Migration Studies at a Crossroads: A Critique of Immigration Regime Typologies

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Migration Studies at a Crossroads: 
A Critique of Immigration Regime Typologies

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Abstract:

International migration and its scientific examination have reached a crossroads. Today, migrants are pursuing opportunities in new destination societies with growing economies and alternative forms of governance from democratic states—transformations that complicate established understandings about national immigration models and their evolution. In light of these transformations, this article reviews the field of migration studies and its sketching of immigration patterns in the contemporary period. It critically examines existing systems of classification in a way that creates space for revised approaches. In doing so, this article identifies three key limitations with existing approaches. First, existing classifications largely focus on Western states, and especially traditional destination countries. Second, existing classifications are weakened by unclear or poorly defined indicators. Finally, even those classifications with improved indicators are hindered by approaches that examine admission and citizenship/settlement regimes independently of each other, ignoring a possible migration-integration policy nexus.

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Introduction

International migration\(^1\) and its scientific examination have reached a crossroads. Today, migrants are pursuing opportunities in new destination societies with growing economies and alternative forms of governance from democratic states. Accordingly, the entry and naturalisation of immigrants is evolving in ways that appear to diverge from the approaches adopted in traditional, largely Western, receiving states. Simultaneously, many of these traditional receiving states are responding to uncertain economic conditions and xenophobic public opinion by restricting entry to their societies. These transformations complicate established understandings about national models and their evolution. While this variation of immigration regimes is reflected in a growing range of social science analysis, it has not yet been adequately theorised in a unified, systematic and comprehensive manner.

Most reflective of this under-theorisation is a lack of contemporary systems of migration regime classification. Many scholars of migration studies characterise whole national regimes using partial considerations of some aspects without a clear identification of the constituent parts of a migration regime. Others — aware of these limitations — draw conclusions about specific dimensions, such as labour migration, citizenship or integration outcomes, but do not contextualise these within a larger understanding or framework of overall migration regime types. Further, many studies characterise different national policies without regard to how closely these policies are enforced in practice.

\(^1\) This article is exclusively concerned with international migration, as opposed to internal migration. These are ultimately different phenomena that merit separate treatment, though they have been considered together by a collection of geographers and anthropologists in the past (see Skeldon 2006). Internal migrants only alter local and regional socio-political trends and, as most states do not monitor sub-national borders, movement is typically unregulated and difficult to measure. International migration requires individuals to register and adapt to a new society and system, leaving questions about their membership and acceptance with the possibility of deportation.
Many contemporary approaches suffer from an unsystematic comparative analysis with case selection focused on democratic, and often, Western European or North American states. Yet, as we explore in this article, over 48 per cent of current immigrant stock globally is resident in states hitherto understood as part of the periphery, semi-periphery, or the global South. As the distribution of resources and political power moves from West to East (and North to South), the supply of migrant labor to countries like China, Brazil, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates is of increasing importance, and must be acknowledged within migration regime typologies. Yet, without a comprehensive consideration of a fuller range of migration countries, based on comparable data, researchers are unable to classify different states’ treatment of this phenomenon in a universal way. Instead, social scientists continue to use approaches and theoretical understandings that have been complicated, challenged or rendered obsolete by real-world trends.

In light of these trends, this article reviews the broad field of migration policy studies and its sketching of migration policy regimes in the contemporary period, since 1985.\(^2\) It critically examines systems of classification in a way that creates space for future approaches accounting for conceptual shortcomings, but also contemporary empirical transformations. In doing so, this article identifies three key shortcomings. First, existing classifications are limited to OECD states, and especially traditional destinations. Second, existing classifications, especially those of immigration entry, are weakened by indicators of questionable validity. Finally, even those classifications with improved indicators are hindered by approaches that examine admission and integration/citizenship regimes independently of each other, ignoring a possible immigration-integration policy nexus.

\(^2\) We begin our analysis in 1985 as this is the point where Hammar (1985) first conceptualised migration as comprising both immigration admission on the one hand, and integration and settlement on the other.
With these shortcomings in mind, we contend that the field of migration politics is positioned for a revised approach to regime classification that addresses these three concerns of case selection, indicator conceptualisation and aggregation. However, it is first necessary to consider the empirical and theoretical rationale for development of robust typologies of migration regimes in the first place.

