingly, despite the bond that existed among the Somali clans, the power of economics outweighed intra-ethnic identity loyalty as cross-ethnic commercial relations flourished. Elsewhere in Eastern Europe, Andreas (2004) observed that during the Balkan crisis an impressive cross-ethnic cooperation existed in the smuggling economy in Bosnia.\(^\text{788}\) In Liberia’s rebels were largely multiethnic and equally some individuals reaping from predatory war economies were of Dutch, Lebanese, Sierra Leoneans, Guineans and Ivorian origins, among others.\(^\text{789}\) In Somalia, which had highly politicized clan polities that anchored most wartime institutions, surprisingly, multi-clan coalitions emerged between clans through the formation of vigilante protection groups to protect investments in Bakarah market and to finance the ICU, particularly in Mogadishu, to deal with crimes and resolve disputes. Several clans or sub-clans also engaged in collective predatory investments, for example, in running and reaping from the Mogadishu port, the assembling of the Coca Cola plant. Some clan families even invested in building a private Isaley airstrip, sharing the proceeds. The preceding analysis also revealed that militia


\(^{789}\) See for example Reno, “Foreign Firms”; Reno, “The Business of War in Liberia.”
leaders controlled regional councils like puppets in order to manage regions where proceeds of predation are shared with several clan members or allied factions. For example, Qanyare shared the proceeds from Daynille airstrip with several allied factional leaders and groups. So, despite political polarization, business interests could unite antagonistic identity groups, albeit temporarily—when imperatives of predatory profit-making and wealth creation necessitated it.

Undoubtedly, business groups are in the business of profit making. In post-state collapse Somalia, predation became official business for political, business and military organizations, often generating heated tensions and polarized relations. Another interesting dynamic in Somalia was the nature of internal patronage relationship and competition between clans’ militia leaders and wealthy business leaders during the negotiation process. In addition to factional warlords, predatory business community groups, among other wartime actors, greatly benefited from the spoils of war in Somalia. War profiteers and businesses operating in an unregulated free trade economic zone characterized by no taxation on imports and exports, were naturally reluctant to accept a resurrected Somali government to enforce unfriendly regulatory mechanisms and taxation. However, fear of peace gripped the business community in equal measure. As a focus group discussion with Somali civil society leaders in Nairobi revealed, few Somali groups were willing to offer the rescue rope to lift up the state as many rather wished the state to remain sunk fearing the return of oppressive state structures or even worse consequences if their rivals dominated the revived state.\footnote{Focus Group Discussions with Somali civil society leaders, Nairobi, Kenya, December 28, 2008.}
In Somalia, the line between militia leaders and business actors became quite blurred and distinguishing between who was legitimate and who was not, was very difficult. A UN official observed that the business community functioned as a double-edged sword—although it was the lifeline for Somalis, it occupied and milked state infrastructure and collaborated with warlords in controlling access to airports, seaports, businesses and black market operations, and in the end, it remained deeply intertwined and immune to the international pressure since it had nothing to lose.\(^\text{791}\) However, as the Somali war economy boomed, this fragile symbiotic relationship between the business community and warlords began to crack due to competing business and predation interests and agendas. Menkhaus observed that over time, relatively, Somali warlords lost their strength or transformed to become political leaders as the business community became more powerful in urban centers, partially shaking off dependence on clans and warlords support—to project their economic interests.\(^\text{792}\)

Business groups were the major challengers to the armed factional leaders, setting off a complex power struggle for economic and political supremacy which further contributed to the frequent political wrangling during the Mbagathi talks. Behind every powerful armed wartime actor existed wealthy financers from clan or multi-clan business groups. For example, powerful warlords such as Muse Sudi, Bashir Raghe, Hussein Aideed, General Morgan, Abdullahi Yussuf, and Mohamed Qanyare, all from time-to-time had the backing of their clans or sub-clan families and business community

\(^{791}\) Confidential communication with a former Somali legislator and scholar, email to author, March 20, 2008.

members. Empowered by a rich economic and financial base, reportedly in 2004, business operatives generated about $40 million from their various ventures (some cross-clan networks), which was banked in accounts in Djibouti, Dubai and Nairobi.\(^{793}\) Such economic wealth made them critical players in the search for peace in Somalia that could not just be wished away as they could become serious spoilers to undermine the outcome of the Mbagathi talks.

Appreciative of this reality and related threats to sustainable peacemaking, during the peak of Mbagathi negotiations, the chair of the ITCS, Ambassador Kiplagat requested that high-level dialogue forums of the Somali Business Community be convened to discuss the role of the private sector in creating a secure environment, rebuilding Somalia and supporting the proposed new transitional government.\(^{794}\) This outreach sought to co-opt and solicit the support of the business community and bring them onboard with a view to raise the credibility of the process and as a tactic to boost the troubled protracted peace talks, and weaken and undermine armed spoilers of the peace process. Three critical conferences for the Somali business community were convened between April of 2003 and July of 2004. In April of 2003, the first meeting was held in Dubai, cosponsored by the Dubai Somali Business Council in partnership with CRD and War-torn Societies Project (WSP) International (which later became Interpeace). In May 2003, the second meeting sponsored by the UNDP Somalia, in partnership with CRD and WSP International was held in Nairobi. In July 2004, the third meeting brought together 36


members of the Somali Business Community in Djibouti, sponsored by the government of Djibouti and the UNDP Somalia facilitated by the EU and CRD/WSP International.

The meeting provided an opportunity for the members of the Somalia’s private sector to interact with the mediators and the participants at the Mbagathi peace process. These forums were geared to mobilize and sustain credible commitments including political, financial and moral support for the Mbagathi peace process, although they failed to maintain significant momentum. In July 2004 participating in the third forum, a Somali businessman reflecting on the complex relationship with armed wartime actors, narrated:

We took weapons to defend ourselves and property from the armed faction leaders who have been recalcitrant to every effort towards peace for Somalia. Should we, the business community, surrender our weapons to the very armed faction leaders, who may form together a government for Somalia, when we are not sure of their true commitment?...We have no problem to give the new government the benefit of the doubt but until we see tangible signs that our businesses and lives will not be jeopardized, we will remain reluctant to surrender our weapons.\(^{795}\)

Such statements speaks vividly to wartime actors’ fear of peace, their inherent desire to protect their economic interests and the uncertainty of the outcome of the Mbagathi talks led and dominated by an armed cabal termed the Leaders Committee. Nonetheless, despite such skepticism, 36 business leaders signed a statement committing themselves to provide financial support for the Mbagathi process and its outcome.\(^{796}\)

According to an interview with a Somali businessman who was later elected as a MP at Mbagathi, this commitment from the business community was essential since Somalia’s

---


\(^{796}\) Ibid. The group eventually donated $25,000 to the Mbagathi process in 2004.
civil society was quite weak and partisan. Nonetheless, during the Mbagathi talks, inherent tensions and competition between clans’ factional leaders and business community members often obstructed the negotiation process.

4.2 Conclusion

The above lengthy chapter has provided an in-depth analysis of the structure of predatory wartime actors, their economic strategies and agendas and critical revenue sources in Somalia. The chapter has demonstrated that wartime actors with economic power and financial resources extracted from control of trade and monopoly over critical resources airports, seaports, checkpoints, and khat trade among others. Using both economic and social logics of predation, the wartime actors managed to build strong insurgent organizations, manipulated and marshaled internal support and nurtured external economic ties with foreign business companies, thereby dominating the political and economic spheres in the collapsed Somali state. It also examined the role and nature of predatory clan politics which gave predation in Somalia a social logic, where shrewd wartime actors mobilized clans to collectively engage in predation and support their insurgent organizations—which cumulatively undermined peacemaking efforts for the country. Through such analysis, the chapter has shown how wartime actors’ predatory and economic agendas shaped the dynamics of peace talks in the country. The next chapter briefly reviews how wartime actors’ predation and dominant economic agendas specifically influenced and undermined the Mbagathi peace process.

797 Interview with a Somali businessman and former cabinet minister, Nairobi, Kenya, October 26, 2008.
CHAPTER 5 IMPACT ON THE MBAGATHI PEACE PROCESS

As stated in chapter 1, this dissertation has examined the conceptual question: why some civil wars are harder to settle than others. This dissertation demonstrated that an intricate link existed between a high degree of economic predation (with both economic and social logic), pervasive war economies and wartime actors’ dominant economic agendas and the struggles of peacemaking in the post-state collapse Somalia (see the table below).

This study makes a critical contribution to the theory of political economy of conflict from a predation perspective. From the existing literature on political economy, it emerges that predation should be more prevalent in a resource-rich environment (endowed with high value resources) than in a resource poor-environment (which lacks the same). However, the economic model fails to explain the nature and forms of predation, which emerged under resource-poor environment such as Somalia. The study advances a new model of predation with both an economic and a social logic – what I call the hybrid model of predation, which significantly shaped peacemaking under even the resource poor environments in Somalia. This study demonstrates that a resource poor environment begets a new form of predation anchored in societies’ social structure and driven and shaped by mobilized social logic. Through such dynamics, peacemaking in Somalia became a protracted venture exposing the centrality of predation, pervasive war
economies and dominance of wartime actors’ economic agendas over political goals of reconciliation.

Despite bearing key fundamentals of a well-designed peace process, analysis reveals that in practice, the Mbagathi peace process faced considerable challenges that undermined the effective implementation of the Eldoret Declaration and the management of the Mbagathi process. The Eldoret Declaration was a weak agreement because it lacked the implementation, verification and monitoring frameworks to be effective. Indeed, Somali wartime actors’ predatory economic interests and agendas outweighed genuine search for peace and reconciliation and peacebuilding efforts thereby dominating and undermining efforts to nurture a return to normalcy in the country. The wartime actors used their economic power and resources and mixed strategies of force, fear, violence, coercion and manipulation of clan politics to steer political negotiations to their advantage and thereby undermine the peace process. Predation and pervasive war economies were the lifelines of the multitude of transformed wartime actors that flourished in anarchic Somalia and greatly made peacemaking much more difficult.

What is the link between a high degree of economic predation, pervasive war economies and the dominant wartime actors’ economic agendas and the struggles of peacemaking in Somalia? As argued in preceding chapters, Somalia, being a resource-poor environment, lacked high-value resources in comparison to conflict environments such as in Liberia, Angola, DRC or Sierra Leone. However, the crafty Somalia’s predatory wartime actors with dominant economic agendas developed economic

---

strategies and used their strategic capabilities to engage and profit from predation, drive war economies and pursue economic agendas through control over such resources. They accomplished this through the mobilization of social endowments by manipulating and mobilizing clan identities to entrench their predatory wartime empires and insurgent organizations. They utilized such economic resources and clan ties to build alliances, extend economic networks and undermine rivals. All such behaviors and tactics were aimed at strategically positioning themselves as the economic and political dominators with a view to influence dynamics and outcomes of peace negotiations in Somalia.

Overall, the study’s major finding is that predation and dominant economic agendas undermined the emergence of ripeness and made inter-party and intraparty bargaining harder and more difficult during the Mbagathi process. Predation in Somalia was unique as it had both economic and social logic which sustained the predatory war economy and wartime actors’ economic agendas despite the country being a resource-poor environment. Specifically, Somalia’s wartime actors critically contributed to the struggles of the Mbagathi process in a number of ways. Basking in the glory of rewarding predatory war economies, a mutually hurting stalemate did not emerge. Contrary to the promise of the ripeness theory, the presence of shared values and interests and joint gains and satisfying formula rested on the convergence of their predatory interests and uninterrupted pursuit of economic agendas, thereby fostering a mutually beneficial stalemate conditions. Hence, the war was more attractive to the wartime actors than peace and reconciliations in the country. Endowed with massive financial and economic power, the wartime actors were able to control force in the form of militias and monopolize
violence, hence accruing the capacity to spoil peace. Further, considering that Somalia had several relatively strong wartime actors, power symmetry did not facilitate the emergence of ripeness. Coupled with a lack of credible leadership (who could rise above their criminal predatory behaviors and the blinding clan politics), an infrastructure to sustain a commitment to political ideals of reconciliation failed to germinate. Hence, the wartime actors’ engaged in the Mbagathi talks only when the talks promised to elevate them to a position of status, stay ahead of rivals, save face among regional and international community and for mere politicking purposes rather than genuine interests to rebuild Somalia.

Therefore, the Mbagathi process struggled because of complex interlocking issues such as: the trappings of rewarding predation with both economic and social logic, presence of facilitative internal and external war economies, entrenched economic agendas and associated wartime actors’ fear of peace; domination of the process by the Lords of War in the name of ‘Leaders Committee’; the power symmetry between the several wartime actors; and utilization of violence as a strategy for predation and spoiling peace. The next section expounds on these findings.

5.1 The Trappings of Rewarding Predations and Entrenched Economic Agendas

Over time, a high degree of economic predation, pervasive war economies and wartime actors’ dominant economic agendas over political goals of reconciliation inhibited the emergence of conditions that would otherwise promote conflict ripeness and hence contributed to the struggles of the Mbagathi talks. Predatory war economies and
dominant economic agendas rewarded and sustained Somali insurgent organizations, which continued to resist and undermine peace negotiations aimed at the revival of a formal state with a capacity to monopolize coercion, use of force and violence and possibly establish a business regulatory framework. As Duffield argued, doing business in an era of globalization does not entirely rely on the presence of a modern state. \(^{799}\)

Similarly, Bradbury echoes that, “…elites in government, warlords or quasi-state authorities do not rely on state institutions, but can survive and profit from economies that are non-territorial, linked to international trade and financial networks facilitated by modern communications equipment.” \(^{800}\)

Additionally, embedded in rewarding predatory activities, Somali wartime actors’ were trapped in a fear of peace as they were vehemently opposed to peace and institutionalization of a legitimate government because that might alter the status quo and undermine their capacities to engage in rewarding predation and advance their economic agendas. Analysis reveals that the dawn of peace under situations such as Somalia does not work with the existence of a powerful and vocal group of wartime actors in the country. These war profiteers monopolized economic power and readily utilized fear, force and violence to undermine the peace talks which did not promote their core economic predatory concerns. As a US-based Somalia’s former Attorney General noted, “Somali problem is like a well. And a nation stuck in a well needs a rope to lift it up.” \(^{801}\)

Indeed, according to this learned Lawmaker, there was little incentive for the majority of

---

\(^{799}\) Duffield, *Global Governance*, 35-44.


\(^{801}\) Interview with Somalia’s former Attorney General, Minneapolis, MN, US, July 4, 2007.
Somalia’s profiteers to aid in the resurrection of the State by engaging in genuine reconciliation and stability.\textsuperscript{802} Evidently, the wartime actors displayed greater commitment to the pursuit of their economic agendas as they worked to maintain the status quo in order to prolong their exploitation of the war economies and perpetuation of their economic interests.

In the minds of the war profiteers, fear of what peace might bring was pervasive. Writing in 2003, analyzing the foundation’s of spoilers’ fears, Menkhaus argued that, “…for some political and economic actors who have survived and thrived in a stateless setting, embracing a state-building agenda constitutes a leap of faith they are currently not willing to take.”\textsuperscript{803} Similarly, Menkhaus linked wartime actors’ behavior to what he termed Somali factional leaders’ risk adverse tendencies, which he argued were to blame for the perpetually failing peace talks.\textsuperscript{804} He argued, “…political and economic actors in collapsed states fear a change in the operating environment which, though far from ideal, is one in which they have learned to survive and profit.”\textsuperscript{805} In addition to these ‘risk adverse’ elites, a whole network of black market networks, drug dealers, gun smugglers, fake currency and passports printers and militias for hire, have also adopted and reaped millions from the rewarding predatory war environment in the country. For them, war was profitable and must continue.

The transformed diverse actors in Somalia have found some alternative ways of not only coping with the chaos but generating considerable profits. For many,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{802} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{803} Menkhaus, “State Collapse in Somalia: Second Thoughts,” 419.
\item \textsuperscript{804} Ibid, 406.
\item \textsuperscript{805} Ibid, 405.
\end{itemize}
uncertainties of a possible peacetime Somalia could not match the profits and seductions of the fulfilling predatory war economies. Exposing the armed factional leaders’ fear, in an interview with Guardian journalist, Somalia elders commented, “What the warlords know, simply, is that none of them is going to be elected legitimately. None has got the capacity of becoming a Somali leader, so the maximum power they can get is what they have now. Why are they going to choose a legal structure that will challenge them?”