**The Need for Robust Migration Regime Typologies**

Regimes (of any kind) have been defined in different ways. The most widely accepted definitions apply to the international sphere. Krasner (1982, 185) defines regimes as sets of “principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area.” Wilson (2000, 256), with a focus on public policies, defines regimes as “governing arrangements constructed by states to coordinate their expectations and organise aspects of international behavior in various issue areas.” As we explore in detail in the next section of this article, a range of typologies that attempt to classify migration regimes exist.

States differ in their patterns of immigration policies and their outcomes, conditioned by historical legacies, situated norms, institutional constraints, popular will, the character of sending states, and situated economic forces. What are the reasons to map variation in regimes? We argue that there are empirical, theoretical and practical policy reasons for this endeavour. From an empirical perspective, it is useful to map the universe of current immigration regimes both in OECD and in key non-OECD countries. This includes the assessment of variation across key dimensions of migration (such as the size of flows, reliance on temporary migration, mix of immigration flows and immigrant stock and naturalisation rates). Some data on migration flows and stock exists currently,
largely through the United Nations Population Division (UNPD) and the Organisation of Economic and Co-operation and Development (OECD). However, this data has not been analysed or synthesised into possible Weberian types of regimes. Further, aside from this currently available data, there is scope to augment these datasets with wider collection exercises in non-OECD countries, in order to reflect global patterns. Understanding how, if at all, states are clustered together across different dimensions of migration outcomes would assist in developing a more generalised understanding of migration patterns globally. Such clustering would also provide a rigorous basis for case selection in future small-N qualitative case analysis in the migration field, as analysts could more accurately identify “exemplar” cases of particular typology types, as well as outliers, or intermediary cases. As George and Bennett (2005, 251-264, cited in Møller and Skaaning 2012) note in their broader assessment of typology development, such approaches can be used to select cases for in-depth qualitative analysis, including process tracing.

Aside from these empirical contributions, robust typologies allow scholars to analyse and deepen existing theory. As Collier and collaborators note in their recent defence of the use of typologies in political science (2012, 224), typologies can be used “to introduce conceptual and theoretical innovations, sometimes drawing together multiple lines of investigation or traditions of analysis.” While some theoretical debates engage causal arguments, which arguably are ill-suited to a typological account (but c.f. Møller and Skaaning 2012), there are a number of enduring debates within migration studies for which a robust mapping of migration regimes would prove important. The first is the relationship between different aspects of the migration process, including immigrant entry, settlement and naturalisation. As we outline in more detail in the third critique below, consideration of the interrelationship between these various stages of the migration process is
underexplored within existing typologies. While some such as Hammar (1985) identify a clear bifurcation between migratory entry and integration, for others, the two are interconnecting in important ways and effectively amount to an immigration-integration nexus (see Meyers 2004, cited in Freeman 2006, 228). Bader (2007) acknowledges emerging demand for the “construction of patterns” that demonstrate “some minimal internal coherence” within the “unstructured complexity” of public policies addressing immigration and settlement. Another enduring theoretical question is whether there is a gap between government immigration policy and actual immigration outcomes. This gap may arise either through implementation shortcomings or the unintended consequences of policy design (Cornelius and Tsuda 2004, 4-5; Messina 2007). Typologies of migration outcomes can be compared against documentation of immigration outputs (laws and policies) in order to identify the relative capacity of states to manage migratory flows. Finally, the relative role of push versus pull factors in generating immigration flows is an enduring—some would contest a central—argument within migration studies (Massey et al, 2006). A clear mapping of migration regimes globally is essential to examine the relative importance of push and pull factors in informing global movement.

Migration typologies also create important input data to test theoretical claims that may not be intrinsically related to migration studies, but are relevant to the broader social sciences. As such, typologisation is central in the development of a wide range of “independent, intervening and dependent variables in explanations” (Collier et al, 2012, 226). These include questions pertaining to partisanship and party politics, ethnic relations, trade, democratisation, and support for the welfare state. For instance, migration regime type could be a central explanatory variable behind the rise of the radical right (Arzheimer 2009). Yet, at present, measures of immigration policy focus on
rubrics of multiculturalism (Banting and Kymlicka 2006a; 2006b) or party policy platforms derived from the Comparative Party Manifesto Dataset (Benoit and Laver 2006), rather than considering actual immigration outcomes, the latter of which is arguably a more accurate input of migration regimes. Third, from a practical public policy perspective, there is also utility in developing typologies of migration outcomes. Such typologies allow governments to more carefully benchmark themselves against other countries. This assists countries in determining how they are performing compared with other most similar countries, and can provide aspirations for improvements in the future.