Writing on warlords’ behavior during the Mbagathi talks, Somali Peace Rally observed, “[the] current uncooperative position of warlords in [the] Somali peace process clearly reflects their passions for the upholding of their economic advantages in anarchic system such as the exploitation of Somalia’s marine resources and forestry, as well as public infrastructure (such as airports and ports).”

As a common feature of modern corporations, at the nerve center of wartime actors was the desire to create, accumulate and protect wealth in a rather unregulated business environment in Somalia. Informed by both economic and social logics of predation, in an otherwise collapsed Somalia, an article in the Guardian (2004) observed, “The traditional bonds of clan and kinship remain strong. But stronger still are two forces that appear to have weathered the storm largely intact; the profit motive and the law of the gun.” In the same vein, Gettleman (2007) wrote:

Beyond clan rivalry and Islamic fervor, the chaos in Somalia is being helped along by an entirely different motive: profit. A whole class of opportunists from squatter landlords to teenage gunmen for hire to vendors of out-of-date baby formula has been feeding off the anarchy in Somalia.

---

806 Guardian, “Desperate Somalis.”
807 Somali Peace Rally, “Somalia Warlords have vested interest.” (Added word).
808 Guardian, “Desperate Somalis.”
for so long that they refuse to let it go. They do not pay taxes; their businesses are totally unregulated, and they have skills that are not necessarily geared toward a peaceful society.  

Indeed, the rewarding predation and economic agendas and booming war economies were key deterrents to peace. The desire to accumulate wealth and maximize profits defined Somalia’s war profiteers ranging from big actors such as established warlords to retail traders such as Omar Hussein Ahmed (an exporter of olive oil who confessed that he and his fellow traders), hated paying taxes and were opposed to the creation of a function government in Somalia.  

Additionally, cases of squatter landlords such as Maxamuud Nuur Muradeeste, who minted thousands of dollars annually after converting the former Ministry of Minerals and Water Offices into a ‘private’ hotel and an armory for insurgents to store their military hardware. Challenging the creation of a perceived oppressive Somali government by the Mbagathi process, Muradeeste interestingly asked, “If this government [TFG] survives, how will I?” Concurringly, a 104 year old Malak Muktar Malak Hassan, chief of the traditional chiefs in Baidoa, describing Somali warlords, perceptively noted, “…the warlords are the problem creators…They are living on war…If there is no war, they can’t live.”

Such a philosophy fertilizes fear and uncertainty in the minds of many who doubted diverse wartime actors’ commitment to the search for peace in Somalia.

---

810 Ibid.
811 Ibid.
812 Ibid (Added word).
Similarly, a delegate in the Mbagathi process, a Somali MP who participated in the selection of Colonel Yussuf as the President of Somalia in October 2004 in Kenya wondered, “it will be interesting to see the warlords and their armies, used to money and control, willingly surrender their jurisdictions to a central government.” Such a remark points to a deeply embedded fear of peace that existed among the Somali wartime actors, making peacemaking under state collapse conditions so difficult. Indeed, for De Waal, “…it is the interactions of clan, class and the nature of state power that has made the Somali conflict so intractable in the south, while making it possible to reach solutions in Somaliland and Puntland.” Hence, predation with both an economic and social face coupled with factional completion to perpetuate their wartime economic empires undermined emergence of ripeness.

Furthermore, analysis also reveals that wartime actors’ fear of peace in addition to a desire to continue with their predatory economic agendas was fueled by concerns and uncertainty of whom among the rival militia leaders will head the transitional authority that Mbagathi process might beget. Yusuf (2004) noted that Somali armed factional leaders obstructed the development of a functional central and regional authority “…because of the danger such authority would pose for their illegitimate businesses. None of them, of course, would refuse if offered to head such a government, but none would accept a government led by another.”

815 De Waal, “Class and Power in a Stateless Somalia.”
This fear was fueled due to Somalia’s experience of previous predatory regimes. Analyzing the role of class-based politics and contributions to struggles of peace talks, De Waal argued, “…not only are the conflicts that arose from the state-linked capitalist transformations of the productive sector still unresolved, but most Somali leaders anticipate that a future government will continue those processes of state-directed accumulation that were interrupted in 1991.”

For various wartime actors, fear of the unknown influenced their decision to oppose emergent transitional authorities and undermine the peace talks. Therefore, it was not rejection of the state as a concept but rather a fear of their rivals’ rise to a position of power and supremacy – which might undermine their economic interests, positions and agendas. Arguing that stakes tend to be quite high, Menkhaus writes, “Although most Somalis understand the benefits that a revived central government brings, they are reluctant to see control of the state fall into the hands of rival clans or factions. As a result, Somali actors view efforts to revive a central government as a zero-sum game that has provoked rather than mitigated conflict.”

Particularly, for the wartime actors at the helm and deeply linked and profiteering from the wartime economies, maintenance of the status quo seemed the wisest strategy. For example, during the brief reign of TNG, a coalition of Mogadishu warlords such as Mohamed Qanyare, Musa Sudi, Hussein Aideed, Osman ‘Ato’ and Omar ‘Finish’, the business groups running the El Ma’an port facilities, were infuriated by the transitional government’s attempts to open up Mogadishu’s main port because such actions

---

817 De Waal, “Class and Power in a Stateless Somalia.”
threatened to disrupt their business interests.\textsuperscript{819} The Somali business class and war profiteers exercising what Menkhaus termed a ‘bounded rationality’ where actors displayed “…a willingness to seek sub-optimal but acceptable outcomes, rather than face the risks a revived state would entail.”\textsuperscript{820} They rejected TNG’s attempts to operationalize the Mogadishu port for fear of the uncertainties of peacetime Somalia.

As a result, during the Mbagathi talks, warlords engaged in endless politicking. Mohamed (2003) observed the struggles of Mbagathi as being characterized by:

No talking, just accusations, demands, stonewalling and the unwillingness on the part of most factions to reverse the gains they have made on the ground in Somalia. Since most warlords and businessmen are benefiting from the chaos in Somalia, the crisis is likely to continue. The warlords are unwilling to surrender territory, and those who have occupied other people’s houses are unwilling to surrender them.\textsuperscript{821}

However, the underdogs of war in Somalia such as minority clans and subdued civil society groups banked on the Mbagathi negotiation process and its expected outcomes to shift the power balance and peacefully unseat well-positioned factional leaders and clans, particularly around resource and infrastructural rich areas such as Mogadishu, Kismayu and the riverine farmlands of the Juba and Shebelle River Valleys. During the Mbagathi process, the quest to control Mogadishu set off a vicious form of economic competition pulling Somali delegates from various regions in different directions deeply polarizing the process.

Espousing hope that the process will succeed, in March of 2004, while addressing over 50 delegates drawn from rival clans in the Gedo region on the Kenya-Ethiopia

\textsuperscript{819} Peleman et al, S/2003/1035, 34.
\textsuperscript{820} Menkhaus, “State Collapse in Somalia: Second Thoughts,” 419.
border, the then Kenya’s Ambassador to Somalia and Special Envoy to the Somali peace process, Honorable Mohammed Affey, painted a hopeful picture that a transitional government would be in place by July of 2004.\textsuperscript{822} However, that prediction failed to materialize. Writing on the numerous setbacks afflicting the Mbagathi talks, Mohamed observed:

Events and the delegates’ behavior in both Eldoret and Nairobi mirror the failure of past peace and reconciliation efforts. The talks have been characterized by walkouts, fights among delegates and complaints about money and the delegates’ inability to agree on almost everything. Immediately one problem is solved another crops up. One begins to question the delegates’ commitment to the talks.\textsuperscript{823}

Why the foot-dragging? In an interview with Middle East News Agency (MENA), Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, the Djibouti Minister of State for International Cooperation, termed Somali warlords as war profiteers and opportunists who have perfectly explored events at the global level for personal enrichment.\textsuperscript{824} The diplomat observed that peace has been elusive in Somalia because the warlords preferred the continuation of anarchy so their trade in arms and narcotics could flourish.\textsuperscript{825} In the same vein, an ICG report observed that, “…many faction leaders are reluctant to relinquish the perks they enjoy living off the revenues of ‘private’ ports and airports, and some fear indictment for war crimes when and if normalcy returns.”\textsuperscript{826}

\textsuperscript{823} Mohamed, “Somalia peace talks proving futile.”
\textsuperscript{825} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{826} ICG, \textit{Negotiation a Blueprint for Peace in Somalia}, 10.
Exposing a social face of predation, in Somalia, although clan politics tend to be ‘inherently a zero-sum game’, in the Bakarah market of Mogadishu, motivated by common security concerns, business groups from diverse clans collectively worked together in protecting their investments.\textsuperscript{827} Thus, this inherent deep-seeded wartime actors’ fear of future governments and rivals notwithstanding, predation and dominant economic agendas, coupled with romanticized clan politics and predatory expectations from the future rent-seeking government, contributed to the struggles of the Mbagathi talks.

The wartime actors and profiteers often arm twisted the IGAD mediators unless their interests were adopted during the talks. Although a small group of military leaders, particularly those who previously staged spirited armed insurgency against Barre’s regime such as perhaps Colonel Yussuf and Ali Mahdi, would be happy to end the war so long as the peace talks paved their way to Villa Somalia, many Somali leaders remained visionless. Unfortunately, those wartime actors who found new wealth and could neither escape their criminal character nor resist the seduction of war economies and hence, resisted peace at all cost.

The criminal minds of the various players constituted a complex network of Somalia’s wartime actors bent on the accumulation of wealth and consolidation of power through the barrel of the gun that dominated the talks, could not risk losing control over the emergent transitional administration. As seen during both the Arta and Mbagathi talks, as well as previous failed peace processes, factional leaders tended to commit to
and invest in peace processes which inclined to propel them to Villa Somalia. In sum, enticed by the rewards of predatory war economies, wartime actors’ economic agendas became the dominant influence over political commitment to any reconciliation objectives of the peace process.

5.2 Domination by the Lords of War over Civilian Institutions

This study reveals that due to their economic wealth, powerful wartime actors, notably the armed militia leaders, dominated over weaker civilian and traditional leaders and thereby undermined the credibility of the Mbagathi talks. Overall, the inherent conditions within the failed state of Somalia accorded wartime actors particularly militia leaders control over resources further politically, economically and militarily empowering them to not only undermine the transitional government (for instance, TNG, a product of the Arta process) but also to dominate and silence other actors such as traditional leaders and civil society groups during the Mbagathi talks. Principally, the armed militia leaders engaged in economics of predation, war profiteering and black market operations and vigorously pursued their predatory economic agendas over political goals to sustain their wartime empires in order to flex economic and political muscle—making themselves indispensable in the negotiation process.

Consciously informed of the pitfalls of the Arta talks, which collapsed due to opposition by these same powerful wartime actors enticed by an early breakthrough in the talks epitomized by the speedy signing of the Eldoret Declaration, ITCS developed an appeasement strategy to reward and tactically motivate the signatories of the agreement
by forming a ‘Leaders Committee’ entrusted with the management and decision-making powers during the talks.\textsuperscript{828} Ironically, this Leaders Committee was largely dominated by militia leaders from the SRRC coalition and Mogadishu warlords which were deeply linked to the predatory war economies.

From the outset, IGAD ‘dignified’ and co-opted the armed wartime militia leaders and put them at the helm of the negotiation process. This cabal of wartime actors not only won seats at the negotiating table, but became the agenda setters, dominators, drivers and gatekeepers of the peace process. The premium that the ITCS placed on the warlords through the formation of the Leaders Committee became quite troubling and a major source of peacemaking struggles. IGAD tasked the Leaders Committee to agree to the rules of procedure for the conference and the establishment of a Somali Advisory Group (comprised of eminent personalities) to steer the process forward and give it direct Somali ownership. Although agreeing to such a civilian advisory structure in principle, the Leaders Committee disapproved and blocked the formation of the proposed Somali Advisory Group fearing that such an institution not only eroded their authority and status but also undermined their monopoly of power and dominance in the management of the peace process.\textsuperscript{829}

As Phase I ended, the Leaders Committee bound together, not by a genuine commitment for peace in Somalia, but by the common need to preserve themselves and their wartime predatory empires and to perpetuate their economic interests, effectively

\textsuperscript{828}See table 3 for signatories of Eldoret Agreement, who eventually became members of the “Leaders Committee.”

\textsuperscript{829}Interview with an American diplomat, Nairobi, Kenya, August 12, 2007.
positioned themselves as the supreme decision-making organ of the Mbagathi process. By creating and legitimizing a powerful Leaders Committee, IGAD’s ITCS became a captive of Somalia’s predatory wartime actors (recast as peace negotiators) as they could not fully function or guide the process without getting express approval from the group. Principally, the Leaders Committee became critical insider spoilers that threatened to sabotage the Mbagathi process from within as they all sought to dominate political power to protect their economic spoils of war through a legitimatized political process. For many Somalis, the dominance of the Leaders Committee was quite unsettling. Elmi (2004) summed:

Unfortunately, while these criminal warlords and their militias continue with the killing, hostage-taking, displacement and rape, the international community seems to tacitly endorse their actions by convening reconciliation conferences for the warlords while excluding civil society and traditional leaders. Appeasing these criminals has left the impression throughout Somalia that the more people one has killed, the more say a person will have in the peace process. New warlords have already appeared, hoping to take their share after seeing other warlords dictating the terms for peace.  

Unlike the Arta talks, the Mbagathi process largely isolated Somalia’s traditional leaders and civil society groups from the talks. Such a design and cooptation of the armed militia leaders undermined the credibility of the process in the eyes of many Somali delegates among other observers.

By dignifying and legitimizing the armed militia leaders through elevation to the position of decision-making authority, isolation of religious leaders and minimal media coverage, the organizers created a situation which disfranchised other delegates and

---

disconnected the process from the dynamics on the ground.\textsuperscript{831} One Somali respondent noted that owing to the Leaders Committee’s dominance, the Mbagathi process was increasingly viewed and perceived as mere power-sharing talks by the militia leaders and not a genuine peace process as it focused less on societal reconciliation.\textsuperscript{832} As Ikle wisely noted, the Leaders Committee engaged in ‘side-effects negotiation’\textsuperscript{833} rather than nurture a credible peace process.

Strategically, as the principal architects and beneficiaries of Somalia’s predatory war economies, the Leaders Committee, among other war profiteers, were more committed to preserve themselves, protect their wealth and maintain their status in the anarchy and advance their economic agendas in Somalia. Due to their inherent concern to stay in power or capture power, the Leaders Committee pursued superficial political strategies with a view to maintain the status quo and/or undermine rivals by entering into unripe power-sharing agreements. Operationally, the Leaders Committee forum developed and negotiated amongst themselves not only the terms and mandates of the six technical committees, but more importantly, the provisions of the TFC and the criteria and qualifications to run for parliamentary and presidential elective posts.

For instance, addressing the appointment of the MPs, procedurally TFC’s Article 30 (1d) states that, “…having ensured full endorsement of the traditional leaders to the compiled list of the selected MPs, the Somali Management and Facilitation Committee (also Presidium) will further submit the said list to the IGAD Facilitation Committee

\textsuperscript{831} Bradbury, \textit{Search for Peace}, 20.
\textsuperscript{832} Interview with a Somali scholar in diaspora, Minneapolis, MN, US, July 5, 2007.
\textsuperscript{833} Ikles, \textit{How Nations Negotiate}. 
within the timeframe specified.”\footnote{See Draft TFC charter.} However, particularly intensifying in the final Phase III, with absolute authority in the management of the peace process, the Leaders Committee became vetting principals and a clearing house of the clan nominees for the transitional assembly – essentially bestowing on themselves the powers to nominate, vet and judge the nominees from the various clans. This position of status further enabled the militia leaders to not only screen delegates’ lists, replace traditional clan and sub-clan elders at will, but more importantly, diminished the traditional elders’ role to that of mere rubber-stamping of the concluded deals and even usurped the powers to select clan nominees to the parliament. Somali diaspora members familiar with the dynamics of the Mbagathi talks, during a focus group discussion observed that the process lost its credibility, as the warlords – potential suspects fit for trials at The Hague for committing heinous war crimes against Somali society–were further empowered to design the future of Somalia.\footnote{Focus Group Discussions, Minneapolis, MN, July 1, 2007.} This view was upheld by Amnesty International (2002) who argued against the inclusion of the warlords in the peace process as it was “…unacceptable for those responsible for such crimes to be included in any new government.”\footnote{Amnesty International, “Somalia: No Lasting Peace without Human Rights,” \textit{AI}, Eldoret, November 7, 2002.} The design of the eligibility criteria for parliamentary and presidential election as spelled out in the TFC was tantamount to an unobstructed notorious warlords’ shortcut to a power-sharing agreement that the Leaders Committee all along desired.

Unfortunately, on their part, IGAD and the international community just watched as the lords of predatory war economies worked to secure their predatory economic
future through a manipulated political process. A Somali respondent who participated in the talks as a member of his clan’s Presidium questioning the credibility of the process, lamented that IGAD’s mediation team just stood by as the factional leaders in the Leaders Committee nominated their relatives, servants and even bodyguards as MPs.\footnote{Interview with a Somali Elder (member of clan’s Presidium), Nairobi, Kenya, November 6, 2008.} Similarly, a former PM in the expanded TFG echoed that the IGAD team should not be wholly blamed as they were rendered helpless as Ethiopia influenced the vetting and the nomination processes at Mbagathi by controlling the grassroots selection of the elders inside Somalia.\footnote{Interview with a former Somali PM, Djibouti, Djibouti, August 14, 2008.}

Although observing that the Mbagathi process was much more inclusive than the Arta talks, an official of a Somali NGO in the US observed that the peace process faced a critical organizational process problem as there was unwarranted focus on the outcome—powersharing—rather than a process in search of a lasting peace in Somalia.\footnote{Interview with a Somali NGO official, Minneapolis, MN, US, July 1, 2007.} Equally, participants in a focus group discussion in the US echoed that the process produced a ‘power-sharing peace agreement’ benefitting wartime actors disinterested in genuine reconciliation and hence accorded them a short-cut to power.\footnote{Focus Group Discussions with Somali respondents, Minneapolis, MN, US, July 1, 2007.}

As can be seen from table 8, over 10 of the Leaders Committee members (who were also leaders of the various armed factions) secured themselves critical cabinet positions in the TFG, and other militia leaders although not captured in the Table secured deputy minister positions and
other lucrative portfolios. Truly, then, Mbagathi was reduced to a crude power-sharing forum. Similarly, echoing the lack of focus on reconciliation, Johnson et al noted that:

At their worst, some of the conferences have degenerated into crude cake-cutting exercises in which the agenda is reduced to allocation of cabinet positions by clan and faction. External mediators have been partly to blame, as they have been consistently tempted to use the revival of a central government as the yardstick of success rather than the less tangible but equally important resolution of conflict.

Seemingly, learning from the state-sanctioned predatory experiences of the Barre’s regime, every wartime actor and allied clan sought to capture the critical ministries and agencies in any future transitional government. Hence, the warlords were in charge as they nominated their loyalist and undermined non-militant actors in the political process. Essentially, economic agendas eclipsed political goals and wartime actors’ predatory behaviors influenced the dynamics and outcomes of the Mbagathi process.

5.3 Strong Parties not Necessarily a Panacea to Peace

Scholars argued that power symmetry, or some form of equality or ability of factions to exercise veto power over outcomes, of a peace process was key to sustainable peace negotiations. Beyond ripeness, scholars such as Druckman and Green observed that legitimacy, strong parties, ripeness and a satisfying formula are the foundations of successful negotiations. Also from studies of peace processes in Afghanistan and

841 See table 8 on grand predation.
845 Druckman and Green, “Playing Two Games,” 299-331.
Mozambique involving multiple parties, scholars concluded that power symmetry and the presence of weak, yet legitimate and strong factions were critical factors that nurtured the peace negotiations.\textsuperscript{846}

In this study, certainly the nature of the parties, their leadership and commitment to peace had an impact on the Mbagathi peace process. The Somali case study seems not to support the conventional knowledge that conflict parties must consolidate and be strong first in order to engage in a credible peace process. The study comes up with an unexpected finding: that under civil war conditions of state failure where predation and wartime actors’ economic agendas are dominant, strong parties do not necessarily lead to successful peace negotiation. Without a functional central authority or a state party, the question of legitimacy is often contested, and basically irrelevant, and further complicated by clan politics. Thus, the desired notion of equality of the parties does not necessarily apply and therefore, the presence of equal parties is not a panacea for effective peace negotiations. For example, in Somalia, President Salat’s TNG was basically weak and unrecognized by the dominant wartime actors – the SRRC and some Mogadishu warlords and the independent autonomous regions of Puntland and Somaliland.

As previously argued, in Somalia, the Leaders Committee with greater leverage due to their possession of economic, financial, political and military power not only isolated minority factions and civil society groups, but also totally controlled and dominated the decision-making process. But other relatively strong wartime actors who

---

\textsuperscript{846} Ibrahim Msabaha, “Negotiating an End to Mozambique’s Murderous Rebellion,” 204-30; and Imtiaz H. Bokhari, “Internal Negotiations Among Many Actors: Afghanistan,” 231-64.
violated the agreements before the ink could dry rendered the Leaders Committee’s signature to the Eldoret Declaration useless. What is important to note is that with the presence of profitable predatory war economies hosting several internal clan-based factions, ‘strong parties’ do not necessarily promote peace due to an internal-external environment’s counter-balancing efforts. Indeed, coupled with predation and the dominance of economic agendas, the multiplicity of actors made it difficult to identity a unified interest for negotiations. The parties were largely committed to predation and the pursuit of economic agendas versus peace; factional leaderships were weak and external actors were deeply split–hence the emergence of ripeness was curtailed.

5.4 Violence as a Strategy for Predation and Spoiling Peace

In Somalia, wartime actors used violence to engage in rewarding predation and as well spoil peace. As Stedman observed total and greedy spoiler categories often undermined peace processes. Fear of peace was a potent driver of spoiler activities in Somalia, as prospects of signature of a peace agreement tended to escalate inter-group violence as factions competed for status and seats at the negotiating table. Menkhaus argued that state-building initiatives often caused greater uncertainty and anxiety among Somalia’s factions. As mentioned earlier, he classified Somali peace spoilers into three categories: situational spoilers who are unsatisfied by their share of the pie in the peace talks; intrinsic spoilers those who have deeply vested interests in perpetuating

---

lawlessness such as war criminals, merchants of war, militia gangs, individuals and groups; and finally, risk-averse spoilers such as prominent Mogadishu business community groups who profited from the war and remained doubtful of the outcomes of the peace talks relative to their economic empires.\(^\text{849}\) As theorized by Keen and Collier, driven by greed\(^\text{850}\), the various classes of spoilers engaged in a vicious competition for power and resource control as means to accumulate and extract vital resources to further their personal and collective group interests.

In Somalia, spoilers driven largely by the desire to perpetuate a state of failure and reap from war economies, the fog of peace and fear of an uncertain future significantly shaped and undermined peacemaking in Somalia. Particularly, the violent spoilers, notably the armed militia leaders, critically undermined the Mbagathi negotiation process by sabotaging the implementation of the speedily signed Eldoret Declaration and by stalling the talks. The wartime actors used violence as a strategy to mobilize clans, intimidate rivals and also to expand their economic predatory base and spoil peace. In Somalia, peacebuilding and state-building projects were diametrically opposed and attracted inherent tensions. The competing tensions between state-building and peacebuilding initiatives were exploited by the emergent powerful class of spoilers of the process which worked to secure their economic future. Stedman’s seminal work on spoilers (whether individuals or groups) reveals this category of actors act to undermine the initiation of peace talks or obstruct implementation of peace agreements.\(^\text{851}\)

\(^{849}\) Ibid, 415.
\(^{850}\) Keen, “Incentives and Disincentives for Violence,” 19-41; Collier, “Doing Well out of War.”
\(^{851}\) Stedman, “Spoiler Problems,” 5–53.
Reflecting on peacebuilding in Somalia, Lyons and Samatar puzzled whether new forces or existing forces should be the point of departure in the reconstruction efforts. For Bradbury, “…statebuilding and peacebuilding are not synonymous but rather are potentially contradictory processes…” and despite the international community’s push to create a functional state, for many Somali actors, it is seen as “…an instrument of oppression and predation by those in control.” Concurringly, Menkhaus argued that:

State building will continue to be a conflict-producing exercise, due to the zero-sum view most Somali political actors have of the control of the state. State-building and peacebuilding can work against each other in the short term. State-building in Somalia has consistently been pursued via powersharing accords without serious attempts at reconciliation of issues such as territorial occupation and conquest in southern Somalia.

For example, in spite of the Eldoret Declaration’s speedy signature, Somalia’s negotiation environment had various types of spoilers and entrepreneurs of conflict, who used violence and mobilized the population by fear, thereby undermining the peace talks.

An article in the *East African Standard* (2003) noted, Al-Haj Mohamed Yasin, a 52-year-old businessman, a delegate to the Mbagathi talks and a Presidential contestant, warned:

As we resume the reconciliation process, there is need for the stakeholders to act tough on the warlords as there will be contentious issues like power-sharing, which will be discussed…But there is no way the leaders of the warring factions can be reconciled if they are allowed to operate as they wish and continue amassing wealth and weapons back home…The warlords are benefiting from the ongoing war and they will not allow the power-sharing initiative.

---

During the Mbagathi talks, working with a zero-sum analysis, whenever their interests were challenged with the dynamics and direction of the negotiation process, an uncharacteristic short-lived unity and solidarity blossomed among the otherwise warring factional leaders. They used their collective veto power, nurtured by the concerns of the collective predatory gains and economic agendas, to ensure that the talk proceeded as they saw fit. Often the wartime actors held joint press conferences giving ultimatums to the mediators with threats of walkouts or some even abandoning the talks and flying off to Somalia.

Desperately hoping to hold the process together, mediators and other committee members or observers of the process, often pleaded with them not to walk out because their departure will disrupt the talks. These militia leaders were fully aware of the reality that the process would not succeed without them and banking on support from their clans, business groups, militias and patrons—they often flexed their political and economic muscles and threatened violence—unless their predatory interests and agendas were accommodated and their requested concessions granted. In fact, as one respondent, who herself in reaction to the isolation of civil society created the sixth clan of the Somali community (to represent women and minority groups’ interests), noted, the Leaders Committee totally eclipsed the IFCS and dominated the peacemaking environment and crafted deals that sustained their political and economic interests.\footnote{Interview with a female Somali civil society activist, Nairobi, Kenya, October 24, 2008.} In the end, the lords of war occupied the driver’s seat in the search for peace in Somalia. However, IGAD also did not have a better option rather than to co-opt these wartime actors, because a peace
process that isolated them (as evidenced by the struggles of the Arta talks and its outcome), risked falling apart.

Beyond clan-based militia leaders, there were other resilient spoilers with greater interests in the dynamics of peace talks in Somalia. As Menkhaus argues:

In Somalia, some spoilers have successfully undermined peace accords to perpetuate armed conflict; others have acted only to undercut local efforts to improve law and order and reduce criminality; still others support peacebuilding and the reduction of crime, but block efforts to revive an effective central government. The latter category includes many businessmen who need a predictable, safe, and peaceful environment in which to conduct commercial activities, but who fear that a revived central government will become repressive and predatory at their expense. The history of the state in Somalia gives this category of state-building spoilers legitimate cause for concern. 857

Similarly, in an interview, a former Somali PM who participated in the Mbagathi talks argued that some business people were profiteers and made fortunes out of the war by dealing in lucrative arms trafficking and money printing, among other black market initiatives, and “…protection of those interests and how a future government will affect them informs their behavior and spoiler tactics.” 858 Particularly, he noted that warlordism and the war profiteer predominance deeply hampered the process, since they did not want peace as “…their interests are based on anarchy and division of the people—for which they are mainly responsible.” 859 By relegating reconciliation to the back burner, the talks failed to deal with key conflict issues which drove the Somali crisis. 860 Such concerns greatly shaped the perception and strategic actions of various wartime actors. In a 2003 report, the UNSG summed:

858 Interview with a former Somali PM, Minneapolis, MN, US, July 5, 2007.
859 Ibid.
860 Bradbury, Search for Peace, 21.
It has become increasingly clear that inside Somalia the continued outbreak of hostilities are motivated by individual rivalries of factional leaders and criminal activities rather than wider issues. Clearly, the ordinary people and traditional leaders were war-weary and yearn for peace and a way out of decades of excruciating state collapse conditions, instability and deprivation. It is those that have the weapons of war who continue to hold the people of Somalia hostage to the cycles of violence.  

Whenever their interests were threatened, factional leaders often resorted to violence and used fear as a strategy to mobilize the populations and make themselves a force with which to be reckoned throughout the Mbagathi process. Exposing the underlying concerns of most Somali actors (the majority of whom were spoilers), Menkhaus observed that, “...more Somali constituencies today have economic and political interests in a certain level of predictability and security, and a greater capacity to advance these interests, than in the days when Somalia was dominated by a war economy and warlordism.” Thus, be they militia leaders or business community members, the Somali wartime actors who benefitted from the rewarding predatory war economies were motivated to maintain the status quo and often suffered from chronic fear of a peacetime Somalia – and often used violence to advance their interests.

In Somalia, during the Arta talks, the major challenges to peace negotiations were the political posturing and tensions and the divide between the centralists and federalists camps on the desired future of political order in Somalia. However, during Mbagathi process, the division was largely between the TNG and the SRRC – with neither having absolute power over the other. Accordingly, Menkhaus characterized

Somali non-state actors as “…players who are not necessarily powerful enough to shape a peace accord or government, but who have the capacity to derail political projects they do not like.” Indeed, Somalia’s wartime actors were both strong yet prone to weakness. The spoiler activities were largely driven by battles between the federalists: SRRC and Puntland (and although not present at the Mbagathi talks, the break-away Somaliland region allied with this group) supported by Ethiopia; and the centralists (the TNG and allied warlords) supported by Djibouti and other Arab League governments. Endowed with massive financial and economic power derived from profitable war economies and patrons’ support, spoilers’ activities were influenced by the desire to maintain the status quo, competition to control and dominate the trade, and capture political power to secure their long-term interests.

5.5 Conclusion

The above chapter highlighted key findings of the study. In sum, as the experiences of the Mbagathi process demonstrated, peacemaking under a civil war environment characterized by a high degree of predation (with both economic and social logic), pervasive war economies and dominant wartime actors’ economic agendas over political goals, remained quite messy, complex, unpredictable and protracted. Consequently, the interactions between wartime actors’ predatory war economies and dominant economic agendas over political goals of societal reconciliation made inter-party negotiations harder and inhibited the emergence of ripeness. In a nutshell, the

research findings demonstrate that deeply linked to predatory war economies and driven by a desire to advance their political status in order to secure their economic interests, the Somali wartime actors became obstacles to the Mbagathi process. The next final chapter summarizes and discusses the results and findings of the study and distils its implication for both theoretical knowledge and the practice of peacemaking. The chapter concludes by suggesting areas for further research.
CHAPTER 6 SUMMARY AND DISCUSSIONS

As an aid to the reader, this final chapter of the dissertation re-states the research problem and reviews the major methods used in the study. The major sections of this chapter summarize the results and discuss their implications for the practice of peacemaking under a conflict environment characterized by a high degree of economic predation, pervasive war economies and wartime actors’ dominant economic agendas over political agendas.

6.1 Re-statement of the Problem and Methodology

As explained in chapters 1 and 2, this study sought to examine the puzzle of why some civil wars are harder to settle than others, especially in civil war environments characterized by a high degree of economic predation, pervasive war economies and wartime actors’ dominant economic agendas over political agendas which influenced and shaped the dynamics of peace negotiations in the failed state of Somalia. Specifically, this case study focused on Somalia’s Mbagathi peace process (2002-2004) which brought Colonel Yussuf and his allies to power in late October of 2004. The study’s key proposition was that peace processes which take place in civil war environments characterized by a high degree of economic predation, pervasive war economies and
wartime actors’ dominant economic agendas over political agendas are harder to negotiate and to settle.