**Current Typologies of Migration Regimes**

A variety of migration typologies have been developed covering both immigration control on the one hand, and naturalisation and settlement, on the other. Tomas Hammar (1985b, 7) classically drew a distinction between a) “the regulation of flows of immigration and control of aliens”; and b) “immigrant policy.” Following this original distinction, typologies can be loosely divided into those that deal with issues of admission and those that cover what happens to immigrants once resident in the host society. The first encompasses the entry of immigrants, whereas the second relates to “issues that influence the condition of immigrants [once settled]; for example, work and housing conditions, social benefits and social services; educational opportunities and language instruction; cultural amenities; leisure activities, voluntary associations, and opportunities to participate in trade union and political affairs” (Hammar 1985, 9). Intersecting with this substantive fault line is a second distinction between policy outputs and policy outcomes. Jim Hollifield draws a distinction between the two with the former comprising “the binding decisions, their implementing actions and […] certain associated kinds of behavior,” and the latter being the “result[s] of policy
implementation” (Hollifield 1986, 114-5). In the immigration field, outputs might include laws and regulations that control and admit immigrants (and their integration) while outcomes are what actually happen on the ground in terms of entrance of immigrants and their subsequent integration. The major typologies of both immigration and integration, cover both outputs and outcomes, and are set out in Table 1 below.

** Insert Table 1 about here.**

Looking first at immigration control, most current typologies distinguish between “settler states” (United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand), Northern European states that received large numbers of workers through guest-worker programs in the post-World War Two period (Germany, United Kingdom, France), and the former sending states of Southern Europe, that became immigrant-receiving nations (Spain, Italy, Greece). As is clear from Table 1, Freeman (1995, 893) draws a classic distinction between English-speaking settler societies (the United States, Canada and Australia), European States with postcolonial and guestworker migration systems (Great Britain, France, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland) and new countries of immigration (Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece). Janoski (2010, 9-16) differentiates between the “settler societies” (Australia, Canada, United States) and the Nordic countries with “colonisers” (France, Netherlands, United Kingdom) and the highly restrictionist “non-colonising” countries Japan, Germany, Switzerland. Cornelius and Tsuda (2004) distinguish between “classic countries of immigration” (the United States, Canada and Australia), “reluctant countries of immigration” (France, Germany, the Netherlands and Britain) and “recent countries of immigration” (Italy, Spain, Japan and Korea). Other studies follow these general distinctions but focus on a smaller number of
countries, such as Joppke (2000) – the United States, Germany and Great Britain, Joppke (2005) – the United States, Australia, Western Europe and Israel, or Freeman (2006) – Australia, Canada, the United States and the European Union. Hammar (1985) considers trends within Western Europe and unlike other studies, also identifies some overlap in categorisation between Germany and Switzerland (‘guestworker’ or ‘rotation system’), Britain and Sweden (‘permanent immigration’) and Britain, France and the Netherlands (‘postcolonial immigration’).

Theorists differ on the extent to which these typologies are viewed as path dependent over time, or susceptible to broader global pressures. Some include a temporal dimension, whereas others focus statically on one particular moment in migration policy development. Janoski (2010) for instance, argues that historical legacies of colonialism play an enduring role in current day naturalisation practices, while Freeman (1995) claims that there is a natural teleology towards a settler state model (but c.f. Boswell 2007). The notion of converging typologies has also been rationalised on the basis of harmonisation of immigration policies across the European Union as a result of supranational policy (Guiraudon 2002). Recently, a Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) literature has emerged, that seeks to arrange immigration selection policies according to capitalist systems design rather than patterns of immigration control. These typologies focus on the interaction between educational training systems and trade union/employer arrangements and shaping immigration, in particular the distribution between skilled and unskilled labour migration, and sectoral divisions in labour immigration policy (Caviedes 2010; Devitt 2011; Menz 2009). The focus of this political economy approach is largely on West European nations.
Looking to the citizenship and integration sub-field, Table 1 makes clear that there are a number of well-developed typologies that classify regimes according to models situated in national history. Brubaker (1992) distinguishes between French republicanism and German ethno-nationalism and considers the implications for integration of immigrants. Castles and Miller (2009, 44-5) extend this typology of citizenship to four categories: those countries that integrate members or former members of multi-ethnic empires; those that focus on folk or ethnic dimensions of allegiance such as culture of language; those that adopt a republican model based on allegiance to a constitution or laws; and a fourth, multicultural model which focuses on pluralistic approaches to cultures. Other scholars have contested the republican/ethno-national divide either in the modern era, or historically (Joppke 2010, 19; Lucassen 2005; Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002).