This study utilized a qualitative case study research design. The data was collected through a comprehensive review of secondary data and through fieldwork over a period of 15-months in the Horn of Africa region (Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti) and among the Somali diaspora in Minneapolis, MN and the Washington DC metro region, US. The field research methods included confidential face-to-face and email interviews and focus group discussions in the Horn of Africa region and with Somali diaspora residents in the US. A purposive sampling method and snowballing techniques were used to identify knowledgeable respondents. Due to concerns for personal security, fieldwork was not conducted in Somalia except for a one-day visit to Baidoa in August of 2008. However, since Kenya is home to such a large population of Somali refugees, elites and experts, I had excellent access to a diverse pool of respondents including politicians, civil society actors, government officials, diplomats and business officials from Somalia and the Greater Horn region.

Additionally, my employment in Kenya’s Foreign Ministry provided me with an excellent opportunity to access key personalities who had intimate knowledge of the operation and dynamics of the Mbagathi talks and access also to critical documents and materials which enhanced data collection on the dynamics of the Mbagathi process and challenges of post-state collapse peacebuilding in Somalia. In total, 50 respondents were interviewed in Horn of Africa and the US. Additionally, key focus group discussions with Somali politicians, elders and civil society actors were held in Kenya and in the US.
Regarding data analysis, after every interview or focus group discussion session, the respondents’ responses and contents of reviewed materials were qualitatively analyzed through thematic mapping of the emerging themes and ideas to make sense of the complex negotiation process. The data was thematically analyzed through a thick description and careful process of tracing of the Somali conflict, its economic and social logic and the consequent challenges to peace settlement.

6.2 Major Findings and Summary of the Results

This dissertation examined why some civil wars are harder to settle than others, especially in civil war environments characterized by a high degree of economic predation, pervasive war economies and wartime actors’ dominant economic agendas over political agendas of societal reconciliation. As the study progressed, the link between the political economy of the Somali conflict and the struggles of peacemaking became quite clear. Therefore, the key findings of the study were as follows: first, making a critical departure from the previously existing political economy literature relative to the economic model which assumes that predation on the part of greed-based organizations depends on the availability of high-value lootable resources, this study concludes that contrary to that economic model, predation on the part of greed-based organizations flourished, even in Somalia’s resource-poor environment. Indeed, despite the fact that Somalia lacked traditional high-value easily lootable resources such as diamonds, timber or coltan, a unique hybrid form of predation whereby wartime actors relied on both economic and social logics of predation, coupled with dominant economic
agendas, contributed to the struggles of the Mbagathi peace process. As this Somali study reveals, within a resource poor environment, wartime actors creatively mobilized and manipulated social structures (clans) to generate resources for war and also developed both economic and social strategies to build militia organizations and recruit rebel participants. Thus, the predation in Somalia had both economic and social logics – where wartime actors embedded within clan structures, manipulated and mobilized the societies’ social structures (clans) with a view to recruit rebels and provide both economic and social incentives to build predatory wartime institutions. Indeed, the wartime actors were aided by a mutually beneficial stalemate and hence peace was not attractive to the host of wartime actors and profiteers.

Second, wartime actors’ dominant economic agendas, which they promoted over the political goals of societal reconciliations, drove and sustained profitable predation and rewarding war economies which made the continuation of war attractive and hence inhibited the emergence of a mutually hurting stalemate, thereby undermining ripeness. The host of wartime actors remained committed to the perpetuation of their predatory wartime empires and economic interests rather than engage in genuine efforts towards reconciliation. In fact, as Ikle long noted, these wartime actors were basically engaged in “side effects negotiations.”864 At the expense of sustainable negotiations, the wartime actors used the Mbagathi process as just a convenient forum to politick and shop for a political future which could aid in securing their economic interests.

864 Ikle, How Nations Negotiate.
Empowered economically, the wartime actors used their power and resources to define and enhance their political and military capability to fund violence, spoil peace, instill fear, and intimidate and break up contending alliances; build and sustain internal loyalty and external economic networks with foreign companies and governments, which were drawn into a predation web exploiting Somalia’s forests, marine resources and anything else that provided an opportunity to generate revenue leading to wealth. Through such means, they created, sustained and institutionalized predatory empires that were linked to rewarding wartime economies, and using their wealth and financial power they steered political negotiations in their favor, thereby contributing to the struggles of the Mbagathi talks. The divergent and competing predatory interests made inter-party negotiations and bargaining much harder due to dominant economic agendas and little to non-existent political and ideological vision behind their hyped clan politics – which in itself was just a smokescreen for perpetuating collective predatory agendas.

Through such creative predatory processes, Somalia’s wartime actors controlled critical infrastructure, state assets, and resources and even mobilized clans and allied business leaders to invest in predatory opportunities. Ultimately, the wartime actors hijacked the political process by leveraging their key role in the quest for peace through the use of walkouts and threats to walk out. To be successful, predation in Somalia required a social context where identity groups (clans) could be easily mobilized through social appeals to blood connections and identity ties, rather than merely the provision of immediate or the promise of future high-value economic rewards and incentives. For example, factional leader Bashir Raghe assembled and mobilized resources from his clan
and built and maintained a private Isaley airstrip in Mogadishu—with the clan investors sharing the revenue generated. Similarly, in 2004, the Hawiye clan mobilized clan investors to pull resources together to create a Coca Cola factory. Many other factional leaders such as General Morgan of SNM, Mohamed ‘Dheere’ of the Jowhar, Mohammed ‘Shattigudud’ of RRA, and Yussuf IndoAddhe of the Merka region, among others, established predatory regional administrations of the respective clans in their controlled regions to control and market resources from seaports, airstrips, highways and critical checkpoints and charcoal, among others.

Third, the dissertation revealed that the existence of power symmetry was not a panacea to sustainable negotiations as Somalia’s various relatively strong clan-based insurgent organizations, coupled with rewarding predation and dominant economic agendas undermined the emergence of any single dominant wartime actor to squash and dominate the political, economic and security environment. Indeed, the trappings of predation and dominance of economic agendas over political agendas undermined emergence of credible leadership.

Finally, wartime actors utilized violence as both a strategy for predation and for spoiling peace, undermined the implementation of the hastily signed Eldoret Declaration, and stalled the Mbagathi talks whenever their economic interests and agendas were threatened or undermined. Benefitting from the predatory war economies and committed to the pursuit of dominant economic agendas, the wartime actors were driven by fear of peace and frequently used violence to intimidate rivals and expand the spheres of their particular predatory empire. The armed militia leaders used threats of violence to
intimidate not only their rivals but also the whole process including international stakeholders who feared that walkouts could mean a resumption of hostilities. Indeed, most of the militia leaders frequently shuttled between Nairobi and their respective bases in Somalia to ensure control over their territories and armed militia groups.

In sum, cumulatively, a high degree of economic predation, pervasive and facilitative war economies and wartime actors’ dominant economic agendas over political agendas made inter-party and intraparty bargaining extremely difficult due to the presence of a mutually beneficial stalemate that emerged from the rewarding predatory war economies. Economic predation and pervasive predatory war economies did not occur in virtual space, but were anchored in social, political and economic environments in the collapsed state of Somalia. Camouflaging their predatory interests and agendas as clan politics, the wartime actors manipulated social structures (clans) and formed alliances to perpetuate the same. Hence, the wartime actors took peace hostage unless it promised to protect their predatory interests, facilitated profiteering from pervasive war economies and advanced economic agendas through a political process to legitimize predatory practices and secure their future. Such motivations and fears of peace dampened reconciliation efforts during the Mbagathi talks. These dynamics was characterized by the domination and hijacking of the peace process by the Leaders Committee, with constant threats of walkouts and actual walkouts by specific wartime actors, clan violence on the ground and endless foot dragging, goalpost shifting, building of alliances and counter-alliances—all of which undermined the emergence of ripeness.
Notably, the militia leaders were trapped in a vicious predation triangle (see figure 1) with competitive predatory politics centered on power-sharing deals, whereby each militia leader who participated in the talks did so in order to secure and protect their turf and solidify their status. As illustrated in the figure below, this study shows that even under a resource-poor environment such as Somalia, the conflict was characterized by a high degree of economic predation, and pervasive war economies and dominance of wartime actors’ economic agendas over political agendas, which contributed to a mutually beneficial stalemate leading to peacemaking struggles.

As the Somali study demonstrates, such dynamics of predation made inter-party bargaining harder due to competing wartime actors and allied clans’ irreconcilable and incompatible predatory economic interests, which undermined the emergence of ripeness.

6.3 Discussions of the Results

What does this study mean? What lessons does the study generate for peace negotiations under civil war environments characterized by a high degree of predation, pervasive war economies and dominance of wartime actors’ economic agendas over political agendas? Principally, this study presents five key insights for post-state collapse peace negotiations. First, overall, from the foregoing discussions, propositions and specific findings, as further summarized in the table below, the study’s critical contribution to the theory of political economy is that a different form of predation emerges in resource poor environments (social model of predation), which has a similar impact of the traditional greed-based model (economic model) based on traditional high-
value easily lootable resources, with the result that the emergence of ripeness is undermined. Moreover, this dissertation generates a theory of predation which states that even under a resource-poor environment such as Somalia, that lacks high-value easily lootable resources, a new hybrid form of predation is generated around non-traditional intangible, yet lootable, seemingly non-high-value resources as wartime actors manipulate and mobilize social structures such as clans (by applying social logic) in addition to economic incentives to recruit, maintain and build insurgent organizations.

Second, wartime actors deeply linked to predatory war economies and committed to the pursuit of economic agendas over political goals tend to be less interested in genuine peace negotiations than the perpetuation of their wartime empires. Thus, fear of peace is often exaggerated in a civil war environment where wartime actors engage and profit from pervasive war economies.

Third, observing that armed economically empowered clan-based militia leaders dominate political, economic and security environments, the study makes an uncomfortable conclusion that cooptation of violent and powerful armed wartime actors such as militia leaders is a necessary evil for post-state collapse peacemaking in failed states such as Somalia. Wartime actors mobilize clans and allied social groups with a promise to protect their interests and in such pursuits, use force and violence as dominant strategies of mobilization and predation. Due to their economic strength based on resources over which they have power, such wartime actors tend to dominate the negotiation talks because they control force in the form of gunmen and militias. Hence, a
coherent spoilers’ management strategy supported by both the regional and international community is imperative.

Fourth, where several relatively strong wartime actors exist, power symmetry cannot emerge, which in-turn undermines the emergence of ripeness. In the absence of a dominant actor further complicated by intricate clan relations and blood ties, reaching critical turning points of ripeness is often quite hard to achieve. Hence, identity politics had a neutralizing effect on the emergence of power symmetry between parties.

Finally, in addition to power symmetry and mobilized clan politics, predation nurtures poor leadership which is in itself a byproduct of the legacies of entrapping clan politics and wartime actors’ blind focus on economic agendas. Such dominance of economic agendas overshadows the development of coherent sustained national political visions and leaders with ideological stands despite the circumstance under which they operated. Before discussing these meanings in detail, it is also imperative to discuss how the study’s findings relate to prior relevant research and studies.

**6.3.1 Relationship to Previous Research and Studies**

The study builds on, complements and contributes to existing research as it relates to the political economy of civil war, particularly the economic greed-based model which Collier and other greed theorists advanced; the nature of new wars and war economies in shadow states; insurgents resource mobilization strategies; and civil war peacemaking literature with a particular focus on the ripeness theory. While this study examines the links between a high degree of economic predation, facilitative war economies, and
wartime actors’ dominant economic agendas and struggles of peacemaking in failed states such as Somalia, it is instructive to revisit and highlight some relevant prior literature in order to contrast and compare the findings of this study.

Previous studies on political economy of civil conflicts have concluded that a greed-based economic model—where the availability of high-value lootable resources entrenched greed agendas—generated greed-based wartime organizations. This study yields a different portrait of how predation unfolds under situations which lack such resources. This study contributes to and challenges key theoretical and practical knowledge of peace negotiations under resource-poor environment such as Somalia. The study concludes that under a resource-poor environment such as Somalia, predation solely based on economic logic and incentives is not sufficient to attract rebel participants and support the development of formidable insurgent organizations. Thus, the economic logic must exist alongside other motivations (for example, social incentives) in order to attract rebel participation.

It is now a commonly accepted fact that state collapse, such as occurred in Somalia, does not occur in a vacuum. As Kaldor and Duffield wisely noted ‘new wars’ in failed states aided by the forces of globalization have become processes of creating alternative institutions. 865 Similarly, scholarly studies by Reno, Keen, Collier, Berdal, Malone, and others have revealed that wars are opportunities for wealth creation and accumulation. 866 In the same vein, scholars like Kaldor and Duffield noted that the new

---

865 Kaldor, *New and Old Wars*; Duffield, *Global Governance*.
wars are products of alternative institution recreation processes, which are often shaped by the ‘strongmen’ and other strategic complexes. Under such circumstances, parties were trapped in what Allen called the ‘spoils of war’ or ‘war profiteering’ as Keen and Collier termed it. In weak states characterized by poor command and control structures, “…war may be a continuation of economics by other means.”

Building on the arguments by the scholars referred above, the case of Somalia points to the fact that in some resource-poor situations, the failure of states and the emergence of alternative institutions can sometimes lead to the creation of alternative forms of predation around which wartime actors’ contentions, economic motivations and predation are hinged or anchored. Under such situations, war stimulates opportunities for creating value out of non-traditional, less valuable resources. In sum, greed theorists such as Collier, Keen and others argue that greed shapes rebellions and that often politics is just a means of perpetuating economic interests – profit, accumulation and wealth. Basically, they argue that most civil wars are not driven by ethnicity or religious factors, but by economics. Understandably, ethnicity or identity ties were often used as group mobilization strategies. Eventually, pervasive war economies set in. Goodhand advanced that different typologies of war economies exist including combat, shadow and coping war economies. As Francois and Sud observed, the ‘ungoverned spaces’ in failed

867 Kaldor, *New and Old Wars*; Duffield, *Global Governance*.
869 Keen, “Incentives and Disincentives for Violence,” 27 (Emphasis in the original).
870 Ibid.
871 Goodhand, “From War Economy to Peace Economy?”
states are turned into breeding grounds for black market operatives, drug dealers, and criminal and terroristic groups.\textsuperscript{872}

Confirming such predications, this study has revealed that under Somalia’s resource-poor conflict environment, wartime actors, or what Duffield called ‘strongmen’ or strategic complexes, creatively engaged in a hybrid form of predation which used both economic and social logics to establish predatory institutions and perpetuate economic agendas, by manipulating social structures (clans). As identified in this case study, Somalia’s complex predatory war economies and wartime actors’ economic strategies were geared to exploit the combat and shadow war economies, while the civilian populations and minority clans struggled to sustain their livelihoods, augmented by facilitative roles played by the humanitarian agencies. Such complex interactions not only aided, but facilitated the perpetuation of wartime actors’ dominant economic agendas and interests. As Menkhaus observed, despite the collapse, Somalia did not degenerate into anarchy; instead, a form of fluid local governance structures emerged to perform the functions of the collapsed state.\textsuperscript{873}

State collapse conditions in Somalia created opportunities for political realignment of the society by dominant forces. The collapse of legitimate political authority did not leave a vacuum, but rather the forces that ousted Barre competitively occupied and dominated the political, security and economic voids in the country. A reconfigured state collapse landscape and new power structures led to the proliferation and entrenchment of powerful and resilient wartime non-state actors such as militia

\textsuperscript{872} Francois and Sud, “Promoting Stability and Development,” 145.
\textsuperscript{873} Menkhaus, “Somalia: Political Order,” 220.
leaders and transnational black market networks, which then pitched their clan, ethnic, factional or predatory business and economic claims to a region or a specific resource, with the objective to further their individual and collective political and economic interests.

Notably, as this study revealed, during the Mbagathi talks economic interests remained supreme. Thus, at the heart of wartime institutions there existed deep-seeded economic motives—driven by predation and a culture of greed nurtured by what Allen diagnosed as the perpetuation of African nations’ system of ‘spoils politics’—whereby competitive power politics driven by a desire for self-enrichment and patronage politics (whereby a ruler or contender dishes out ‘material benefits’ to allies) and coupled with poor economic performance, slips into ‘terminal spoils.’

These terminal spoils sustained wartime actors’ economic agendas and continued to undermine peacemaking under the resource-poor environment in Somalia.

During wars, economic resources are both the nectars that attract rebel recruits as well as the foundation for building strong insurgent organizations. As Weinstein observed, rebel leaders require critical resources to finance, sustain and arm their organizations.

Importantly, research by Weinstein reveals that under resource-rich environments, rebels and participants in rebellions are driven by greed and the promise of current economic gains; while under resource-poor environments, they are attracted by a commitment to social goods and economic rewards are considered secondary until after

---

875 Weinstein, “Resources and information problem,” 599.
the victory. Weinstein argued that the availability of high-value resources or the lack thereof have an impact on the behavior, character and orientation of insurgent groups. Resource-rich conflict environments such as Angola, Congo, Liberia and Sierra Leone attracted ‘opportunistic joiners’; while in resource-poor environments such as Eritrea, Ethiopia, Uganda and Rwanda, rebel leaders often activated social networks, class, local ties and nationalistic appeals to engage and sustain insurgencies. Advancing social ties and resource mobilization theorists such as Jenkins observed that social endowments are critical mobilizing structures for rebellions. Quite elaborately, scholars such as McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly argued that a group’s endowments shape the future strategic orientation of the insurgent organizations. Such opportunities aid in transforming a group’s economic strengths into selective incentives with a view to draw upon social opportunities in resource-poor conflict environments. This study advances a new theory of predation as summed and discussed below.

876 See Weinstein, Inside Rebellion; and Weinstein, “Resources and information problem.”
877 Weinstein, “Resources and information problem,” 599.
878 See Jenkins, “Resource mobilization theory.”
879 McAdam et al, Dynamics of contention.
6.3.2 Theoretical Implications of the Study

6.3.2.1 The Hybrid Model of Predation: Fusion of Economic and Social Logics

As opposed to the conventional greed-based model driven by economic interests based on the presence of high-value easily lootable resources, Somalia’s case study reveals a unique form of predation, which I will call the ‘hybrid model of predation’ whereby wartime actors utilized both the economic and social incentives to recruit and maintain insurgent organizations (see the table below). The hybrid model of predation, in addition to utilizing economic incentives to mobilize rebel participants relies on social endowment such as clan identities and social values to build predatory insurgent organizations. This form of predation makes peace settlement extremely difficult, as was the case in Somalia.

Challenging the existing literature on the greed-based model, which is based on predation revolving around high-value easily lootable natural resources, this study demonstrates that even under resource-poor environments, the political economy of war, in conflict situations characterized by a high degree of economic predation (economic and social logic) further aided by associated facilitative pervasive war economies where wartime actors’ dominant economic agendas prevail over political goals of reconciliation, matters and influences post-collapse peace negotiations. The study shows that there is a unique and dynamic interaction and fusion between predatory war economies, wartime actors’ dominant economic agendas and the dynamics of peace talks. Such fusion nurtures the emergence and institutionalization of a mutually beneficial stalemate – characterized by wartime actors’ convergence of shared economic interests and greed-
based predatory values—to continue the war, maintain the status quo and disrupt the emergence of rivals-dominated transitional authorities which might undermine the implementation of their economic strategy. Additionally, under such conditions, the wartime actors were more committed to the development of a satisfactory formula based on clan representation which aids their ability to mobilize social structures; and to demonstrate less interest in negotiation as a pathway to peace settlement, preferring instead to use violence to dominate rivals.

Table 7: Models of predation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Features</th>
<th>Mobilizing structures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic model</td>
<td>Greed-based and relies on economic logic of predation to exploit easily lootable high-value resources</td>
<td>Economic incentives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hybrid model</td>
<td>Relies on both economic and social logics of predation. Often occurs under resource-poor environments but is enabled by the presence of manipulated and mobilized social structures such as clan and blood ties. Relies on social endowments and social meanings of predation and rebellion.</td>
<td>Economic incentives and social rewards</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is the creative application of social logic based on manipulated and mobilized clan structures that completes the web of predation under a resource-poor environment. Under such a conflict environment, it is only then that predation becomes meaningful and a resilient deterrence to peacebuilding projects. Such mobilization strategies coupled with dynamic war economies and wartime actors’ economic predation behaviors and agendas significantly shaped the dynamics of the Mbagathi peace process. Indeed, as this Somali
case study reveals, in addition to economic incentives, social endowments and blood ties shaped the behavior of the rebel recruits. In Somalia, the clan-based factions, notably SRRC, TNG and a coalition of Mogadishu’s Big Five warlords (Muse Sudi, Hussein Aideed, Mohamed Qanyare, Osman ‘Ato’ and Omar ‘Finish’) were the relatively strong wartime actors and significantly shaped and undermined peace talks in the country.

As set out in chapter 1, the strength of a wartime actor is based upon a well-crafted economic strategy grounded on: the control of a territory, infrastructure, assets or key resources such as seaports, airstrips, marine resources, charcoal, checkpoints, khat trade and other symbolic landmarks; a capacity to command, recruit and sustain a well-armed militia force to play critical spoiler roles or to unleash violence; and a resilient internal loyalty and social base and the nature of external economic networks.

In Somalia, predation was not solely the preserve of internal armed militia leaders, but also sucked in business groups and foreign companies from around the globe. Predation and war profiteering promoted the bonding of local and global predatory economic networks based on commonly shared predatory interests and greed-based motivations to generate profit and accumulate and protect wealth. Perpetuated mostly by hosts of wartime actors including warlords, factional leaders and black market operatives, such predation led to the exuberant growth of illicit war economies including combat, shadow and coping types, which greatly boomed and enriched a vast array of war entrepreneurs—which ranged from the control of seaports and airstrips to scrap metal dealing to the provision of illegal licensing of fishing companies from the Far East to the Horn, providing critical revenue for the perpetuation and prolongation of armed wartime
empires in the country. As Duffield argued, war profiteers creatively avoid the pitfalls of the global system to protect their wealth.\textsuperscript{880} The Somali wartime actors linked up their local predatory war economies and aligned their economic agendas by marketing their looted products to regional, global and international markets.

As the state collapse prolonged, Somalia’s wartime institutions began adapting to doing business under unpredictable security situations. Over time, although relative stability emerged in the Somaliland and Puntland regions, southern and central Somalia remained in chaotic security situations due to the predatory nature of the emergent armed wartime actors. As discussed earlier, the wartime actors’ power base was anchored on the control of strategic resources such as seaports, airports, checkpoints, \textit{khat} trade, piracy, counterfeit currency printing and passports printing, arms trading, the selling of illegal fishing permits, and the illegal dumping of nuclear and other toxic wastes, among others. Particularly, the tentacles of predatory war economy networks significantly gripped the Mogadishu and Kismayu areas and the riverine environments (Juba and Shebelle Valleys), which became fiercely contested hotbed of factional warfare and predation—largely claimed by multi-clan factions and endowed with strategic economic resources and infrastructure.

Aided by the ‘dark side’ of globalization, the war profiteers established enduring regional and international networks whose interests were not founded on peace and stability in Somalia, but rather the perpetuation of a state of chaos and maintenance of the status quo. Hence, as Naylor observed under such circumstances, legal and illegal

economic activities became quite intertwined. In particular, post-state collapse Somalia nurtured opportunities for the impoverished youth, freelance security agents and mercenaries for hire to exploit the spoils of war in order to better their lives, or so they believed. In such endeavors, these actors became the fuel of predatory warlordism that consumed the soul of the Somali nation. Thus, in Somalia, predation, in addition to being a tactic to intimidate populations into submission and a critical element in spoiling peace, was a direct strategy to accumulate economic resources in order to boost factions’ political and military status. The militia leaders and business communities and foreign companies in Somalia—the major beneficiaries of war economies—resisted peacemaking as they had adapted to operate well under a state of chaos, misery and under pervasive state collapse conditions.

Grounded in the hybrid model, predation as a resource mobilization and socially engineered tactic to enrich individuals and clans, further critically shaped the behavior and sustainability of the emergent insurgent organizations. In sum, viability and resiliency of an insurgent group is a factor of the leadership’s ability to mobilize identity groups, raise resources to attract the recruits, finance and sustain the rebel institution and push for the achievement of the ultimate goal of the rebellion. In an environment of contested legitimacy, factions that controlled key economic resources, infrastructures and assets principally gain more and end up becoming influential players in the negotiation processes. Hence, economic predation is a means to a political end – which tends to be mutually reinforcing.

---

881 Naylor, Patriots and Profiteers.
As such, in Somalia, principal wartime actors such as the SRRC, TNG, Mogadishu’s Big Five, other business leaders, and clan militia groups were less committed to nurture and participate in genuine and substantive peace negotiations with reconciliation as the end goal. Specifically, the wartime actors, often working within the ‘Leaders Committee’ or diverse alliances, tactically used the negotiation process to sanitize their illicit wealth, secure their political and economic interests and legitimize their predatory empires by entering into unripe power-sharing arrangements. Utilizing their power and resources, these wartime institutions use mixed strategies of fear, violence, coercion and patronage politics (Big Man Syndrome) to create predatory and exploitative networks to institutionalize and expand their spheres of influence in order to sustain their economic interests and steer political negotiations in their favor. In practice, the emergent wartime entities were preoccupied with incessant political struggles, constantly fighting off a multitude of smaller, and typically weaker, factions.

The foundation of the social logic of predation is based on clans as mobilizing social structures. In Somalia, predation without a social logic would not have a meaningful impact on the dynamics of the predatory war economies and subsequent peacemaking processes. During the post-state collapse period, identity dominance (clan distributions) in particular regions further shaped the emergence of regionalized predatory armed institutions. Clan solidarity and the social support base were central to the strength of armed clan-based wartime actors as a degree of interdependence between armed militia leaders, clan leadership and allied business groups emerged. Scholars have
established the link between the power of clan solidarity and kinship ties in Somalia.\textsuperscript{882} As highlighted earlier, these connections, interdependent and symbiotic ties are illustrated by ingrained Somali sayings such as: “\textit{doofaar ficil la’aan ayaa lo cadaaba},” translated as “\textit{a warthog without the guts to look after his kith and kin is sent to hell}” and another saying goes, “\textit{tolkaaiyo kabtaadaba wa lagu dhex jiraa},” translated as, “\textit{rely on your clan’s protection as you rely on your shoes}” and finally, another states, “\textit{tolkaa ama bar ka ahaw ama badhtanka kaga jiri},” translated as “\textit{either lead or be led by your clan, but do not stand aside.}”\textsuperscript{883}

As such, in addition to other drivers, clan politics fanned the fire of clan-based predations. The foundation of this clan-based predation has more to do with the fact that Somalia, despite being a homogenous nation, had numerous clans and closely knight social relations. Importantly, as evidenced by Siad Barre’s deeply clan-based MOD (Marehan, Ogaden and Darod) dominated governance system with decades of poisoned inter-clan relations, the practice had a significant impact on clans’ relations in the post-state collapse period. With the collapse of the regime, many Somalis found comfort and security in their clan strongholds, hence the mushrooming of clan-based military organizations in the different regions.

Although on the surface, Somalia’s conflicts have frequently been described as clan-driven, this study reveals that clans were just smokescreens for deeply predatory and rewarding war economies—whose exploitation, resources and power were derived thereof, entrenched in economic interests which significantly undermined peacemaking efforts.

\textsuperscript{882} Mohamed, “Kinship and Contract.”
\textsuperscript{883} Adam, \textit{From Tyranny to Anarchy}, 112 (Emphasis in the original).
This formed the foundation of the social logic of clan-based predation in the post-state collapse Somalia. As mentioned earlier, during the prolonged civil wars in Somalia, it is peculiar how the predation processes unfolded, adopting both economic and social logic as wartime actors’ tactically hid behind the veil of clan politics, manipulated and mobilized social structures such as clan and sub-clan families with a view to perpetuate their economic agendas and build wartime organizations over political goals of societal reconciliations. In the end, it was observed that predation with both economic and social logic, aided by facilitative war economies and wartime actors’ economic agendas, dominated over political agendas as wartime actors competed for power with a view to create profit and to accumulate and protect wealth. Thus, clans were merely used as social support structures which provided abundant financial resources, weapons and a militia recruitment base for the clan-based insurgent organizations.

Moreover, Somalia had several relatively strong wartime actors deeply rooted at clan and even sub-clan levels. Giving predation a social face, the armed factional leaders, operating at either the clan or sub-clan levels, developed mutually symbiotic predatory relationships with clan members and their allied business groups: armed militia leaders depended on their respective clans and business groups for support, while the clans enjoyed protection of their clan interests and investments. In Somalia, various types of wartime actors emerged: occupiers/accumulators (USC, Darod and Hawiye factions), protectors/liberators (RRA and SAMO militias), and networkers (concerned about business and lacking clear political or military agenda such as Osman ‘Ato’). Business groups straddled the different categories from time-to-time. Often times, as previously
highlighted, factional displacement occurred as well-armed and stronger clans factions such as the USC, Habr Gedir and Ogadeni militias drove off poorly armed militia groups or weak minority clans (for instance, the Gosha, Bantu clans, SAMOs and RRAs) from their land and properties to create space for predation and then capture and enslave them.

Often the dominant wartime actors used insurgent organizations for their personal enrichment and pursuit of self-aggrandizing political ambitions – which basically was a concealed strategy for the perpetuation of their own economic interests and those of their allied clans and business groups. However, over time, in order to enhance the survival of their militia organizations, factional leaders developed creative strategies to spread and deepen the benefits of collective predation. The wartime actors mobilized and manipulated social structures (clans) to entrench their predatory practices and economic agendas – with clan members often participating in collective predatory enterprises. For instance, the Hawiye clan’s investment in the Coca Cola plant, Bashir Raghe’s construction of a private Isaley airstrip in Mogadishu, and Mohamed Qanyare’s sharing of the proceeds from the Daynille airstrip with factional leaders such as Hussein Aideed, Osman ‘Ato’ and allied clan members of the ICU are notable examples of key collectivist predatory investments with a social face.

Consequently, politics was a means to an economic end – eventually undermining the Mbagathi talks. The powerful wartime organizations used war and violence as strategies to control critical resources, around which they mobilized their clans for support and undermined peace talks which threatened to undermine their economic lifeline. Such wars facilitated the exuberant growth of an illicit economy, which greatly
boomed and enriched a vast array of war entrepreneurs across the clan divide, providing critical revenue for the perpetuation and prolonged factional warfare and civil war conditions. By the very fact that the diverse wartime actors found war meaningful and beneficial, conditions for sustainable peace negotiations failed to take root. Through clan manipulations and mobilization, dominant clan-based wartime actors carved up the country into predation enclaves as they pursued various economic interests and agendas. Despite lacking high-value lootable resources, predation with both economic and social logics defined Somalia’s predatory war economies in the post-state collapse period.

**6.3.2.2 Implications for the Ripeness Theory**

But how do predation and wartime actors’ dominant economic agendas over political goals aid or inhibit ripeness? In negotiations, as Mitchell argued, success is inbuilt and determined by the circumstances or context under which the process takes place. As Zartman argued, the ripeness theory, heralded by the existence of a mutually hurting stalemate, the existence of valid spokespersons and the realization that negotiation is the key to ending the conflict greatly enhances our understanding of the conditions that make conflicts amenable to successful negotiations. Additionally, from studies of negotiations of protracted internal conflicts such as in Lebanon, Afghanistan, Liberia, Colombia, Cambodia, South Africa and Mozambique, scholars generally observed that certain key conditions nurtured successful talks, including: ripeness, power

---

885 Zartman, Ripe for Resolution, 217; Zartman, “Ripeness: The Hurting Stalemate and Beyond.”
symmetry, legitimate and strong parties, shared interests and values, expectations of joint gains, a satisfying formula, the presence of strong internal and external pressure (for example, changing contexts, carrots or sticks), strong leadership structure within the parties, and finally, a mediator’s leverage and tactics. Ripeness, as Zartman pointed out, is not an automatic process but must be tactically nurtured.