Recent activity since 2000 reflects a particular interest in the development of robust citizenship regime indicators based on policy outputs. Scholars have developed varied instruments to distinguish between certain ideal-typical regimes defined by the liberalness or exclusivity of their settlement policies. Koopmans et al. (2005; 2012) offer a tool to measure the restrictiveness of nationality acquisition and cultural rights attribution during four time intervals across ten Western European states. Banting and Kymlicka’s Multiculturalism Policy Index (2006a, 2006b; see also Banting et al. 2011) attempts to measure the character and strength of multiculturalism policies in 21 OECD countries and across three time intervals (1980, 2000, 2010). The Migration Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) (Migration Policy Group 2006; 2011) considers broader integration policies in all European Union member states plus Australia, Norway, Switzerland, Canada and the United States for 2007 and 2010. Bauböck et al. (2006) employed standardized expert questionnaires to examine trends in the acquisition and loss of citizenship across 15 EU states between 1985 and

In the area of welfare state typology building, the work of Esping-Andersen (1990) is well established. In *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*, Esping-Andersen (1990) classically differentiates between liberal, corporatist and social democratic welfare states (see also Esping-Andersen 1999). A variety of indicators, including welfare usage rates are employed to measure social rights. Recent immigration scholarship employs the basic Esping-Andersen rubric to analyse the social rights of immigrants in particular. This includes most notably Sainsbury’s (2006) work that analyses immigrant welfare entitlements, as compared with long-term residents and citizens, according to visa categories. Others also apply the Esping-Andersen typology, although with less detailed differentiation across different visa categories (Doomernik and Jandl 2008; Geddes 2003, 151-161; Geddes 2005; Menz 2006; Morissens and Sainsbury 2006). All of these studies remain small-N and generally, are situated within the field of social policy and welfare, rather than the field of immigration. None include non-Western nations, and most focus on Western Europe (see Koning and Banting 2010). There is significant scope for a new welfare-immigration typology of the scope of Esping-Andersen’s original work. As these typologies fall more squarely within the welfare rather than immigration field, we do not include them in Table 1. Having set out these features of the existing typologies, we now turn to our critiques of the field as it stands.
Critiques of Existing Migration Regime Typologies

A Western Democratic Focus

The most glaring shortcoming of contemporary migration policy regime typologies is a general reluctance to include non-OECD countries in the analysis. As is clear from the analysis in Table 1, with only one exception (Segal et al, 2010), only Western democracies and often, only Western European nations, are considered. Migration to non-OECD states accounts for a significant share of existing global migration stock. While Ratha and Shaw (2007, 5) estimate immigration to developing countries to comprise around 41 per cent of immigration movement (flows), Özden et al (2009, 20) show that South-South migration, as it is known, makes up 48 per cent of existing global migration stock. As such, non-OECD states in the Global South now contain approximately half of all migrants (Ibid). From Tables 2 and 3, we can see that states with the largest absolute stocks and the largest stock as a proportion of total populations are not only traditional, Western destination states. Indeed, Russia and Saudi Arabia are among the top four in absolute stock, while India and Ukraine are in the top ten. When stock is analysed as a proportion of states’ national population, each of the ten states with the highest proportion are non-OECD states. The top four are Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Jordan. In particular, the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA 2009: 20) has found that the United Arab Emirates has had a near 16 per cent rate of growth in international migrant stock between 1960 and 2005 (See Baldwin-Edwards 2007). It is also worth noting that while DESA suggests that China has one of the

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3 Dumbravă 2007 considers Eastern European nations in his analysis of citizenship policy and in doing so identifies some of the issues of selection bias in only focusing on Western European nations.