Considering the struggles of peace negotiations in the country, does the ripeness theory tell us enough about Somalia’s protracted peace talks? Where does it fall short? In the Somali case, the Mbagathi talks took place after several years of state collapse during which predatory wartime actors, committed to predation and economic agendas, dominated the economic, political and security landscape. Hence, operating in an environment devoid of a functional central authority or regulatory framework, these wartime actors were enticed into rewarding war profiteering activities, jealously protecting their economic interests and undermining any peace process that threatened to curtail the advancement of their economic agendas. Hence, for many, peace was not attractive. Spoiler activities of wartime actors deeply linked to predatory war-economies and committed to the pursuit of economic agendas over political goals of reconciliation, made interparty and intraparty negotiations more difficult, and therefore ripeness harder to achieve. As this study demonstrated, due to the seduction and entrapment in rewarding predatory war economies, aided by the logic of economic and social incentives, ripeness failed to emerge and hence peacemaking in the country was undermined.

886 For detailed discussions on these case studies see Zartman, ed., *The Elusive Peace.*
887 Ibid.
Considering that Somali wartime actors were deeply involved in the web of rewarding predations in Somalia and their pursuit of economic agendas, without any form of sanctions in place, these economic predators were given a blank check to reap from the spoils of war. Naturally, the wartime actors saw peacemaking projects as threats to their rewarding and promising economic future. For example, the mere existence of factors for successful negotiation such as: shared interests and values, expectations of joint gains, a satisfying formula, power symmetry and strong leadership structure, and internal pressure did not lead to a mutually hurting stalemate - a key element of ripeness. On the contrary, as summarized below, in the Mbagathi case study, the presence of the above conditions had a different outcome: instead of stimulating a mutually hurting stalemate; the Somali situation fostered conditions that promoted a mutually beneficial stalemate.

First, the Somali wartime actors undermined peace because they were not committed to genuine negotiations and used the opportunity to politick or buy time to rearm their insurgent organizations and relied on the power of guns and clans to dominate others. The wartime actors had shared interests and values to continue engaging in predation and economic agendas, and the only expectation of joint gain was the future predatory prospects and utilization of the expected positions of political power to secure their economic interests and ensure that their rivals do not get access to political power in the future government. Additionally, the only satisfying formula for the Somali wartime actors was proportional clan representation which was often manipulated and mobilized to engage in singular or collective predatory enterprises. This formula basically became
the front for the clan to *eat* when their turn came.\textsuperscript{888} Just like their Kenyan brothers across the border, the Somali clans often saw their position of power in the various transitional governments not as opportunities to establish structures of good governance and societal reconciliation, but rather as a license to engage in unbridled official predation and corrupt practices to milk the State. Therefore, for most Somalis, clans and politics became the means to economic ends.

Second, the wartime actors did not believe in or invest in negotiation as a strategy to end the war, but as an opportunity to advance their economic interests and prevent rivals from rising to positions of leadership in the transitional authority. Consequently, the peace talks were turned into mere forums where the wartime actors took the per diems and much needed break from the war’s frontline as they retreated to Five-Star Hotels in various regional capitals, one after another.

Third, under state collapse conditions where no valid representatives or legitimate party exist and dispersal of authority had occurred, the issue of legitimacy and power symmetry as conditions for effective negotiation failed to hold. Indeed, against conventional thinking that peace processes among strong parties have better chances of success, the Somali study reveals the opposite. For example, the warring parties in the Sudan (government of Khartoum and the Southern Sudan Liberation Army) were strong enough to oversee the birth of sustainable peace negotiations, which resulted in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, thereby ending a 21-year civil war in the country. In

\textsuperscript{888} For detailed narration of similar regional cases, where African ethnic groups which occupies seats of power, resort to bad governance practices of sanctioned predation and official corruption, see Michela Wrong, *It’s Our Turn to Eat: The Story of a Kenyan Whistle-Blower* (London: Fourth Estate/HarperCollins Publishers, 2009).
Somalia, there existed several relatively strong parties (wartime actors) which were deeply engaged in predatory war economies and committed to the pursuit of economic agendas over political goals, thereby inhibiting the emergence of ripeness. Under those conditions, ripeness was curtailed as the presence of relatively strong parties (wartime actors) did not lead to effective peace talks, as no dominant actor existed to reign over and enforce a mutually hurting stalemate on the other parties.

Moreover, Somalia lacked visionary leadership which had a sustained political vision and commitment to rise above clan divisions, coupled with weak traditional structures and poor civil society leadership, ripeness failed to emerge. The clan-based politics of numbers and seduction of predatory war economies diminished the potential for the emergence of credible leadership among the various factions to lead them to the negotiating table. Most of the traditional leadership and civilian societal structures were either silenced by the power of the guns or co-opted through clan-labeled predatory rewards. Indeed, most of the dominant militia leaders in Somalia were illiterate and therefore lacked technical and professional qualifications to serve in the various cabinet positions they were accorded. Hence, beyond extending predatory economic incentives to their militias and clan associates, Somalia’s wartime actors could not offer strong ideological, credible leadership or a sustained political agenda to galvanize their movements and aid in the resurrection of the collapsed nation.
6.3.2.3 Violence as a Strategy of Predation and Peace Spoiling

Violence was quite pervasive and significantly undermined the emergence of ripeness in Somalia. Violence was used as both a strategy to spoil peace and to engage in predation and perpetuate economic interests. Darby advanced that four preconditions are necessary for violence to have catalytic effects on a peace process: high quality leadership; strong intraparty cohesion and strong connection between the leader and the constituents; timing—when the negotiated agreement is about to be born, peace is within reach; and the parties’ fear sliding down to an era of violence.\footnote{Darby, Effects of Violence, 97-98.} When these elements are present, then, violence precipitates peace.

Fear was used as a dominant strategy of mobilizing clan structures to facilitate predation and perpetuate wartime actors’ economic agendas. Concurring, as Lezhnev argued, driven by self-interests, warlords behaved like one-dimensional thugs and dominated their populations through violence and intimidation. Both the armed actors and determined spoilers controlled force and violence through gunmen and killings, rapes and looting by militias. Fractional leaders utilized political and military strategies to intimidate, dominate and terrorize populations into submission. Either through manipulation, intimidation or voluntary support, the most powerful armed militia leaders in Somalia commanded greater internal loyalty and support among specific clans and their business community members. Hence, the clans grew more fearful and mobilized to take charge of their own group’s security, survival and interests, but were often dominated by other, more powerful, clan families.

As a result, the dominant wartime actors in Somalia such as the SRRC, TNG and Mogadishu's Big Five exploited intergroup fear, security dilemma, suspicion and hostile relations to mobilize and dominate populations during the negotiation process. Such domination, in addition to empowering them economically, critically aided in enhancing dominant wartime actors’ status in the eyes of their clans and at the negotiating table during peace talks. Additionally, the fact that there were no credible peacekeeping forces on the ground and given the structural weakness of the Eldoret Declaration that lacked mechanisms for implementation, monitoring and verifying compliance, the various

893 Sasha Lezhnev, Crafting Peace: Strategies to Deal with Warlords in Collapsing States (Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2005), 2-3.
relatively strong wartime actors easily violated the Accord without fearing any repercussions or adverse regional sanctions.

Consequently, fear of peace was a major source of peacemaking struggles and similarly, violence was used as both a strategy of predation and of peace spoiling. As discussed in previous chapters, Somalia’s complex negotiation environment was characterized by the dominance of armed and predatory wartime institutions (warlord networks and their militias, business groups), pervasive clan politics, autonomous regional entities such as Puntland and Somaliland, which became critical spoilers in the process with influences from external allies. Often spoilers hindered peace for fear that the formation of a future government, which might be dominated by their rivals, would undermine their control and their monopoly over profitable war economies and risked weakening their factions militarily—hence damaging their political and economic status. These spoilers participated in peace talks to stay relevant, dominate the process to perpetuate their dominant economic interests and to appease constituents and allies or for merely politicking purposes.

As analyzed earlier, Somalia became a ‘Garden of Eden’ for war profiteers and other black market operatives as the combat, shadow and coping war economies flourished. In fact, wartime actors’ competition for profitable resources was much more prevalent as war became a creative business enterprise. The spoilers’ violent tactics were motivated by the desire to continue to engage in the rewarding predatory war economies, to obstruct any rival camp’s rise to power and to perpetuate their economic agendas.
In Somalia, no credible or coherent regional or international strategy for spoilers’ management emerged—hence the struggles encountered in the peace talks. Spoilers (ranging from internal parties, black market operatives, business groups, clans and even regional governments) had a field day and went about their predatory business without restraint. In addition to pervasive war profiteering and seductive and captivating predatory behaviors of dominant wartime actors, complex clan politics and interests and divergent patronage pull and push in the ITCS and the IFCS obstructed the emergence of coherent spoilers’ management strategies. The rewarding predatory war economies undermined the development, imposition and enforcement of a coherent regional strategy to deal with spoilers. Often IGAD and other regional governments made rhetorical statements without taking decisive actions to tame the spoilers.

In sum, dominant wartime actors in Somalia (the SRRC, TNG and Mogadishu’s Big Five) tended to accept and support the implementation of peace agreements that promised to further their political status and goals and not those that threaten to undermine the pursuit of their economic interests—they used politics to perpetuate their predatory economic interests. Under such circumstances, coherent regional and international spoilers’ management strategies with functional sanctions would have been required in order for the Mbagathi process to succeed and for its outcome to be sustainable.
6.3.2.4 Cooptation of Violent Armed Actors as a Necessary Evil

Should mediators co-opt violent armed predatory wartime actors as credible partners in the management of a peace process in failed states such as Somalia? Beyond struggles to overcome the challenges of parties’ politicking and competition for recognition and representational issues, mediators have often being confronted by the dilemma of whether to include or exclude armed wartime actors in peace talks. As Lyons and Samatar posed, tensions have often arisen on whether to accommodate the existing forces or support new actors in peacemaking and the reconstruction of failed states. This study emphasizes that the inclusivity of the armed militia leaders in the negotiation process was beneficial – however, such cooptation must be carefully managed. In Somalia, despite concerns about the domination of the talks by armed militia leaders, their exclusion, as shown by the experience of the Arta talks, was unwise and counterproductive. Likewise, dignifying them and giving them supreme decision-making powers through the instituted Leaders Committee as revealed by the experience of the Mbagathi talks, was equally problematic and counterproductive.

Basically, the resilient wartime actors engaged in platform-enhancing negotiation where they saw the peace process as a mere opportunity for maintaining the status quo or enhancing the pursuit of their political and economic interests. In peace processes, Ikle argued that parties often engage in ‘side-effects negotiations.’ The wartime actors committed to the pursuit of economic agendas, rarely participate in peace processes

---

894 Lyons and Samatar, Somalia: State Collapse.
895 See Fred Charles Iklé, How Nations Negotiate.
unless such engagements advanced their economic and political interests. Often, during the Mbagathi process, the SRRC, the TNG and Mogadishu’s Big Five signed peace agreements if the talks and the expected agreements promised to propel them to positions of power and status or due to pressure from their respective clans or patrons. For example, the armed leaders’ signature of the Eldoret Declaration in less than a week after the start of the talks was basically a patrons-pleasing gesture and a tactic to play a ‘leader’s role’ to strategically gain recognition as credible partners in peacemaking. The factional leaders also used the opportunity to position themselves strategically in the eyes of the mediators, and the regional and international community – a strategy which bore fruit following their crowning as Leaders Committee—a supreme decision-making body of the Mbagathi process. As discussed earlier, such a position of status and privilege enabled Somalia’s notorious war criminals to set the agenda, make decisions, identify and vet nominees of various technical committees and even parliamentarians and most importantly, held the ITCS captive.

As elsewhere, the Somali problem demanded a balanced participation that brought onboard political, military and civilian actors in order for a credible process to be initiated and sustained. In Somalia, with the support of the IGAD and other regional governments, the militia leaders through the Leaders Committee dominated the management of the talks, resulting in the formation of the TFG through which the majority of them became ministers. Basically their wealth, the raw power of the gun, and their monopoly over force and violence bought them to a position of power – which was essential for protecting their illicitly gained war spoils and riches, even under the new
order. Militia leaders became dominant because Somalia’s predatory wars were infused with complex clan politics (the social face of predation).

Further, in addition to domination by violent force, the Somali civil society organizations, clan leaders and business groups were highly politicized along clan lines and hence they obstructed the emergence of vibrant and credible civil society institutions. Since the armed actors were powerful determining spoilers with resources, as learned from the experience of the Arta talks, it was wise for the ITCS to co-opt them in the Mbagathi process. However, the major mistake was putting them in the driver’s seat of the talks with absolute authority—a situation which undermined the credibility of the Mbagathi process.

6.3.2.5 Power Symmetry and Poor Leadership as a Consequence of Legacies of Predation

Despite conventional knowledge that power symmetry between parties leads to effective negotiations, in Somalia, it undermined the emergence of ripeness because no credible political leadership emerged. Further, the problem was compounded by the fact that Somalia’s key armed wartime actors were both strong and weak at the same time. First, the country lacked a single dominant faction; rather it was characterized by the presence of several relatively strong clan-based insurgent organizations. Since predation in Somalia had inherent social logic, support from clans, allied business groups and external patrons found a way of eroding the power of strong actors such as the SRRC, TNG, Mogadishu’s Big Five and other multi-clan alliances such as the G8, G13, SNOC, among others.
Second, due to a fusion of predatory war economies with the pervasive nature of clan politics, security dilemma and competing patronage politics, the Somali political and security environments driven by fear of rivals curtailed the emergence of a clear dominant actor to ripen the process for resolution. Opposition by the leadership of the autonomous regions of Puntland and Somaliland undermined peacemaking efforts in south-central Somalia. Military stalemates did not emerge between the leading, relatively strong wartime actors (the SRRC and TNG) due to a continuous inflow of financial and military support from clans, allied business groups, diaspora and external well-established patrons, including governments from the Horn of Africa and the Gulf States. Such assistance delayed the emergence of mutually hurting stalemates and created a power balance, which undermined the ripeness of the Somali conflict. This explains why no Somali warlord had absolute domineering power to reign over others. During the negotiation process and in the post-Arta period, fierce opposition driven by armed actors fronted by the SRRC coalition and Mogadishu-based factional leaders prevented the TNG from institutionalizing itself in Mogadishu, in addition to opposition by the leadership of the Puntland and Somaliland regions. Similarly, during the Mbagathi talks, considerable opposition from the TNG leadership and key Mogadishu-based warlords troubled the process as well.

Third, Somalia’s political environment lacked credible internal leadership—a leader with a national following and acceptable to all the major clans. A key condition of ripeness, as Zartman argued, was the availability or presence of valid representatives.896

896 See Zartman, Ripe for Resolution and Elusive Peace.
This did not exist in Somalia during the Mbagathi talks. Competition among the diverse, relatively strong wartime actors inhibited the emergence of credible and acceptable leadership to unify the various competing clan identities.

Finally, due to competitive patronage politics and support, evidently neither the SRRC nor the TNG leaders possessed superior dominant military, political and economic power to shape the polarized Somali landscape in order to nurture effective peace negotiations. Support from regional patrons such as Ethiopia (an ally to the SRRC) against Djibouti, Eritrea and some Gulf States (allies to the TNG) further obstructed the emergence of a dominant military force to subdue the other and ripen the process. Due to the presence of an overwhelming multiplicity of actors, cross-clan alliances and diverse agendas arising from the deeply factionalized nature of Somali politics became a logistical nightmare for the organizers, leading to interconnected organizational challenges and constant disputes over the credibility and legitimacy of the various delegations. In fact, leadership continuity and effective control and command structure over their militias varied across factions—a situation which tended to cause anxiety while they were away at talks.

Consequently, this dissertation demonstrates that economic predation undermined emergence of credible political leadership to lead the warring parties to the negotiating table. Poor political leadership is a direct outcome of the legacies of entrapped predation and wartime actors’ blinding focus on economic agendas. The amorphous nature of factional militia leaders and the lack of credible command and control structures of most factions curtailed the emergence of credible leadership and undermined peacemaking in
Somalia. Thus, owing to dominant predation and too much focus on economic agendas, coupled with incessant supremacy wrangles and poor discipline among militias, credible leadership failed to emerge as even stronger and economically empowered militia leaders such as Mohamed Qanyare did not exercise total command over or absolute loyalty from among their factions. Moreover, although structural conditions undermined leadership’s command and control structures over their militia, predatory violence and looting to intimidate and dominate various identities remained the frequently used political and military strategies of warfare. Essentially, building effective insurgent organization demanded enhanced access to key strategic resources as a form of appeasing their predatory militias—to have access to looting opportunities while the masters were busy negotiating in Mbagathi.

During the Mbagathi talks, turbulent internal wrangling, factional splits and camp switching characterized the political negotiation process – which was flooded by over 60 factional groups, each of which brought their own delegates to the peace conference. Identity loyalty displacement occurred and shifted as state failure prolonged. Fractional loyalties became less and less dictated by clan or ethnic interests or allegiance to specific leaders, but instead were largely driven by predatory desires to create wealth and reap material and monetary rewards, as exemplified by factional competition for the control of strategic resources and militias’ looting sprees and taxes from makeshift roadblocks across diverse identity lines, among others. This on-going shifting in loyalty had three major implications: it undermined the emergence of credible political leadership, weakened the control of warlords and clan elders over their clan militias accentuating
opportunistic predation, and led to a mushrooming of relatively strong wartime actors. Frequent battles for supremacy and legitimacy afflicted contending parties in the Mbagathi process. Furthermore, the various factional leaders lacked a clear and sustained national political agenda and vision beyond their narrow predatory and divisive factional politics. Internal delegates’ intra-clan divisions, centered on personalities, led to the permeation of poor institutional leadership and societal incoherence, which obstructed the emergence of ripeness, as Somalia’s diverse, relatively strong wartime actors were largely clan-based and clan-supported. Hence due to a measure of power symmetry among the major clans (Darod and Hawiye), such paralysis hindered the rise of acceptable and credible nationalistic leaders to ripen the process.

In conclusion, the possibilities of ripeness conditions emerging was inhibited by resilient wartime actors operating in a complex interlinked enabling social, economic and political structural system, dominated by predation with both economic and social logics, complex clan politics and shifting and mutating alliances between clan factional leaders and allied business groups, in particularly Mogadishu and Kismayu – two hotbeds of predatory politics. For the shrewd wartime actors, it was better to be in a peace process and protect one’s economic interests from within than stay away from ongoing negotiations which might put their rivals in power. Trapped in such predatory politics and fearing the uncertainty that peace and emergence of a transitional government might usher in, these wartime actors used the talks to politick and thereby protract the negotiation process. For many, Somali factional leaders’ participation in perpetual peace talks was an opportunity to get away from the hassles of frontline warfare and to take a
much-needed vacation, at the region’s luxurious hotels with money-making opportunities overseas. The Mbagathi process attempted to ripen an unripe process. Over and above, factional military leaders, with new-found wealth, failed to free themselves from their criminal characters, succumbed to the seduction of predatory war economies and were deeply committed to perpetuating their economic agendas and thereby approached the peacemaking process quite skeptically.

6.4 Implications for Practice

This dissertation contributes to an understanding of the impact of a high degree of economic predation, pervasive war economies and dominance of wartime actors’ economic agendas over political agendas on peace negotiation processes in Somalia, with applicability to other similar cases—past, current and future. The Mbagathi experience reveals that Somalia’s violent wartime actors, linked to economics of predation, dominated the process and other stakeholders in the pursuit of their dominant economic interests through political means. Such conditions undermined the emergence of conflict ripeness. Such an enhanced understanding critically compels us to revisit previous and design better modalities and approaches for post-state collapse peace negotiation under situations where peacemaking environments are characterized by such aforementioned variables. There are inherent tensions between peacebuilding and state-building initiatives which tend to be intensified under state collapse conditions, such as were present in Somalia.
Under such conditions, the practice of post-state collapse peace negotiation demands a practical paradigm shift from peacemaking under otherwise ‘normal’ civil war conditions. Such paradigm shifts are essential if sustainable peace processes are to be crafted in the future. In this regard, this study advances a strategic pillar of post-state collapse peace negotiations centered on the following six key action steps, in order to ripen conflicts and build successful negotiations under predatory war economy conditions.

 Analyze the structure and logics of predation in order to understand the driving forces of war economies and structures, and the nature of economic agendas and tactics of predation;

 Map the nature and dynamics of social structures and the role of wartime actors and develop strategies to manage and curtail predatory war economies within the conflict setting;

 Map spoilers and other actors’ economic interests and networks, and develop credible and coherent spoilers management strategies by making predation costly and peacetime economies attractive;

 Develop strategies to transform militia leaders into politicians through collaborative leadership training;

 Introduce and support a third force by empowering traditional leadership and CSOs; and

 Stimulate ‘neighborhood ripeness’ to aid in spoiler management strategies.
To be effective, these strategies must be employed before, during and after peace negotiations so that the process will succeed and its outcome soundly implemented. The next section expounds on some of the key steps of the strategic peacebuilding pillars to stimulate lasting ripeness under civil war conditions characterized by a high degree of economic predation, pervasive war economies and dominance of wartime actors’
economic agendas over political goals of societal reconciliation. First, there is need for
greater understanding of the predation environment. It is imperative to analyze, map and
understand the structure of predation and its economic and social logic. It is critical to
establish the nerve center of the predation and the pervasive war economies, including
sources of revenue for the diverse wartime actors. Attention should be paid to the
transregional and transnational nature of the predation web and identify external
facilitating actors or conditions, particularly the black market networks and foreign
companies.

Second, it is important to understand the nature of social dynamics and social
structures and related identity politics that make predation possible. The analysis should
identity the types and nature of dominant wartime actors and their linkages to the war
economies. Beyond the usual armed militias, it is crucial to determine the types of actors,
their leadership and command structures, sources of support (both internal and external),
clan relations, identity loyalty and patronage ties and specific political and ideological
objectives. Such analysis should determine their specific histories and experiences,
linking them to external governments and other actors within the macro conflict system.
It is also essential to analyze the internal factional dynamics and possible fault lines,
which present opportunities or challenges for the negotiators or mediators.

Third, under such civil war conditions, the management of spoilers is a key
ingredient for nurturing successful peace talks. The Mbagathi peace process experience
demonstrated that managing competing wartime actors and development of credible and
coherent spoilers’ containment and management strategies are key fundamentals for
effective peace negotiations in failed states. The absence of such a strategy in Somalia to deal with spoilers and war profiteers and to harmonize divergent and competing regional interests coupled with actors’ fears and concerns over security imperatives, failed to promote ripeness and contributed to the struggles of the Mbagathi talks. In the management of spoilers, Stedman advanced that coercion, socialization and incentives are useful strategies. This study reveals that management of spoilers under state collapse conditions demands a more coherent regional and international strategy and effective implementation. Without clear sanctions and an international enforcement mechanism, deeply linked and enticed by the seductive war economies, spoilers and other armed wartime institutions and other transregional and international black market operatives lack sufficient commitment to genuine reconciliation talks.

As a key component of spoilers’ management, breaking the command and control structures of anti-peace wartime actors through carefully managed DDR should be established as prerequisites for participation in the talks. Third-party security guarantees, in the form of aggressive disarmament, demobilization, peacekeeping and peace enforcement, with stiff sanctions and other penalties for bad behavior, should accompany the signature of any peace accord and the inauguration of a transitional authority. Without such guarantees and sanctions, spoilers and profiteers from predatory war economies, committed to their own economic agendas, will have no incentive to support peace. Otherwise, transitional authorities are destined to fail as they will lack capacities to institutionalize themselves. Thus a credible and committed security stabilization plan is a panacea for post-state collapse peacebuilding.
Fourth, for a dramatic transition from a country at war to a country at peace, it is imperative to provide a catalyst to transform military leaders, whose mindset in the past was aggressive pursuit of selfish interests, into politicians and statesmen who will henceforth put the interests of their country as a whole ahead of their own interests, and those of their clan and business group. Not all militia leaders would be capable of such a transformation and even for those who are, the progression is likely to be sprinkled with failures and periods of backsliding along the way. One approach is to initiate collaborative leadership training for actors that have emerged out of the war as preparations for peace talks are initiated. It is critical that conscious and deliberate strategies be implemented to tactically work towards creating traditional civilian leadership, especially in conflict environments characterized by contested legitimacy and a power imbalance between militia and civilian actors. In the case of the Mbagathi process, in the end, the lords of war in the name of the ‘Leaders Committee’ occupied the driver’s seat in the search for peace and the focus tended to be more on unsustainable power-sharing in the proposed transitional government. Genuine societal reconciliation was pushed to the back burner of the talks. Indeed, a quick scan reveals that 10 notorious warlords (most of whom are illiterate) because of the power they possessed secured cabinet positions in the TFG during the Mbagathi talks (see table 8 for details).

Fifth, although it might not be easy to avoid co-opting violent armed militia leaders as partners in post-state collapse peacemaking projects, mediators should strike a conscious imbalance in designing their involvement in relation to those of the civil society and business groups, which should play greater roles. Legitimacy should be
vested in the resilient traditional and civilian structures of government and in countries where such structures have been greatly weakened, targeted pre-peace talks that focus on the shoring up of those weakened structures prior to the formal beginning of peace negotiations should be initiated. In as much as armed actors will be part of the emergent transitional authorities, efforts should be made to reconstitute and institutionalize a civilian leadership in order for durable peace to be nurtured and sustained.

The tested tigers of predatory war economies must be transformed into humble servants of the people. How? Co-optation of spoilers should be a short-term measure—balancing the participation of spoilers against a strategy to empower civilian leadership both during the negotiation process and in the implementation of the resultant peace agreement. Focus should be on pre-talks capacity building of traditional leaders and CSOs. For post-state collapse peace agreements to be sustainable, there should be a clear provision of power-sharing between the armed and unarmed wartime actors and specific timelines for transition to civilian leadership once a measure of stability has been realized. Robust regional and international commitments and capacity building for the transitional institutions must be fulfilled in a timely manner and tactically. The conclusion of a peace process and signing of an accord should not be seen as the end game, but rather as the beginning of a more difficult task of selling peace to communities and establishing critical structures to enhance sustainability. The peacemaking community should not expect transitional governments emerging from state collapse conditions to walk before they can even find their feet. It is thus essential to undertake leadership training, problem-solving and political education for selected wartime actors.
such as within an expanded Leaders Committee, with a view to sell the promise of long-term stability as opposed to current short-term gains.

Finally, as the Mbagathi talks revealed, ITCS was at the mercy of the Leaders Committee and was held captive since the mediators were unable to ripen the process; therefore, peace talks remained an uphill task. To ensure success, neighborhood ripeness conceptualized as the harmonization of regional governments’ readiness and willingness to support the neighborhood reconciliation process must be nurtured. For example, for spoiler management strategies to be successful, regional and international political will and interests must be harmonized to make the war economies less profitable, providing for extremely costly consequences for violations. Interdependence and nurturing of regional and international political will is critical for constructing, sustaining and implementing a post-state collapse peace accord. Mediators must make concerted efforts to nurture regional and international coherence early on, during the pre-negotiation phase, for peace talks to succeed. Importantly, as a feature of neighborhood ripeness, mediators must be carefully selected and capacitated in order to deliver success.

Often, African mediators lack capacity to competently mediate and therefore, end up being just meddlers without means. Thus, to foster success in a post-state collapse peace negotiation process, in addition to an enhanced understanding of both micro and macro level conditions, before picking mediators, the architects of the impending process must draw up a framework for capacititating any potential mediators. It is a fact that mediators rarely remain neutral and frontline states often have vested interests in the affairs of the neighboring failed states due to vested security concerns. Hence, it is
important to carefully consider the composition of the regional mediation team and more so, to ensure that it is diverse and not merely composed of representative from neighboring governments, but also from both regional and international actors including representatives of sub-regional organizations, the AU, the UN and local civilian representatives and other respected personalities to serve within the mediating body. Such a composition will provide a check-and-balance against the influence of regional powers and threats of macro-level fractionalization and polarization.

As this study demonstrates, a successful negotiation must be evaluated according to its transformative capacity to turn wartime structures of violence and belligerence into constructive peacetime structures of dialogue and problem solving. To some extent, a successful peace negotiation depends on the conflict mediators’ abilities to appreciate and competently exploit and manage internal and external conditions in failed states to foster a successful process.

In conclusion, the key to nurturing peace under such circumstances relies greatly on the implementation of the strategic pillar of peacebuilding put forth herein. It is critical to tame the dominant wartime actors, deeply linked to predatory war economies (drain or seal the reservoirs of predation and turn the taps off), and to break the triangle of predation web through the design of an honest dialogue process. The development of coherent regional and international strategies for spoilers’ management and security stabilization plan should focus on making predation unattractive and peace spoiling costly. As an idea for further research, it would be worthwhile to explore the impact of micro and macro-fractionalization among the Somali parties and IGAD member states in
contributing to the acute lack of ‘neighborhood ripeness’ which hindered the Mbagathi process. It is also essential to examine in-depth how social logics of predation has unfolded in different countries, apart from Somalia.
Figure 5: Map of Somalia
Table 8: Grand matrix of predation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Region/Area (s) Controlled</th>
<th>Clan Affiliation</th>
<th>Political Roots &amp; Military Strength</th>
<th>Economic Sources</th>
<th>Background and external Relations</th>
<th>Political Agenda</th>
<th>Key Leadership 200-2004</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Kismayu and Various</td>
<td>JVA</td>
<td>Kismayu airport</td>
<td>Good relations</td>
<td>Secure clan</td>
<td>Colonel Bare</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
surrounding areas. clans but dominated by Marehan, Ogaden and Habr Gedir. Formed to counter a coalition of the RRA, SPM and Puntland. 650-700 militia (loyal permanent forces about 300-370). and seaport, taxations, clan contributions, charcoal, and checkpoints. with Hussein Aideed and later with Ayer-dominated ICU. Kenya Controlled Kismayu port and environs and often clashed with General Morgan. interests, controlled Kismayu’s resources and Installed federal government from Kismayu to Gedo region. Adan Shire ‘Hirale.’ Hirale became the Minister for Reconstruction and Resettlement after Mbagathi.