4 Although Özden et al. write that South–South migration is declining as a proportion of total world migration (from 61% in 1960 to 48% in 2000), they explain that “when the migrant-creating effects of South Asia and the Soviet Union are factored in, ...South–South migration remains stable over the period.” Yet, their definition of south-south migration does not include intra-Soviet, intra-Russian or intra-Indian sub-continental migration, at the regional level; as distinct from internal migration that is not included in any case.
world’s smallest migrant populations as a proportion of its populace, China’s Ministry of Public Security and the Bureau of Exit and Entry (2011) reports that there are 493,139 foreigners currently resident in the mainland as of 2009—a number arguably substantial enough to merit the examination of China as a case of migration governance.

As many new immigration-receiving states are non-democratic, observers must recreate frameworks of analysis beyond existing regime typologies that are democratic-state centric. In many of these states, the civic contract between polity and constitutive member may be better characterised as an ad hoc economic exchange of required labor for financial compensation. The absence of generally applicable rights regimes complicates analytical frameworks that treat migrants as more than just “a pair of hands.” Instead, human labor may have become commoditised and portable in the same way as raw materials—governed by specific rules of trade, unfettered by human rights standards. Such states may also incentivise or otherwise facilitate alternative forms of human migration—migration to one state in order to reach another (incremental migration), migration with self-imposed temporariness (circular migration) and migration with a length of stay subject to government/private sector whims (ad hoc labour migration).

With regards to the central issues of naturalisation and settlement, as authoritarian and autocratic states often sustain power through charismatic nationalism or the structural privileging of certain nationals, they may be less likely to foster inclusive national identities that change according to demographic compositional shifts. As such, a lingering question is whether there is a Fukayama-esque teleology towards a settler state model at all, as suggested by Freeman (1995), or whether quite separate paths are discernible, particularly in this age where migration is no longer only a
South-to-North, periphery to core phenomenon. These contentions need to be explored empirically. To do so, researchers must consider the broadly democratic nature of an immigration regime—whether the migration regime is located within democratic or non-democratic modes of governance.

Economic and demographic trends suggest that South-South migration will become more important over the course of the twenty-first century. As world economic growth shifts towards China, India, the United Arab Emirates, Brazil and Turkey, and as countries outside the OECD adopt the same demographic trends of population ageing evident within the OECD, we can expect concomitant shifts in migration outcomes. In fact, the United Nations (UN) makes clear that the rate of population ageing in key developing nations such as China is greater than that of developed nations, rendering the necessary labor market adaptations faster (UN 2009, ix). As such, it is likely that over the twenty-first century immigration will become a central mechanism to maintain labor supply and former developing world.

That said an interest in policy outcomes across developed and developing states is not unproblematic. Due to the fact that states—particularly in the global South—measure the scope and character of their migration profile in different ways, the consideration of migration outcomes across a broad range of countries is methodologically challenging. The incongruence between policy creation and actual policy implementation in non-Western countries, coupled with challenges of data availability, has potentially deterred many scholars from focusing on the developing world (see GFMD 2012: 11). These challenges may also explain a Western and OECD bias in the existing

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5 Defined by Solimano (2010, 4) as non-OECD countries. While we realise that the Global South currently features some of the most quickly developing economies, we prefer the “North”/“South” dichotomy as it reflects the conventional dichotomy that has defined immigration scholarship until now.
comparative analysis of global migration. Up until now, the scope of earlier works’ has been limited to developed countries that maintain statistical data of comparable quality. Future studies will need to overcome these data hurdles in order to incorporate these emerging and immigration states.