3 The riverine region that includes Bay, Bakool, North part of lower Shebelle and some part of Gedo regions Parts of Baidoa. Rahaweyn sub-clans of the Digil and Mirifle. RRA Formed in 1996/97 against the forceful occupation of the USC-SNA. 5,000-6,000 (2500 militia force and about 4000 new recruits trained in 2002) and also had police to maintain law and order 15-20 ‘technicals’ and 23 smaller cars. Taxation, business, charcoal and checkpoints. Good relations with Puntland, Muse Sudi, SNF Gedo and the SRRC group Shatigudud initially supported the TNG but fell out with them in October 2001, which lead to a split within the Liberate its clan territory, install self government administration, and advance clan’s profile in Somali politics. Colonel Hassan Mohamed ‘Shatigudud.’ He became Minister for Agriculture in the TFG and Madobe became the Deputy Speaker of the TNA. Sheikh Aden Madobe Became Deputy PM in the TFG. Ibrahim Habsade
| 4 | Northern Gedo, mainly areas like Dolo, Gedo, Luuq and Beledhawo districts. | Darod mainly, Marehan. | SNF formed in 1991-93 after the collapse of Barre’s government by his loyalists. 400 militias (loyal force of 100-150). | Taxation; internal and external support. | Good relations with the SRRC groups, Kenya and Ethiopia. | Power competition, clan marginalization and fighting against caste system. | Mahmud Said Yussuf Kanti Nur Metan |
| 5 | Southern part of the Gedo region. | Dominated by the Marehan sub-clan. | SNF Garbahaare faction. Bihi’s faction had 4 ‘technicals’ 100-150 weapons per militia. | Taxation in urban areas, clan support and assistance from JVA. | Good relations with the JVA, Kenya and later Ethiopia. | Power and competition for resources and control of Gedo. | Colonel Abdirizak Isaak Bihi one of the factions of SNF led by the politically and economically dominant clans of Marehan, especially those who had lots of influence under Barre’s regime. |

---

| No. | Part of the upper Juba and the Kismayu areas. | The Ogaden of Juba mainly dominated by Awlian sub-clans and the Harti sub-clans of Kismayu. | SPM was formed in 1989 against the Siad Bare regime by various army officers from the Ogaden sub-clans. After, 1991 SPM expanded its membership and included the Harti sub-clans of Kismayu. In early 1990s it split into two: Omer Jess faction dominated by the Ogaden sub-clans of Mohamed Zuber and also affiliated with the USC/SNA and later with JVA; and the Aden Gabyow faction dominated by Ogaden sub-clans of Waltham and the Harti sub-clans. This faction was led practically and technically by General Morgan who | Taxation, air and seaport services, diaspora and clan support. | Good relations with SRRC, Ethiopia and Kenya (General Gabyow defected from Kenyan military while holding the rank of a Sergeant). General Gabyow served Barre’s regime as Defense Minister. General Morgan was former army commander and a powerful son-in-law to Siad Barre and infamously known as the ‘butcher of Hargeissa.’ | Clan interests and competition for the control of resources and port revenues. | General Abdullahi Aden Nuur Gabyow spent most of his time outside Mbagathi process but lost the control of Kismayu port to Hirale’s JVA forces. Omer Jess |

---

| 7 | Mogadishu districts mostly, Villa Somalia. | Haber Gedir sub-clan of Saad. | USC/SNA (Hussein Aideed faction) formed in 1992. Had strong militia in Mogadishu, central Somalia and the riverine regions. In May 2003, sold 41 Strella missiles to the Taxation, clan and diaspora support, business, foreign aid, and fake currency printing. | Former US marine and allied to the SRRC (pro-Ethiopia but a shifty personality). Allied to JVA, Puntland. | Political leadership and clan dominance in the politics and economy of Somalia. | Hussein Farah Aideed\(^{900}\) (became Deputy PM and Minister for Internal Affairs in TFG) Hussein Aideed took over after his father’s |

---


| US for $500,000. | Good relations with Egypt, Eritrea, Italy, Yemen, Uganda, Kenya, USA, Arab States, Russia, and Malaysia. | death. Weakened after the battle of Baidoa with RRA in 1998. Fluid leadership and unpredicted nature of politics and relations. Lastly, because of power competition within the leadership of the Saad sub clan, the role of Hussein Aideed was replaced by an ex-police officer Abdi Qaybiid. |

BBC, “Analysis: Somalia’s Powerbrokers.”

See Fisher, “Mogadishu Journal; A Peace-Starved City Weighs the warlord Factor.” He once displayed to a visitor his gigantic garage which was “filled with millions of dollars in bulldozers, backhoes and other heavy machinery.”
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Clan/Group</th>
<th>Key Events</th>
<th>Political Alliances</th>
<th>Other Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Part of north Mogadishu and the Medina district of South Mogadishu.</td>
<td>Abgal sub-clan (Weisle).</td>
<td>USC/SSA formed in 1993. Sudi controlled south and north (Balad district) part of Mogadishu. Had about 200-300 loyal fighters and about 50-150 ‘technicals.’ Considered Abgal’s dominant armed faction. But following the 2002 Mbagathi process, Sudi Jazira natural port before the port of Mogadishu and airport; opposed the TNG. Taxation, checkpoints, clan and foreign support. Muse Sudi previously a driver who worked with diplomatic missions. Considered a tough military leader despite his illiteracy and had good support from his clan. Member of the Personal as well as clan interests.</td>
<td>SRRC but later abandoned it. Good business relations with governments of Kenya, Italy, Egypt, Uganda, South Africa and Yemen.</td>
<td>Muse Sudi (became Minister for Trade and Commerce in the TFG peace deal). Omer ‘Finish’ (allied to the TNG and frequently clashed with militias loyal to Muse Sudi).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
was challenged by his deputy, Omar “Finish”, who split and formed another faction controlling the Medina district of Mogadishu. Since then the faction role as Abgal forces remained in vain and other sub-clans created their own sub factions; among them were Mohamed omer Habeeb ‘Dheere’, Bashir Raghe and Abubakar Omer Adani groups – which further weakened it.

CIA-funded Alliance for Restoration of Peace and Counter Terrorism (APRCT). Good relations with most but affiliated with Puntland, RRA and SRRC groups. Rarely traveled outside of Mogadishu, but visited Ethiopia when he did because of a cozy relationship. Friendly and meets with visiting foreign delegations but “the only power who could made him change his
<p>| | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jowhar and part of the North Mogadishu.</td>
<td>Abgal-Harti sub-clans.</td>
<td>USC-SSA (Mohamed ‘Dheere’ faction).</td>
<td>Taxation of businesses, checkpoints, Jowhar city and airstrip and several ‘bush airstrips’, charcoal trade, clan and diaspora support.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Mogadishu area</td>
<td>Abgal.</td>
<td>USC-SSA (Ali Mahdi faction)</td>
<td>Businessman and owned a hotel in Mogadishu.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

905 Interview with an Ethiopian military intelligence officer, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, November 17, 2009.
Allegedly accepted money and allowed dumping of Italian toxic diesel waste off the Somali coastline.

interim President after the fall of Barre, but clashed with Farah Aideed. While heading USC-SSA, he had good relations with Egypt, Italy, Djibouti and Ethiopia (1996-1997). He was Egypt’s Liaison officer and Egypt provided him with a residence in Cairo in the post Sodere period until 2000.

political group; respected leader of his Abgal clan; could cause problems in Mogadishu if he wanted. Participated in the Sodere process of 1996/97 and elected as one of the Presidency of the Council of Somali Salvation. Participated in the creation of the TNG and setting up of the Banadir administration in 1997 in Cairo with Hussein Aideed and Qanyare and had rapport with them and
| 12 | Some areas and roads of Mogadishu. | Abgal. | USC  
In 1992 when Aideed took over USC, they split and formed USC-SSA together with Ali Mahdi and others. Weak military power; had only a handful of bodyguards who safeguarded his residence, had 7 ‘technicals’ loaded with heavy weapons and 10-15 militias. Often relied on relatives who had 5 ‘technicals.’ The group was not influential and only controlled areas where Mr. Bode resided. | Checkpoints, business and foreign aid. | Very well educated, diplomatic problem solver and considered himself Ambassador for peace and reconciliation.  
Good relations with most factional leaders, and city merchants. Close ally of Musa Sudi which turned sour when he accepted the TNG. | Clan and later personal interests. | with Bod. Contested the TNG Presidency, but lost. |
|   | Part of Mogadishu near Bakarah and the Daynille district. | USC. Mursade sub-clans and other related Hawiye clans. | 2000-man militia. Good command and control over his militias as he was able to regularly pay them. | The lucrative Daynille airstrip frequently used by *Khat* traders and UN. Had large fishing fleet and engaged in lucrative fishing business. Proceeds from checkpoints near Bakarah. Allegedly illegal drug business, money laundering and kidnapping syndicates, transport and security services. | Good relations with his clan and factional leaders such as Osman ‘Ato’, Aideed, Sudi and TNG’s PM Galaydh. Member of the CIA-funded APRCT. | Lacked specific political or expansionist agenda but protected his personal and clan interests. | Mohamed Qanyare Afrah President of the USC in 1991-1992. Member of Manifesto Group and a very wealthy man. Joined Farah Aideed’s government in 1995 and elected as the deputy President. Due to his personal friendship with TNG’s PM Galaydh. |

---

907 Crawley, “A dovish Somalia offers militias training.”
<p>| | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| His factional friends such as Muse Sudi and Osman Ali ‘Ato’ were not happy when he joined the TNG. He subsequently lost his ministerial position after a vote of no confidence ousted Galaydh’s government.  

---

---

Galaydh, he supported TNG and was appointed as Minister for Fisheries. Later became Minister for National Security in the TFG after the Mbagathi deal. Among the prominent warlords of Somalia and due to his financial strength, he was involved in various political and economic activities.
| 14 | Hiraan region and some pocket in Mogadishu controlled by its clan. | Hawadle sub-clan dominated | USC Had about 400-600 fighters. Strong militias in Hiraan /Beletweyn regions. Later due to leadership problems and rise of radical groups, the faction’s influence diminished dramatically. | Checkpoints and taxation in Beletweyn. | Had relations with the SRRC, Puntland but later shifted its alliance to groups against the SRRC. | Clan interests. | Colonel Omer Hashi |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 15 | Reverine areas and some parts in Mogadishu. | Clans of Bantu origin. | SAMO | Clan contributions. | Originally good relations with USC/SNA, but latter with SRRC groups. Also good relations with Kenya, Ethiopia and USA. | Protect group’s interests and fight marginalization and enslavement particularly in the riverine areas of Juba and Shebelle river valleys. | Mowlid Ma’ane Mohamoud |
| 16 | Merka and parts of Qoriyole areas. | Biyemal and other Dir sub-clans. | SSNM (BERIM) Had weak or zero control in the areas where the group claimed. The group did not actively mobilize Biyemal clans to rise against the invaders, | Clan contribution and foreign assistance. | Good relations with Puntland, SRRC group and Ethiopia. | To liberate its clan territories occupied by Habr Gedir forces. | Sheik Ismail Former Somali Ambassador. |
| 17 | Merka and Qoriyolle area, Lower Shebelle. | Habr Gedir – Ayer sub-clan. | USC- SSA ICU | Port services, checkpoints, plantations, security services and drugs farms. | Close relations with the Islamic radical movements and the ICU in Mogadishu Eritrea. | Personal, ideological and clan interests. | Yussuf IndoAddhe By the virtue of the weakening of the Hussein Aideed’s faction and the AIAI, IndoAddhe got a chance to be a powerful warlord who protected and maintained the interests of the Habr Gedir clan, particularly the Ayer sub-clan. |
| 18 | Bashir Raghe Parts of North Mogadishu, the El Ma’an seaport and Isaley airport. | Abgal | USC- SSA | Airport and seaport income, businesses, foreign assistance, especially US, as member of the CIA-funded | Good relations with other Abgal warlords, El Ma’an business groups and American security networks, | Personal interests and, at times, those of the clan and allied business group. | Bashir Raghe His wealth and clan support enabled him to be a powerful factional player. |
| 19 | Most of North Mogadishu and areas controlled by the Ayer sub-clans (Mogadishu). | Mostly Habr Gedir’s sub-clans of Ayer, Selleban, Duduble and others from Abgal sub-clans. | ICU emerged to provide law and order, resolve disputes among locals and business actors. Hence expanded areas of influence. Controlled approximately 14 clan-based Shariah courts, with 13 rooted in the Hawiye clans. ICU was established to strengthen the various clan-affiliated Islamic Court networks in Mogadishu. AIAI founded in late 1980s and operated | Support from clans and business persons, foreign aid from external governments and organizations from Eritrea (due to proxy war with Ethiopia), Egypt, Iran, Hezbollah, Lebanon, Libya, Djibouti, Saudi Arabia and | Strong links with various Islamic groups and radical movements such as the Ras Kamboni and AIAI, Saudi based NGOs and the government of Saudi Arabia, other Islamic INGOs and other Gulf states. | Strategy to install Islamic state and became heavily militarized. Expand area of control by providing security. | Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys. Became one of the founders of Mogadishu’s ICU. Staunch opponent to the TFG and Ethiopia. A former military Colonel in Barre’s regime who became a top official in AIAI. |

---

911 The UNMG on Somalia termed it the ‘third force’ as the Courts became militarized and began arms purchases. See Schiemsky et.al, S/2006/229.
912 Colonel Sheikh Aweys was a veteran of the Ogaden war and in 1989 Barre’s regime sentenced him to death by firing squad due to his AIAI membership, but was later pardoned and returned to the army. After the collapse of Barre’s regime, he rejoined AIAI as its vice-chairman and commander of the military wing. See ICG, *Can the Somali Crisis Be Contained?* 17. In 1992, AIAI fighters under the leadership of Aweys, staged a failed coup in northeastern Somalia and in the process held hostage about 40 senior officials of the SSDF including Colonel Yussuf. Since then, the relations between Yussuf and Aweys and other Islamists have been hostile and violent. See ICG, *Somalia: Continuation of War by Other Means?* 15.
from southern Gedo region. Estimated to total about 10,000 -20,804.\textsuperscript{910} The rise of the ICU scared the regional and international community which, fronted by Ethiopia, invaded the country in 2006 to flush out the ICU. Although Ethiopia successfully dismantled the ICU, in its place, powerful Al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam radical terrorist groups have emerged.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Syria.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Sheikh Sheriff Ahmed Became President of Somalia in January 2009 through a UN-brokered peace agreement.

\textsuperscript{910} Former Ambassador and co-chair of SRRC puts it at 10,000 while warlord Morgan puts it at 20,804, see McNeil, “A New Scrutiny.”
| 20 | Most of Lower Juba region. | Ogaden’s sub-clan of Mohamed Zuber. | The Ras Kamboni Group had been part of the AIAI, and created its own area of control and constituency in the aftermath of the Luuq war in 1990/97. Of all other AIAI branches, this group was highly involved with the global jihad, thus it helped Al-Qaida operatives in attacking the US Embassies in Nairobi and Tanzania in 1998 and the bombing of an Israeli-owned hotel in Mombasa in 2002. | Foreign assistance,\textsuperscript{913} fishing and business groups and sympathizers from Somalia, Kenya and others. | Linked with the global Jihadist networks. | Install Islamic state and ideological global Jihadist orientation. | Sheik Hassen ‘Turki’ Sheik Ahmed Madobe. |

\textsuperscript{913} Reportedly, AIAI operated several educational institutions and had about 100,000 students, and for each student they received a monthly donation of $300 from Gulf-based organizations. Certainly, during this period they generated about $30 million per month which enhanced their military capacity. See Tambi et al, S/2005/153, 15.
REFERENCES


*Africa Confidential*. “Possible president.” *AC* 41, 17, September 1, 2000.


Blomfield, A. Adrian. “Americans hunt for al-Qa'eda in Mogadishu ruins Ten years after its ignominious withdrawal, the US has returned to Somalia.” Daily Telegraph (London), March 27, 2004.


Bradbury, Mark ed. The Search for Peace: A Synthesis Report of the Peacemapping Study. A Joint report produced by Interpeace, Center for Research and Development,


Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD). *Communiqué of the 9th IGAD Summit of Heads of State and Government on Somalia.* Khartoum, January 11, 2002.


Kane, Sean. Fishing for the Motives that Lie Behind Piracy: Attacks on Vessels Can Often Be Attributed to Social Deprivation in Coastal Regions, LLOYD’S LIST, March 5, 2008.


Ross, Michael. “Oil, Drugs, and Diamonds: The Varying Roles of Natural Resources in Civil Wars.” In *The Political Economy of Armed Conflict*, edited by Ballentine and Sherman, 47-70.


Russett, Bruce M. “Inequality and instability: The relation of land tenure to politics.” *World Politics* 16, 3 (1964):442-54.


CURRICULUM VITAE

Roba D. Sharamo grew up in northern Kenya. He attended Kenyatta University in Kenya, where he received his Bachelors of Environmental Studies in Planning and Management in 1998. He went on to receive his Masters of Arts in Sustainable International Development from Brandeis University (US) in 2002. He then received his Doctorate in Conflict Analysis and Resolution from George Mason University (US) in 2012. He has over 15 years experience in international development, diplomacy and conflict analysis and resolution where he worked in senior management positions with the Government of Kenya, non-governmental organizations and a leading think-tank, Institute for Security Studies in Addis Ababa and Nairobi, among other institutions. He has lectured and made presentations at numerous regional and international conferences and published key articles on peace and security in Africa including a recent one, “In the Eye of Terror: Challenges of Building Peace in Somalia,” Horn of Africa Bulletin, August 2011. He also co-edited a book with Berouk Mesfin entitled Regional Security in Post-Cold War Horn of Africa (April 2011). Currently, he works for the United Nations Development Programme in Kenya, as the Team Leader of the Peacebuilding and Conflict Prevention Unit. He plans to pursue a distinguished career in international peace, security and development.