**Unclear Indicators**

Typologies are only as comprehensive and reflective as the indicators of which they are comprised. As Collier and collaborators (2012, 222-3) note in their appraisal of typologies, clearly defined dimensions of a typology are essential in order to maximise the utility and validity of typologies as a social science method. “Row and column variables”, or the dimensions that sit under the overarching concept, need to be clearly articulated in any typology (Collier 2012, 22). As the “methods and variables” column within Table 1 clarifies, a central shortcoming of many existing migration regimes typologies is that the column variable—the policy outcome or output of the migration regime—is not always clearly defined or operationalised. First, with the exception of the existing citizenship and integration literature, these typologies often do not clarify their indicators of comparison. For example, Freeman (1995) does not identify whether the variable(s) of interest are the size of immigration intake, the composition of such migration, the visa categories for immigration, the temporary/permanent divide, or the rights accrued following settlement. It is necessary to disentangle these various features of migration regimes because otherwise the “building blocks” of a typology are unclear (Collier et al 2012, 224). Second, existing typologies often do not adequately explain decisions around the aggregation of these variables, at the same time presuming single umbrella terms – such as “settler states”, “continental European states” or “former emigration states.” As Finotelli and Michalowski (2012, 234) note, the consolidation of complex and seemingly divergent policies into broader national models “can impede a nuanced
measure of internal differences, rather than helping to empirically compare them” (citing Bader 2007, 875-6). In fact, the question of how aggregation is undertaken, and whether it is even possible, is a primary methodological step that demands far greater attention. Third, existing typologies generally provide little insight about borderline cases that might be classified in a variety of groupings, or in a middle point along a continuum. This may relate to the discussed tendency to develop country-based typologies rather than typologies along other columns variables, such as the visa mode of selection (see only Freeman 2006).

In the field of citizenship and integration, indicators are significantly clearer. Contemporary scholars have coded extensive policy output data to develop typologies and indices of different national approaches, along with inferential arguments based on this data. Howard (2009), and Goodman (2010) code citizenship and civic integration policy (respectively) according to selected policy indicators as collected in larger databases. Banting and Kymlicka (2011) code specific policies of immigrant diversity accommodation, which they deem to be reflective (and constitutive) of states’ approaches to multiculturalism. Similarly, the Migration Policy Group (2011) and its collaborators solicit legal experts to code policies related to a range of integration approaches.

However, admission and settlement regime classifications would both benefit from indicators based on observable policy outcomes, rather than focusing on policies themselves, which is the emphasis within most of the typologies reviewed in Table 1. There are a number of reasons why at this stage a focus on migration outcomes may be preferable in the development of migration output typologies. First, attempts to synthesise specific policy outputs are currently underway (EUDO 2011; IMPALA 2011; Migration Policy Group 2011) but at this point, the most comparable cross-
national data is on policy outcomes, not policy outputs. Second, outcomes reflect what happens “on
the ground”—the reality as experienced by migrants and citizens. While we could otherwise
examine the *de jure* policy outputs, these do not reflect actual *de facto* circumstances (Money 1999,
22). In this way, outcome data may be used to triangulate and confirm observations based solely on
policy outputs. Indeed, examining policy outcomes in many cases allows the researcher to avoid
validity challenges that emerge over how policy outputs ought to be measured. This is especially
true in non-democratic states where regulation is frequently either unenforced, or implemented in
varied ways that do not always mirror laws and policies.

*The Immigration–Integration Policy Nexus*

Moving on to this third critique, current typologies tend to examine several admission or integration
outcomes in isolation. This has led to partial renderings of migration regimes. Yet, consideration of
migration policy variation based exclusively on one measurement is not that different from
considerations of economic policy based exclusively on trade policy. Indeed, many capitalist states
have protectionist trade policies, but are otherwise quite different in other aspects (such as
redistribution, regulation or fiscal spending). These factors in turn alter the taxonomy of trade
regimes (Rodriguez and Rodrik, 2000). Similarly, we argue that social scientists must consciously
work to build more comprehensive classifications of migration policy outcomes that allow
researchers to consider complimentary or contradictory outcomes together. Until now, we neither
know how different outcomes work with each other, nor what varieties of national migration
regimes exist, once both admission and integration/citizenship are considered in tandem.

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6 For example, Howard (2009: 24) uses naturalization rates as a “correction” that accounts “for the potential problem of
a country appearing to have a very inclusive naturalization policy, but in reality – whether due to administrative
‘discretion’ or other barriers or disincentives – being much more restrictive in practice.” Koopmans et al. (2005: 38;
2010: 8 note 5) does the same. This demonstrates the reluctance of researchers to take outputs at face value.
Chief among these under-explored interactions is the nexus between selection (or admission) policies and settlement (or integration) policies. Some may dispute attempts to combine measures of immigration selection (i.e. immigration scope, admission criteria, immigration composition, reliance on temporary migration) with measures of settlement (i.e. naturalization, and immigrant stock size, integration policies). As noted above, as early as Hammar (1985: 272-276), immigration scholars have generally distinguished between immigration control policies, on the one hand, and integration policies, on the other. As such, the two stages have often been treated separately, as is reflected in Table 1 above.

For a number of reasons, we believe that it is essential that both immigration and settlement dimensions be incorporated into typologies of migration regimes in order to appraise and acknowledge the extent of such an “immigration-integration nexus”. First, there is reason to believe that integration policies could constitute a source of pull factors for immigration flows (Thielemann 2007). As such, the latter may inform the former. Second, there may also be a trade-off between the scale of immigration and the approach towards settlement rights issues, such as naturalisation (as argued by Ruhs and Martin 2008). This reflects what several American scholars have referred to as a “grand bargain” (e.g. Cornelius et al. 2004; Papademetriou 2002) whereby liberal and restrictive policymakers exchange facilitative naturalisation and incorporation regimes for tight border enforcement. Finally, in terms of practical policies, it is clear that state policy-makers do make links between immigration entry and settlement. Certain types of migrants may be selected because it is anticipated that they will better integrate into the existing polity. It fact, this argument is common in the debates over, and preference, for skilled immigration, which is seen to place fewer burdens upon
future public goods than other migrant categories (Borjas 1999; Doomernik et al 2009; Hawthorne 2008). As such, there are strong arguments for the development of typologies that combine the two dimensions of immigration.

**Prospectus: Steps Forward**

This article demonstrates that migration regime typologies remain significantly under-theorised and under-specified. The current focus on Western, largely democratic, migration regime typologies characterises a field of scholarship that, to a large degree, lacks a common category for analysis; lacks clear variables for assessment of the various components of the category; does not consider how, if at all, these variables can fit together in a systematic way; does not generally account for migration and settlement into non-democratic and non-Western states; and does not attempt to build a common conceptual framework across the different dimensions of migration and naturalisation policies cross-nationally. This critique is not intended as exhaustive. Other arguments can also be leveled at the shortcomings of existent regimes, such as a tendency towards point-in-time analysis, and an under-recognition of temporality (Finotelli and Michalowski 2012: 234). We have not considered this issue of temporality in detail. However, we believe that this article nonetheless addresses many of the key limitations with existing migration typologies in a comprehensive manner.

A central agenda is to consider how different variables of immigrant regimes interact with each other and relate to each other within countries, as well as across them. Do countries cluster similarly according to these different dimensions, allowing us to speak of a single migration regime typology? Or is there variation in clusters across the various outcomes identified above, suggesting
instead at a number of typologies? What is the relationship between admission and settlement regimes? This critique is intended to create the space for progressive steps toward developing a new typology, or new typologies, of migration regimes that would facilitate the pursuit of answers to these questions. A first step forward would consider the broadly democratic nature of an immigration regime—whether the migration regime has democratic or non-democratic modes of governance. Although no existing measure of democracy is without fault (Coppedge and Gerring et al, 2011), levels can be measured using both Freedom House and Polity IV instruments. A second step forward would identify outcomes central to the character of national immigration policy regimes. Such outcomes might include variables such as (i) the scale of immigration entry into a country; (ii) the compositional mix of immigration flows (economic, family, humanitarian); (iii) the proportion of immigrants that are temporary or permanent in their status to capture the temporality of migratory presence in a nation; (iv) the extent of migrant stock proportionate to general population size; and, associated with this, (v) the rate of naturalisation of migrants born outside the host society. It is important to recognise that variation in these outcomes will be a product of not only government policies of immigrant states, but also a variety of other factors that migration scholars have identified, such as push factors, markets, individual migrant agency and national historical and cultural legacies. This list would allow a third progressive step, one toward a more holistic approach to regime characterisation and classification that considers immigration (admissions) policy outcomes alongside integration (settlement) policy outcomes. Such an approach would allow the possible immigration-integration nexus, identified above, to be explored in more detail.
That this review is merited reflects the fledgling nature of migration studies, which still remains in its adolescence relative to other social scientific endeavours, such as the study of democratic variation (see Coppedge and Gerring 2011). By responding to our critiques and the progressive steps we outline, future undertakings may develop more comprehensive, informed and systematic approaches to the study of migration regimes that pushes the state of the art forward.

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